Anatomical Analysis of Terrorist Organizations: The Ikhwan Group - Research Paper Example

Anatomical Analysis of Terrorist Organizations: The Ikhwan Group Introduction The 21st century has been characterized by numerous challenges that have compelled nations to rethink their policies and priorities the world over; a critical increase in global terrorism, beginning with the 9/11 attacks on the United States, has been a major concern to global powers. The Arab world of the Middle East has been a hot spot for terror activities and organizations, and the nerve center for other global terror organizations. The US-led war on global terror has been intensified over the years, but terrorism remains a serious threat to the global peace, stability and development efforts. Terrorism has a huge cost, not just in terms of loss of property and lives, but also in terms of disruption of economies and political stability, which eventually leads to the failure of states. Terrorism inflicts immeasurable pain and suffering on people and nations all over the world, which makes the fight against terror groups a primary responsibility for the entire global community. According to the Global Terrorism Index, nearly 18,000 deaths occurred as a result of terrorism in 2013, which is more than 60% increase from the figures that had been recorded in previous years (MacAskill, 2014). These deaths have been attributed to major global terror organizations such as Iraq and Syria’s Islamic State (Isis), Nigeria’s Boko Haram, Afghanistan’s Taliban, and Al-Qaida, whose operations and actions are spread across several parts of the international community. This paper discusses the operations, actions and external relations of one of the largest and oldest terror groups in the world known as Jamiat al-Ikhwan al-muslimun, simply referred to as the Ikhwan, or the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) (as it is commonly known in the western world) (Farmer, 2012b). Background of the Ikhwan The Ikhwan traces its roots back to Egypt, where a teacher and cleric known as Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) founded it in 1928; initially, Ikhwan was a Pan-Islamic outfit that sought to unite all Muslims (Farmer, 2012b). The group aimed to bring all the Muslims under a single Islamic theocracy that would be guided by the Koran, the Sunnah and sharia law (Iyaad, 2014); apart from that, the Ikhwan group also had a secondary goal, which was to expel all the westerners in the Middle East and other Islamic territories. On these premises, it is clear that the Ikhwan group was anti-secular and anti-western right from the beginning; besides merely seeking to unite all the Muslims, the group also had an implicit agenda of extending the influence of Islam beyond the Arab world to the rest of the world. The group’s founder Al-Banna conceptualized Islam as a dominant force that should control the world by imposing its law on all nations while expanding its influence to the rest of the world. The Ikhwan group has a set of ethos that they abide by, key among them being jihad and martyrdom, which are a critical aspect of the group’s identity. The group’s motto states bluntly that "Allah is our objective; the Quran is our law, the Prophet is our leader; Jihad is our way; and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations" (Farmer, 2012b). The Ikhwan’s motto clearly encapsulates the critical importance of jihad and martyrdom to their ethos, hence to their course, which is (according to them) for the greater good of all humanity. Historical Development As an influential anti-Semite and anti-British control of Egypt then, Al-Banna advocated for the forceful expulsion of these two groups, even if it meant using violence and terrorism (Farmer, 2012c). The Ikhwan group espouses the Salafism ideology, which is a strict and extremely puritanical faction of Sunni Islam; Salafism has been described as the fastest growing Islamic movement in the world. Over the years, it has emerged that the Ikhwan have a significant influence among the Shi’ite Muslims as well, despite having started within the Sunni Islam. Since its formation, the Ikhwan became so big that by 1936 it had already gained 800 members and the number rose rapidly to 200,000 members by 1938 (Farmer, 2012b); in the aftermath of WWII, the Ikhwan had nearly two million members from all over the Muslim world. The group opened numerous chapters in other places throughout the 1930s and the successive decades; for instance, the Lebanese, Syrian, and Trans-Jordan chapters of the Ikhwan were opened in 1936, 1937, and in 1946 respectively (Farmer, 2012b). Presently, the Ikhwan group has branches in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan, Tunisia, and in 70 other nations and locations around the Muslim world. Currently, the global membership of the Ikhwan group and its branches is not quite definite, given the varying estimates available; nevertheless, the group’s global reach and influence is undoubtable. Even though the Ikhwan group has never been recognized as a formal political outfit throughout its existence, the group has spun off many political parties beyond Egypt. Additionally, the Ikhwan group has previously pursued political