Shipboard Management Issues - Essay Example

Ship board management On 6th March 1987 the RORO passenger ferry Herald of Free Enterprise left the port of Zeebruge according to scheduled run to Dover few minutes after 6 pm. There were a crew of 80 and 459 passengers along with cars and other vehicles. It met with a disaster due to sinking after passing from outer most point of harbor. This resulted in death of 150 passengers and 38 of them were the crew.1 The accident of Ro Ro vessel unraveled number of lapses in the systems of rescue of passengers on board. If the ship or a ferry sinks some important precautions must be taken. There was no message to people on board that is capable of saving them. The people who were killed in the accident were those ones who did not try to come out of the ship. When a ship inclines for 30 degrees and more it will be dangerous for the passengers. When the ship is tilted the life boats cannot be released, so the warning system must alert passengers before the tilt takes place. In this condition the passengers did not understand the advantage of taking life rafts and use the life vests on the ship. By the time they understood the situation is out of control. The life rafts were not easy to use and board. They over turned when used by the passengers. It is difficult to assemble them by the people on board. This did not ensure any protection to passengers at the time of accident The supervision regarding the safety measures was not up to mark as some rafts were checked repeatedly and some were left without checking. This caused the destroying the roofs of the rafts for identification by the rescue helicopters. As there are many people to be rescued the number of helicopters did not comply with the need. They were over crowded. The number of rescue crew that came with the helicopters was not enough when compared to the number of people to be rescued. The investigation through the video tapes revealed the bow door failure. The failure was due to separation of it from the ferry. The ramp and screen of the bow were damaged and there is no supervision regarding it. This disturbed normal safety measures implementation. The video monitoring that should be done was limited to some part of the vessel only and the bow door and the adjacent parts were not monitored by it. The monitoring of the video was up to that extent only that it is useful after the accident to estimate that up to how much extent and in how much time the water entered the vessel. 1 The crew in operation also did not know about these lapses. Had they know it, they might have reversed the ship which could have avoided the accident by sinking in deep water. This reveals the communication gap between the administration of the ship and crew in operation. After this a joint agreement between different states took place to influence and amend the administrative issues regarding the prohibition of inspection. Not only did the investigations about the sinking of the vessel, the investigation set a stage for enacting further safety measures on board of every vessel. The commissioner for wrecks, Mr Justice Sheen stated that it was the duty f the officer loading the main vehicle deck to see that the bow doors were safe and secure before leaving the harbour. Not only in this case the commissioner found after this investigation that this safety instruction was regularly violated by number of managements of the ship and other officers who monitor the loading of vehicle deck. In this particular case it was found that the officer left the responsibility of closing the bow doors to his assistant. This comes under the violation of standing instructions. The commissioner criticized the ship management company regarding the violation of safety measures and stated the need of considering the strict compliance to the safety measures. When the above statement of commissioner was considered the main responsibility of the disaster lies with the chief officer, his assistant and senior master who was responsible for the monitoring of implementation of the safety measures. When investigation was continued into the administrative lapses, it can be found that the management of the company found fault with the safe management of their vessels. But the cause for the disaster was that they delayed in giving the orders for the strict implementation of the safety measures. The lack of communication between the directors of the company as well as the lack of communication between the management and the middle management resulted in delaying orders. The lack of thought and planning also was one of the reason for the delay in order to crew of the ship. The management present at harbor also can be held responsible for over looking the safety measures to be followed. Report regarding the safety measures after the accident of Hereld of Free Enterprise: It was observed that when the ship increased the speed, the bow wave exceeded the free board and the water entered the lower deck through bow doors. This prompted for the improvement of safety in ro ro vessels. Though the safety measures were recognized long back the efficiency in transportation dominated the safety considerations. This prompted in introducing internationally, the IMO network of convention requirements.1 The big open space near the water line was considered as the reason for the loss of stability. This may result in breach of water tight security. The safety measure suggested is that, if the surace there was heeled and free surface is reduced, there is a chance of regaining of stability. The next preferential risk is the collision risk. There was not much concentration on wave impact forces on the bow doors. The another item that attracted attention in the report is that the damage stability in the case of final flooding. The ro ro ferries will survive only in calm conditions, if there is less free board. For this purpose, the metacentric height along with free board space is increased. The heeling that was considered before to avoid the flooding at bow doors can be an obstruction at the stage of final flooding. To over come this difficulty the ferry should stay upright for sufficient time to evacuate passengers. The increase of meta centric height and increase of free board space can make this possible. These things were accepted internationally and implemented through IMO. Despite the criticism the commissioner stated that according to the law the owners did not commit any offence. The section 44 of the merchant shipping act of 1979 was not breached.1 The law in section 44 dealt only with the condition of machinery and hull status. It did not deal with the safety measures like door status and conditions. This exposes the lapses in the regulations regarding the safety measurements of the ships and ferries. The court deciding on the petition of the kin of the dead concluded that there is no ground for corporate manslaughter against the shipping company. The reason is that the investigations did not produce sufficient investigation for that type of offence. Till this disaster happened there was doubt about convicting the company but after this judgment it was concluded that there was no statutory provision to convict the company due to the lapses or violation of safety measures. Due to the absence of the provisions of convicting the company no charge was able to bring company under the preview of law. This is due to the fact that all the safety and security measures that are developed and adopted by IMO and member and coastal countries were regarding the safety of the vessel and the security from the robbers and gangs that invade ships. But there was no provision to make the owner of the ship or vessel responsible for the violation of the rules and regulations. This disaster caused the rise of view that the company must be made responsible for the violation of the safety and security measures. According to R v Cory (1927) the company cannot be responsible for the violation of safety norms by crew and staff in the harbour. 