Ethical Treatment of Animals and Animal Rights - Essay Example

Animal Rights Introduction: Animal rights is the idea that all animals are en d to certain rights because they also possess moral rights, as a result of which those rights should be recognized within the framework of the law.1 Animal interests should also be considered on an equal basis with those of humans, and excluding animals from such consideration would be tantamount to a form of discrimination known as specicism.2 The idea that “all animals are equal” refers to the principle of equal consideration of interests, as put forth by Singer: “The interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being.”3 As a result, no distinction is to be made between the rights of human beings and the right of animals, and according preferential treatment to human beings as opposed to animals would be morally and ethically a wrong principle. However, the question that arises in this context is, can animals be ascribed a moral status that is equal to human beings? They are sentient beings just like us and they also feel pain, therefore it would be morally and ethically wrong to kill them or cause them pain. Should they then be accorded equal consideration as human beings in terms of the rights that are accorded to them? Analysis: Singer has defined specicism as “a prejudice or attitude of bias towards the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.”4 As a result, human beings apply a double standard, whereby human beings are accorded a privileged moral status while non humans are not. According to Wise, human rights are a function of human autonomy, which implies a high level of moral reasoning, and such autonomy cannot exist independently of human dignity.5 Since animals do not possess this power to reason and make moral choice, this implies that they are on a plane that is inferior to human beings. Cohen argues that a person who is entitled to a right should be in a position to recognise “possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked.” On this basis, he also rejects Singer’s argument which argues for animals to have equal rights, on the basis that mentally regressive human beings are incapable of moral judgments and yet are accorded rights. Cohen states instead that the test for moral judgment cannot be one that is “administered to humans one by one.”6 Therefore, his criticism of equal rights for animals is based on their inability to execute moral judgments and that animals cannot be equated to mentally disabled humans in this aspect. Ethical treatment of animals and the question of protection of their rights arise from the perspective of whether or not it suffers. Animals are conscious beings that have a point of view or perspective and definitely suffer when pain is inflicted on them. On this basis, animal rights proponents such as Peter Singer7 advocate a position whereby the interests of conscious beings turn on the absence of suffering. Segliman has written about dogs involved in animal research experiments that were subjected to repeated shocks and became very depressed as a result, resulting in both physical and mental helplessness of the animal.8 This provides a clear indication that animals do become debilitated as a result of pain, and they most likely feel pain and suffering even if they do not have the means to express their suffering. The perspective of animal rights activists is thus the fact that the self-awareness or autonomy that animals possess, entitles them to the right to possess their own bodies and remain unrestricted in their movements and freedom. It is likely that animals experience frustration when such freedoms are diminished. Moreover, when there is a curtailment of autonomy and freedom, which is also coupled with the infliction of suffering, the result is an undesirable outcome that must be addressed through a removal of suffering and restriction by allowing the rights of the animals to be recognized on par with humans and with an equal consideration of their interests. Fox reiterates the utilitarian views of Bentham9 who spelt out the criterion for deciding how animals are to be treated, which should not to be dependent upon whether they can reason or talk, but whether they suffer. According to Bentham, animal pain is as real as human pain and the ability to suffer must be the determinant of how we treat other beings, since using the criterion of reason to determine the same would mean that beings like babies and the disabled would be treated badly, because they do not have the requisite moral reasoning power.10 This is also the basis of Singer’s argument that animals should be accorded equal consideration and their rights should be considered on par with those of human beings. On the basis of the above, it may thus be noted that there are two main reasons why animal rights proponents like Singer advocate that animals should be accorded rights on par with human beings and contest the double standard that places animals on an inferior level as compared to humans. These two reasons are (a) animals also suffer as much as human beings and should not be allowed to suffer and (b) animals should not be placed on an inferior level merely on the basis that they do not have moral reasoning capacity, because this would mean that we would need to place disabled humans and babies who do not have the moral reasoning capacity on an inferior level as