Balance-of-Power theory in World War I & II - Research Paper Example

Balance-of-Power theory in World War I & II The First and Second World Wars were both the result of the accumulation of conflict that began in the 19th century. Nationalism, alliance systems, and acts of Ferguson all contributed to the start of these global conflicts. While WWI was more re suit of growing tension and competition, WWI was caused by direct aggression (Russel 130). The swelling of nationalist pride that began in the 19th century and endured into the 20th induced both wars at least partly. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand and the conflict between on Serbia and Austria, for example, was a result of Serbian nationalism and was fueled by a longing for self-determination. World War II was also begun by nationalism, especially that of the Germans. It was this German nationalism and desire for sell‘-determination that fueled Hitler's campaigns to take over Europe. Both wars were sparked by the upset of the delicate balance of power in Europe. In WWI, tension between the big powers of the time- Germany Britain Russia and France- upset this balance, likewise the balance was tipped ones again when Hitler’s campaign began and the German ‘Reich’ began to expand. While WWI began with a conflict between small countries, which then branched out through the tangled alliances of Europe to other larger countries. WWII began with the big powers. WWI can be traced back to the rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Over time, large powers such as Russia and Germany stepped in to defend their allies and this enraged oven more countries. The inception of WWI was therefore like a 'ripple' effect beginning quite small, and then expanding. WWII was quite the opposite, beginning with the brutal campaigns and expansion of revisionist powers Germany and Japan. If WWI began with a ripple, WWII began with explosion. Large European powers got involved in WW1 because they wanted to protect their allies, not because of direct acts of aggression against them. WWII was marked by such acts daggrassim as the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the invasion of Poland, and the Rape of Hackling. While WWI began largely because of tension between countries that had been caused by competition over reign markets and colonies (Paul et al 112). Largely Fascism and a thirst for revenge began WWII. Hitler’s attacks on Europe and the transformation of Germany into a dictatorship was made possible because the German people were vulnerable and scarred by the previous war. These wars could be considered one continual conflict that was not properly resolved in the interim. The nationalism, alliances, and aggression that led to both wars points out that their roots were quite similar. The lesson learned is that the resolutions or lack of it has therefore shaped the way we make peace today. Both World War I and II were preceded by large armament buildups. In WWI, in Europe they were of a long-standing nature and in response to balance-of-power exigencies which usually placed a two to four times greater per capita burden on the populace than in the United States Germany‘s per capita burden was 7.65 times more than that of the US. There was no doubt that it was a nation poised for war. There was little support for a contrary opinion in both world wars; eminent expenses grew beyond the security needs of the nations. Rates immediately prior to both wars were of such a magnitude as to strongly suggest the imminence of war. In both these cases, inhibitory controls on armaments could have prevented wars of the sizes that occurred. For example, Treaty of versatile prohibitions on Germany and the League of Nations treaties vetoed by Great Britain in the 1923-25 period. What distinguished the occurrence of WWI and WWII entailed the dependence on the military, and the inhibitory controls. The choices made were military ones: balance of power and Maginot Lincoln neither ease did these methods perform, as intended, to prevent war. In terms of the present model in the WWI-WWII interim period, German DT was not sufficiently increased by balance of power or the Maginot Line. Low DT combined with low ML, WW, and an absence of AB (which had been rejected by failure to support the League) resulted in a low RLC for Germany. After Germany was found guilty of breaking the Versailles and Locarno treaties, nations substantially set the stage for WWII. Neither defensively nor offensively did the military or the statesmen of any major power took actions which could have been reasonably expected to prevent WWII. In the present nuclear age, we are again presented with more weapons than the security needs of each nation warrant and with the presumption that the potential adversary will be deterred. The extent to which the accidental component influenced the beginning of WWI and the extent to which strategists‘miscalculations failed to prevent WWI and WWII suggests that deterrence, as a means for securing peace, is a theory that runs contrary to this century's history. The following are attributes that caused world war - nationalism, social Darwinism, imperialism, and militarism - supposedly have cultural roots. All four demands begin with attitudes or preferences said to be widely held among “the masses.” In that respect, then, they may be subjected to some common lines of criticism. Each of these causes should be considered at three “levels”: those of mass belief, the advocacy groups, and the decision maker’s responses. Many assertions put forth with respect to these factors appear in what might