legitimacy in some of the Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt and Libya, in what came to be described as “the Arab Spring”, leading to the branding of the group as a terror organization by Egypt (Kalabalık, 2013). Structural Organization of the Ikhwan The Ikhwan is a highly structuralized group, with a General Organization Council (GOC) that is made up of delegates from each of the group’s individual chapters across the world. The Shura Council establishes the general goals of the group and an Executive Office, which is at the helm of the structure, is responsible for implementing all the directives of the Shura and the GOC. The Ikhwan group’s operation model is akin to the “leaderless movement” model, and functions as a distributed network (Farmer, 2012a); the group has decentralized its operational responsibility to the local levels, despite having a highly hierarchical and bureaucratic leadership structure. The group’s local groups are organized cells or “franchises” that have competence to execute both their own independent operations as well as coordinated action. The Ikhwan’s primary mode of operation, which entails the use of small cells as their basic unit of organization, has greatly improved the group’s resiliency, while making it nearly impossible for outsiders to infiltrate the organization. The Ikhwan group has a vast multinational network of communications, which it uses to distribute its messages and ideologies to its adherents and the rest of the world; for instance, the group has links with mosques, clinics/hospitals, commercial ventures, as well as charitable organizations, as well as madrasas. Every member of the organization is obligated to give up a portion of his or her wealth in support of the group’s aims and objectives across the Arab world and beyond. Moreover, the group receives a significant amount of financial support and sponsorship from various sources in the Middle East; precisely, the group relies on the petrol dollars of the Middle East and on sizeable donations from the Saudi royal family members, who belong to the Wahhabi sect of Sunni Islam that is dominant in the Arab Gulf States (Farmer, 2012b). Through the financial backing by wealthy patrons in the Middle East, the Ikhwan group has managed to make inroads into the western world and is deeply enshrined in the western culture and society. External Relations The Ikhwan is highly advanced in its organization and external relations; presently, the group has a communications/propaganda organ that is responsible for its public relations. The Ikhwan’s communications strategy is to dilute the anti-Islamic statements made to the non-Islamic western media as in the recent backlash on Saudi’s for declaring Ikhwan as a terror organization (Dhia-Allah, 2014). Besides that, this communication seeks to disseminate information about Jihad, sharia, and Islamic supremacy to their adherents; the Imams in Mosques across the western world have also adopted a similar communications strategy. Propaganda and false-flag are favorite tricks off the group’s playbook; for instance, in the wake of the 2006 Lebanon invasion by Israeli troops, Hezbollah operatives released photos of burned-out ambulances to international news agencies, as evidence of Israel’s atrocities (Farmer, 2012a). This provoked massive criticism and global condemnation against Israel, yet it was actually Hezbollah that had destroyed the ambulances and used them to set up a fake scene depicting Israeli brutality. Besides that, the group provides funding to a number of websites, publishing houses and newspapers that are committed to its course in the Arab world and beyond. Through its publishing houses, the Ikhwan group maintains a steady flow of messages throughout the Islamic territories to its followers; great works by its founders and past leaders are passed on to subsequent generations of rising Muslims through numerous madrasas. The group has also popularized similar anti-Semitic works such as the Nazi manifesto “Mein Kampf”, which has remained to be a leading best-seller in the Muslim world over the years (Farmer, 2012d). Members of the group are featured regularly in global news channels such as the Arabic cable television and broadcasting network, as well as Al-Jazeera; they are also interlaced into the wider network of multinational organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the United Nations. The Ikhwan group has a number of fronts in the western nations, through which it pursues its objectives in the western world; for instance, The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is one of such organizations (Farmer, 2012b). In addition to the CAIR, the Ikhwan group has similar other not-for-profit groups and an extensive international network of Islamic charity organizations through which it spreads its influence in the western world. The Ikhwan group has existed in the United States of America since 1963, with the formation of the Muslim Student Association (MSA) by a number of Islamic student refugees from the Islamic nations of the world. The group’s presence has also manifested in Europe through the initiatives of Said Ramadn, Hassan al-Banna’s son in law, who first established a mosque