The Linking Failed States and Terrorism - Research Paper Example

Linking Failed States and Terrorism Introduction In the aftermath of the September 11 bombings, governments all over the world have deeply embraced counterterrorism as one of their major agenda. As the recipient of the 9/11 attack, the United States, together with its allies on the Global War on Terror (GWOT), has spearheaded initiatives and espoused strategies and policies to trace the root and location of terrorist groups, detect their illegal activities and ultimately put an end to them. The successful implementation of such counterterrorist strategies and policies heavily relies on the capacity of the US and its allies to prevent states from failing and resuscitate those that have failed. Contrary to popular belief that terrorist networks are faceless and therefore independent from states, there is actually a tight connection between failed states and terrorism. Firstly, the already chaotic environment of failed states “provide an attractive venue for terrorist groups seeking to evade counterterrorism efforts of the United States and its [GWOT] partners” (Dempsey 2006, v). Terrorist groups take advantage of the internal wars within these states to make themselves difficult to identify and difficult to sanction. Secondly, because of their chaotic environment, failed states easily welcome, are caught unaware by, or have no control over the entrance of insurgent groups and exiled notorious individuals. In effect, they “provide breeding grounds for terrorists, narcotics trade, black marketeering, human slavery, weapons trafficking, and other forms of nefarious activity” (Popp and others 2006, 2). With the view to establish a connection between failed states and terrorism, this essay presents the attributes of a failed state and how they attract and breed terrorist groups, insurgents and the like. In addition to a few case studies, the essay also explores certain alternatives considered by the counterterrorist movement to bring these failed states back to a more successful status. What Are Failed States? For states to be considered a failure, they must first comply with the following attributes: the incapability to “[project] power and [assert] authority within their own borders,” “a monopoly on the legitimate use of force,” widespread corruption, high crime rates, “inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain drain, environmental decay,” and ineffectual provision of “basic public goods like territorial control, education and healthcare” (Rotberg, 2002; Fund for Peace, 2009; Huria, 2009, 1). These attributes stem from a variety of geographical, historical, sociocultural, physical and political factors, and facilitated “through explosion, implosion, erosion, or invasion” over varying points in time (Rotberg, 2002; Fund for Peace, 2009). Just a little higher in standing than failed states are “weak” and “failing” states, which constitute much of sub-Saharan Africa, a great part of central Asia, and certain areas of Latin America and South Asia (Brooks, 2005). Failed, weak and failing states have not only become safe havens and harbors of terrorism because of those aforementioned attributes, but they are also riddled with ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts. Furthermore, these entities either have governments that teeter on the edge of anarchy or have no functional government to call everything to order. They suffer what scholars call a “sovereignty gap” (Coyne 2007, 107-109). Failed states first appeared during the Cold War era. In the pursuit of greatness, both the US and the Soviet Union engaged in several proxy wars, and delegated nuclear armaments to fledgling states. During the Soviet-Afghan War, the US provided weapons, supplies and military training to the mujahideen resistance, which sought to overthrow the communist government of Afghanistan and the Soviets (Runion 2007, 112). Following World War II, the actions of the two superpowers divided the Korean peninsula and prompted the outbreak of the Korean War. This time, the Soviet Union provided weapons and supplies to the newly established communist state of North Korea. Today, Afghanistan and North Korea are just among a number of proxy war participants classified under the failed category. These states are also marked as rogue proliferators of WMD (Record 2000, 3-15). Linking Failed States and Terrorism Failed states are attractive venues for establishing terrorist networks, nodes, hubs, or hideouts. The lack or absence of effective state control, in addition to a violence and chaotic environment, is an attribute that greatly draws terrorist and insurgent activities in failed states. Terrorist groups, syndicates and the leaders of rogue states “take ready advantage of the prevailing anarchy” by using the existing ripples of violence and strife to shield themselves from counterterrorism efforts (Brooks, 2005: Dempsey 2006, iii). Afghanistan is a chief example of the way in which a failed state could attract a dominant force in the art of terrorism. From 1979-1989, when Afghan mujahideens waged a war against their communist government and the invading Soviets, Osama bin Laden and his mentor Abdulla Azzam established a “Bureau of Services” to fund and recruit jihadist rebels. This agency became the foundation for the terrorist network Al Qaeda, which was created at the end of the war as “a potential general headquarters for future jihad” (Moyers, n.d.). Azzam’s death gave bin Laden full control over the group. When he was exiled to Sudan by the Saudi government, Al Qaeda’s base of operations was also relocated and it gradually ripened into a terrorist network, primarily aimed at planning and aiding attacks against its former ally: the US. The rise of the Taliban in 1996 strengthened the struggling Al Qaeda. Bin Laden found support in this coalition of Sunni Muslims from the Pashtun tribes of Aghanistan. Taliban members are self-proclaimed reformists, who were mostly educated in Pakistan, their country of refuge during the Soviet