Operational Arts Napoleon versus Stonewall Jackson - Term Paper Example

Operational Arts Napoleon Versus Stonewall Jackson TOPIC: What impact did Napoleon have on the art and science of war, and in particular on the notion of operational art? How does Napoleon compare and contrast to Stonewall Jackson? Table of Contents Operational Arts 1 Napoleon Versus Stonewall Jackson 1 Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 Napoleon’s Influence on War Strategies 3 Operational Arts 4 Napoleonic Impact on Operational Arts 5 Stonewall Jackson 6 Napoleon versus Stonewall Jackson 6 Conclusion 7 Bibliography 9 Introduction In the words of Halleck, “War in its most extensive sense may be regarded both as a science and an art. It is a science so far as it investigates general principles and institutes an analysis of military operations; and an art when considered with reference to the practical rules for conducting campaigns, sieges, battles & c.”1 He goes on dividing it in four categories, including: Strategy. Napoleon’s Influence on War Strategies Until Napoleon, the act of war was there were either the state rulers or the trusted warriors who were regarded as responsible of the entire affair. However, Napoleon and Fredrick II had introduced a new concept of ‘warrior-king’ who can apply diplomatic as well as military power for his own aims “…and thus could more directly tailor military actions to strategic aims--and more thoroughly conclude peace following decisive military events”2. The warfare was in evolution even in the age of Napoleon. He had cleverly noticed the problems of sustenance and movement of armies in the battlefield and he took advantage of it. He had increased the mobility of the armies and had applied his creative tactics in the art of warfare, especially in the quick formation of army combinations. His creativity and insight into the affairs of War tactics had won him great victories. Critics believe that Napoleon’s victory lies mainly to his ability in synthesizing and exploiting the developments made by others. He did not rely on personal novelties; rather he tried to gain concepts from the war tactics applied by others. This approach ended the earlier “force employment, as opposed to weapons technology or logistical means”3. “Napoleon was about action; he did not share Jomini’s focus on principles”.4 To him, war was what is done in the battlefield, not in books. Though napoleon had not proposed a definite theory of War as his main concern was application of tactics, Jomini and Clausewitz have interpreted his actions and strategic aims to lay a basis for modern art and science of war. They had studied the operational circumstances and strategies applied by napoleon and they had added the active factors in the theory and art of war operations: pivotal points, main focus, climax, etc. Operational Arts “Operational arts” is a modern concept that deals with the conception and execution of military operations through the direction of military forces for particular strategic intentions. The whole operation involves the combining of the forces and allocating of the assets to planned units. Thus, it forms a bridge between strategy and tactics by building an association between the aims of war and the actual fight in it, and seeks to attain a level between these. Napoleonic Impact on Operational Arts Many critics believe that the origin of the concept of operational arts lie back to eighteenth century with the theorists belonging to “the Soviet inter-war”. However until recently, this term referred to only a combination of activities performed in the battlefield, such as: defining the routes of attack, scavenging and stocking, and barriers along with the growth of overall mans, unceasing processes athwart manifold battles of war, and the distribution of power among dogmatic and armed leaders. Later, Napoleonic wars as well as the industrial revolution developed them into a true set of operations. Napoleonic wars introduced large groups of inspired men-of-war while the other had provided with the sources for army’s sustenance. Some other critics believe that ‘Operational arts’ is fundamentally a modern concept and the earlier forms were mere developing stages. According to Kelley Justin, “It was only towards the end of the 19th century that a special meaning of operation--as a succession of tactical actions sharing a single unifying idea--was defined and began to pass generally into doctrine.”5 However, no one denies the impact that napoleon casts on the Operational arts. Bartholomees and other many has defined operational arts in a way to explain napoleon’s influence in it: “The essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a [Center of Gravity] to neutralize, weaken, destroy (consistent with desired end state/[Commander’s] intent), or otherwise exploit it in a manner that best helps achieve military objectives and attain the military end state.”6 Stonewall Jackson Stonewall Jackson was American a Confederate general who had served America during the Civil War. His repute as a commander is