The Muslim Insurgency in Thailand - Essay Example

The Muslim Insurgency in Thailand Introduction: Thailand is a country that became familiar with the West through the novel The King And I and its subsequent musical adaptation 'Anna and the King of Siam'. The country is bordered by Burma, Cambodia and Malaysia. From 2004 onwards this relatively peaceful country has been experiencing conflicts with the Muslim population concentrated in the southern parts of the country. This paper deals with the situation and focuses on the events that had happened there, relationship between the government of Thailand and its Muslim population. It then moves on to analyze the cause of violence and the social, economical, and political fallout caused by the violence and ends with a conclusion from what is understood from this analysis. Thailand - A Brief History: It is prudent to include a brief history of the country so as to analyze whether the present disturbances faced by the country has any its roots in its history. Thailand is credited to have been in existence from the late 1300's itself and till 1930, was known as the Siam. Even though, it is a constitutional monarchy, the country had its shares of coups and the last one had happened as late as September 2006. 95% of its population is Buddhist, with Muslims constituting a meagre 4.5% and other minority groups forming the rest. Its main source of income is through exports of electronics and machinery. Tourism too is a major revenue earner and Pattaya beach is a very popular tourist destination. It has a healthy per capita income of USD 3700 and an envious unemployment rate of only 1.5% of the labor force. "Thais date the founding of their nation to the 13th century." (Background Note: Thailand: Profile: History, 2008). The Ongoing insurgency in Thailand: Since 2001- the same year that Thaksin Shinawatra assumed the prime ministership of Thailand - the Southern provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat have been rocked by almost unprecedented violence. Although some accounts trace the cite January 4th, 2004 - the date of an attack on an army base in Narathiwat (which produced four deaths) and 20 school burnings - as the true start of the violence that has since continued unabated. In what amounts to the gravest political violence in Thailand's recent history, during 2004 and 2005 almost 2,000 separate assaults shook the three Southern promises and claimed more than 1,000 lives. Though Prime Minister Thaksin was celebrated by some for his "businesslike solutions" to various problems, following the January 2004 assaults, his government and forces responded to the violence with hard-line tactics that apparently including a number of covert, illicit actions on the parts of military and security personnel. Yet the imposition of martial law throughout the South and intense, heavy-handed policing tactics failed to staunch the deadly attacks. Indeed, the assaults appeared to become ever more sophisticated and more fatal. The roots of ongoing crisis date back more than 100 years to the prolonged fighting which led the annexation, in the early twentieth century, of the majority-Muslim Malay sultanate of Pattani into the Kingdom of Siam. Such analysts note that, for decades following the annexation, the Thai regime employed authoritarian policies intended to consolidate an expanded, Thai-dominated nation-state, moving aggressively to prevent Malay-Muslims from preserving their traditional cultural and ethnic identities. Perhaps not unsurprisingly, many Malay-Muslims resisted official policies that sought, in effect, to eradicate their traditions and clamored for separation from Thailand, but the Thai regime responded to that resistance with even fiercer and more repressive measures. From the 1960s and into the late 1980s, "separatist" groups were active in the South, with levels of tension and violence reaching particularly high levels during the 1970s, when the so-called "separatist movement" reached a peak. During the 1980s, the Thai government under Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanond initiated new policies towards Malay-Muslims in the southern border provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, Songkhia, and Satun. In contrast to the old, largely counter-productive emphasis on fierce repression, the new policies extended at least a measure of acceptance of the Malay-Muslims' cultural distinctiveness, granting them greater cultural and religious freedoms, and seeking to encourage their participation in community development efforts intended at ameliorating their economic circumstances and their quality of life. By most accounts, the policies of tolerance and economic development aimed at the Malay-Muslims did work to assuage the "separatist" movements in the south. But after insurgency restarted in 2004, it has grown steadily worse with the Thai Government admitting that its policy had failed in its attempts at bringing down the violence. "Some are already calling it war, a brutal Muslim separatist insurgency in southern Thailand that has taken as many as 2,000 lives in three years." (Mydans). Relationships between the Thailand Government and its Muslim population had been uneasy ever since it incorporated the Muslim dominated