Free Will, Determinism and Moral Responsibility - Term Paper Example

?(In)Compatabilism: Free Will, Determinism and Moral Responsibility Introduction To all individuals belongs a free will or the unique ability to control their actions. Free will is directly connected to two other vital philosophical concepts: freedom of action and moral accountability. In other words, a person who has free will is able to choose his or her route of action without coercion. Not only human beings, but also animals have a measure of free will that they exercise. This fact adds fire to the discussion since typically, only human beings are thought to possess free will1. This philosophic research study delves into the theories of free will, determinism, and moral responsibility and shows the relationships, exceptions and disparities among them, primarily within the frame work of compatibilism and incompatibilism. Free Will in Context Over the years, an ongoing controversial debate has kindled concerning the nature of free will. On one hand, free will can be defined as an ability that an individual harnesses or on the other, free will can be constructed as a possession inherent in a person. The reasoning faculty of humans facilitates and empowers free will. Causal events are attributed to the exercise and natural outcomes of free will. If rational human actions are assumed to arise from free will, then that would mean that free will is contingent on those events. That position leads to the belief that a person acting freely essentially manifests the working of his or her free will (Van Inwagen 1983). The implications of free will are moral responsibility, legal accountability and self-determinism.2 Self-determinism is a principle founded on free will and self-influenced decision and action. In religion, the possession and exercise of free will places man in a position to either follow the divine will or go against it. Free will makes man liable for his choices and answerable to an authority. Free will also frees man to a certain extent from passivity of man, seing that he is characterized an active moral agent who can make changes in his life and that of others. Philosopher Thomas Hobbes asserts this theory by stating that all free-willed actions are based or influenced by external factors compelling an individual to act. However, one might dispute this approach because these actions are spurred by two distinct types of freedom: freedom of will and freedom of action. The disparity between freedom of will and freedom of action in the context of causality is underlined by the fact that agents can have free will but no freedom of action.3 For example, if a person wants to go to the store and buy an item at the mall, he or she is free to do so. However, if the said individual is tied fast to a chair or does not have the money to buy anything, these conditions directly hinder his liberty to act on his free will. The individual still has the free will to steal the item or attempt to break free from restraint. According to Hobbes’ theory, external factors such as the person’s pressing necessity for that item or someone else’s request have influenced the individual to come to the decision to go to the mall. In both cases, the individual retains the free will to execute the action, nevertheless agencies outside the individual’s control impacts on the final outcome. The fundamental question here is the leveling of responsibility at an individual for actions arising not from his own free will, but from exterior environmental factors over which he has no control. The simple answer would be these individuals are not responsible for their actions, however unpopular this view may be. If one were to introduce a system of reward and punishment to instigate or control action, then, no one can be praised or blamed owing to the incentive or disincentive. 4 However, an exception to Hobbes’ theory lies in the premise of causal determinism proposed by the British analytic philosopher Galen Strawson. The premise implies that current events are fixed outcomes since events are actuated by a cause and the cause constitutes the compound of environmental/natural laws and previous events (known as the antecedent).5 In other words, causal determinism asserts that the course of the future is determined by the combination of past realities/events and environmental law. From this school of thought, the theory of incompatibilism arises in which determinism eliminates the possibility of free will. There are three branches of determinism: theological, scientific and logical determinism. Theological determinism is the concept that it God’s will and essence determine the existence, occurrence and flow of events. As a result, human free will becomes irrelevant since events are divinely ordered and predetermined. Indeed, religious traditions hold that God has ultimate responsibility for everything that happens.6 Scientific determinism proposes that the joint action of natural laws and the antecedent stages in evolution dictate the initiation and progress of events. Logical determination promotes a fatalistic view on life and events. It assumes that the course of future events cannot be averted in any way, in other words, they are inevitable. Another premise of logical determinism is that if there are two or more possibilities in an event’s outcome, only one of them will come to pass7. A central belief of logical determinism characterizes future actions or events as true. The differences between compatibilism and incompatibilism are clear-cut and occupy polar opposites. Compatibilism advocates the compatibility of free will and determinism so that both theories harmonize seamlessly. Although an event is determined by what happened before it and other environmental factors (factors outside the person’s control), the occurrence of the event does not take away the individual’s free will to decide a particular outcome. The rule of determinism may imply that a person’s choices and actions are predetermined, however, it