be termed the “declarationist” mode, that is, unsupported statements of frequency and weight or importance. The problem is that with no serious public opinion surveys prior to the mid-twentieth century, we have no satisfactory indication of the prevalence, intensity, or import of any “mass” attitude. lt is easy to declare that “fervent nationalist” views were held by some tens of millions. We have better evidence with respect to the supportive associations - the advocacy groups although even here the quantity is limited and the quality often questionable. We can often find data on total membership of such organizations (Paul et al 100). However, rarely do we find indications of intensity, of how many of the members were active, how many inactive, how many lapsed. We rarely find a time series showing membership trends over the course of key decades. Associations, with rare exceptions, inflate the membership figures and exaggerate their influence. Another frequent problem appears in this connection: partial or one-sided presentations. Information on nationalist sentiments and organizations is reported at length, but no equivalent account of internationalist tendencies is provided. The same holds with respect to the militarism- pacifism pair. Social Darwinism was widespread, to be sure, but opposition to those views was probably also widespread, especially in the major religious bodies. In contrast to our knowledge of “mass sentiment” and of the organizations, our knowledge of the decision-making coteries is extensive. However, here too one finds a serious gap. Were the members of the coteries responding to the demands of the masses? Or to the demands of organizations representing them? Or were they fending off mass demands? Or - another possibility - were they simply indifferent to such importunities? Or was he moved by social Darwinist beliefs when he made the key decision for war? Or was his decision based on some strategic concerns, on Germany's place within Europe? The basic problem here is the failure to specify the connections: How did the alleged cause, those “mass” sentiments, affect the decision makers in July 1914? Nationalism, the second of the causes reviewed here, appears in all countries of Europe, and those sentiments clearly gained importance in the course of the nineteenth century. Balance of power When one talks Balance of power the idea that comes into our minds is the anarchy that reflects the assumption that because no one is in charge of the world, every state must defend itself from attacks by other states. Some versions of this model assume that the most powerful states are self-conscious actors, interested not only in preserving themselves but also in upholding "the system," the current division of power and the rules. This view adds to power-over an element of power with and is reflected in the proposition that, tor most states, the primary objective of international relations is to avoid war (Paul et al 77). In this variation of the balance of power model, states use diplomacy, alliances, payoffs, persuasion, and appeasement to keep the peace. In contrast, the standard version of balance-of- power theory assumes that no state is committed to the system; each is com- mitted only to itself. Here, the threat of war is the ultimate power-over mechanism that keeps the balance among the dominant states, and war itself the creator of a new balance that the losers are cautioned not to cl1allenge.“" Why does a power system become unbalanced? Political scientist Robert Gilpin otters a simple and elegant answer: because things change, and, when they do, they do not change evenly. Powerful states inevitably become weaker—maybe their militaries become fat and self-satisfied and their governments become so complacent that they allow their clients to loot the state and steal its capacity to provide and protect. Perhaps citizens refuse to pay taxes or rebel against how the state spends the money it takes from them (Russel 120). However, even if a powerful state maintains huge armies and weapons stockpiles, says Gilpin, other states can still beat it. They can invent better weapons systems; their economies can expand because they innovate more successfully than their rivals in commercial markets; they can acquire colonies that produce valuable materials and offer strategic bases. Any state that convinces its people that it is under threat can devote a disproportionately large share of national production and wealth to increase its power as an international competitor. This is another way in which the military is used as a tool of the government and not just when it becomes the only way to protect populations because all else has failed. When we look at real cases, however, it becomes clear why balance-of-power theory by itself is not a useful predictor of the future. Perhaps the best example is the mental image analysts have when they think of "classical" balance-of- power theory, the states system envisioned as operating from about 1820 to the start of World War I (WWI) in 1914. Prior to WWI, Britain, the dominant world power in a multi-polar international system (one with more than two major powers) throughout much of the nineteenth century, suffered a relative decline in its economy. New competitors, especially the United States and Germany, developed more efficient industries that undermined British products worldwide including in its home markets. Although the British navy remained the most powerful in the world, Britain had not fielded a large army, even during wartime, since the seventeenth century. Meanwhile, the armies of