well. But as pointed out above, Cohen has rejected this argument because the ability to engage in moral reasoning must be applied to a species as a whole and not on an individual basis. Moreover, it is only those beings that are capable of recognizing what is good and just who can be accorded a high status. Since animals do not possess the facility of even recognizing what is moral and good, they cannot be legitimately be placed on par with humans and accorded similar rights. Another criticism that has been raised of the position of activists like Singer advocating animal rights and equal consideration of interests, is Scruton’s view that rights can be assigned only to those who are able to understand the obligations that go along with such rights. Expecting an animal to understand the obligations co-existing with rights and ensuring preservation of equal rights for animals with humans will be also difficult to actually execute in practice. In this context he cites two examples to illustrate this difficulty in demarcation of the extent to which animal rights should be practiced – the first in support of foxhunting in order to protect the habitat of the foxes11 while on the other, he condemns factory farming on the grounds that animals are subjected to inhuman conditions.12 Both these conditions raise the moral dilemma of how far rights are to be protected in the absence of a concomitant understanding of the responsibilities that go alone with rights. The question of obligations running concurrent with rights is also addressed by Carruthers, who argues that the framework of the law is geared towards enforcing rules that are a part of a hypothetical social contract13 that exists among the members of a particular society – i.e, humans. Consequently, animals are not included within this group and as a result, humans have no obligations towards them to treat them equally under the law.14 Humans and non humans cannot exist as a part of one society because humans have the power of moral reasoning and understand the responsibilities and obligations that go along with moral rights; therefore they deserve to have those rights accorded to them because they know how to exercise it responsibly. Animals on the other hand have no conception of moral rights and therefore cannot exercise obligations and responsibilities that go along with them. On this basis, they cannot be placed in the same social group as human beings, because rules cannot be enforced on animals like they can be on humans. While humans deserve the rights because they are aware of the responsibilities that go along with those rights and can be held accountable for failing to adhere to those responsibilities, animals cannot be similarly held responsible and therefore cannot be accorded the same rights. This forms the basis of the arguments advocated by those who argue that animals are not equal to human beings and therefore they cannot be accorded the same rights as humans are. Conclusions: The arguments of animal rights activists have depended on the core principle that animals must be accorded equal consideration with human beings. “All animals are equal” is a theme frequently reiterated in the arguments of animal rights activists and as may be noted from the above discussion, it concerns the equating of animals and human beings. Equal consideration is to be provided to animals, in the same manner as it is provided to human beings. They cannot be treated as if they are inferior beings because this would mean that one species will be treated differently from another. Are non human animals our moral equals? This is the crux of the debate between those animal activitists and those who argue that animal interests cannot be accorded equal consideration with human beings. Nevertheless, activists such as Tom Regan view animals as self-conscious beings that have a distinct point of view and on this basis; they have certain fundamental rights, such as the right not to suffer through confinement or through the infliction of pain.15 Ryder is of the view that all beings that feel pain like human beings deserve rights equivalent with human rights, therefore their moral rights accrue from the equivalency in terms of suffering.16 According to Regan, non-human animals have the same rights as humans because the rights accorded to humans are based upon their cognitive abilities, which some sentient or self-conscious animals also possess, therefore they also have moral rights, just as humans do.17 Therefore, Regan’s contention for equal moral status for animals is on the basis of their cognitive abilities. As stated above, Singer’s argument for establishment of equal moral status for animals is on the basis of eschewing specicism or the practice of treating one species differently from another. Also corroborating Regan’s views for ascribing moral status to animals is Francoine, who is of the view that the status of animals under the law as property is the root cause of the ill-treatment meted out of them.18 Animals are viewed solely as the property of human beings, therefore their identity as separate beings entitled to exercise their autonomy and live in freedom is completely ignored where the question of their rights is concerned. Therefore, he vigorously advocates animal rights and presses for the abolishing of the status of animals as property under the law. Singer and Regan share a similar view where animal