determinism does not mean that man is not a free moral agent and can make independent and accountable decisions8. Instead, determinism affirms that thought, choices and actions comprise part of the contributory process by which we act and further an effect in the world. On the other hand, incompatibilism teaches the incongruity between determinism and free will. If an event is already predetermined by antecedence and other environmental factors, then there would be no other options left to the individual. As a consequence, if no choices exist, then the individual does not possess free will to influence the course of an event. Premise: Determinism removes the possibility for us to control and be accountable for our actions. Since those who believe in incompatibilism also forward the idea that an individual does not have free will, it follows that the individual is not a free moral agent, accountable for his actions. Moreover, if there is neither moral responsibility nor accountability, then it is impossible that a person be blamed for his actions since he is not responsible for his actions. If a person cannot be held responsible for his actions, then it is unjust to judge or censure another for his actions. In short, one does not have the right to even discipline the actions of others because it would be incorrect to imply that they had any choice in the action taken. Moral responsibility is supported by the autonomy or self-independence; so that individuals completely control their actions. Premise: Determinism deprives us of the authority and ability of choice Conversely, proponents of compatibilism keep the focus on choice, arguing that determinism necessitates a free will. Choice is the avenue through which one acts and determines certain outcomes; free will can only exist if a person has a real option and can wield the power of choice. One can only have choice if there is a range of alternatives from which one can either accept or reject. For example an individual may be faced with many tasks that he/she must perform at one given time such as, cooking, reading a recipe’s instructions and standing. This premise thus states that an individual can choose which action to take based on his ability to perform them. Ultimately, one arrives at the conclusion that both of these premises substantiate the claim that a person has the ability to control his actions by the choices that he makes and his choices proceed from the existence of an array of possible actions. Arguments of intuition and determinism A common argument that supports incompatibilism is that of the intuition. According to this premise, if determinism is not a fallacy then human beings are similar to puppets, manipulated into performing actions that do not originate in free will. If persons do not have free will and can be lead into performing an action, then the person is on the same level as an animal. These positions however are not conclusive9. Libertarianism and free will pessimism are doctrines both based on incompatibilism but share different views on it. Some incompatibilists think that determinism is an accurate worldview, therefore no one in the real world can exercise free will because it is non-existent. Opposed to this stance are others who maintain that the real world is not deterministic and so some individuals in the world actually possess free will. Galen classifies the latter group as libertarians (persons who believe in free will and free will’s incompatibility with determinism). On the other hand, Galen labels the former category as free will pessimists/ no freedom theorists who side with incompatibilism, holding that free will is not likely if determinism is true10. From these conclusions C.D. Broad deducts that “libertarianism…entails Indeterminism, but the converse does not hold11. In other words, indeterminism teaches that the free will exists without antecedent factors, events or causes. Since the exercise of a free will can be sustained in indeterminism, and indeterminism puts forwards no outside influence or instigator of an action, then, free will becomes harder to prove. Broad also believes that “rather than helping maintain free will, indeterminism undermines it12. The free will pessimist argues that it is hard to see how indeterminism could advance the notion of a person’s free will, because the event is non-determinist. Also an individual would be unable to explain all the reasons inspiring an action and the implications of making such a choice - it is beyond the person’s power. Hence this inability to trace the inspiration of choice and actions lead to chance or probability. If the person were to make a decision and there are no external influences beyond the person’s control, then the choice is founded instead on probability13. Owing to chance/probability, pessimists suppose that indeterminism makes people unable to fully control their actions and thus free will. Free will denial, a principle derived from determinism, supposes that free will is an illusion, instead, choice and life are driven by other forces such as God’s will, chance/probability, genetics, external environment and influences – put differently, no individual has control over his actions14. What free will deniers must also assume is that without free will, there cannot be moral accountability for an action. Pessimists, however, possess a more convincing thought, thinking that free will is not possible15. Not only do people not possess free will, there is no way that they could have it. For the pessimist, the only way to defend moral responsibility is to decline that free will is an imperative state for moral responsibility. Arguments for Incompatibilism: Consequence argument The most accepted and prominent argument for incompatibilism is the consequence argument which is based on the elementary dissimilarity between the past and the future. The consequence argument recommends that if the determinism theory is true, then whatever happens in the universe is solely a consequence. No person ever