Germany, France, and Russia were large and growing, while Japan surprised all the European powers by demonstrating excellent war-fighting ability against Russia in 1905 (Japan won that war). This brings us to another problem with applying balance-of-power theory. Ferguson, basing his analysis on the self-conscious”balancer” model (power- over plus power-with), argues that Britain should have allied with Germany, which became the continent's weaker power/ coalition following the alliance between France and Russia. Had Britain done so, Ferguson suggests, there would not have been a world war. There might not have been a war at all if Germany had not seen itself as being in a "now or never" position, fearing it would have to face all three of the strongest powers in Europe on the battlefield in future. Most historians take the opposite view, arguing that whatever Britain did or did not do, war in Europe was inevitable (Paul et al 200). A combination of the militarization of German politics and the way the German military prosecuted the war from the beginning—invading neutral Belgium and purposely targeting civilians along with cultural monuments from cathedrals to the library at Louvain— would have persuaded Britain to send the HEP regardless and to the same effect.“ Even this explanation, with its stress on the actions of the weak Austrian- Hungarian empire, contradicts balance—of-power expectations. Indeed, the persistence of Germany's Convictions that it would win were so strong (until the sum.mer of 1913) that it made plans for the territories it would claim in Europe and Africa and argued about what it would demand as reparations from its defeated foes. This shows how little the balance of power matters in real life, as well. In response to difficulties in applying standard balance-of-power models to real situations, some theorists have built models based on the “mitigation” of anarchy, strategies for modifying anarchy to give agents more scope. These models add more dimensions to balance of power theory. They also offer better explanations of events and, analysts hope, better predictions of what might happen in the future. Most still focus on the nation state, but many include non-states as agents in their descriptions of the international system and how they work. The study of alignments has long been defined by various realist explanations. Systemic explanations identify a state's relative position in the structure of the international system as the primary determinant of alignment outcomes. Balance of power theory highlights the distribution of capabilities as the most critical variable in determining alignment behavior (Paul et al 120). These theorists suggest that states tend to balance for two reasons. First, by aligning against the strongest power and potential hegemony, states ensure that no one state will dominate the system, which stabilizes the system and creates a new equilibrium or balance. The traditional British role of continental balancer is indicative of this strategy. As Winston Churchill explained joining the stronger side was at times both easy and tempting, however, “we always took the harder course, joined with the less strong Powers, . and therefore, frustrated and defeated the continental tyranny of military. . .“.' Based on this propensity to balance power, scholars in the post-Cold War applied this rationale to U.S. grand strategy. For instance, Christopher Layne championed the neorealist cause, arguing that the post-Cold war unpopularity is an illusion that is destined to fade within a few decades as other great powers rise up to balance Washington's prominent position. This rationale is prefaced on a strong belief in the anarchic structure of the international system. States arc seen as the primary actors in world affairs, and they interact in a system that lacks an effective government above states, an international policing force, and a widely accepted body of international law. Thus, states find themselves locked into a perpetual structure from which, much like Jean Paul Sartre‘s conception of hell, there is "no exit. Because of this socialization to anarchy, states seek self-preservation and pursue security to ensure their survival. In a refinement of balance of power theory. Stephen Walt argues that states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone. Walt sees the level of external threat as a function of four factors including the distribution of capabilities, geographic proximity and offensive capabilities and perceived aggressive intentions. Thus, a state might not necessarily balance against the most powerful state, but consider through some factors which state poses the greatest threat and balance accordingly (Russel 99). Nonetheless, Waltz and Wall agree that the dominant behavior of states is to balance, although they disagree as to the reason why balancing would occur. Under some circumstances, states may find that the distribution of capabilities favors an alignment with the stronger power. Bandwagoning theory suggests that states may join the stronger side in order to avoid immediate attack and divert it elsewhere. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 illustrates the dual usage of the term. Through his alliance with Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin was able to divert any immediate attack on the Soviet Union.