Hierarchism and the Horizontal Division of Work - Coursework Example

Management Theory Student’s Name Course Tutor’s Name Date: (Word Count: 2,072) Hierarchism assumes that ‘to act together successfully in the world necessarily entails a hierarchy of command, centralised control and the institutionalisation of roles of expertise and leadership’ (Blaug 1999: 35). Introduction Hierarchism and the horizontal division of work have their genesis in classical management approaches, where organisations were perceived as closed systems, and the employees as cogs whose only purpose was to successfully attain the objectives of the organisation. Max Weber (1864-1920) is credited with having popularised hierarchism in his bureaucracy theory, which posited that ‘power and domination were at the heart of the rise of modern civilisation’ (University of Leicester 2008, p. 12). In addition to citing hierarchical authority as a key idea in bureaucracy, Weber also included job specialisation, rules, impersonality, job security, and the ‘separation of work and leisure’ as other key components of bureaucracy (University of Leicester 2008, p. 14). This essay will commence by identifying the assumptions of hierarchism; the discussion section will follow giving reasons and arguments why this writer agrees with the same assumptions. In the end, the essay concludes by observing that it is agreeable that assumptions of hierarchism as indicated by Blaug (1999, p. 35) can be used to explain why hierarchical organisations exist to date. Going forward, and considering changes in the social, cultural and political environment, the essay argues that organisations may need to adopt flat organisational structures. The essay notes that some of the successful organisations (e.g. the Virgin Group) have flat management systems where even the chief executive officer can interact with employees at all department levels. Assumptions of hierarchism Blaug (1999) has expounded on the concept of hierarchism, and has specifically identified the assumptions therein as: i) the assumption that ‘to act together successfully in the world necessarily entails a hierarchy of command, centralised control and the institutionalisation of roles of expertise and leadership’ (Blaug 1999, p. 35); ii) the assumption that the hierarchical structures are similar to bureaucracy, especially because the hierarchies give little or no chance to people in the lower cadres to make decisions; iii) the assumption that hierarchies are oriented to act as routes to organisational success; and iv) hierarchism substitutes the formal written rules and /or procedures with judgements attained through argumentative procedures or discussions. The first assumption as detailed above will be the subject of this essay, since it contains most of what is detailed in assumptions ii) to iv). To start with, it is notable that the subject assumption is deeply entrenched in the social psyche of most communities in the world. As Blaug (2010, p. 20) acknowledges, the reality of the world is that some people have more power than others, and this practically enables them to dominate and subordinate others, create institutions that have asymmetrical power relations, and crease hierarchic organisational structures. While this assumption is necessarily true in many societies where it is assumed that the top-ranked person has the decision-making prerogative hence equating rank to decision-making competence, the reality as identified by Blaug (2010, p. 20) is that it has many related costs. For example, the concentration of power on those people positioned at the top-most rank is not always a good thing. In fact, some leaders have been known to make decisions that lead their organisations to absolute failure. The 2008-2009 economic downturn where banks and other financial institutions lost their shareholder’s net worth is one example that clearly indicates that the decisions made by the high-ranked people are not always the best. As Hargie, Stapleton and Tourish (2010, p. 722) note however, the high-ranked Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) avoid taking blame for anything and often apologise ‘for the situation’ rather than for their contribution in the situation. The negative impact of hierarchism is further observed in that shareholders (who should be ranked higher in the organisational hierarchy owing to them being investors) are not always given a chance to either accept the apology given by the CEOs or not. Hargie at al. (2010, p. 724) for example argue that apologies are at times seen as an end to the discussion rather than the beginning of the same. Unfortunately, it is often assumed that by approving the CEO and the board of directors, the shareholders often vest the responsibility of running the company on the former. As such, the CEO, and the board occupy high ranks in organisations, thus leaving shareholders little or no decision-making discretion. Chronic exclusion of lower ranked people in decision-making is also a counterproductive reality related to hierarchism and