Marx's historical theory - Essay Example

Marx’s Theory of History Introduction In the groundbreaking book ,The Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels begin with the assertion that class struggles are integral in defining the existing society. This forms the basis of understanding Marx’s concept of history. According to Marx, the outline of history has two dimensions of linear chain events: a consistent progress in class division, created and overthrown in subsequent order, until it reaches a utopian endpoint, or communism. In the book, Marx argues that the history of humans occurs in a teleological order, unfolding to a distinct series of stages, each subsequent to the other(Blackledge, 2006:101). Ultimately, these stages lead to a certain utopian endpoint, which marks the end of the changes and an end to history. In his perception, Marx believed that thesescientific laws could allow the prediction of these stages, as the scientific laws governs the progress of history. Class struggle, in Marx’s perception, determines human history. Therefore, the primary reason for historical changes is class animosity. Accordingly, societies are based on antagonism of the oppressed and oppressing classes. Thus, history is definable at any one time by the relationship between the different classes. In other words, the theory seeks to establish the premise of the materialistic methods in relation to humans’ production to satisfy material needs.The satisfaction of human needs give rise to new needs of social and materialistic nature, forming a society that corresponds to the forces of human production development(Shimp, 2009:7). In this regard therefore, material life determines or conditions social life, thus social explanations emanate from materialism to social forms, and ultimately to forms of consciousness. As production means develops, economic structures or production modes rise and fall. According to Marx, communism may possibly become real as the workers become aware of alternatives, motivating them to initiate reforms. In his reinterpretation of the theory of history by Marx, Gerald Cohen created the development thesis, which states that production forces develop, becoming stronger over time. However, the thesis clarifies that the development is not absolute, but rather a tendency. Together with productively applicable technology and knowledge, these forces are production means(Cohen, 2000:176). The primacy thesis is Cohen’s next thesis. The latter has two important aspects: first, the productive forces level of development may explain the nature of the structure of the economy, and second, the nature of the structure of the economy explains the nature of the superstructure. From these observations, it is evident that Marx believes that the economic structure of a society may explain the nature of societal ideology, such as moral, artistic, philosophical, and religious beliefs within the confines of the society. It is indeed possible for various activities to combine aspects of ideology and superstructure simultaneously. A prime example is religion, which combines both a set of beliefs and institutions. Scholars argue that revolutionary changes occur naturally from the failure of further development of productive forces. At the revolution point, the development of productive forces is fettered. Drawing from the theory, once development fetters in an economic structure, another structure will eventually replace it. It is reasonable that human productivity develops over time, and also that structures of economy only exist insofar as they develop the forces of production, but are ultimately replaced when they fail their duty of development(Stanford). Nonetheless, Marx’s theory of history has come under criticism, primarily for its incoherence, as well as lack of projection and empirical evidence. Criticism There are various forms of criticism against Marx’s theory of history, including claims of incoherence, lack of evidence and projection. These three categories result from the fact that the aspects and principles of the theory scatter across Marx’s work. According to them, the theory is incoherent because Marx and Engel did not dedicate enough materials in indicating how the communist economy would practically function, thus leaving a negative ideology on socialism(Shimp, 2009:12). Others argue that the class analysis has flaws as this criterion is not the most fundamental inequality in the history. Moreover, there is lack of evidence to support Marx’s argument of social or class evolution. Incoherence Yet others argue that lacks to fulfill rigor scientifically. They argue that the theory is initially scientific, but eventually degenerates into dogma and pseudoscience as predictions did not occur, as well as the ad hoc adaptations and revisions made to concur with the facts. They further argue that between the utopian socialists and Marx, the former was more scientific since it applied scientific principles, experiments, testing, and hypothesis. Marx’s theory is therefore an untestable and unscientific prophecy. The most common criticism, however, concerns evidence for the end of history. The critics argue that the world has been experiencing the spread of liberal democracy, with an apparent lack of revolutionary movements indicate that social democracy or capitalism may perhaps be the last human government form, rather than communism or Marxism(Blackledge, 2006:111). Scholars classify these arguments under three dominant classes: incoherence, lack of evidence and projection.Since incoherence is the most significant criticism challenging theories, thus the focus for this paper. The Individuation Problem Incoherence criticisms fall under two main classes: the multidirectional causation and the individuation problem. From the analysis of Marx’s theory of history, it is evident that he perceived social factors as relations even with physical objects. From his discussion, the worker’s person, real products, and machines are elements of certain social relation. For instance, we learn that capital is a production instrument, past personal labor. According to such perception by Marx, it then follows that every component is a relation in its own right. Thus, Marx conceives all things as relations. We may thus argue that Marx did not address issues raised by materialist contents in his internal relations philosophy. Insofar as his relational view operated successfully, Marx did not prioritize defense and elaboration of his theory(Stanford). Such were the concerns of Engels, especially with his works on physical sciences. Nonetheless, this creates a legitimate concern on whether the unity posited by the relation concept precludes the existence of the separate structures that allegedly constitute the unity. In essence, this is the problem of abstraction or individuation, and depicts a major challenge towards the acceptability of the theory of history by Marx. Cohen provides a solution