Theory of Terrorism and Practical Counterterrorism - Research Paper Example

Theory of Terrorism and Practical Counterterrorism Number: That terrorism is a global threat is a matter that is beyond repudiation. The global aspect of the threat of terrorism is underpinned by the fact that terrorist organizations target the US, its interests and allies, while the world is knit into a complex whole. While the problem of terrorism is ubiquitous, terrorism has neither universal definition, nor global commitment to banish it as the bane of the present civilization. States and other actors in international actors that would like to exert effort in counterterrorism are passed on as being hegemonic or being obsessed with America’s problems. As America, her allies and other states concert counterterrorism efforts, terrorism is equally learning to adopt new faces and approaches to remain afloat and effective. This state of affairs necessitates discussions on the nature of terrorism and approaches that can be used in counterterrorism efforts. It is only when such discussions are sustained that the prevailing state of affairs can be described and ameliorations made, for the sake of world peace. Introduction When the Iron Curtain of Berlin fell, signifying the end of Cold War in 1989, American and the rest of the world woke up to the realization of another threat which is terrorism. As the systematic use of violence intended to create fear for political, religious and ideological goals, terrorism deliberately targets non-combatants and remains the most menacing threat to the entire globe, in the 21st century. This paper therefore seeks to divulge on the nature of terrorism, the different schools of thoughts that have attempted to explain terrorism and noncombatant approaches that can be used in counterterrorism efforts, as shall be seen in the discussion that ensues forthwith. Linkages between the Theory of Terrorism and Practical Counterterrorism Activities That there is a direct relationship between theory and practice is a matter that is beyond any meaningful repudiation. The case is not an exception when it comes to counterterrorism activities. This is because; counterterrorism efforts have their blueprints in theories that explain terrorism or terrorist activities. This observation is exemplified in the few illustrations that ensue forthwith. The first theoretical explanation of terrorism postulates that terrorism is a deliberate choice being executed by an actor. The actor in this is an organization that acts to attain collective values. The chief among these values is the radical transformation of political and socioeconomic systems. The foregoing means that terrorism is seen as a response to external stimuli; specifically, the government’s actions. In the same theoretical approach, terrorist violence is not only seen as intentional but also as a violent coercion and a bargaining process, due to the power to hurt, kill and intimidate. The covert nature of terrorism helps underscore this intention and to cow the government into changing its political position. Virtually, all democratic governments that believe in this theoretical standpoint do not ascribe to holding negotiations with terrorists or terrorist organizations. As a matter of fact, many governments such as the US and the UK have made it denial a form of deterrence against terrorism. In this light, the government denies the gains that a terrorist may gain from an attack by raising the cost of a terrorist organization’s contemplated actions. The second theoretical standpoint sees terrorism as an internal organizational process within a group that uses terrorism, or among organizations that harbor the same objectives. This means that terrorism is seen as being consequent to organization’s struggle survival in a competitive environment. Herein, leaders of terrorist outfits facilitate organizational maintenance by extending varied incentives to followers. Not all the followers are involved in the pursuit of the organization’s political purposes. To prevent defections, the leaders inculcate intense loyalty. The organization responds to external pressure by innovatively changing the incentives that are due to members. It is against the backdrop of the above theoretical postulation that some governments aim at long-term solutions to the threat of terrorism by seeking to provide values such as education and more jobs. The crux of the matter herein is that the youth who are mainly the chief potential recruits are presumed by the government to be better off and resistant to the allure of terrorism, in the event that they are educated and are able to access jobs. There are others such as Martin (2011) who rightly observe that if terrorism is a means to an end, then there is a possibility of using substitutes. Because of this, the absence of alternatives to terrorist organizations will be important. This is because organizations which do not solely rely on terrorism are more likely to abandon the use of terrorism because of failure. Because of this, constant failure of a terrorist outfit to actualize its own goals may pave way to internal wars and thereby causing the ultimate collapse of that outfit. The extension of this thought is that terrorism eventually fades when it undergoes constant failure and when the operational costs are high and the opportunities for violent terrorist onslaughts have been abated. The theoretical standpoint adopted above has been seen to be adopted in the US. Since the September 11th Attacks, the US has intensified its counterterrorism efforts. These efforts are not just aiming at the apprehension of terrorists, but also thwarting terrorist attacks ands plans. Through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the US government attempts to freeze assets that terrorists use. This stalls the operations and attacks that may be carried out by a given terrorist outfit. Secondly, America’s counterterrorism efforts are aimed at combating terrorist outfits. All these efforts serve as a form of distraction from terrorists’ main goal- launching terrorist attacks. With frozen assets and the need to be on the look out, terrorist outfits are unable to launch terrorist attacks. The theory that sees terrorism as an intra-organizational competition (wherein a terrorist organization competes in the same environment with the government) also necessitates the application of asset-freezing. The rationale herein is that an organization cannot function or thrive without accessing its assets (Crenshaw, 2008). The same standpoint has inspired America’s resolve to engage in deterrence and defense. In the employment of America’s defense tactics, the main aim is to forcefully prevent terrorists from attaining its goals. The US also engages itself in preemption, as a way of warding off terrorism. The crux of the matter herein is that through deterrence, the US government communicates to the adversary that the costs of the actions he contemplates to execute far outweigh the potential benefits that he is contemplating. Predicting the Most Likely Directions Terrorism Will Take In The Future Terrorism is bound to change tact due to the constant success in counterterrorism efforts. This is mainly applicable to America and Britain. Particularly, terrorism may shift from its conventional form which is the use of explosives and firearms, to newer versions that are more covert. Part of the terrorist attacks that may be used in future include poisoning water supply, sabotaging power and gas supply