A Failed French Railways Project - Case Study Example

A Failed French Railways Project in 2014, the SNCF (Société Nationale Des Chemins De Fer Français) Name Institution Affiliation Date Abstract The French government in the year 2014 commenced on a project which would have seen the country transform its railway network, by introducing new trains. However, the project did not turn out as successful. The project was a failure as the trains, and the prospected outcome could not be realized (PMI, 2013). This paper explores the entire failure of the French railway project in 2014 while stating the potential reasons leading to the failure as well as the lessons learned from the project failure. Introduction A proper project management is one of the key aspects of a vital success of any project. Project success is as well the most expected outcome of any timely and quality invested money in any projects. However, some projects turn out to be the failure, due to some uncalculated risks or human errors resulting after execution of such projects. Methodology This report will employ a secondary method of data collection. The secondary method used would intensively cultivate the internet search on the available content involving the French railway project that failed. This method will be majorly employed alongside with other secondary sources, such as reading journals, publications, and books listed at the end of the report about failed projects, in particular, this French railway project. Results/Findings As Meunier and Dukakis (2015) assert, the French government indulged in a project to transform its railway project in the year 2014-2014. The projected costs, time and quality or performance, was to fit the prospects of the country railway plans. The government started working on the project with its proper consideration of the project management aspects. The project failure came in towards the end of the project, at a time when the entire project could not have been called off, the last stages of the project involved testing the bought trains to the existing railway. However, the project hit a hard rock when the trains were established to be too big for the railway, at the last stage. As Meunier and Dukakis (2015) argue, this move was a project failure from a top government corporation, an SNCF, a railways projects, and operations handler. The failed project forced the government to embark on widening the railway lined so as they can fit the bought trains. Another project which erupted from the first failed project. As Meunier and Dukakis (2015) asserts, the company had purchased 2000 new trains, which were seemingly for the excising railway track, but later found out that they were too wide for the railway track. This fact was discovered when the company brought in its first fleet of trains, they were too wide for the track, and could not even fit in most of the country’s railway station tracks, which they were majorly bought to serve). The mockery of the French railway company went too far to even many magazines, including the British newspaper which reported that the country had bought the TGV high-speed trains which were too fat for the railway tracks. Like Larson (2014) chronicles, the discovery that the trains bought were too wide for the constructed trains was made at a late stage of the project lifecycle. The stage at which nothing could have been made to reverse or cancel the entire project or even change it. This stage was the post delivery of the trains when the tracks were already made, and the company could not reverse the purchase, having been delivered the first fleet of the trains, the government had already wasted a lot of taxpayers’ money, amounting to over one hundred million euros. As Larson (2014) assert, this failed project would have been avoided for a better project, which could have been modifying the railway network and suit the current demands. This choice would have even made earlier if the SNCF could have realized that the trains to be purchased were to be too big for the railway track. As Larson (2014) argues, this move again could have been avoided I the company had done a proper feasibility studies before embarking on the project. An inclusive and intensive technical feasibility study before indulging in the project which failed to establish this error and caused these remarkable losses to the French government. As Larson (2014) argue, the two thousand trains purchased by the SNCF cost the government more than the initial project proposal of attempting to repair and upgrade the railway platforms. These losses the French government and the railway company incurred by this failed project could have just been avoided by simply repairing the original railway tracks and well as the exciting tracks. SNCF had given the contracting firm, the RFF, which is a subsidiary network operator of the SNCF the dimensions which only excited over thirty years ago. As Larson (2014) asserts, so the RFF used these dimensions in their bids to purchase the new trains, without prior knowledge that the new train tracks were smaller and thinner than those dimensions, which excited over three decades ago. The different new dimensions were built to replace the old ones, and after the collapse, if the SNCF project, there arose a need to refit the new trail network to suit the North trains. Another project which could have utilized more funds then the first train purchase funds. Discussion i) Causes of the Failed French Railway Project As Mitchell (2014) state, the primary cause of the French railway project failure is the wrong dimensions of the rail track given by the French national rail operators, the RFF to the train company, SNCF. This move made the SNCF trust the RFF for the dimensions it gave, and as the rules of the business states, you give what the customer party asks. The blame was taken up for the RFF for giving wrong dimensions. As Lehmann (2016) states, the railway French federation body failed to obtain the required information on the situation and the statue of its railway's networks, including the thickness, width as well as the actual sizes to match the trains to be bought. As Mitchell (2014) asserts, another cause responsible for the failed railway project in France is additional assumptions. There were too many assumptions emanating from the responsible personnel as well as the main parties in the entire railway project. Among