in Munich in 1960. Through the Munich mosque and Ramadan, the Ikhwan group succeeded in establishing a contemporary European presence in the 1960s, thereby extending its influence to Europe. The group’s presence in the western culture and society manifests itself, particularly in schools, colleges and universities; this is consistent with the group’s goal of spreading Islam to the rest of the non-believers of the non-Muslim world. The Ikhwan have made concerted efforts to influence the content of instructional material such as text books and lesson plans across schools as it has been established by independent researchers in Texas (Farmer, 2012a). Moreover, a vast number of universities across the western world have also benefited greatly from generous contributions by Muslim benefactors whose aim is to establish centers for Islam studies. Usually, the staffs of such centers are mostly academicians that are sympathetic to the Ikhwan cause and the Pan-Islamism movement; the Ikhwan have also recruited heavily from the wide population of the disaffected blacks, as well as from the US prison population. Similarly, the group has also infiltrated the banking and financial industries in the modern day western society and is part of the western world’s commercial sector (Farmer, 2012b). The group’s influence in the banking and financial sector of the western world can be felt through the lobbying of its members for the establishment of Sharia-compliant financial services and other products that are custom made for its adherents and Muslims in general (Roberts, 2014). Lately, the group has also been able to plant its members in various critical security wings of governments in the western world; for instance, the group has penetrated the United States’ law enforcement, intelligence and military/national security fabric. For instance, the infamous FT. Hood shooter and mass assassin, counsellor Nidal Hasan, had the well-known “Soldier of Allah” (SoA) engravings on his US Army business cards (Farmer, 2012a). In 2003, US Army Sergent Hasan Akbar, who masterminded the Kuwait grenade attack that killed fellow soldiers, also attested to the massive infiltration of Islamic extremists into the US government and military. Ikhwan’s Operations & Activities As a public relations stance, the present-day leadership of the Ikhwan group has taken clear stands against violence and terrorism, taking every opportunity to denounce these vices whenever they are in public spaces (Farmer, 2012b). Deception has been a critical strategy characteristic of the Ikhwan group’s way of conquest; Muslims only lie to the infidels (non-Muslims), and not to their fellow shahids (believers). A prime example of their deception is the continuous denial of involvement with the Ikhwan by the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), yet it is clear that the Ikhwan created the society itself. Evidently, these strategic public rhetoric has been well received by the simple, unquestioning minds of the western world, even though existing evidence suggests otherwise. The Ikhwan have particularly enjoyed great protection and rhetorical cover for their atrocities across western nations in most of left-leaning media outlets in North America and Europe (Smith, 2014). Precisely, the Ikhwan group has succeeded in manipulating the left-leaning western press through numerous tactics including disinformation, psychological operations, as well as propaganda (Farmer, 2012a). That way, the group has managed to push for its agenda in the non-Muslim western world while at the same time obscuring its atrocious intentions to the unsuspecting western nations. By successfully disguising its real intent, the Ikhwan group has managed to distance itself from well-known terror organizations and proxies, thereby quelling global suspicions of its engagements in, and contribution to the soaring incidence of terror activities around the world. Evidently, the Ikwan have often projected a “respectable” face to the world, despite their engagement in brutal and violent operations in the pursuit of its goals across the non-Islam western world (Farmer, 2012a). Beyond the façade, the Ikhwan group has a paramilitary wing that is the source of all the present day Islamic supremacy movement and a plethora of some of the most vicious terror groups around the world (BBC, 2013). The Ikhwan group has continued its clandestine support to all manner of atrocious operations through direct action groups such as the Al-Qaeda since the 1960s while at the same time publicly disavowing violence. The Ikhwan has been linked to numerous extremist causes for so many years now, and has even directly used violent methods to achieve its goals around the world; in addition to that, the group’s actions have been executed through proxies. For instance, back in 1948, many of the group’s top leaders were put behind bars by the Egyptian government, which then outlawed the movement in the country, following a series of bombings and assassination attempts (Farmer, 2012b). In retaliation to the arrest of the Ikhwan leaders and suppression of the group, one of the group’s members assassinated the Egyptian Prime Minister, which then led to the execution of Al-Banna months