Naturalized Epistemology - Term Paper Example

?Naturalized Epistemology Introduction The question for certainty and truth has long been part of humanity’s quest for answers to some basic questions that people normally possess. Perhaps, some of these questions may include how do I know that I know x? At first glance, the questions appear to be rhetorical. However, upon closer look and reflection on the question there are three interrelated elements. First, there is an I who claims to know. This means that the ‘I’ possesses some inherent attributes that enables it to ‘know’. Then, second, there is ‘x’ that can be known. This implies that ‘x’ is in such context or state that the possibility of ‘x’ being known is increased. Finally, third, the question of certainty, which is highlighted by the question by the question ‘how do I know that I know x? In the face of such questions, can it be hold that certainty is something that eludes humanity since the basis for the certainty of what people may claim to know is not stable and solid. In fact, some modern philosophers have asserted the supposition that maybe there is an evil demon that is playing a trick on us making people believe that x can be known when in fact, it is not. Nonetheless, what is vital in this scenario is that epistemology has been considered as humanity’s response to uncertainty as presented by the malum genie. In this sense, epistemology has become field that sought to eliminate uncertainty by providing the solid ground wherein one may claim with certainty that one has a knowledge of X. Is this quest of epistemology significant? Coming from a common perspective, the certainty of what we may claim to know is vital in the relationship with our claims regarding the world and the ensuing empirical claims, in which, scientific knowledge is claimed to be anchored. Unfortunately, epistemology is still in the process of discourse how can people justify what they claim they know even if the ultimate goal of epistemology is to provide the certainty that what proceeds from our claims about the world are in fact rooted in that experienced of the world. In this condition, Quine argues for the futility of the epistemological quest for certainty and affords a re-framing of epistemology, belief, justification and knowledge. In this regard, this paper have the following structure. The first part of the paper will deal with the arguments raise by Quine against the epistemological goal of certainty and his proposal regarding what ought to be done to epistemology. Meanwhile, the second part deals with the criticisms against Quine’s position. The third part will be the exposition of the researcher’s view regarding the debate. Finally, the last section is the conclusion. Hopefully, in the end a clearer understanding of both sides is attained. On Quine Quine’s counter-arguments regarding achieving certainty through epistemology is grounded on the position that Arithmetic itself, which has long been considered as certain because of its deductive method has been proven to be incomplete by Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem (71). Creating a parallel argument, Quine claims that since arithmetic itself which is considered as certain because of the rigors of deduction has been proven to be incapable of being grounded or fully justified, how much more is epistemology whose knowledge claims are built on induction. This is a very important criticism against the certainty of epistemology which is grounded on induction and the “Humean Predicament” is the counter –arguments against induction. This asserts that no theory can be derived from mere observation. Primarily because there is no way that the validity of the observation is transferred to the theory derived from it. In the same sense, Quine is raising the argument that if arithmetic itself is something that cannot be validly deduced from the theorems themselves, which is already a close system, how much more are the epistemological claims made about the world. In this regard, both conceptual reduction and doctrinal reduction are rendered ineffectual as they suffer the same condition as arithmetic. How? Conceptual reduction is terms that are referring to the phenomenal features of sensory experience and of which theories of science belongs. The clarity of the terms under conceptual reduction is attained via the connection of the existing definitions. On the other hand, doctrinal reduction refers truths about the world which are based on the truth of sensory experience which are justified by induction. In this condition, epistemology cannot provide solid justification or ground for continued belief on empirical knowledge claims axiomatic systems are incomplete or inconsistent as shown by Godel or truths derived via induction is not freed from Humean Predicament. In this context, is there way for epistemology to continue its quest. According to Quine (74-75), The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology? Such a surrender of the epistemological burden to psychology is a move that was disallowed in earlier times as circular reasoning. If the epistemologist's goal is validation of the grounds of empirical science, he defeats his purpose by using psychology or other empirical science in the validation. However, such scruples against circularity have little point once we have stopped dreaming of deducing science from observation. If we are out simply to understand the link between observation and science, we are well advised to use any available information, including that provided by the very science whose link with observation we are seeking to understand. Quine, in effect, is asking the epistemologist to remove the illusion that one can find grounds for belief. Instead of focusing the attention in the search for the justification of the belief, epistemologist should start asking ‘how can one move from sensory experience to belief?’ In this regard, Quine is setting new paradigm for epistemology. This is claim based on the premise that Quine’s proposal no longer looks for the foundation of knowledge or the ground for its justification, rather, what he is proposing is a search for the description and the causal connection among the sensory experiences. This proposal asserts epistemologist should stop validating what they claim to know and just look on the psychological factor enabling people to undergo cognitive processes. The question for epistemology is no longer how do I know that I know? But it is transformed into how I know? As such, epistemology becomes a chapter of psychology. Quine’s position is a move away from traditional epistemology whihc addresses the question how knowledge is attained and what exactly are those things that may qualify as knowledge. He rejects the whole process of justification of knowledge as futile. Alternatively, Quine is saying that epistemology should be part of psychology, a law-predictive explanatory empirical science (Kim 389), with the main focus of understanding resting on the question how does the human cognizers develop a picture of the world. As such, epistemology is naturalized, removes from philosophy and placed under psychology which is a natural science. Criticisms Studying the Quine’s regarding the psychology or the cognitive processes behind knowing is a worthwhile endeavor. As it will help humanity gain a better understanding of their cognitive processes. However, there are certain gaps in the arguments of Quine against epistemology that asserts the need for normative standards of justification. The first criticism against Quine’s proposal is the very same argument against Cartesian mentalism. Cartesian foundationalism holds at the