Why Gay Marriage Should Be Banned - Essay Example

Same-Sex Marriage and Natural Law Same-sex marriage constitutes one of the most decisively polarizing issues in the current American political dialectic. The debate, in fact, represents much deeper ideological divisions at work: the partitions between religious-minded conservatism and the socially liberal emphasis upon positive rights. Needless to say, the war over same-sex marriage which has been forged and fought has ended in a draw. By attrition, the contenders which fall within the trite paradigms of conservative and liberal are incapable of mounting any new offensives. What is necessary in this conflict is a new arsenal of weaponry: one which neither relies upon the rejection of natural law nor upon steadfast religious conservatism. The problem regarding the latter is that it cannot provide the justification needed, in argument, to prove the incorrectness of the opposite side’s view. That is, religious arguments against same-sex marriage are mere opinion, or, as Plato called it: doxa (Bourdieu). The problem regarding the former—a rejection of natural law—will be dealt with later on. So, instead of relying on old and tried arguments, this discussion will hope to achieve consensus with a new account of why such marriage rites are morally reprehensible—an account which does not rely on any theological groundwork. The hope will be to use a theory of natural law, one which dates back over two millennia, to prove that there is no “natural goodness” inherent in same-sex marriage. This entails a detailed examination of reality to determine the metaphysical truth on which we will ground moral claims and establish them as irrefutable. In the end, it shall be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that same-sex marriage violates natural law—a moral theory based on the dictates of reality—and must not be allowed. Firstly, however, an account of the natural law tradition is necessary. “Natural law theory”, indeed, has been labeled on a variety of theories of civil law, theories of ethics (both religious and secular), and theories of politics. The focus here, of course, will be on natural law theories of secular ethics, and although the discussion will involve St. Thomas Aquinas, none of Aquinas’ metaphysical (or theological) views shall be considered. Knowing this, the thesis of natural law theory in ethics is that natural law makes the foundational principles of practical rationality for mankind, and it possesses such status by nature. The thought that natural law creates the foundational principles of practical rationality implies that (1) the dictates of natural law are universally and absolutely compulsory by nature and (2) the dictates of natural law are always conceivable by nature. All humans actually possess a foundational knowledge of such dictates of natural law. This knowledge is found in each individual’s “intrinsic directedness” toward the various goods that the natural law drives people to follow. The precepts of our natural law are too compulsory by nature: no living creature could have a “human nature” yet not to be fixed on the dictates of our natural law. This is a result of these precepts directing individuals toward the good as such (Murphy). There seem to be many claims made here about natural law which seem to suggest an overtly religious ethic: namely, “dictates” and “intrinsic directness”. Nevertheless, “it is not inconceivable that a passion for science or the analyses of practical reasoning, coupled with purely secular interpretations of ‘nature’ and ‘law,’ could lead an atheist to a strong defense of natural law” (Kainz 88). In other words, “God” and “nature” can be treated to be linguistic equivalents. Given by divine intelligence or not, such considerations are irrelevant to applied natural law ethical theory. However, the answer to the where from question is helpful in proving the universality, or mere existence of, natural law. But the answers to such questions are relatively simple: all human beings have needs, which are “basic human goods” (such as life, knowledge, and so on) which are intrinsically valuable. A secular natural law is a moral theory based upon human needs insofar as their possession is good and their privation is bad. It is universal inasmuch as these goods are necessary, which they are intrinsically (George). One additional theoretical consideration is in due order: namely, that of natural goodness. What is good naturally for the human being, and how does natural law reflect these natural values? Aristotle postulated that the good is not subjective and that something is good if it is somehow “perfective” of a being. What is meant by “perfective” of a being depends on the nature of the being involved. For example, what may be good for a dog is what is perfective of the dog, which of course depends on the nature of the natural kind dog. Accordingly, for a human, what is good depends on what may be perfective of a human being, which depends on the nature of a human being. Thus, the good is not defined fundamentally by reference to subjective desire, but is instead by the requirements for a characteristically good human life (Murphy). The “perfective” internal nature of certain institutions then relies on the concept of a “function”, where a function is a purpose or a telos. When certain “perfective” actions, in nature and in humans, are not fulfilled, this upsets what is a natural order in the cosmos. In the realm of human action, upsetting the natural order must be considered intrinsically immoral (Morris). Now, with these premises about natural law in place, we now must consider some aspects of metaphysical reality, which are undeniable, in order to base our claims on what natural law has to say about them. We must first recognize that human relationships between parent and child are not biologically determined, but are socially constructed. Filial respect is a function of a parent’s fulfillment of a moral commitment to provide nurturing for a defenseless infant. And political philosophy being the corollary of moral theory, political obligation is the result moral obligation. Marriage, properly constituted, is the political manifestation—a legal commitment—of a moral commitment to caring for the child. Although these observations do not at all take into consideration the sexes of the parents involved, the institution of marriage, although purely a political institution, is the product of sexuality (Pickett). Marriage is a “product of sexuality” insofar as there are many kinds of love, but only marriage is a legal contract between two non-related adults seeking a political contract to express a moral commitment to each other, and perhaps, to a child. Marriage is a contract which represents the only kind of love in which sexuality is involved. Still, this defining feature of marriage does not discount the possibility of same-sex marriage. Nevertheless, we must reflect on the purpose of sexuality, which is intimately related to the purpose of marriage, for marriage would not exist if not for sexuality. The purpose of sexuality is, undeniably, procreation, as it is neither for pleasure nor manipulation, and such is a natural fact. Call this natural fact NF-1. Another natural fact is that sexuality is instrumental to the institution of marriage, for sex is the ultimately expression of love and affection between two individuals who enter into a marriage. Call this natural fact NF-2. Combining NF-1 and NF-2, we derive a third natural fact, NF-3, which