channels, attempts to expose the public to biologically engineered diseases and germs. Measures on Counter Terrorism Other Than Overt Military Engagements and their Setbacks According to Morgan (2002), legislation is one of the most formidable tools that can be used to wage the war on terror. Particularly, it is imperative that all states in the US should declare US citizens who have joined terrorist organizations as enemy combatants. In this light, the suspect upon being convicted for terrorism should be charged on the account of both mens rea and actus rea, as opposed to the actus rea only. This legislation is best exemplified in the May 8th, 2002 incident where a US citizen, Jose Padilla was arrested in a dirt bomb plot. However, the government later moved to charge Padilla as an enemy combatant, and not just for being in possession of a dirt bomb. This is a very good form of deterrence since it is instrumental in dissuading Americans from crossing over to the side of terrorists and endangering America. Similarly, the crux of the matter herein is that if Padilla were to be charged based only the actus rea, no sooner will he have been charged and convicted, than for him to continue with his criminal intent. The only drawback with charging a suspect based on the mens rea instead of the actus rea is that it raises legal implications of the entire trial. This is because the trial should be based solidly and solely on the evidence, and the evidence must be adduced in the court of law. In the event that evidence is not tabled, the constitutionality of the entire attempt to declare the suspect an enemy combatant may be successfully challenged. With the charge being successfully challenged, the suspect may be set free, despite other charges based on actus rea having reasonable ground. This development may take the War on Terror several steps backwards. Conversely, it is also important that more counterterrorism efforts are carried over to the Internet. The need for this is underscored by the fact that when the US and its allies took the War on Terror to Afghanistan and Iraq, the physical threshold for terrorism shrunk. Following this, terrorist masterminds took to the Internet to recruit and to propagate terrorism agenda. Moreover, with through the Worldwide Web, the threshold activity gained a more global and more covert playing field. Because of this, it became expedient that the CIA and Homeland Security take counterterrorism efforts to the virtual world. In this case, it is necessary that the US maintains the registration of all Internet users so that tracking is made tenable by reading the IP addresses. This makes it possible to detect sundry developments in terrorist websites such as newly recruited individuals, the ideological underpinnings of a terrorist outfit and plans that a terrorist may have up its sleeve. Again, the necessity of this measure is underscored by the fact that leading terrorist organizations such as the Al Qaeda and Taliban had their websites, although these websites remained very fluid. The problem with this approach is that many may see it as an affront to the right to privacy. This is because online counterterrorism may involve hacking and impersonation. At the same time, terrorist websites are very fluid. A website may pop up and shut itself after five hours, having fulfilled its purpose. Terrorists may also use fake websites as decoy, and thereby frustrating counterterrorist efforts. In another wavelength, it is commendable that passport and immigration rules have been put in place to sift potential terrorists from genuine immigrants. This has been mainly strengthened through the creation and maintenance of a comprehensive database that shares information and briefings from the security department and US entry points. However, it is important that the US entry points are fit with more advanced weapons or arms detectors. Initially, America was using weapon detectors which only detected metallic weapons. However, terrorists have attempted to canvass this process by passing explosives that are odorless and nonmetallic. At the same time, the stakes are high because of late, terrorists are resorting to carry explosives in an unassembled form. The case of Umar Faroukh Abdulmutallab who unsuccessfully tried to bomb a plane he had boarded on December 25th, 2009 is an express exemplification of the recommendation above. Abdulmutallab had on that day concealed explosives in his underwear. The explosive materials could not be detected by the weapons detector at the Amsterdam Airport simply because they were nonmetallic and unassembled. Once aboard the Northwest Airlines Flight 253, Abdulmutallab would try to assemble the materials, before brave passengers wrestled and disarmed him. This incident underscores the fact America must not mistakenly find refuge in the presence of metallic weapon detectors and sniffer dogs. Again, another of the alternative that the US can use in the War on Terror is a collective approach in international relations. The US should marshal its allies in the UN General Assembly so that a uniform legal definition of terrorism can be coined. From the definition, the UN can draw modalities that other member states can adopt in the War on Terror. This effort will help other member states pass the values envisioned in the US Antiterrorism Bill after successful domestication. Likewise, this approach will have relegated counterterrorism to the UN, the global suspicion that other states have towards America as a highly hegemonic entity will have been significantly assuaged. Counterterrorism will not only be seen as America’s propaganda, but as an expedient undertaking, but also as a global problem that is best tackled collectively than discordantly (Wilke, 2005). The serious pitfall with this approach lies with the limitations of the United Nation’s legislation. Unlike independent states, the UN has no executive or legislative arm to enforce its laws. The UN in turn only to rely on treaties to have its laws adhered to. In the event that there is no adherence, the UN can only seek to impose trade embargoes and sanctions on the errant state. Even in this case, other member states may come together to defeat the sanctions and embargoes. Given the emotive nature of terrorism, the notion that Arabic or Islamic states may rally one another against UN resolution on terror may not be very preposterous. Conclusion In respect to the foregoing, it emerges clearly that both the schools of thoughts on terrorism and counterterrorism approaches have no single point of convergence. This should not be misconstrued to mean an absence of the will to fight terrorism. On the converse, this reflects the rational nature of man and the need to harness together all the ideas and input that are spurned within the auspices of the society. It is only through the collective bringing together of ideas that the most feasible approach in counterterrorism can be arrived at, for the sake of political stability and world peace. References Crenshaw, M. (2008). Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches. Inside Terrorist Organizations, 14 (4), 16-28. Martin, G. (2011). Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues. New York: McGraw Hill. Morgan, J. (2002). US Hate Crime Legislation: A Legal Model to Avoid in Australia. The Australian Journal Association, 38 (1), 25-38. Wilke, C. (2005). War v. Justice. Terrorism Cases, Enemy Combatants and Political Justice in the US Courts. Politics & Society, 33 (4), 637-669. Read More