Disaster Management - Assignment Example

Disaster Management Order No. 369282 Qs. 3.1 - Critically analyze the response of 3 emergency services on hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina is considered to be one of the worst catastrophes in recent times where organizational and operational failure resulted in heavy losses of both life and property. On August 24th, 2005, a tropical depression occurred and became a disastrous storm which devastated the SE Florida in the form of a Category 1 Hurricane named Katrina. To worsen an already bad situation, the hurricane surged forward and clashed with the protective flood barriers of the Levees System, compounding the catastrophe still further by flooding the entire neighborhood with water. Emergency services were urgently called in response to the situation and they had battled with Katrina for over a week to try and restore some sort of normalcy. In this essay, we’re going to critically analyze the emergency service departments that were called in during the Katrina Hurricane disaster. This investigation would help us understand the level of response of the organizational emergency services, the extent of damage incurred by the hurricane and improvement in the area that would be indispensable during future catastrophes. Given below are 3 emergency services that have been critically analyzed for its failure in appropriate response. a) The Pre- hospital Emergency Care Response According to Congressional Reports, an executive summary was drawn up by a select committee who identified the level of failure in the different emergency departments. These failures were not only institutional but also individual. Though there were exceptional acts of leadership and sacrifice, the major part involving the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina was a failure in the larger picture. One of the major failures involving Pre-hospital emergency care was ‘‘information gaps” that resulted in sluggish response. According to the Select Committee, Katrina was chiefly a failure due to poor initiative. Good leadership requires the right information and smooth coordination between the government and various other emergency departments and agencies in order to carry out the responses safely and efficiently. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, proper information was insufficient that resulted in slow Pre-hospital emergency care. Though disasters differ in their size, type and etiology, the desert and common features in their medical and organizational principles. These similarities have contributed towards developing a concise medical approach referred to as “Mass Casualty Incident Response.”(MCI’s) whose primary objective is to reduce the mortality rate brought about by disasters. (Briggs SM, Brinsfield KH, 2003) The primary goal of any casualty response on a large scale is that they have to achieve the best possible outcome for the largest number of individuals involved in the catastrophe. In lieu of this, the United States of America has set in place the Incident Command System (ICS) which they incorporated as a national program and called it the National Interagency ICS Management System (NIIMS) (Wenger D, Quatrantelli EL, and Dynes RR, 1990) & (Brewster P: Clear, 1990) The key structure of the ICS are command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. In a pre- hospital emergency care disaster response there should be complete coordination of the community by integrating efficient disaster plans in order to attain the desired response. Hospital wide drills are not only educative but highly essential for all the hospital staff members to give them good hands – on experience. Currently there is no evidence based literature that defines the best medical response framework in any disaster setting. However, immediate response and readiness can be achieved through such simulation drills, table – top exercises, testing and modifying existing disaster plans. For all casualty disasters, surgeons and surgical specialists are critical to ensure that the pre-hospital emergency care response is successful. Hence, surgeons and other medical personnel should take an active role in the framing and development of efficient institutional disaster plans based on past experiences. (Klein JS, Weigelt JA, 1991) & (Waeckerle JF, 1991) The first priority and responsibility of the security force is to ensure the safety of both its victims as well as the first responders during any disaster because poor safety and security could bring about a worse disaster if rescue workers became victims. (Cushman JC, Pachter HL, Beaton HL 2001) Law enforcement or security was another snag that was faced during the Katrina Hurricane disaster as there was widespread looting by the locals and it took a long time before the hospital security personnel could gain control over the situation since most of them were unarmed and incapable of managing the huge crowds of people. These criminal activities with a stumbling block to rescue operations as that caused a great hindrance to free movement of hospital, security and voluntary personnel during the rescue operations. The inability to predict public response and criminal activities such as looting and sniper attacks were clearly seen during the Katrina Hurricane disaster in New Orleans. (WNBC & CNN, Sept. 6th, 2005) Information and Communications Services The Information and Communication emergency service is highly critical to any disastrous situation. Considering the current scenario of MCI’s requires efficient planning and response that are well integrated into a safety and response emergency framework. Good intentions do matter but preparedness and timely enforcement of work within the different departments would ensure better results. Information and communication services are highly essential for the proper functioning of all departments within the emergency framework. A lack of immediate, effective and reliable information contributes towards compounding problems still further. One of the chief problems faced by MCI’s is the proper and accurate flow of communication to the public as well as to all the emergency departments. An analysis carried out on the twin towers, the night club fire that took place in 2003 and the Katrina Hurricane