Safety: Shooter Critical Incident Response - Term Paper Example

Safety: Shooter critical incident response Safety Introduction This safety response plan presents the general response guidelines for dealing with the active shooter incident. The active shooter incident, in this case, has been described as involving suspect(s) whose activities are intent on causing immediate bodily harm or killing others and they have not been contained. There was no discernible exact target and the shooting victims were unaware that there were targets until after they had been shot. This safety plan makes the victims aware of their environment, take common sense precautions and be attentive to instructions on how to protect themselves. An analysis of the situation shows that the University of Northern Florida (UNF) sits on more than 1400 acres of land and has a student population of approximately 60,000. The UNF has multiple campuses. There is a campus police unit located within the University who patrol the university grounds at regular intervals, though they are unarmed. There is an ongoing basketball game at the 9500 seat university arena with the campus police providing security. Shooting erupts at the spectator section in the arena during which approximately 15 individuals suffer gunshot wounds and several other individuals are critically wounded. The shooter escapes from the arena in the melee. Prior to the game, a note was found in the men’s restroom that intimated at a possible attack within the UNF compound. A security meeting, held after the note had been found but prior to the basketball game commencement determined that the university security measures were adequate to handle any potential security threats. Immediate Safety Action Securing the incident area The first safety action would be to secure the incident area, in this case the university arena in which a basketball game had been proceeding when the shooting occurred. Firstly, the area is secured by locking and barricading all entrance and exit points into the arena. In this case all available materials can be used to block the entrances, for instance bleachers, tables, and other furniture. This action is conducted to ensure that the shooter(s) do not get access to the incident area, or if they are in the incident area then they are contained. Secondly, all persons in the incident area are to be moved away from clear lines of sight and positioned behind barricades and solid objects. This removes them from the shooter(s) possible line of sight and shields from bullets. Thirdly, the entrances are barricaded if the assailant enters or leaves the incident area. Finally, the persons in the incident area can seek a safer refuge if they determine that it is safe to do so or the incident area does not offer them adequate protection (Division of Capitol Police, 2014). Undertaking protective actions The second safety action would be to undertake protective actions that include steps aimed at reducing vulnerability. The first activity is to close the blind and block all windows to ensure that if the shooter is outside then they are unable to see into the incident area. This action also affords the rooms occupants privacy and some level of protection. The second action is to switch off all computers and radios, and switch all phone to silent mode. This is intended to reduce the level of noise in the incident area and ensure that those who are outside that area are unaware that people are in the room (Giblin, Burrus & Schafe, 2008). The third action as placing posters and signs on outside windows to enable rescue personnel on the outside to identify your location, you population and presence of injured persons. The fourth action is to calm the persons in the incident area and ensure that they are quit. Persons in dangerous situations are likely to panic and endanger themselves, thus it is imperative to ensure that they are calmed, reassured and their questions answered. All actions should be explained to them to ensure that they understand the efforts that have been undertaken to ensure their safety. The fifth action is to secure the incident areas by positioning all the occupants, including the injured, out of direct lines of site and behind items that can offer some level of protection from bullets. For instance, the room’s occupants should be placed behind bleachers, pillars, file cabinets, desks and tables (Division of Capitol Police, 2014). The fire alarm, sprinkler system and gas supplies should be turned off in the shooting incident. The loud alarm noise interferes with rescue efforts by making it difficult for communication to be carried out. They also make it difficult to pinpoint gunshot locations. The sprinkler system should be turn off unless there is risk of a fire occurring. If left unchecked, water levels would rise and interfere with power cables thereby posing additional risks. Gas lines should be turned off as they pose a risk of fire. The electricity supply shut off is based on the response commander’s discretion (Chancellor’s Task Force on Critical Incident Management, 2007). Seeking protection if the area is unsecure The third safety action would be seeking protection if the area is unsecured. The first concern would be placing barriers between the assailant and the areas occupants. The second activity would be planning an escape from the incident area – this is only undertaken if the assailant(s) precise location is known and there is an unobstructed escape route. Supposing an escape is not possible, then the safety position in the incident area and away from the assailant is identified and secured in the best possible way. Even minimal concealment could be helpful as they may not be able to stop a bullet but they would help in hiding from the shooter (Fein et al., 2004). Reporting the incident to law enforcement agencies The fourth safety action would be to report the incident to law enforcement agencies and ensure that they are apprised of the incident progression. Occasionally, the law enforcement line may be busy, thus it may be necessary to ring the number more than once before a dispatcher answers. Whoever makes the call to the law enforcement agencies show provide them with information on: the incident and what is happening; incident area location in the form of building, floor and door number; number of people at the location, the injured and types of wounds; location of the assailant(s) and how they are armed; and other