Bioterrorism: Biological Warfare - Research Paper Example

?Shaun Pinto Bioterrorism Over the years, research in biological agents has grown, and many believethat there is a threat of an imminent attack in the United States. In this case, there is a strong belief that nations such as North Korea, Iran, and China are engaging in biological warfare research. In effect, there is growing fear that these nations may use the weapons against others, especially against the United States. In addition, there is a possibility of the research falling into terrorists hands, which will pose a greater challenge to United States. It is important to point out that the use of biological warfare comes with disastrous results, just like other weapons of mass of destruction. Despite nations devising tactical approaches, meant to stop the threat posed by biological weapons, the simple nature in manufacturing the weapons puts nations such as the United States at a risk of an imminent attack from terrorists. According to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), “A bioterrorism attack is the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, or other germs (agents) used to cause illness or death in people, animals, or plants.” Based on the foregoing, it is evident that these are natural agents of causing diseases. Nevertheless, terrorists change these agents by increasing their ability to cause diseases, increasing their capability to resist drugs, or even escalating their capacity to spread widely in the environment, which is often with catastrophic effects. The CDC further noted the possibility of terrorists to use biological agents since their detection is not simple, and the biological agents have the ability of concealing illness for several hours or even days, which enhances their spread to other people and to the environment. However, it is important to point out that there is a tendency to collocate biological agents with nuclear weapons and lethal chemical weapons as potential weapons of mass destruction. However, there are discernible differences between these other weapons and bioweapons. In this regard, pathogens are living things, which is not the case with the other weapons. In effect, biological weapons are able to reproduce and independently engage in adaptive behavior, which is not the case with the other weapons (Steinbruner 87). Therefore, these contrasting characteristics of biological weapons enhance the potency of bioweapons in comparison to the other weapons. Vogel noted, “A commonly held belief is that the technology behind biological weapons is relatively simple and therefore, one could argue, less dependent on tacit knowledge than nuclear weapons” (660). In this case, this emphasizes the ease with which terrorists can acquire these weapons and even manufacture them easily by acquiring the essential ingredients that are readily available. It is common knowledge that experts and the media have made the widespread belief that the requirements for biological weapons are chicken soup, a bathtub, and seed culture (Vogel 660). This effectively puts emphasis on the ease of making biological weapons. To support this argument, Steinbruner noted, “A small home-brewery is all that it would be required to a potent threat of major proportions” (86). On the other hand, there is an argument that the inherent dual-usage of biotechnology renders previous tacit knowledge in bioweapons explicit (Vogel 660). In effect, this poses challenges to policymakers regarding protecting civilians against attacks that result from the use of the biological weapons. In support of this line of thought on the ease of manufacturing biological weapons, Steinbruner noted, “As potential instruments of destruction, biological agents are inexpensive, readily available, and usually dangerous” (85). In this case, various pathogens affect human beings with some of these pathogens having the potential of causing massive destruction. Indeed, Streinbruner pointed that some biological agents can cause destruction “with mortality levels conceivably exceeding what chemical or even nuclear weapons could produce” (86). In support of this line of thought, the CDC noted that terrorists would ordinarily improve the ability of pathogens to be drug resistant and improve their capability to spread widely in the environment. In effect, this increases the number of people attacked by these pathogens and the challenging nature of their detection increases the catastrophic impact of these biological agents. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent mailing of anthrax to US lawmakers, the nation has realized the importance of shifting focus to the US public health system. In this case, experts have realized the need to create a responsive public health system that is capable of effectively responding to biological attacks is pertinent to making the effects of an attack less catastrophic. According to Borelli, the anthrax attack, although small in scale in comparison to projections of bioterrorism experts, exposed the weaknesses in the US public health system at all levels of government in responding to such bioterrorism attacks (2). In effect, bioterrorists may look to exploit these weaknesses and attack the United States if policymakers failed to address these weaknesses. According to experts, the use of a more perfect delivery system, or releasing deadly communicable biological agents like smallpox, might have had disastrous effects effectively overwhelming the public health system in the US (Borelli 2). Although the United States developed the most comprehensive legislation for bioterrorism preparedness in December 2001 that appropriated $3billion to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), concern on biological weapons rose during the Gulf War, and after the Aum Shrinkiyo sect attempted to use botulinum toxic in Tokyo’s Imperial Palace (Borelli 3; Steinburner 87). Among other things, the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001 primary objective is to improve the nation’s health systems to respond to any bioterrorism attack. In addition, the act provides for the protection of the country’s national food supply in case of a biological attack. Furthermore, the act provides for accelerating the capacity to produce and develop treatment and vaccines while improving coordination of the federal government’s antiterrorism efforts, which requires enormous funding and investment. In effect, the act provided for a total of $3.25billin during the financial year of 2002, and any other sum as may be essential in other financial years (Borelli 3). Despite the legislation and other efforts aimed at enhancing the country’s capacity to respond to bioterrorism, the country remains at a great risk of attack using biological weapons. According to O’Toole, the undersecretary for science and technology at the Department of Homeland Security, “The immediacy and potentially strategic significance of the bioweapons threat is not widely appreciated, nor is the country prepared to cope with the consequences of major bioattacks” (qtd. in “America is Not Prepared”). In this regard, O’Toole’s sentiments put the country’s efforts to protect its citizens under intense focus regarding the capability of the government to respond to bioterrorism threats and its response regarding any potential attack. To a majority of people, the amount of funding allocated to HHS may appear enormous. However, experts point out that the figure is not enormous in comparison to the expenses meant to develop and purchase the important countermeasures. In this regard, it is evident that the HHS’ operations are on the premise that it must develop countermeasures not only to bioterrorism, but also to chemical, nuclear, and radiology attacks. In effect, this constrains the funds allocated to the body. Case in point, the government provided HHS with $5.6 billion in 2004 to develop countermeasures to potential threats. However, this figure largely remains insufficient considering that the average cost of developing a drug to use as countermeasures is $800 millions, which is prior to purchasing a single pill or vaccine (“America is Not Prepare”). In effect, this implies that the amount of allocations to the HHS for developing countermeasures is not sufficient not only to respond to bioweapons, but also to respond to nuclear, chemical, or even to radiological threats. In conclusion, it is evident that the government’s efforts towards developing countermeasures against any bioterrorism attack are not adequate. In this case, the funding to HHS is insufficient based on the foregoing although the legislation called for other collaborative efforts in surveillance and federal cooperation during antiterrorism efforts. Therefore, extra funding to the HHS will go a long way in helping the HHS develop measures meant to improve the country’s responsiveness to any bioterrorism attack. On the other hand, this expose has elucidated the ease with which terrorists can develop biological weapons. Therefore, the government should ensure that its efforts towards developing countermeasures against any biological attack were competent with the amount of funding to the HHS being a starting point. Works Cited Author’s Name.“America Is Not Prepared for Bioterrorism Attacks.” Epidemics Volume.Issue (Year of Publishing): Page Number. Name of the database. Web. 17 May 2012. Borelli, J. V. Bioterrorism: Prevention, Preparedness, and Protection. Hauppauge: Nova Publishers, 2006. Print. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). “Bioterrorism Overview.” Centers for disease control and prevention. 12 February 2007. Web. 17 May 2012. . Steinbruner, John D. “Biological Weapons: A Plague upon All Houses.” Foreign Policy 109(1997): 85-96. Print. Vogel, Kathleen. “Bioweapons Proliferation: Where Science Studies and Public Policy Collide.” Social Studies of Science 36.5(2006): 659-690. JSTOR. Web. 17 May 2012. . Read More