regions south of Thailand as its own territory almost 100 years back. This happened when a border demarcation agreement with the then British Malaya was put into action and four regions namely Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Songkhla, and Satun came under Thai rule. In the period following World War II, there was widespread sympathy in Malaysia for the Malays who became part of Thailand because of the demarcation agreement. There were indications that the Malay Muslims of Thailand were thinking about autonomy or reunification with Malaysia. At that time the Malaysian Government was worried about the rise of communism in that country. In a mutually beneficial agreement, Malaysia agreed that it would not support any insurgency in Southern Thailand for autonomy or reunification with Malaysia by the Muslim majorities and in return Thailand agreed that it would give sanctuary to Malaysian communists. This was formalized in 1976 through an agreement called the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. This was a blow to the southern Muslims, but an advantage to the Thai government because it was assured of non interference by Malaysia in this matter. Even though the Malaysian government has voiced its concern over human rights concerns, it has never tried to interfere in Thailand's problems with the insurgents. There were also resentment when attempts for a 'national identity' started by Thailand. One of the policies was that Thai language was to be taught in all schools across the country. The Malay speaking population of the south saw this as an attempt to destroy their own identity. This was one of the reasons state run schools were made a target of attacks throughout the insurgency. Underdevelopment and human rights violations have also contributed to worsening relationships between the two. In 1960 feeble attempts were made at conciliation when a residency was established at the behest of the king of Thailand. But the residency was soon replaced by provincial councils that were appointed by the Government. The Thai government has always been accused of countering insurgency through heavy handed efforts worsening the relationships further. Till the resurgence of insurgency in 2004, the Thai government had dismissed violent incidents as the work of bandits. The fact that communism was beginning to take hold in the northern parts of the country also was a reason why the government considered the problems in the south as minor and of no consequence. The Muslim schools of the south were also considered as radical by the government and all such institutions were to be brought under the control of the Ministry of Interior so that they may not accept foreign aid. Serious conciliatory efforts were made by the Thaksin Government by an announcement of $500 million as aid to the development of the south. "The Thai Cabinet approved a $500 million aid package to the southern provinces - further proof that the Thaksin government is deeply worried about alienation in the Muslim south." (Smith). An Islamic university is also proposed to be set up as a branch of the Al-Azhar University of Egypt. But it should be mentioned here that the Muslims had a fair share of representation in the country's parliament trough the Democrat party, the dominant party of the south. The Thai Government also had cabinet ministers from the community like Wan Muhamad Nor Matha, who had a role in helping the Thaksin government to tackle sensitive issues. The Ministry or Education and Interiors of the government also take advice from the National Council of Muslims comprising of five eminent Muslims. The interim prime minister of Thailand, Mr. Surayud Chulanont had apologized to his southern Muslim citizens for the violence heaped on them by the Thaksin government in the pretext of tackling insurgency. The new government has also formed the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center for the purpose of to as a link between southern leaders and the Government. It also has promised to see that more Muslims are given opportunities in getting government posts. "The military government again established the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center to restore links between leaders in the south and Bangkok as well as a civilian-police-military task force." (Zissis). It has now been established that there are eight identifiable groups who operate in Southern Thailand engaged in terrorist and subversive activities. They are the United Front for the Independence of Pattani (Bersatu ), Mujahideen Pattani Movement (BNP), Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP), Barasi Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP), Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (GMIP), Mujahideen Islamic Pattani Group and Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO). (Military: Thailand Islamic Insurgency). Causes of Violence: a. Autonomy: The annexation of the three provinces that formed the Kingdom of Pattaya had resulted in a Muslim dominated population being ruled by a Buddhist government. Moreover efforts at bringing them into the Buddhist mainstream had caused resentment among the people of the annexed state. Such a situation resulted in a clash of cultures which about