the many assumptions made were that all the trains that could be purchased by the SNCF had the same size and the wheel width was the same. This was a fault assumption given that different companies make trains all over the world, and thus different trains have different when sizes as well as the when widths. Therefore, the trains do not necessarily have the same size. The RFF similarly assumes the trains the France had been same since the last time they were built, without necessarily consulting if there were any changes. This was a fault assumption given that over three decades ago the trains’ network changed, and the details of the changed were not well given by the RFF to the SNCF. As Mitchell (2014) chronicles, mismanagement of yet another reason for the French failed project. Poor management of the French railway upgrading is among the principal causes of the failed project. The management of responsible for strategizing for the project actives. The management of the RFF failed miserable in strategizing on the information to give the contracting firm the SNCR. The local RFF form failed to collect the necessary data needed to make the project a success. Any project needs a complete analysis as well as the problem identification, before the onset of the procedures leading to the project fulfilment. ii) Lessons Learnt from the Failed French Railway Project. As Lehmann (2016) asserts, the first lesson learned from the failed French railway project of the proper analysis and the feasibility studies on the project to be undertaken. In any project there is a problem identification, which indulges the urge of the project execution so as to solve the project, the proper feasibility studies make it possible for the project team to identify the necessary problems each sector may encounter, such may include both the financial, technical, and the technological studies. As Mitchell (2014) puts, if the French railway project had its stakeholders, majorly EFF doing a proper technical feasibility studies they would have stablished the proper measurement of the existing railway gauge size. The rest of the technological and the financial aspects would well fit with no collapse or failures in any of the sectors of the project, proper problem identification, as well as feasibility studies is a key vital organ in establishing a project success. As Lehmann (2016) asserts, the second lesson learned from the failed rail project is that management is very vital to the success of any project. The administration of the French railway project failed miserably when they failed to let the RFF substantiate whether or not the correct information was given to the SNCF for the railway sizes and the rail track sizes. The management of the RFF similarly could not perform to its expectation, as it was to blame for the failed project. Management to nay project should categorically establish the validity of the information it gives to the suppliers as well as other stakeholders about the project to avoid mix-ups as well as wrong deliveries. Management of therefore a vital component of any project and the project should be itself be managed properly to ensure its success. As Lehmann (2016) ascertains, a yet another lesson learned about the failed French trail project is that assumption on figures and statistics are very dangerous on any project. Key figures in the industry so called the pros may be termed as perfect in what they say basing their experience on the industry, but yet a single assumption let the project suffer. This assumption about the French rail project was made when the RFF failed to substantiate the actual size of its rails to make the right order of trains. As Lehmann (2016) chronicles, the last lesson learned from the failed project in French railway transformation is that no one can escape the project triangle. The project triangle has three main objectives that it should operate within the stated budget (cost), the scheduled duration (time) and the stipulated performance (quality). With a close follow of these three objectives the project will always deliver. The French railway made a mistake in the performance objective, failing in the most obscure aspect of ensuing the information given is quality and valid, miscommunication very dangerous on any reject. Conclusion Project success is the primary aim of any project execution. The French railway's project was meant to solve the railway's problem and upgrade its networks, with a project which was meant to be a success. However, simple mistake proved the team wrong as it lead to the failed project. Among the many causes of the project failure we the giving of salacious details of the sizes of the railway by the RFF to the SNCF, mismanagement of the project, and many assumptions in the project. The lessons learned from this failed project are that management is very vital in any project and that no one can fully ignore the project triangle as well as the complete feasibility analysis before embarking on the project is very vital. Recommendations The following are the recommended actions to be taken up to avoid any project failure. i. Close follow-up of the project process. All the phases of the project should be followed up, with professionalism to prevent any mix-up of ideas while making the project a success. ii. Avoid assumptions in any project. Assumptions, especially in the key research areas, are so dangerous in the progress and fulfilment of the project. Hence, any research before the commencement of the project should be done fully to ensure correct information ids given. iii. A project needs proper management. Any project needs a good management to steer up its execution while strategizing on the key action areas. An incompetent management results to failure in the process of making the project a success. References Larson, E. et al., (2014) Project management: the managerial process. McGraw-Hill. Page 14 Lehmann, O. (2016). Situational Project Management: the dynamics of success and failure. Boca Raton: CRC Press. 34 Meunier, J. & Dukakis, M. (201 5). On the fast track french railway modernization and the origins of the TGV, 1944-1983. Westport, Conn. London: Praeger. Page 81 Mitchell, A. (2014). The great train race: railways and the Franco-German rivalry, 1815-1914. New York: Berghahn Books. Page 67 PMI (2013) Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge. 5th Ed., PMI. Page 6. Read More