had a choice16. Van Inwagen defines it that if the laws of nature and the events of antiquity do not belong to human beings, then, the consequences of these dynamics are not the responsibilities of humans. In the consequence argument one also is mindful that the past is set and irreversible whereas the future seems to be open. This idea is illustrated by the fact that one does not deliberate the actions of the past in the same way we deliberate about the future17. An individual can influence what will occur in the future through his actions but cannot change the actions that have already occurred in the past. One can contemplate actions in the past and ponder whether it was the best step taken or one can calculate what future actions must be performed. In the situation that a person believes that he is employing his free will, he is in fact choosing from a litany of possible future outcomes. At the end of it all, the consequence argument holds that the future is not open if determinism is involved since the future would be as fixed as the past18. Origination Argument The origination argument seeks to deliberate the starting point of a free-willed decision. According to this argument, a person has free will only when his decisions come from the person himself. Proponents of origination claim that a person has to be the ultimate source of his actions. From this argument, the assumption that we are morally responsible for our actions is disputed in the context of coercion and manipulation since the coerced or manipulated individual is not the originator of his actions19. In the case of going out to buy an item, one can assume that this decision to go out was stimulated by his own belief or desire. However, one has to consider that these beliefs or desires were already in formation and at work in the past. Thus the action still springs from an external factor; so that although an individual still remains one of the sources for his action, he is not the ultimate source. Therefore, the defenders of origination believe that humans are not the ultimate source of their actions. In origination, free will is not ultimate, since free will philosophy supports that an individual has complete control over his actions. Arguments for Compatibilism Arguments for compatibilism are founded on the freedom of will prerequisite for moral responsibility.  If one can show that moral responsibility is attuned with the accuracy of determinism, and if free will is mandatory for moral responsibility, one will have absolutely shown that free will is itself well-matched with the legitimacy of determinism. Frankfurt’s Argument against “the Ability to Do Otherwise” The arguments for compatibilism assert that choice is the capability to do otherwise. Frankfurt advances a few scenarios to provoke the observer to deliberate the pilot of thought, decision and action: free will or circumstances. Underlying each scenario would be a hidden factor, unknown to the individual, which would cast in doubt the notion of free will20. A typical example is the case of an individual holding a small computer chip that can control his actions. For example, an individual has to choose between exercising or not exercising. If the individual decides to not to exercise, the chip is activated and influences his decision, and eventually compels the person to exercise. In such a case, Frankfurt asserts that the individual would be morally responsible for their actions because the presence of the chip plays no role in the decision21. He arrives at this conclusion because the individual is morally responsible for taking care of himself and the presence of the chip only facilitated the decision and fulfilled moral responsibility. If Frankfurt is right and his argument holds water that such situations are possible, then the reality of determinism is incompatible with a kind of freedom that needs the capacity to do otherwise, it is compatible with the sort of freedom indispensable for moral responsibility22. Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes In a reputed article, Peter Strawson asserts that many conventional debates between compatibilists and incompatibilists are erroneous. He asserts that the focus should instead be on reactive attitudes, that is, the attitudes that we have toward others based on their attitudes and treatment towards us23. Reactive attitudes are essentially natural human reactions to reciprocate good or bad to others relative to their attitudes and actions. He argues that these attitudes are vital in human interaction, and that they offer the foundation for holding individuals morally responsible. Strawson then argues that one can use “excusing considerations” which clear a person’s seemingly bad treatment/behavior, removing them as the target for retaliation. The first point excuses a person’s treatment/behavior based on the accidental nature, the lack of intention, or the lack of ill-will. The next excusing consideration clears a person by reasoning that the person who committed the seemingly bad action is not morally responsible himself say because of disability, immaturity or abnormality24. Furthermore, Strawson also argues for a normative assertion that the non-fallacy of determinism should not challenge our reactive attitudes25. Hence although determinism may be true, the will has to be harnessed and our natural reactions mollified, changed or deferred toward non-moral agents. Doris and Murphy in comparison to Strawson Doris and Murphy’s perspective coincides with Strawson since they believe that “individuals who have been cognitively degraded are not morally responsible for their actions based on the exempt and excuse conditions” (Murphy). On account of the exemptions or “excusing considerations” of persons not morally responsible, one deduces that those persons do not have exercise of free will to make independent and responsible decisions. According to Doris and Murphy the non-responsibility argument can apply to mentally handicapped and persons with severe