centre of knowing is the first person indubitable account of what can be known. However, how can a person understand the account if it is something personal. In the same way, if the intention is to understand how human cognizers develop a picture of the world, then what can be ascertained are descriptions of the process and correlations, but not the why and what is knowledge? Of course, others may claim that the entire point of Quine is not to ask why knowledge and what is knowledge. Rather, how does the experience move to belief, but that is the whole point. A different set of language is being used in order to frame the questions of knowledge, but if it is broken to, its miniscule part how does sensory experience become parts of belief is also looking at how does one know that she/he knows. Likewise, has been observed that Quine is searching for the possible causal connection. Unfortunately, causal connection also falls under the Humean predicament. Hume claims that in reality there is no causal connection. It is just because the mind has been used in seeing A before B that is why it claims that A. is the cause of B. For Hume, it is imagination and there are certain conditions that have programmed the brain to see causal even when there is none. These conditions are contiguity in space and time, resemblance, and habit. Another criticism against Quine is that in his claim of futility of the effort in search for the normative justification that validates belief, he is not saying that we should give up on the Cartesian frame (Kim 1988). It creates as question as to the motive of just leaving it. Is it because it is really futile or is because the underlying concepts may be used in order to forward the causal connection between cognitive processes and belief. In addition, by merely recognizing the cognitive processes that happen as the sensory experience happen and become belief, it fails to account for rationality of the cogniser (Kim 392). The human person is not just cognitive processes. Then, suddenly the sensory experience becomes a belief. The context, the condition and other attributes of the human person is already transcribed into the belief. The person sifts the information selects only those which have been valued and those which are not significant are often discarded. The researcher believes that human beings are not mere passive receivers’ of data. The actual cognitive process is not performed in a vacuum. It is influenced by numerous factors ranging from social status, age religion and other important factors that influence the person. As such, belief in itself is not just sensory experience. It is a whole gamut of experience, conditioning, context and gender. Another point that has been raised against naturalized epistemology is that the question of Quine ‘how does one move from sensory experience to belief? is one of the many questions under epistemology. However, it is not the main question of epistemology. It is the question of justification. When Quine choose to address one of the many secondary questions in epistemology, is he giving up on what he claims is futile enterprise. This is being raised because Quine does not provide a solid ground in why we should not have normative concepts of justification. However, others can say the Incompleteness Theory of Godel manifest the inconsistency of axiomatic system. Considering this situation, another question can be raised, is a closed axiomatic system necessary for belief? Of course, epistemologists have come up with all the axiomatic systems that they can think of in order to justify and validate belief. Nonetheless, in day-to–day interactions with other human beings, is it useful? Finally, Quine committed the straw man fallacy. He was attacking Cartesian foundationalism and there is the view that it is filled loopholes that it is easy to attack. He should have attacked stronger versions of foundationalism. My Position Sometimes, when people discuss epistemology, one knows that one is discussing pure philosophy. However, the question is, is there a pure philosophy? Is not it that our experiences of life have propelled us to look into life and become philosophical. In this context, I would like to support Quine in his proposal regarding removing epistemology from philosophy and placing it as a chapter in psychology. In fact, I would suggest that it should be placed under neuroscience. Since, that is what they are studying, how are sensory experience being process by the brain. Seriously, I believe that Quine is raising a serious counter-argument against epistemology. Since, by re-framing the question of epistemology how does my sensory experience move and become belief? He re-orders the position in knowing. What happens under Quine’s proposal is that there is the sensory experience and then there is belief. It does not presuppose the existence of a rational person who can sift through all the sensory experience and in that mere filtering of experience there is the manifestation of rationality, of valuing. In this regard, there are already many assumptions attributed to men as they try to justify what they claim they know. As such, I believe that Quine’s proposal is cognizant of the natural order of how can we know? This has strong repercussion in women knowing. As soon as the question of rationality id removed from the discourse of epistemology then women’s claims regarding their own sensory experience becomes a legitimate epistemological claim. Another reason why I claim that Quine is correct in his proposal in the sense that his proposal offers not only a better description of world or a better causal connection, but it also provides a better understanding of our humanity. Basically, science is about the description of the world. However, since epistemology has been closely associated with truth claims under scientific claims, it ceases to be about the world, but it has become more of why the world is like this. Quine, by proposing a naturalized epistemology, has asked that epistemology be stripped of what it cannot have, normative concepts of justification. Likewise, with the propose naturalized epistemology, humanity has become closer to what it claims to know - my sensory experiences. This creates a paradigm in which humanity may approach understanding of what it takes to be a human person. Conclusion The quest for knowledge has been largely a search for certainty, for justification and validity. However, Quine has raised the proposal of leaving behind traditional epistemology, accept the futility of the search for certainty, and remove epistemology in philosophy and placed it as a chapter under psychology. Quine’s proposal removed epistemology from its pedestal. However, his claims regarding epistemology should help humanity realized what really is knowledge and where is our quest for knowledge leading us. The deconstruction of the nature of epistemology that Quine proposes establishes a new paradigm for knowledge. It may offer a possibility for some and quandary for others. Nonetheless, the reframing of the question how do I know that I know x? to how my sensory experience move to become a belief? is not a difference in the kind of question asked in epistemology, but a shift in the focus of the question – from value laden questions pertinent to knowledge to real questions regarding how can we know. In the end, the challenge of Quine’s naturalized epistemology to traditional epistemology is a relief from the burden of justification. References Kim, Jaegwon. “What is Naturalized Epistemology?” Philosophical Perspectives 2 Epistemology (1988): 381 – 405. Quine, W.V. Naturalizing Epistemology. MIT/Bradford: Cambridge: 1985. Read More