Fragante v City and County of Honolulu - Essay Example

FRAGANTE v. AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.1989) FACTS In the case of Fragante v. and County of Honolulu 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.1989), Manuel Fragante applied for a clerks job with the City and County of Honolulu (Defendants). Although he placed high enough on a civil service eligible list, he was not selected because of a perceived deficiency in relevant oral communication skills caused by his “heavy Filipino accent,” (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). Fragante then brought a suit, alleging that defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). The US District Court of Hawaii, found that the oral ability to communicate effectively and clearly was a legitimate occupational qualification for the job in question (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). The court also found that defendants failure to hire Fragante was explained by his deficiencies in the area of oral communication, not because of his national origin (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). Finding no proof of a discriminatory intent or motive by the defendant, the court dismissed the suit, hence, an appeal by Fragante (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). ISSUE Whether or not the City and County of Honolulu articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Fragantes non-selection (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). RULE AND ANALYSIS Title VII enunciates the policy that unlawful discrimination based on national origin shall not be permitted to exist in the workplace and also provides for the ‘preservation of an employers remaining freedom of choice’ (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(1982). The Court stated that Title VII aims to balance employee rights and employer prerogatives (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). The intent of the statute was to drive employers to focus on qualifications rather than on race, religion, sex, or national origin (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). The Court explained that an adverse employment decision may be predicated upon an individuals accent only when it interferes materially with job performance, and that there is nothing improper about an employer making an honest assessment of the oral communications skills of a candidate for a job when such skills are reasonably related to job performance (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). In this case, the defendants advertised for applicants to fill SR-8 vacancies (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). The job announcement required the ability to “deal tactfully and effectively with the public” and hence, the oral ability to communicate effectively in English, which is reasonably related to the normal operation of the clerks office (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). Said position required that one must be able to respond to the publics questions in a manner which the public can understand and involved dealing with a great number of disgruntled members of the public (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). In determining whether defendants established a factual basis for saying that Fragante would be hampered in performing this requirement, the Court found that Fragantes placed third in the interviewers’ record, based on his “pronounced accent which is difficult to understand,” (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). The Court noted that Fragante cannot point to facts which indicate that his ranking was based on factors other than his inability to communicate effectively with the public (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). Although the district court determined that the interview lacked some formality as to standards, instructions, guidelines, or criteria for its conduct and that the rating sheet was inadequate, the court said that these ‘insufficiencies’ were irrelevant with respect to plaintiffs complaint of unlawful discrimination (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). The persons who made the interview, namely, Kuwahara and McCandless, recorded their evaluation of Fragantes problem in separate written remarks on their rating sheets (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). This being a legitimate factual basis, the Court found that Fragante would be less able to perform the required duties was established (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). The Court also held that the inability to communicate effectively may be a valid ground for stating that a job applicant is not qualified (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). On whether said reason was a mere pretext for discrimination, the Appellant, was not able to prove this charge (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). The Court stated that although the process may not have been perfect, it reveals no discriminatory motive or intent (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). The Court did not find even a hint of a mixed motive such as that which existed in Price Waterhouse case (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). Hence, according to the Court, the defendants were motivated exclusively by reasonable business necessity (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). Fragante failed to get the job because two competitors had superior qualifications with respect to a relevant task performed by a government clerk (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). Having no proof whatsoever, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision in finding of “no discrimination,” (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). CONCLUSION The Court found that Fragante was passed over because of the deleterious effect of his Filipino accent on his ability to communicate orally, not merely because he had such an accent, which is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Fragantes non-selection (Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 1989). SMITH v. SHERIFF PURVIS 474 So.2d 1131 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) FACTS In the case of Smith v. Sheriff Purvis 474 So.2d 1131 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985), the Smiths took possession of a boat which they found lying beside the roadway in Mobile County. In seeing two sheriffs deputies, they stopped them to discuss the boat (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). The deputies, over the Smiths objections, impounded the boat (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). The Smiths then made it clear that if the true owner of the boat was not found they wanted it (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). No one claimed the boat, and it remained in the custody of the Mobile County Sheriffs Department (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). The Smiths sued for the boat and later for conversion (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). The Sheriff however, asserted a local ordinance enabling him to act as he did. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to finders, but ordered them to pay cost of storing boat (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). Hence, the finders appealed as to storage costs, and sheriff cross-appealed judgment against him and denial of his motion for summary judgment (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). ISSUE Whether or not the Smiths own the boat. RULE AND ANALYSIS The Court explained that, although there is a local ordinance passed pursuant to Act No. 596 of Alabama (1976 Ala.Acts, Act No. 596), which provides that any personal property found by a citizen in Mobile County, the sheriff, or one in the sheriffs employ, is deemed abandoned if the owner cannot be found within six months, and hence can hold a public auction, this however does not apply to the facts at hand (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). The Court agreed with the Smiths, in that, as finders of the boat, they acquired good title upon taking possession of the boat against all but the true owners (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). The Court cited that under section 35-12-1, Code 1975, the finder of a lost thing is not bound to take charge of it, but if he does so, he becomes a depository for the owner (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). The Court explained that in common law, the finder of a lost chattel acquired title and ownership of the chattel against all the world except the true owner (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). In this case, the Smiths found the boat and took possession of it with the intent to keep it against all but the true owner (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). Under section 35-12-1 they were entitled to do so and to keep the boat, unless the true owner appeared and demanded the same (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). The Court examined that under both the local county ordinance and sections 35-12-1 through -6, Code 1975, these statutes purport to govern the facts of this case, but the application of both will render conflicting results (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). Given this, the Court stated that conflicting statutes should be reconciled and construed in harmony with each other and, in interpreting statutes, the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statutes, must be considered (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). The Court explained that the legislature, by authorizing the ordinance to be adopted, intended to create a system whereby lost or abandoned property found in Mobile County by the sheriff or by a citizen and voluntarily turned over to the sheriff could be disposed of (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). On the other hand, the legislative intent of section 35-12-1, Code 1975, is that a citizen who found lost property and wanted to keep it could hold it against everyone except the true owner (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). Hence, the Court said that the intention of the legislature in the first instance is to provide for the disposition of lost property found by a citizen who did not wish to keep it and in the other instance, to authorize a citizen who found lost property and wanted to keep it to do so against the wishes of everyone except the true owner (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). In the case at bar, the Smiths desired to keep the boat and only reluctantly turned it over to the sheriffs deputies (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). The Court of Civil Appeals stated that the trial court correctly concluded that the Smiths were entitled to the boat, but incorrectly found as to the storage costs as the local ordinance did not apply (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). Finally, the Court stated that there was not a scintilla of evidence that the Smiths voluntarily relinquished possession of the boat to the sheriff nor did they place the boat with the sheriff for storage as is permitted by the local law (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). CONCLUSION The Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the summary judgment awarding possession of the boat to the Smiths is correct, but that part of the judgment requiring the Smiths to pay the sheriff storage costs is in error and must be set aside (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). The denial of the sheriffs motion for summary judgment is correct (Smith v. Purvis, 1985). Works Cited Fragante v. City and Country of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.1989). Smith v. Sheriff Purvis, 474 So.2d 1131 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985). Read More