is that one major function, or telos, and perfective role of marriage is procreation by means of sexual reproduction. Trying to upset this perfective role is immoral, for what is perfective of anything is the good. One may object to NF-3 by saying that the function of marriage is, in fact, a legal commitment which expresses a moral commitment to another human being because of one’s love for that other person. However, this falls outside the proper realm of marriage, for if love and marriage were a product exclusively of love or commitment, a slippery slope would be introduced. Supporters of same-sex marriage, even though they present principled arguments, present logical conclusions which transcend their intentions, and leave no principled arguments with which to discriminate between same-sex marriage and polygamous marriage or incestuous marriage, which too violate natural law. Thus, even if NF-3 is disputable, the fact remains that NF-1 and NF-2 logically imply it, which means that the more fundamental claims about marriage and sexuality are less likely to be incorrect, and hence so is NF-3 less likely to be incorrect. To illustrate these points, they may need to be connected back to the notion of natural law and natural telos laid out in the beginning of this discussion. The Roman orator, in his De Republica, defined natural law by saying “[natural law] is right reason in agreement with Nature” (Cicero 45). In other words, that which is moral conforms to the dictates of metaphysics, which have been laid out previously by NF-1, NF-2, and NF-3. Homosexuality, in general, conflicts with the natural order of the universe; and accordingly, same-sex marriage, which is the political institution of a moral commitment, too violates the natural order of the universe. For a government, which controls political institutions, to sanction immoral actions is itself unjust and contrary to reason. Marriage, in summary, is a political contract which is based on a moral commitment and is itself representative of a love relationship based on sexuality, the perfective role of which is successful procreation, according to NF-1. Let us now address objections to the claims made above: namely, (1) that same-sex marriage introduces a possible slippery slope into incest and polygamous political institutions of marriage, and (2), our primary claim that same-sex marriage violates natural law. In response to (1), the defender of same-sex marriage may retort that each step in the “slope” can be analyzed and evaluated on its own merits. However, as previously explained, same-sex marriage advocates provide no discriminatory power between same-sex marriage and incestuous marriage with the fundamental premise that marriage is the “product of love”. Also in response to (1), the objector may claim that there is reason to ban polygamous marriages in which there has been historical evidence of an imbalance of power, coercion, and a financial burden placed on the state, and that none of these arguments can be applied to gay marriage. But this objection essentially strips away the same-sex marriage advocate’s fundamental premise that marriage is a product of love, making it simply a matter of practical economics, and shifting the focus of discussion away from morals and metaphysics and to pure politics and finances. In response to (2), the claim about natural law, the advocate of same-sex marriage can turn on any of three claims: (a) there is no requirement that two people who marry have sex; (b) homosexuality has been observed in non-human animals; and (c) if the only purpose for marriage is procreation, elderly people and infertile couples should not be allowed to marry, and that to allow them to marry undermines the thought that the perfective role of marriage is procreation. However, all three of these objections fail. In response to (a), the claim made above is not that the two parties in a marriage must have sex. A marriage is a contract which binds two people together by their moral commitments. But in a heterosexual marriage, the possibility of sex’s perfective role exists, whereas in a same-sex marriage, it does not. Thus, the creation of straw men for the arguments being presented here fails in the case of (a). In response to (b), scientific evidence shows that, in nature, homosexuality improves an individual’s reproductive success. That is, same-sex partners could improve their chances of climbing the social ladder and get better access to the opposite sex (Roughgarden). Hence, in animals, homosexuality is not an end-in-itself, but a means to procreative success, which undermines (b) directly. And, in response to (c), the marriage of elderly people and infertile couples does not violate natural law because there exists the possibility of sexuality’s perfective role, but only that the chance of this possibility’s actualization is minimal. That is, elderly people and infertile couples can quite naturally have sexual relations, but with very little chance of procreating. This objection fails on the grounds that it takes the difference between fertile and infertile heterosexual couples to be a difference in kind, as if infertile heterosexual couples are equivalent to fertile homosexuality couples. But the difference between fertile and infertile heterosexual couples is a difference by degree, and the difference between them and any type of homosexual couple is a difference in kind insofar as homosexuals and heterosexuals have no commensurable characteristics. Having answered some possible objections let it suffice to say that claims ordered (1) and (2) respectively stand against the most troubling refutations. We have established three natural facts and outlined a system of natural law which evaluates actions in terms of natural order and natural function in the universe. By assessing such metaphysical facts, we derived moral principles based on such natural order and postulated a corollary principle that same-sex marriage is morally unallowable in a political context. This account, much unlike many proffered in contemporary debates, does not lie immersed in a thick theological conception of natural law. This account is based purely on observations of science and common perception—applied to the realm of virtues and moral oughts. As Cicero said, “True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions” (Cicero 45). Homosexuality, treated as an end-in-itself and not as a means to sexual procreation, as it is done in nature, and the institution of same-sex marriage, violates the natural order of things in nature, including the perfective roles of sexuality and marriage in the context of human relationships. Not only this, but the logic of the opposition transcends their intentions and consequently justifies any perversion of marriage conceivable. Works Cited Bourdieu, Pierre. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De Republica: De legibus. Chicago: Heinemann, 1948. George, Robert P. In Defense of Natural Law. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001. Kainz, Howard P. Natural Law: An Introduction and Re-examination. Peru, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 2004. Morris, Larry A. The Male Heterosexual: Lust in His Loins, Sin in His Soul? New York: Sage Publications, 1997. Murphy, Mark. The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics. 23 September 2002. 10 November 2008 . Pickett, Brent. Homosexuality. 6 August 2002. 8 November 2008 . Roughgarden, Joan. "The in-crowd." New Scientist 17 January 2004. Read More