“ The domestic turmoil caused by industrialization, forced collectivization, and the Stalinist purges of the 19305 left the Soviet Union unprepared for combat with Nazi Germany. Time was needed to mobilize the Soviet economy for war production and strengthen the depleted officer corps of the Red Army. Simultaneously, Stalin, through his appeasement of Hitler, was granted a buffer zone between Third Reich, and the Soviet Union. Other realist propositions are more specific to interstate wars. One of the oldest realist theories is balance-of-power theory, which posits the avoidance of hegemony as the primary goal of states and the maintenance of equilibrium of power in the system as the primary instrumental goal. The proponents of the balance of power holds on a believe that the balance of power strives to alleviate hegemony. However, the military coalition that forms against them is a deterrence owing to their defeat in war. In this view, the 20th century world wars and the European war against Napoleonic France a century before were all balance of power wars that resulted from the formation of a military coalition to block a state from achieving a position of dominance. Scholars have also applied balance of power theory to regional state systems. One important difference between great-power systems and regional systems, however, is that the central assumption of anarchy is less valid for the latter, where, unlike the former use, powerful states outside the system can play a significant role (Russel 84). For example, outside powers can support a regional hegemony against a coalition of other states within the region, a coalition that might otherwise have restored a balance of power in the region. There are no significant powers outside a worldwide great power system that might play this role. Thus, some modifications may be necessary in applying balance-of-power theory to regional systems. An important alternative to balance of power theory is "power transition theory" which shares many realist assumptions but emphasizes the existence of order within a nominally anarchic system. The growth rate led the rise in hegemony as well as its fall. The probability of a major war grows as the hegemony loses its dominant position. A rising challenger that is dissatisfied with the existing international system overtakes the probability of war reaching the peak. Thus power transition theory appears to make the opposite prediction from balance-of-power theory—an equality of power, not a concentration of power, is most conducive to war. Power transition theory has direct implications for the contemporary world. It predicts that un popularity under U.S. leadership con- tributes to stability in terms of a continuation of the great power peace. With the inevitable decline of U.S. hegemony, however, new instabilities will arise particularly in the context of the continued rise of Chinese power. Many believe that the greatest threat to great— power peace will involve the dangers of a Sino-American conflict as the point of power transition approaches, which is estimated to be in about three decades. Although most experts believe that, the existence of nuclear weapons will help deter a Sino-American war, most expect an intense rivalry between the two mid- century superpowers. That rivalry might be somewhat mitigated, however, if China abandons its communist ideology and embraces liberal democracy. That would presumably lessen its degree of dissatisfaction with the status quo, as defined by the capitalist international economic stem currently led by the United States. Another prediction of power transition theory, one it shares with balance-of-power theory, is that leading states often act to block the rise of peer competitors. One balance-of- power theorist who explicitly makes this argument is John Mearsheimer, in his influential “offensive realist" theory. Mearsheimer argues, contrary to power transition theorists, that even the strongest states lack the resources to achieve hegemony over the entire world system. These states can sometimes achieve regional hegemony, however, and if they do they will use their power in an attempt to block other great powers from achieving hegemony in other regions.” One of the strategies that states sometimes adopt against rising challengers, in regional m well as great-power systems is preventive war (Russel 36). The argument is that a state facing a rising adversary may be tempted to initiate a preventive war in order to defeat the adversary while the opportunity is still available—before the adversary achieves a dominant position or crosses a critical threshold of military power. The logic of prevention is reflected in argument that "what made die Peloponnesian War inevitable was the rise of Athenian power. Preventive logic motivated the Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1931, and it was the initial rationale of the second Bush administration for its 2003 war against Iraq. Preventive war theories have yet to identify the specific conditions under which States take preventive action against rising adversaries, however, and there is considerable uncertainty about whether the United States or possibly others might strive preventively against North Korea or Iran. The former is believed to possess nuclear weapons and the latter appears determined to develop them. Conclusion It is clear that the balance of power played an important part during the World War period. The main reason for this phenomenon was to prevent further war to nations who were not involved in the first and Second World War. Work Cited Paul, Thazha, Wirtz, James, and Michel, Fortman. Balance of Power: Theory and practice in the 21st century. New York: Stanford University Press, 2004. Russel, Richard. Weapons Proliferation And War In The Greater Middle East: Strategic Contest. New York: Routledge, 2005. Read More