abnormalities. Holding them responsible for their behavior is unjust. Doris and Murphy expand the concept of non-responsibility to apply to soldiers in combat zones who are negatively affected by toxic smells of human waste and putrid death. They discovered that warfare conditions impair something called the “normative competence” which is in control of distinguishing between right and wrong. Using the same, excusing and exemption rule, because of the damaging effect of these wartime smells on the psyche, soldiers cannot be held responsible for their actions. An atrocious case which functions as an example is the My Lai Massacre. Taking place during the Vietnam War, denatured American soldiers barge into a Vietnamese village and barbarously murder over 500 people. In this scenario, “Doris and Murphy never say that the atrocity, itself, is excusable” However the point remains that the effect of war crippled the minds of the soldiers so that they could not make morally responsible decisions. The second category of cases is those in which while the active person is a moral agent, his action toward us is unassociated to actions toward another. For example if an individual is speeding on the highway and cut a person in a traffic queue, one would have feelings of resentment or even anger. On the other hand, if one discovers that it was because of a medical emergency and the driver is rushing to the hospital, then one understands that one was not the target and their actions are not associated. As a result, one would not be justified to hold resentment against the active agent. Thus, Strawson thinks that the legitimacy of determinism ought not to weaken our reactive attitudes. Strawson argues that moral responsibility is well-matched with the certainty of determinism since moral responsibility is founded on the reactive attitudes, and if free will is a necessity for moral responsibility, Strawson’s argument offers support to compatibilism26. Conclusion It is significant to keep in mind that mutually, compatibilism and incompatibilism are debates founded on the prospect of possibility. According to the compatibilist, it is possible for an individual to be entirely determined and yet free. On the reverse, the incompatibilist maintains that such associations are inconsistent and impossible. From this short paper, one can therefore come to a clearer understanding that free will touches on important issues in the philosophy of human nature, metaphysics, action theory, religion and ethics. It has been noted that there continues to be much deliberation from divergent opinions concerning nearly every facet of the free will theory. I believe that incompatibilism is wrong because external factors and free will both act in accordance with one another, influencing choice and impacting a person’s will. I agree that man is a free-willed moral agent, however, there are external factors with which he comes into contact such as the past and outside occurrences that determine certain outcomes. Thus, external factors must be included and considered along with free will in determining moral responsibility. Bibliography Anglin, William. 1990. Free Will and the Christian Faith, Gloucestershire: Clarendon Press. Baron, Robert. 1997. The Sweet Smell of... Helping: Effects of Pleasant Ambient Fragrance on Prosocial Behavior in Shopping Malls, Personlaity and Sociology Bulletin, 498. Broad, Charlie Dunbar. Kegan Paul. 1990. Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism, New York: Routledge. Chisholm, Roderick. 1967. "He Could Have Done Otherwise," Journal of Philosophy, 409-417. Ekstrom, Laura Waddell. 1999. Free Will: A Philosophical Study. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. Fischer, John Martin. 1984. "Power Over the Past." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 335-350. Frankfurt, Harry. 1997. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, New York: Hackett Publishing 156-166. Honderich, Ted. 2002. How Free are You? London: Oxford University Press. McKenna, Michael. Paul Russell. 2008. Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P.F. Strawson's “Freedom and Resentment,” Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Murphy, Dominic. 2007. From My Lai to Abu Ghraib: The Moral Psychology of Atrocity. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXXI, 25-55. O'Connor, Timothy. 2011. Constantine Sandis. A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Oxford: John Wiley & Sons (Wiley Blackwell) Publishers. Pereboom, Derk. 1997. Free Will. Indiana: Hacket. Strawson, Galen. 2010. Mental Reality, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Strawson, Galen. 2008. Real Materialism and Other Essays. New York: Oxford University Press Strawson, Galen. 2009. Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press. Strawson, Galen. 1994. "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility." Journal of Philosophical Studies, 5-24. Van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will, Gloucestershire:Clarendon Press. PAPER DEFENSE: Dear Customer: I have chosen to graphically represent your argument. Please familiarize yourself with the content as well. The first diagram is the compatibilist view which states that both external factors and free will can work together to produce an outcome. (You agree with the first diagram – external factors and free will are to be considered in decision-making within the framework of moral responsibility). (External Factors such as the past and environment) (Free Will of an Individual) DECISION The second diagram is the incompatibilist view which states that both external factors and free will cannot work simultaneously to produce a decision. On one hand, free will is non-existent. (External Factors such as the past and environment) DECISION (One makes a decision with only external factors as the influencing agent. Man loses his free will and becomes a passive being) On the other hand, one can have non-existent external factors. (Free Will of an Individual) DECISION Read More