the feeling for the need for autonomy. "This was the beginning of the Thai state's attempts to "Thai-icize" the Malays of southern Thailand." (Upward). b. Corruption and criminal influence: Southern Thailand has been a place dominated by corrupt government/military officials and politicians. A nexus between growing criminal elements and corrupt officials is an ideal breeding ground for violence. Criminal activities like dealing in illegal arms, drugs, prostitution, human trafficking and black marketing are commonplace. Such a situation will result in violence that is not politically motivated or influenced by radical Islamism. "While the violence may well have had external influences, several informed political and security analysts in Thailand believe the current spate of attacks has more to do with entrenched criminal interests than localized or imported Islamic radicalism." (Holt). c. Underdevelopment: The short history of Thailand given at the start of the paper had shown that economic factors in the country were satisfactory. But this rate of development and prosperity had not taken place in the southern part of the country. The violence that erupted as a result of insurgency has partly been due this underdeveloped state of southern Thailand. "To some extent, the political articulation of ethnic consciousness in Pattani can be explained as a response to the economic, cultural and political subordination of the Muslim communities as a consequence of "internal colonialism." (Croissant). c. Islamic Fundamentalism: Many youth from this problem region had taken part in militant activity in Afghanistan. They came back with military training and radical ideas imbibed during their stay abroad. This situation would naturally manifest itself into violence. Impact of Violence: The violence due to insurgency has been going on since the state of Pattani had been annexed to Thailand in the early 1900's. It is true that its level had risen and fallen with times. After a period of relative peace, violence erupted again in 2004 and since them more than 2000 Muslims and Buddhists have been killed, either by insurgents or by security forces. What will such a situation have on the social structure of a country It has been mentioned before that Buddhism constitutes 95% of the population and Muslims just 4.5%. Terrorism is an activity where size does not matter. It has been proved with telling effect by the attack on the World Trade Centre. What will ultimately happen to the social structure in Thailand is an alienation among the two religious groups. This alienation will also affect the lives of those Muslims who were not a part of the Malay. They were those who moved into the country voluntarily for different reasons. They are at present living in relative peace and prosperity in different areas in the country. Hostility towards the southerners will ultimately be directed at those Muslims who have no hand or interest in the activities of the Malay Muslims. The political fallout due to insurgency in southern Thailand resulted in the coup that overthrew the Thaksin Government. The main justification given was that the overthrown government had mismanaged the whole affair. Thing would have been better if the insurgents had been handled with more care instead of the violent reprisals taken up by the previous government. The coup leaders, though unlikely to bring in drastic changes in the Emergency Decree of 2005, had promised negotiations with the aggrieved persons. But the problem here is that even though several terrorist groups have been identified, none of them have come forward for negotiations. Only one group, the PULO have showed willingness to come to the negotiating table. But they no longer hold much sway on insurgents inside the country because they are an exiled group. As long as the insurgents feel no real threat from the government, a willingness to negotiate will not be there. This is true in the case of Thailand since no major arrests of insurgency leaders been made since the restart of violence. "There have been no meaningful arrests, their network is intact, their technical proficiency and experience is improving by the day, they can attack at will and the government's policies continue to alienate the population." (Abuza). There are two main areas where insurgency will affect Thailand negatively. One is tourism and the other is foreign investment. Thailand is a popular tourist destination and continued insurgency will hit the tourism industry hard. But tourism is a very resilient industry and even if negatively impacted, can pick itself up once problems cease to exist. Until then the inflow of tourists to Thailand will be reduced significantly. Foreign direct investment will be more seriously hit since the money involved will be much higher and the time taken for investments to become operational quite long. The domestic industry will also be negatively affected. This situation has affected the south more than other parts of the country. Threats of cutting of ears and even killing are made to shopkeepers who open on Fridays and other Muslim Holy days. "Most vendors stay home, terrorized by leaflets threatening to kill or cut off the ears of anyone who works on the Muslim holy day." (Pinyorat). Conclusion: Terrorism is the twentieth century is perceived as mainly caused by Muslims the world over. A very pertinent article written by Graham E Fuller in the February 2000 issue of the Foreign Policy Magazine gives a hypothetical view of a world without Islam. The issue discussed was, will level of terrorism be different if the Islamic religion did not exist. Would the levels of suicide attacks, hijackings, car bombings, jihads and fatwas be non existent A sudden response to such a question would be that there would lesser problems in the world today if such a situation existed. But the author analyses the issue and comes up with a strong argument that things would not be much different in either case. He builds up his argument in the following way. It would not be accurate to say that if Islam did not exist, the whole Middle East would be Christians. The early European expansion known as the Crusades happened not because of the need to reform pagan religions. It was a push to gain social, political and social advantages. An imaginary Christian Middle East would not have welcomed such a move. The result would be resistance to the colonialism of the West as had happened in many parts of the world like India, China, Vietnam and Africa. The move to protect oil fields by superpowers is not for the benefit of the owners, but for the self interests of the protectors. Again would democracy be more common without the Muslims. Many Christian nations like Spain and Portugal had dictatorships and some of them ended only in the latter half of the twentieth century. Christian dominated countries in Latin America still have dictatorships. The situation in the Middle East would not have been any different whatever religion existed. Christian persecution of Jews ultimately resulted in the formation of Israel, who in turn turned out thousands of nomadic Arabs who had been living there for centuries. Iraqis would not have welcomed the US invasion of that country had they been Christians. The author also argues that it is religious insecurity that gives rise to aggressiveness, because otherwise people fear that their religion would ultimately be wiped out. Finally on the matter of terrorism the author says that such acts have been perpetuated in India by Sikhs and Sri Lankan rebels. There have been acts of terrorism by Greeks on the US and the Irish Republican Army on Ireland and Britain. Marxist governments have indulged in acts of terror in all countries that had followed the doctrine. The author's main intention is to let the reader understand that it is human greed and insecurity that spawns acts of violence and not the existence of a particular religion. "Some today might wish for a "world without Islam" in which these problems presumably had never come to be. But, in truth, the conflicts, rivalries, and crises of such a world might not look so vastly different than the ones we know today." (Fuller). So is the problem in Thailand a result of the fact that the majority of the population in that Buddhist dominated country is Islam Taking into consideration all the above factors, it can be said that it is not the case. The issue is greed, insecurity and a lack of caring coupled with bad governance and poor vision. Unless steps are taken to find a solution for the above maladies, problems will continue in the world. The situation in Thailand is no different. The way ahead requires patience, understanding, capability and vision. It is a long journey ahead for Thailand, but one that is definitely worth the destination. Works Cited Background Note: Thailand: Profile: History. US Department of State. 2008. 27 Mar. 2008. . Mydans, Seth. Muslim Insurgency Stroke Fear in Southern Thailand. International Herald Tribune. Asia-Pacific. 25 Feb. 2007. 27 Mar. 2008. . Smith, Anthony L Dr. Trouble in Thailand's Muslim South: Separatism, Not Global Terrorism. Bangkok Responds. Asia-Pacific Security Studies. Dec.2004. 27 Mar. 2008. . Zissis, Carin. The Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand: How is the New Military Government Handling the Insurgency Council on Foreign Relations. A Non-Partisan Resource for Information and Analysis. 1 Feb. 2007. 27 Mar. 2008. . Military: Thailand Islamic Insurgency. GlobalSecurity.org. 27 Apr. 2005. 27 Mar. 2008. . Upward, Jeff. Insurgency in Southern Thailand: The Cause of Conflict and the Perception of Threat. Historical Background. Nov. 2006. 27 Mar. 2008. . Holt, Andrew. Terrorism Monitor: Thailand's Troubled Border: Islamic Insurgency or Criminal Playground. Global Terrorism Analysis. The Jamestown Foundation. 20 May. 2004. 27 Mar. 2008. . Croissant, Aurel. Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, Causes, and Consequences Since 2001: Absolute and Relative Economic Depravation. Strategic Insights. Vol. IV(2). Center for Contemporary Conflict. Feb. 2005. 27 Mar. 2008. . Abuza, Zachary. Terrorism Monitor: The Effects of Thailand's Coup on the Southern Insurgency. Global Terrorism Analysis. The Jamestown Foundation. 19 Oct. 2006. 27 Mar. 2008. . Pinyorat, Rungrawee C. Muslim Violence Destroying Economy in Southern Thailand. SignOnSanDiego.com. By The Union Tribune. 18 Sep.2005. 27 Mar. 2008. . Fuller, Graham E. MORE OF THE SAME. A World without Islam. Foreign Policy Magazine, 2008. Read More