quite well-known. It is said that Jackson had learned a lot from Napoleon’s war tactics. He is known to be a great admirer of Jomini and Clausewitz, and had internalized many a great tactics of Napoleon from their interpretations. Napoleon versus Stonewall Jackson As Jackson was a great admirer of Napoleon’s arts of war, he had adopted many of his war tactics and a great many of his war concepts, especially: swift mobility of forces, creative combinations of fighters as well as situational decisiveness of great import. Jackson is said to be in habit of planning flexibly at the start of the campaign like Napoleon, so that to modify it easily whenever needed. They both also had share the practices of precise preparations for the tasks keeping in mind the future prospects as well as analysis of the area location. They both had also shown a tendency to hover many objectives at the same time to create confusion and chaos among them. As far as the swiftness and speed of the actions in battlefield is concerned, Napoleon and Jackson both had realized the importance of this particular aspect and they both had commanded it from their soldiers. Another comparable quality demonstrated by these two commanders was the single-man handling of an operation. They did not rely upon their subordinates and remained secretive in their entire operations. However, this tendency had caused mush harm as it worked against the building of subordinates’ trust and sincere contributions. They also had refused to be influenced by contemporary dogmas and doctrine, and had interpreted the events and theories according to their own intentions and ideas. Other than these similarities, these two great commanders of past had observed many differences also. Jackson had not completely and truly followed the footsteps of Napoleon; he had modernized his art of war. His military tactic was based “on centralized command and control, rapid marches to achieve surprise, and rapid recombination of forces to achieve superior mass at the point of decision”.7 Critics relate his victory in Shenandoah Valley campaign (1862) as a remarkable success of his military intelligence and Individuality that had earned him far superior objectives than were intended. Unlike Napoleon, Jackson had never commanded huge troops in the battlefield. He also seemed to follow Robert Lee in his strategies of confederation and had not attempted to make any direct impact on the strategic level of war. Also, he had realized modern needs of defenses and had believed that to divide forces in U.S territory would be of great benefit. Thus, he had purposefully divided his troops at many occasions during his military career against the spirit of Napoleon. Conclusion Conclusively, we can say that though Napoleon had contributed much to the art and science of war, especially the operational arts, he was not a man of words. His art of warfare became renowned and appreciated due to his admiring interpreters Jomini and Clausewitz. Their interpretations of Napoleon’s tactics and strategies had won Napoleon even a greater number of admirers including the great American Confederate Stonewall Jackson. Jackson had adopted a great number of ideas from napoleon, especially the swiftness of military mobility, flexible planning of battlefield as well as secrecy of plans. But this does not mean that he proved to be a blind follower of Napoleon, he had devised his own tactics as well, particularly the intelligent division of troops according to US locality as well as avoidance of commanding huge troops in the battlefield. Bibliography Bartholomees, J. B., Harry R. Yarger, David Jablonsky, James F. Holcomb, and Frank L. Jones. "U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy." Vol. 1. 4th ed. J. B. Bartholomees, USA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010. Bartholomees, J B. "U.S. Army war college guide to national security policy and strategy." 2nd ed. J B. Bartholomees, USA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006. Bismarck, Friedrich W., and North L. Beamish. On the uses and application of cavalry in war: from the text of Bismark, with practical examples selected from antient and modern history. London: T. & W. Boone, 1855. desaxx. Accessed May 18, 2011. http://desaxx.blogspot.com/2010/09/napoleon-stonewall-jackson-and.html. Halleck, Henry W. Elements of military art and science: or, Course of instruction in strategy, fortification, tactics of battles, &c., embracing the duties of staff, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers. 3rd ed. London: D. Appleton & company, 1862. Kelly, Justin, and Mike Brennan. Alien: how operational art devoured strategy. USA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009. Vego, Milan N. "Joint Operational Warfare Theory and Practice and V. 2, Historical Companion." Vol. 2. 2nd ed. Newport: Government Printing Office, 2009. Weigley, Russell F. The American way of war: a history of United States military strategy and policy: Wars of the United States. 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. Read More