later, after the assassination incidence (BBC, 2013). The Ikhwan later regrouped again and lasted through the pro-western monarchy of King Farouk I, which was ousted by General Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952 (Farmer, 2012b); the group made attempts on Nasser’s life in 1954, when he started governing in a too-secular fashion. Following this incidence, the Ikhwan were also banned in Egypt and its prominent members including Sayyid Qutb were confined while some were executed (Spears, 2002); through this incidence and many others of that nature across the vastness of the Middle East, the Ikhwan acquired a wide range of operational lessons and competence. Consequently, the critical need for advanced organization, compartmentalization and security has been on top of the group’s agenda in subsequent years. Moving forward, from the 1960’s onwards, the group has maintained a low profile, while still pulling strings from the shadows, through the direct action of terrorist and paramilitary operations of proxies such as the PLO-Fatah and their ilk (Farmer, 2012b). As a result, the Ikhwan group has often been able to deny culpability over violent actions witnessed around the world, while still supporting them secretly, through its vast range of global undertakings. For example, the “Ground Zero” Mosque controversy has been recognized as one of the group’s masterworks through the Iman Feisal Abdul Rauf, who is a supporter of Hamas (Farmer, 2012a). In pursuit of its primary objective of establishing a global community of Muslims, the Ikhwan has systematically expanded into the non-Muslim territories of the world by erecting Mosques, schools and community centers. Whereas Mosques may pass for ordinary places of worship to most people, they certainly mean something more to the Muslims; for instance, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been quoted saying the mosques, domes, minarets and the faithful represent the barracks, helmets, bayonets and soldiers of the Muslims respectively (Farmer, 2012a). The Ikhwan group controls nearly 80% of the more than 3000 mosques in the US, and runs the suburban Detroit correspondence school, the Islamic American University (IAU), which trains teachers and preachers (Ehrenfeld & Lappen, 2011). Yusuf Al Qaradawi, who is a famous Ikhwan leader, is the IAU chairman and head of the board of trustees; Qaradawi, who was banned in the US in 1999 and has been residing in Qatar since then, is an Egyptian graduate. The Ikhwan has a website, “Muslim Brotherhood Movement Page (Hizb Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimoon),” which is used for global communications, and to spread the Ikhwan ideology to the rest of the world (Ehrenfeld & Lappen, 2011). Information available on their website shows that the group has branches in nearly more than 70 countries across the Arab world and even beyond; presently, the group has presence in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco, Lebanon, and many others. The group’s program always advocates for active rebellion and spread of Islam in all its areas of operation; many other Ikhwan websites carried by US internet hosts also bear these messages. For instance, the ummah.net bears Sheikh Al Qaradawi’s fatwa embargoing the use of products from the US and Israel; Qaradawi’s fatwa has also calls for the organized execution of American servicemen in Iraq. Yet another website, the Jannah.org, which is held by the ENoor Creations has a book by Qaradawi, which recommends domineering practices such as wife beating (Ehrenfeld & Lappen, 2011). Qaradawi has openly advocated for suicide bombing, including the use of female bombers, and he currently presides over the London-based International union of Muslim Scholars, besides being a member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research. Overall, the foregoing discussion has indeed highlighted that the Ikhwan has gained enormous grounds from its humble beginnings in 1928, thereby becoming an extensive multinational Pan-Islamic movement. Through the 21st century, the group has experienced massive growth both in terms of its membership, which now spans across the entire Muslim world and beyond, as well as in terms of the coming of age of its organizational structures and operational competence. The numerous challenges incurred by the Ikhwan group notwithstanding, the organization has also had its fair share of breakthroughs, by successfully pushing its agenda across the non-Muslim western world. In view of their expansive reach and broad networks as detailed in this discussion, the Ikhwan remains to be a lethal terror force and a potential threat to global security and stability of the world’s major economies. References Iyaad, A., 2014. Al-Fawzan, Al-Luhaydan, Aal Al-Shaykh: The Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) Are From the 72 Sects, Use Secrecy and Aim Only to Seek Power. Ikhwanis. 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The Muslim Brotherhood, Part III – Hitler’s Imam. Family security matters. [Online] September 4. Available at: http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/the-muslim-brotherhood-part-iii-hitlers-imam#ixzz3MbwNLSem [accessed 24 Dec. 2014]. Read More