information as requested by the law enforcement agencies. In communicating with the law enforcement agencies, the caller should be calm, concise in their description and respond to verbal questioning cues (Gajda, 2006). In reporting the incident to the incident to law enforcement agencies, the caller should: specify the assailants precise location and the direction of their movement; communicate the shooter(s) gender, ethnicity, and age if possible; include their cloth colors and dressing style; describe their physical features such as facial hair, eye color, complexion, weight and height; describe the weapons – such as handgun, rifle, shotgun and explosives – used in the incident; describe anything they may have carried, for instance bag or backpack; report of the assailant was recognized and could be identified by name; and the incident description to include what was heard and seen (Gubernatorial Task Force for University Campus Safety, 2007). Treating injured persons and shooting survivors The injured should be given medical attention. When the law enforcement dispatcher was informed of the incident occurrence, as outlined in the fourth safety action, they would have been expected to notify emergency medical services (EMS) of the incident and the condition of victims as was reported. The EMS will respond to the shooting incident, but will be unable to access the incident area. They will only be able to access the site after the assailant shall have been apprehended or the area secured. The injured persons are likely to require first aid as they wait for the area to be secured and the EMS to arrive or they be evacuated. Pressure should be applied to the bleeding area and the elevated. The persons in the incident area should also be reassured and informed on the progress of the rescue attempt (Langford, 2004). Un-securing the area It is possible that the assailant may not stop their assault until after their primary objective – in most cases their objective is to cause human fatalities – has been met or they are neutralized by law enforcement officers. In this case, the persons in the incident area must factor in the level of risks before they debar the incident area. There will be some level of risk for as long as the assailant has not been disarmed or the area secured. For that matter, any rescue attempts should only be conducted and coordinated if such actions would not endanger the persons involved and those in the secured incident area. The persons in the incident areas must also be cognizant that the shooter may fraudulently seek entry into the secured area by calling attention to themselves and implying that they are scared victims. In this case, it is prudent to only unsecure the area if and when rescue personnel arrive. In essence, if an action is likely to compromise the safety of the persons in the secured area then such an action must not be undertaken (Leavitt, Spelling & Gonzales, 2007). Responding agencies The law enforcement agencies will assess the threat and determine their response based on their perceived seriousness of the threat. There are three threat levels in any situation: low; medium and high. A low level threat poses little risk to public safety and would – on most occasions – not require the intervention of law enforcement agencies. A medium level threat possess some level of risk to the public and would require law enforcement agencies response in the form of information exchange and/or presence. A high level threat possess serious risk to the public and necessitates response by law enforcement agencies. The shooting incident is a high level threat as some of the victims risk losing their lives and the shooter(s) will definitely face criminal prosecution if apprehended. In addition, the law enforcement agencies will coordinate all rescue efforts and conduct interviews to develop a comprehensive understanding of the shooting incident (Dwyer & Osher, 2000). The local campus police will respond to the incident, assisted by local law enforcement agencies. Additional help from other rescue agencies will be solicited after an initial analysis of the incident and the determination that additional help is needed. For instance, the FBI may be called in if a hostage situation arises and the present rescue personnel determine that they are not equipped to negotiate for the hostages. For that matter, the campus police and responding law enforcement agencies will be tasked with: locating, containing and halting the progress of the shooter(s); and informing victims of the secure areas and aiding them in accessing them. The victims must be made aware of the fact that the shooter(s) may be more dangerous as they are cornered by the law enforcement officers (Duffee & Maguire, 2007). The responding health personnel must not treat the injured persons in the incident area and begin victims’ evacuation unless it has been secured or the shooter(s) have been apprehended. For that matter, they must explain this concept to the victims to calm them down and make them understand the rationality of such an action. Once the area has been secured and/or the threat neutralized then the evacuation and treatment may begin (Peak, Barthe & Garcia, 2008, p.236). Responding to the threat The victims should adopt a lockdown, evacuation and shelter in place plan in response to the incident. Lockdown involves moving to the designated lockdown areas and initiating the lockdown procedure. The lockdown areas are designed to protect victims from attack and ensure their safety. Evacuation occurs immediately following the lockdown. It involves leaving the dangerous areas once they have been secured and/or the threat neutralized.Shelter in place involves selecting a secure location in the incident area and barricading oneself in the incident area. It implies looking for a safe setting or camouflage from injury, but could also mean remaining at the same position as when the incident began until a secure message is broadcast or rescue personnel arrive. To shelter in place in the arena means sitting against the solid arena wall and away from all windows. The victims will apply either if the three response strategies based on their situation analysis and discretion (Giblin, Burruss & Schafer, 2008). The victims should not look for the shooter(s), instead they should hide or attempt to leave the incident area. In case the shooter(s) finds them, then they should be prepared to respond with deadly force as the