to the individuation problem by highlighting what may occur in individuation and what actually occurs. According to Cohen, the real world comprises of sense perceptible qualities in an infinite number, and whose interdependence unites them to a whole. Applying these relational concepts to social factors and things, then there is a possibility of applying the same concept to qualities. However, the linking process may halt at a given point between the whole and the individual quality, thus the dividing the former into further distinct parts becomes endless(Stanford). One possible outcome is that a thing may be perceived as an attribute or quality of another thing. It follows that a quality or attribute may be a thing, and a thing may be an attribute: thus the limit line is relative. According to Cohen, the solution to the individuation theoretical problem is successfully solved by the daily practice by people, such as enjoying their right(Cohen, 2000:253).Cohen presents some arguments in defense of Marx’s aspects of history. He first states that the superstructure refers to all economic institutions as well as all non-economic institutions explainable by the economic structure nature. But since we may explain non-economic institutions by the economic structure nature, it follows that non-economic institutions are predominantly superstructures(Cohen, 2000:265). In essence, economic structures comprise of productions relations. However, economic structures are explanatory and different from the superstructure. Moreover, law is an element of the superstructure, and finally, legal terms define production relations, especially with reference to property and productive forces rights. Cohen does not consider himself with fact that these individuals do not fully comprehend their practices as individuating distinct parts of an interconnected, as it is a different concern. People’s conceptualizing activity, as it operates with real sense material, gives particular “things” to the world that the people see in it, and this is the only concern for Cohen. His functional solution suggests how structures may exist within the confines of internal relations philosophy, a concept that majority of scholars consider not possible. Nonetheless, there is a vague and necessary correlation between structures from our conception and broad similarities given that individuation is not arbitrary but rather governed by such similarities existent in nature. In essence, this is how the study of conceptual schemes presents the realities of the world, whether focused on internal relations philosophy or not. The fact that Marx’s study of capitalism primarily focuses on social relations as essential does not necessarily conflicts the underlying concept that every part relationally incorporates independence ties to all other things(Shimp, 2009:33). Some ties may have preference, or perceived as forming some structures is not any different from the conceptualization of individuation acts, with real resemblance. The Multi-Directional Causation The multi-directional causation problem is the more pressing of the two subparts. According to a wing of scholars, the historical materialism has inconsistencies, especially between claims by Marx (which seems to utilize economic structure primacy to explain productive forces development) and the explanatory primacy of productive forces. For instance, Marx argues that without the regular revolution of the production instruments, the bourgeoisie cannot exist(Stanford). Consequently, this appears to develop explanatory and causal primacy to capitalism, bringing the development of productive forces. This results to a contradiction, because the development of productive forces and the economic structure have priority explanations over each other. Cohen provides functional explanation as a defense. The most important idea is to acknowledge that economic structures develops productive forces, and that according to the theory, is what capitalism is all about. In other words, the failure of capitalism will eventually lead to its disappearance. This fits with the aspects of historical materialism. Marx asserts that the failure of an economic structure to develop forces of production, or when it fetters factors of production, there will be a revolution and the era will definitely change. In this regard therefore, the idea of failure or fettering becomes an integral part of functional explanation theory. In essence, failure is the result of a dysfunctional economic structure(Stanford). This argument, by all standards, seems plausible. However, this raises several questions. First, can we consider functional explanation as a device to test methodological coherence? Second, why do economic structures persist insofar as they develop forces of production? Why do they diminish after failure? According to criticism by Jon Elster, arguing that there exists an agent whose primary purpose is development of productive forces as much as possible, then it would be reasonable for such an agent to select economic structures that perform well in future, thus intervenes the history. Nonetheless, Marx does create such assumptions of a metaphysical nature. Thus, Elster raises concern over the fact that the theory seems to appeal to historical purpose without the particularity of anyone(Elster, 1985:513). The counter criticism to this is that purpose does not need to be conscious or intentional. For instance, let us consider the mechanism for biological evolution such as natural selection. Birds develop bones with hollows to enable and assist them to carry out the flight function. Indeed, this is not an intervention of an agent, nor backwards causation, but rather an explanation for justification of an earlier adaption for later or future function(Shimp, 2009:25). In this regards therefore, the analogy would be incoherent if natural selection also occurred in economic structures. A complex causal loop feedback sustains these functional explanations, where the functional elements undergo filtration for competing with better and enhanced functioning elements.According to Cohen, such background accounts are elaborations and he further acknowledges that functional explanations require elaborations. Nonetheless, explanation for standard cause equally needs elaboration, but we momentarily pass them to be true. For instance, a person might feel satisfied with the explanation that the ceramic cup broke because it fell on the concrete floor(Elster, 1985:519). However, there is still a vast record of information required to explain why such an explanation is plausible. Therefore, Cohen argues that it is justifiable to offer a functional explanation despite the ignorance of the elaboration it requires. Before Charles Darwin, causal elaboration only appealed to God’s purposes. In his explanation of natural selection, Darwin provides a very plausible mechanism, but the lack of genetic theory renders his mechanism not