organisation theory (Blaug 2010, p. 21). Specifically, it has been argued that while it is easier to make decisions without wide consultations, the quality of the decisions may be questioned by those working at lower hierarchy levels, and this may even hinder the implementation process of the same (Simons & Thompson 1998, p. 9). Additionally, to make quality decisions, one needs to fully understand the problem, and due to the complexities of communication involved in hierarchies, high-ranked decision-makers rarely understand the problem as those who experience it (those low on the hierarchy) do (Saaty 2008, p. 84). Interpreted, this could mean that decisions made by the high ranked officers in an organisational hierarchy are sometimes based on misinformation, especially since the information passed to them through the organisation hierarchies may be distorted, thus losing its original meaning. The hierarchy of command as conceptualised by Blaug (1999, p. 35) can be linked to the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ as expressed by Robert Michels. Michels (1958, p. 304) claims that leadership in organisations makes the generation of hierarchies inevitable. He argues that as organisations become more complex, the need for ‘a certain amount of Ceasarism’ arises, and this means that some people gain status and powers to provide direction for those working under them (Michels 1958, p. 79). Interpreting Michel’s views, one gets the impression that working (or even socialising) in a collective environment always calls for one to be subject to the wills of someone else thus creating a hierarchy of command. Proponents of hierarchy observe that it ‘simplifies the knowledge environment, limits processes of communication, lowers costs and systematises tasks’ (Blaug 2010, p. 23). Yet, it also presents inefficiencies in the organisational set up since it restricts the flow of information through hierarchical bottlenecks. More of hierarchism’s inefficiencies are shown in the extract below. Based on such reasoning, one can therefore argue that the claim that hierarchism is necessary for purposes of coordinating human action is not necessarily true. As has been proved by networks, order and efficiency can also be attained even in instances or environments where hierarchies do not exist. The costs associated with hierarchism Source: Blaug (2010, p. 106). The antithesis of hierarchy is anarchism; and although the assertion that ‘anarchy is order’ (Blaug 2010, p. 24) may be construed to be too bold by some people, it is indicative that effectiveness can still be observed in human networks that are devoid of hierarchy. The notion of centralised control in hierarchies as stipulated by Blaug (1999, p. 35) can also be interpreted in the context of Michel’s (1958, p. 305) claim that organisations need leadership. While the assumption is true in as far as it resonates (and justifies) the hierarchical approach, it is not a scientifically proven ideal that only hierarchical organisations can effect control over the workforce. As Blaug (2010, p. 24) observes, the idea that leadership is vital in organisations is just an ideology rather than a scientific law. In view of such an argument therefore, it is not guaranteed that organisations that fail to abide by hierarchical arrangements will automatically be less effective than those that do not. The example of Virgin Group as used in the introductory part can yet again be used to expound such reasoning. As a group whose owner and leader Richard Branson prefers open systems of management, the Virgin Group has been cited as a successful non-hierarchical organisation (De Vries 1998, p. 9). In an interview Branson is quoted as saying that committees, board meetings, and such like formal interactions are a rarity at the Virgin Group. Branson further added that ‘if someone has an idea, they can pick up the phone and talk to me... better still, they can just go ahead and do it; they know that they are not going to get a mouthful from me if they make a mistake’ (De Vries 1998, p. 10). Arguably, Virgin is not an absolute flat-structured organisation since Branson is often called upon to approve decisions made by others. However, it is relatively flatter compared to organisations that follow the top down approach. The assumption that ‘institutionalisation of roles of expertise and leadership’ as noted by Blaug (1999, p. 35) is also true to the extent that it validates hierarchical organisations. As Blaug (2010, p. 25) notes, ‘in a hierarchy, when A yells at B... B does what he is told’. This could be interpreted that each party knows where he/she belongs in the hierarchy. Those at the top of the hierarchy will probably sit in offices waiting for reports from their juniors, who would on the other hand have to instruct and supervise those working under them. The institutionalisation perhaps explains the settled structures that characterise how those in dominant and subordinate positions relate with the dominant assuming leadership roles, while subordinates acts as their