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With the recent death of Osama Bin Laden, a number of critical questions have been raised regarding the nature of the United States’ fight against terrorism. One of the recurring concepts has been whether the death of Bin Laden actually constitutes a viable advance against terrorism, or simply a symbolic death. In ‘Osama’s Wake: the Second Generation of Al Qaeda,’ Blake argues that killing leaders of Al Qaeda are ineffective as the nature of the organization is structured so that individuals can simply take their place. The question then becomes what constitutes the best means of fighting terrorism. This essay considers the recruitment and financing of operatives by Al Qaeda and argues that the pivotal element in stopping terrorism is to follow the financing.
Recruitment can be argued to represent the backbone of Al Qaeda operations. In considering recruitment processes, it’s argued that Al Qaeda recruits are not simply restricted to a regional area, but are rather united through the Muslim struggle against Western dominance. It follows that recruitment practices span the globe. Indeed, Blake states, “Pennsylvania professor Marc Sageman discovered 70 percent of terrorists were recruited outside their native country” (Blake, pg. 9). Within this spectrum of understanding, there are a number of elements implemented as means of recruiting displaced individuals. Among these elements indicate that training camps within Afghanistan and Pakistan represent crucial areas where individuals can become involved with Al Qaeda operations. Gunaratnaa (2004) supports Ward’s contention in these regards, indicating that training camps function as crucial elements of recruitment, but in lieu of these camps networks throughout the globe, function to fill gaps in enrollment. Other recruits are indicated to come from other jihad groups fostered in Afghanistan.
In addition to recruitment, financing represents a core issue of Al Qaeda operations. Indeed, Ward attests that Al Qaeda operations cost near $30 million dollars a year. It is no surprise then that in fighting terrorism, it is critical to track and stop this flow of money. Funding to Al Qaeda comes from a variety of sources. Among these include, “charitable donations, businesses, and just about any illegal activity such as drug, weapon and immigrant trafficking, counterfeiting, forgery, kidnapping, etc” (Ward, pg. 17). Some of the major income sources include Saudi charities. David Farley (2003) argues that if these sources could be shut down Al Qaeda operations would suffer perhaps a critical blow. Bin Laden’s connections to wealthy contacts constituted a highly important element in procuring a large amount of this funding. While these charitable donations are given for a variety of reasons, the primary reason seems to be a religious affiliation with the political aims of the Al Qaeda terrorist effort. In addition to charitable donations, Al Qaeda business interests constitute other important elements of financing. In these regards, investments in a variety of sources function as important avenues of income. Like the mafia, Al Qaeda business operations function through fronts that operate for the nefarious terrorist purposes underneath. For instance, Bin Laden was able to generate income by secretly selling freight ships for a period. Within all of these operations, the laundering and movement of funding to different organizational elements also constitute essential elements of the terrorist organization's operations. It’s clear that funding constitutes a major element of Al Qaeda operations.
Ultimately, these points indicate that the only means of limiting Al Qaeda operations is to trace and eliminate funding sources to the terrorist organization.
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