testing such as that used in research is concerned - both experts advocate the abolishing of all kinds of testing because it would be ethically and morally wrong to make an animal suffer, because it is a living being like us Accordingly, the focus of those who press for animal rights is the notion that they have moral rights, on one grounds or the other and therefore on this basis, they should be accorded rights on par with humans and accorded equal consideration. The membership of animals in the community of living beings is undisputed, although they belong to a different species from human beings. It is also not difficult to arrive at a determination that animals do not have moral reasoning power. It is also true that animals are not capable of understanding complex moral obligations and responsibilities that go along with rights. The question of obligations that go along with rights is an important aspect, because rights can be accorded only when their significance can be comprehended by right holders who possess the ability to make choices. Therefore, animals cannot be completely equated to human beings in a moral sense, because they do not comprehend the obligations due from rights holders, nor do they possess the ability to make choices. Applying Singer’s argument about specicism from the moral perspective, animals and human beings cannot be placed on an equal footing where their moral reasoning powers are concerned. They belong to different species and possess differing levels of moral and cognitive ability. However, applying Singer’s argument that animals merit equal consideration, there is a certain amount of validity that exists in this argument, because animals also suffer pain as much as human beings do and because they also have some cognitive powers, they must be treated with consideration and their rights must be respected. The fact that animals suffer does mandate equal consideration for their rights as living beings. While animals may not be capable of the levels of complex moral thinking and reasoning that human beings are capable of, nevertheless as Regan and others have argued, they are capable of feeling pain and share cognitive abilities to some extent. This alone is sufficient to place them on a moral par with human beings, albeit it may not be on exactly the same level. Therefore, it would be correct to conclude that non human beings are our moral equals to some extent, in so far as they feel pain and possess cognitive abilities. Animals are not exactly equal to human beings in every quality and ability they possess. However, from a moral perspective, engaging in actions that cause then pain or kill them would be wrong in a moral sense, because they are also living beings. As cited earlier, Francoine has pointed out that the status of animals has been equated to that of property, which is akin to placing animals on par with non living objects. As a result of this, cruelty and inhumane treatment to animals is condoned as if it were being inflicted upon non living objects. From a moral and ethical perspective, this is wrong because animals feel pain and are capable of suffering, apart from which they also possess some level of cognitive abilities. Therefore they deserve equal consideration; since they are also living beings like human beings, they must be accorded consideration on moral and ethical grounds. Thus it may be concluded that despite the arguments that have rightly pointed out that animals are not equal to human beings, animals are our moral equals in a certain sense. They are out moral equals to the extent that they feel pain and suffering and possess cognitive abilities the way we do. On this basis, they deserve humane treatment from human beings, since common decency and morality dictates that they be treated with equal consideration because they are living being, not inanimate property. Bibliography * Bentham J, 2000. “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”, The Library of Economics and Liberty. , (20 November, 2007 * Carruthers P, “The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice”, Cambridge University Press. * Cohen C, 1986. “The case for the use of animals in biomedical research” New England Journal of Medicine, 314(14): 865-70, < http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~norcross/Cohen.pdf>, (November 20, 2007). * Francoine G, 2000. “Introduction to animal rights: Your child or the dog?”, Temple University Press, Philadelphia. * Franklin JH, 2005. “Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy”, Columbia University Press, New York * Regan T, 1984. “The Case for Animal Rights”, Routledge, New York. * Ryder R, “All beings that feel pain deserve human rights” The Guardian, 6 August 2005, , (20 November, 2007). * Scruton R, 1998. “Animal Rights and Wrongs” Demos, London. * Seligman ME, “Depression and Learned Helplessness” in Friedmand RJ & Katz MM (eds), The Psychology of Depression: Contemporary Theory and Research, V.H. Winston and Sons, 1974, , (20 November, 2007). * Singer P, 1990. “Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals and Practical Ethics”, 2nd ed, New York Review of Books. * Singer, P, “All Animals are Equal” at pp 390 * Singer P, 1975. “Animal Liberation”, 2nd ed, Avon Books, New York. * Wise S, 2000. “Bending Toward Justice” IN Wise SM, “Rattling the Cage”, Perseus Publishing, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Read More