junior, and/or followers. Notably, Blaug (2010, p. 25) observes that while the power relations between the dominant and the subordinate can still be successful in leading an organisation towards its desired objectives, the power relations therein can corrupt not only the dominant (leader), but also the subordinates (the followers). Notably, the contemporary person prefers to have some sort of a democratic space, and as noted by Blaug (2010, p. 25), prefers power that is not always obvious or observable. In response, leaders can adopt a subtle, concealed and indirect way of exercising power by engaging their followers in decision-making, communicating directly with them, and using words, ideas, actions, and decisions that inspire trust and loyalty among the followers. Such however, is only possible in the non-hierarchical organisations. From the assumptions discussed herein, it appears that the hierarchism concept was developed on the belief that power must be exercised through control. As Blaug (2010, p. 28) notes however, hierarchism heavily compromises individual autonomy since it assumes that people ranked high in the hierarchical order have the ability to determine and provide the leadership needed to those in lower hierarchies (Blaug 2010, p. 28). In the followers, hierarchism is said to develop dysfunctions that include excessive reliance on the leader to make decisions, group-mentality, lack of personal initiative, and what Blaug (2010, p. 38) refers to as the development of ‘a collective fight or flight response’. Such aspects would be contrary to what would be expected in flat, non-hierarchical organisations where would-be leaders and followers work as part of a team, owning their own work, and hence taking a collective initiative to design, organise and manage their respective teams. As noted by Peat (2003, p. 10), flat organisations are structured in a manner that people therein take responsibility for outcomes, monitor their own performances; take corrective action, and initiate programmes that would help others in the same organisation. This is unlike hierarchical organisations where the organisation determines the paths, designs and progress that different people in the hierarchy will adopt or be measured against. Conclusion As implied in the discussion above, the assumptions cited by Blaug (1999, p. 35) are true in as far they resonate with and validate the hierarchical structures in organisations. However, being true does not necessarily mean that they are right or effective in generating efficiencies. As the essay has argued, flatter organisations are likely to generate efficiencies since the contemporary global business environment has a diversity of cultures, knowledge and ideas, whose value to organisations can only be realised if employees (or followers) are encouraged to actively participate in the organisation. True to the hierarchical assumptions listed by Blaug, the structured control, command, roles, expertise and leadership compartmentalise knowledge and skills, thus discouraging creativity, innovation, diffusion of ideas, and by so doing, limit the growth of both the individuals and the organisation. In conclusion, this essay admits that it is agreeable that assumptions of hierarchism as indicated by Blaug (1999, p. 35) can be used to explain why hierarchical organisations exist to date. As noted elsewhere however, just because the assumptions justify hierarchism does not mean that they are scientific facts – they are just ideologies, which can be replaced with newer ideas that would fit into the contemporary social, cultural, and political environments. References Blaug, R 1999, ‘The tyranny of the visible: Problems in the evaluation of the anti-institutional radicalism’, Organization, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 33-56. Blaug, R 2010, How power corrupts: Cognition and democracy in organizations, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. De Vries, M F R 1998, ‘Charisma in action: The transformational abilities of Virgin’s Richard Branson and ABB’s Percy Barnevik’, Organisational Dynamics, winter, pp. 7-21. Hargie, O, Stapleton, K, & Tourish, D 2010, ‘Interpretations of CEO public apologies for the banking crisis: Attributions of blame and avoidance of responsibility’, Organization, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 721-742. Michels, R 1958, Political parties: A sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy, Glencoe, Free Press, Illinois. Pete, R 2003, ‘Values drive value’, Business Review, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 1-11. Saaty, T T 2008, ‘Decision making with the analytic hierarchy process’, International Journal of Services Sciences, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 83-98. Simons, R H, & Thompson, B 1998, ‘Strategic determinants: The context of managerial decision making’, Journal of Managerial psychology, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 7-21. University of Leicester 2008, Organizational Analysis, Learning Resources, Cheltenham. Read More