invasion. While they ruled the government of Afghanistan, they supported terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and permitted them to use Afghan and Pakistani soil as training grounds for jihadists (Hayes and others, 2007). Although in 2001 the Taliban was ousted due to US counterterrorism efforts, the fundamentalist group’s influence continued to increase in rural Kabul and Pakistan (Bruno & Kaplan, 2009). Taliban and Al Qaeda have since evaded sanctions from the international community. Even American intervention after 9/11 failed to restore “some semblance of stability” in Afghanistan (Huria, 2009, 2). The groups’ ability to blend in with civilians and use them as human shields pose such difficulties for the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. The US and NATO forces err in their counterterrorist strategy their use of massive, mostly disproportionate air power in Afghanistan, such as “aerial bombings, especially unplanned air strikes,” has resulted to massive civilian casualties and set off a “huge public outcry” (Huria, 2009, 2). Recently, Taliban has been placed alongside adopted son bin Laden in the terrorism blacklist. One of their alleged crimes is “training unrepentant Times Square bomb plotter Faisal Shahzad” (Agence France Press, 2010). Considering the experience of Afghanistan and how it attracted the terror groups of first Al Qaeda, then later Taliban, it is therefore understood that failed states must be saved before they breed more terrorists, insurgents and other illegal movements and organizations. Established terrorist organizations uses the sentiments of local rebel groups to transform them into one of their hubs, like in the case of Somalia. Somalia, ranked number one since the 2005 Failed States Index, has provided the world with a package of terrorist activities--to radical Islamist militias (i.e. Al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiyya) that “tightened their grip on the streets of Mogadishu,” to greedy leaders terrorizing the peace and safety of their own citizens, to Mafia-structured pirates plundering foreign ships (Hammond, 2010; Cohn, 2010). The country serves as a perfect breeding ground for several international crimes, of which terrorism is the most compelling. The terror group Al-Shabaab has forged a connection with Al Qaeda since 2007 and now controls most of Southern Somalia (Hanson and Toiba, 2010). Al Qaeda failed to penetrate Somalia during the 90s, but following the Ethiopian invasion in 2006, Al-Shabaab has reconsidered and finally has realized that affiliation with the terrorist network would be of great benefit to the organization (Cohn, 2010; Hanson and Toiba, 2010). Rescuing Failed States In this age of globalization and high interdependence, failed states are a great threat to world security and to the national security interests of the US and its GWOT allies. With the absence of responsible governmental authority, “threats that would and should be contained within a country’s borders can now melt into the world and wreak untold havoc” (Farah, 2006). In view of this looming threat, these states need to be saved rather than annihilated. The conclusion provided by Steven Walt (cited in Toral) is that America and its allies should “involve themselves in “fixing” failed states” such as Afghanistan, Somalia, North Korea and Iraq. State intervention is necessary to “bring the [failed] state back” in shape (Skocpol 1985, 3-4). However, the point in question is how efficiently or inefficiently this intervention is delivered and “the form it should take” (Ghani and Lockhart 2008, 115). Rather than using force to subdue terrorists on humanitarian grounds, the US and its GWOT allies ought to be more diplomatic and forge economic and political relations instead (Toral 2007, 60). States fail mainly because of underdeveloped economic systems and governments that lack political will and maturity. Such attributes lead them to turn to terrorist organizations for financial and ideological support and camaraderie, especially when Western nations turn a blind eye to their development needs. Thus, the roles of the US and its allies are to provide failed states a framework for sustainable development and help them rebuild their ailing or dysfunctional social systems and institutions. When these are strengthened and states are made aware of their own functions, they would neither resort nor fall prey to terrorist networks (Rotberg, 2002; Skocpol 1985, 14-17). Developed states of the West should also include failed states in the globalization bandwagon by giving them access to the activities of the World Trade Organization, engaging in bilateral trade agreements, or loaning them capital to renovate their economy through the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Aside from economic capital, Western states should also consider providing or mentoring other forms of capital (i.e. human capital, knowledge capital, infrastructure, and social capital) (Toral 2007, 60-61). Conclusion Indeed, failed states serve as perfect avenues for terrorism to hide and at the same time proliferate itself. These states lack or are devoid of effective state and social mechanism, rendering them vulnerable to the influence or penetration of terrorist, insurgent, or other syndicate groups. They are helpless without the moral, economic and political support of the international community, particularly those of developed countries. The US and its GWOT allies have therefore a corresponding responsibility in pulling these states out from failure and bringing them back to a more successful. The use of force only contributes to the never-ending cycle of violence. Counterterrorism strategies should also be viewed in the context of global justice through economic and political assistance. These are more viable in helping failed states rebuild themselves, adopt responsible goals, recall their neglected duties towards their citizenry, and eventually attain sustainable development. 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