elaborate enough to meet the criterion of a detailed account. Thus, out knowledge on this particular field remains incomplete to the present day. However, it does seem rational to claim that the hollow bones in birds are an adaption to facilitate the flight function(Blackledge, 2006:167). The point that Cohen tries to present is that the weight of evidence regarding the adaption of organisms to their environment would allow a pre-Darwinian atheist to justifiably declare this functional explanation. It thus follows that in the absence of a candidate elaboration, a person may justifiably offer a functional explanation given that the weight of the inductive evidence is adequate. At this point, we may divide this concern into empirical and theoretical categories. In the empirical category, the central concern is the concern for the evidence that forms of society only exist insofar as they develop the forces of production, and are consequently replaced by revolution in the instance of their failure. An individual, at this point, must acknowledge the fact that empirical record and evidence is very patchy, and there is evidence that there have been long periods of stagnation and regression but revolution of the dysfunctional economic structures did not take place(Stanford). In the theoretical category, the main concern is whether there exists a plausible explanation for elaboration exists to underpin the functional explanation of Marx’s theory. The problem, however, isin attempting to devise similar elaboration to those in Darwin’s tory, and appealing to natural selection and chance variation that ensure replication and survival of the fittest. “Fittest” in this case refers to the most viable form of economic structure capable of presiding over the development of the forces of production(Blackledge, 2006:198). Conceptually, chance variation would resemble the roles of people trying new forms of economic structures and relations. New economic structures, on this account, initially begin as experiments, but through developing the forces of production, become persistent and thrive. The environment of the gene, however, tends to be more influential to the success of the gene rather than the gene itself. Ideally, Marx intends to claim that the world will necessarily and eventually arrive at communism. Despite the vats previous knowledge of the evolution of life to adapt of its environment, we cannot provide an accurate prediction of what will pass and what will survive in the future. This, therefore, drives us to a problem. In order to maintain the analogy using natural selection as a functional explanation justification tool, we need to remain within the confines of the model that eventually makes the theory’s prediction unsound(Shimp, 2009:47). However, this is the very point that makes the theory predictable. There are two eminent problems with Cohen’s explanation. First, the forces of production (as he well knows) do not have an internal and inherent tendency to develop without improvement inducement. Previously, Cohen argued that the development tendency of the forces of production results from the rational imperative of humans in overcoming scarcity via innovations(Cohen, 2000:321). However, it may be because humans lack the natural inclination to innovation apart from external pressures and influences such as military competition. Second, Cohen corners himself by wrongly tying innovation to the development thesis, especially with reference to technological improvements. Functional Explanation To determine the tenability of functional explanation, we need to understand exactly what functional explanations are. In general, the functional explanation regarding the presence or nature of an item, such as behavior, is primarily an explanation that enlightens us on the presence of that than item because of a certain function in a suitable system. There have been several scholarly attempts to characterize the functions of items, with plausible distinction between the good consequence doctrine, the goal doctrine, and the explanation doctrine. Our case scenario coincides with the latter. The explanation doctrine can be summarily presented as: the main function of A is to carry out activity X, on the condition that A is present because it does X, and that X is a consequence of the presence of A. However, a penetrative and comprehensive discussion shows that none of the three categories is tenable without some prior adjustments and modifications. Therefore, the tenability of functional explanation as well as the functional explanation concept may apply to Marx’s theory of history provided that there are some adjustments in the aspects and principles of the theory(Stanford). Conclusion From Karl Marx’s point of view, class struggles form the basis of human history. Marx perceives that the history of human unfolds in a teleological order, unfolding in distinct historical and subsequent stages. These stages, however, ultimately result to a utopian endpoint, which marks the end of history. According to Marx, we may be able to forecast these changes using scientific laws because they govern the progress of history. Using the class struggle concept, Marx argues that feudalism will replace bourgeois capitalism, and bourgeois capitalism will give way to proletarian rule. However, these changes do not occur as results of random political, social, or economic events, but rather in predictable linear succession(Blackledge, 2006:203). However, Marx theory has come under heavy criticism, with accusations for lack of coherence, empirical evidence and projection. The fact that incoherence is the most significant challenge of all theories, incoherence criticisms was the central focus of the paper. The paper also explored the arguments put forth by Cohen to defend Marx’s theory of history. Cohen provides a comprehensive defense against the two common criticisms under the incoherence accusation: multidirectional causation and individuation problems. In defense of the latter, Cohen applies the aspects of base and superstructure, as well as powers and rights(Cohen, 2000:309). For the former, he uses functional explanations to defend the principles of the theory. Worth noting, however, is that the functional explanations are rather not tenable without prior modifications or changes to ensure they suit the real world. Bibliography Blackledge, P., 2006. Reflections on the Marxist Theory of History. Manchester: Manchester UP. Cohen, G. A., 2000. Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense. New York: Oxford UP. Elster, J., 1985. Making Sense of Marx. Cambridge, Cambridge UP. Shimp, K., 2009. The Validity of Karl Marx’s Theory of Historical Materialism. Available from: http://business.uni.edu/economics/Themes/shimp.pdf [Accessed March 30, 2012] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Karl Marx. Available from: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/marx/ [Accessed March 30, 2012] Read More