1 The corporate companies act collectively to escape from the prosecution which makes difficult for the administrations to bring a statute that can book the companies. According to the law the responsibility of the individual is less than the criminal culpability. The negligence does not matter to the criminal nature of manslaughter. But the laws that were after that gave a hope of bringing the companies under the statute. The UK government established Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) to reflect the arrangements that were in place to investigate. The investigations include the casualties. The investigations of MCA were passed on to MAIB for consideration in preparing the report. The report targeted the fact that the regulation must be in a form of avoiding the disasters but not blaming any one for it. One of the rules may be involving the company management in case of disaster. Leadership regarding shipboard management and for avoiding the disasters: A combination of rational approach to leadership with a concern for his followers and ethics must be followed by both captains and the managers in the company. The managers must concentrate on safety measrures along with the efficiency in transportation. The transportation efficiency should not interfere in the safety matters of the passengers and crew. The managers of the marine transportation companies and the captains of the ships must apply themselves the principles of stewardship and servant leadership. By internalizing the core values the development of the character will result in efficient handling of the situation in crisis. According to George Shelley, the best way to define a man's character is to seek out the particular mental or moral attitude that comes out of him in crisis. Similarly the best way to tell about the leadership qualities is the way the managers of the company deal with the crew and the way the captains of the ships act with the crew and the passengers in the time of crisis and danger. In the time of crisis and danger the principles of stewardship and servant leadership can help in saving the crew and the passengers. This must be the culture of a transport company ant the persons who lead the crew in the middle of the sea. To attain this stage a leader cannot be appointed directly. Experiencing the hard work along with the knowledge is required for the leader who was concerned with the safety of number of persons. So the leadership positions in marine transportation should not be the direct appointments. They should experience the hard work from the grass root level and then they must be promoted to the top level according to their character. This will ensure the safety of the crew and passengers along with efficiency in transportation. ISM Code The most significant consequence of Herald disaster was development of ISM code which was designed to improve the safety operations of the ship by making management at various levels and various places responsible for violation and disaster.The purpose of the code is to provide safety management in the ships along with prevention of pollution. This code has the rules and duties of the ship master and responsibilities of management for maritime safety and pollution prevention. The management at different levels and places were brought under the purview of this law. This code makes the commitment at the top level of the management critical for the good safety management system. This code means that it is the code of international safe operation of ships and for pollution prevention as adopted by the assembly of IMO. The term company in the code means the owner of the ship. If the ship is having individual owner instead of a group the term company points the owner and make him liable for the happening. The administration must comply with the code to make the ships move in the international waters and to get certain security measures. The safety mangement system in the code is a structured document that enables the company staff to implement the safety management effectively. The IMO issues a safety management certificate to the ships belonging to the countries that comply with the code which enables the ship board management to operate in accordance with the safety management system in various places. The document talks about objective evidence which is either qualitative or quantitative. The records or facts were considered as objective evidence. The safety management audit will be conducted which will act as substantial objective evidence in case of violation. By giving anniversary dates the expiry date of the ship was mentioned on it and enables the management at various places to avoid violation regarding the expiry conditions of the ship. Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 31 0 28 21 31 0 30 0 31 0 30 0 31 0 31 0 30 0 31 0 30 0 31 0 372000 84000 381600 378000 390600 378000 387500 375900 375000 387500 375000 387500 12000 12000 12600 12600 12600 12600 12600 12500 12500 12500 12500 12500 31 7 31 30 31 30 31 31 30 31 30 31 The rows in the above coloumn represent the following order Days in the month. Dry dock days Amount for one day hire Total revenue in that month Days of hire in each month 1. Media wiki, 2006, M/s Estonia, Wiki pedia, , electronic, 28-10-06, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MS_Estonia 2.Herry lawford, 2002, Criminal responsibility in shipping. MLAANZ conference, ,electronic, 28-10-06, http://www.mlaanz.org/docs/Herry%20Lawford.doc 3. IMO, 2002, ISM code, IMO, ,electronic, 28-10-06, http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asptopic_id=287 4. IMO, 2005, COMSAR, IMO, electronic, 28-10-06, http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asptopic_id=1321&doc_id=6174 5. IMO, 2006, MSC, IMO, ,electronic, 28-10-06, http://www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asptopic_id=1321&doc_id=6306 6.MCA team, 2006, International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention, IMO, ,electronic, 28-10-06, http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/mcga-guidance-regulation/mcga-dqs-ss_guidance_to_surveyors/dqs-instuctions-ism.htm 7. Author not mentioned, 2000, International conventions, legislation, regulations, cooperation, web and wire.com, ,electronic, 8-12-06, http://webandwire.com/chapt09.html Read More