shooter(s) would be armed and intent on causing them harm. The victim must, therefore, be prepared to cause serious body harm and possible kill the shooter(s). In attacking the shooter(s) the vitals should be targeted, including the groin, head, throat, nose and eyes. Assuming the victim is not armed with a weapon that is equivalent to the firearm, they should be ready to improvise the items found in their vicinity and use them as weapons. For instance, a jacket wrapped around the forearm could act as a shield to counter an attack by a sharp object, a backpack or heavy book could serve as a spontaneous bullet proof vest, scissors and box cutters could act as attacking weapons, and a belt could act as a garrote for strangling (Fein et al., 2004). Victims who are trapped together should coordinate their efforts to improve their chances to surviving the shooting incident. Their goals should be to disarm the shooter(s) if possible. The victims who are away from entry ways should distract the shooter(s) to allow those in the entry way to ambush them. Once the shooter(s) has been neutralized, they should be bound and gagged and delivered to the law enforcement agencies. The most qualified individuals should secure the weapons taken off the disarmed shooter(s) and take defensive positions around those who are not armed. The armed victims should never leave the incident area to prevent their being confused with the shooter(s). They should wait to be directed by the rescue personnel(Fein et al., 2004). Evacuation The responding law enforcement personnel will establish safe corridors to be used in evacuation before they can proceed. In this case, establishing the safe corridors and evacuating victims is a time intensive exercise that requires a lot of personnel to conduct it. The evacuees will be instructed to remain in safe and secure areas before they are evacuated. Given that this is a shooting incident, the evacuees will be instructed to proceed along the safe corridor with their hands on their heads. They will also be subjected to bodily searches before they are evacuated. All the evacuees will be instructed to follow the evacuators’ instructions diligently. All evacuees will be directed to a secure holding and staging area from which they will be debriefed on the shooting incident, provided with medical attention and counseled. No evacuee will be allowed to access the incident area or retrieve their personal items until after the law enforcement officers shall have processed the areas and released them (Langford, 2004). The first response team in a shooting incident will typically be a small armed unit of law enforcement personnel who have been tasked with securing the area. The respondents should therefore not approach the rescue personnel but await and follow the instructions they have been given. The victims should keep their hands in plain view of rescue personnel and expect to be treated as suspects until after their innocence or status as victims has been ascertained. The first responders would not typically render first aid as their primary concern is neutralizing the threat and disarming the shooter(s)(Langford, 2004). Once the victims have been evacuated, a headcount should be conducted to determine those who are missing and may be trapped in unsecured areas. Possible victim locations should be identified based on the headcount. These areas can then be identified as priority areas targeted for securing(Langford, 2004). Staging areas The staging areas will be located in secure areas that are away from the incident areas. The staging area will include: a command post from which the rescue agencies coordinate their activities; a tactical staging areas in which armed response personnel assess the shooting threat and prepare for response; a helicopter landing area to facilitate the transportation of rescue personnel and equipment into the area, and medical evacuees to seek medical attention in health facilities; a medical staging area to set up medical response facilities; a media staging area to coordinate media reports on the incident; an interview area to help in identifying evacuees and collecting their statements on the incident; an evacuation and relocation site in which the evacuees are released and reunited with their family members, friends and classmates (Fein et al., 2004). References Chancellor’s Task Force on Critical Incident Management (2007). SUNY system. Albany, New York: State University of New York. Division of Capitol Police (2014). Critical incidents and response strategies for state employees. Retrieved 1 July, 2014, from http://www.dcp.virginia.gov Duffee, E. & Maguire R. (2007). Criminal justice theory: Explaining the nature and behavior of criminal justice. New York: Routledge. Dwyer, P. & Osher, D. (2003). Safeguarding our children: An action guide. Washington DC: Department of Education and Department of Justice. Fein, A., Vossekuil, B., Pollack, S., Borum, R., Modzeleski, W. & Reddy, M. (2004). Threat assessment in schools: A guide to managing threatening situations and to creating safe schools. Washington, DC: United States Secret Service and Department of Education. Gajda, R. (2006). Safe schools through strategic alliances: How assessment of collaboration enhances school violence prevention and response. Journal of School Violence, 5(1), 63-80. Giblin, M., Burruss, W. & Schafer, A. (2008). Critical incident preparedness and response on campus: Examining the relationship between local law enforcement and post-secondary institutions in Illinois and the United States. Illinois: Southern Illinois University Carbondale. Gubernatorial Task Force for University Campus Safety. (2007). Report on findings and recommendations. Retrieved 1 July, 2014, from http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/campusSecurity/docs/finalReport052407.pdf. Langford, L. (2004). Preventing violence and promoting safety in higher education settings: Overview of a comprehensive approach. Newton, Massachusetts: The Higher Education Center for Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse and Violence Prevention. Leavitt, O., Spelling, M. & Gonzales, R. (2007). Report to the President on issues raised by the Virginia Tech tragedy. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Department of Education & Department of Justice. Peak, J., Barthe, P. & Garcia, A. (2008). Campus policing in America: A twenty-year perspective. 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