demonstrated that communication between the various emergency departments was hindered as most of the phone connections had been destroyed during the catastrophe which made it impossible to pass on vital information to everyone. This resulted in poor response towards the victims affected and a rise in casualties. Due to the breakdown of the information and communication system specific instructions to voluntary and hospital agencies could not be provided and as a result there was a huge surge of critically injured casualties. (Hirshberg A, Holcomb JB, Mattox KL, 2001) The failure to respond immediately to rescue operations and evacuations resulted in huge loss of preventable deaths, extreme suffering and heavy delays in providing relief. National response plans were executed very late resulting in heavy loss to life and property. Lack of Communication Services also resulted in the impairment of command and control at all levels delaying the much needed relief measures. (Patricia Thompson, 2005) In order to counter such a situation, the ICS has put in place a flexible management structure that facilitates proper communication and the sharing of resources by the different departments and agencies of the health care institutions. These systems that are developed and constructed for emergency on the basis of ICS principles have been recognized and categorized as ‘high-reliability organizations’ (HROs; Crawboski & Roberts, 2000) that demonstrate nearly error-free operation, even during ‘multifaceted, turbulent, and dangerous task environments’ (Roberts, 1990). National Emergency Response Agencies The National Emergency Response teams such as FEMA and DHS proved inadequate because they were unprepared to meet such a catastrophic event like the Hurricane Katrina and this served to reduce the Federal response still further. The FEMA management was unaware of the grave situation and their logistic system proved highly challenging in order to get rescue and voluntary workers, crucial equipments and other supplies to their destinations. FEMA also lacked highly trained personnel with the uniform approach to meeting its goals which impeded the rescue process still further. (Patricia Thompson, 2005) The Army Corps of Engineers could not gauge the pre- landfall and this contributed towards heavier losses and a much slower rescue response. However, they had provided crucial resources to the victims in spite of poor judgment. The Coast Guard responded well by saving lots of lives but improvement could be made in the area of coordination with other respondents. Military response was badly hampered due to the lack of integration and coordination between the National Guard and other duty forces. DOD did not have information sharing protocol and hence communication between the military components was slack. DOD was also unaware of post landfall conditions which initiated a much slower response. (Patricia Thompson, 2005) Proper communication equipment that is required for smooth on the ground ordination was lacking between the Joint Task Force Katrina, the National Guard, Louisiana, and Mississippi. (Patricia Thompson, 2005) After hurricane Katrina had struck, the different medical responders were unable to communicate and get help which slowed down the process of saving lives. The American Red Cross faced the challenge of trying to cope with such a massive mission as they were not fully prepared for such a huge catastrophe. (Patricia Thompson, 2005) 3.2 Was there any room for improvement in any of these responses? Justify your answer with reference to the actual response. The initiatives taken in response to Hurricane Katrina were a failure in the larger picture and definitely there is room for a lot of improvement in the Emergency Response Agencies. The first step in this direction would be to implement a much more sophisticated Information and Communication system. This system should incorporate the latest technology and should closely coordinate with all the departments of disaster management in order to lend a strong support during catastrophic events. The general public and all the important departments of rescue operations should have access to accurate information, so that they could act immediately in response to danger alerts. All the rescue and security personnel should be properly trained in order to live up to any catastrophic event and in addition to training they should understand how the system works because they have the responsibility of saving lives and property. The response of medical staff could be greatly enhanced by making them familiar with catastrophic situations by conducting drills and training them how to respond in these situations. The government should undertake the responsibility of putting a master plan in place by funding and coordinating closely with all the departments to ensure the safety and security of its people. Q-3.3 If you were the ambulance commander would you have managed this incident differently? If I was an ambulance commander, I would have reacted and managed this incident in a different manner. When I found the response to the situation was slow, I would have taken the risk of giving a few instructions to those voluntary agencies who were waiting for information orders to be given. I would have reacted on my instincts which were to save as many lives as possible. As an ambulance, commander, I would have risked issuing a few orders for the ambulances to remove the injured and the dying immediately to places of safety. I would have also requested medical staff to attend to the injured and the traumatized immediately without delay and thus ensure that their lives a safe and secure. References Brewster P: Clear understanding of ICS proves value for emergency management. Hazards Monthly 1990; 7–9 Briggs SM, Brinsfield KH: Advanced Disaster Medical Response. Boston, Harvard Medical International Trauma and Disaster Institute, 2003 Cushman JC, Pachter HL, Beaton HL: Two New York City hospitals’ surgical response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in New York City. J Trauma 2003;54:147–155 Hirshberg A, Holcomb JB, Mattox KL: Hospital trauma care in multiple casualty incidents: A critical review. Ann Emerg Med 2001;37:647–652 Klein JS, Weigelt JA: Disaster management lessons learned. Surg Clin Am 1991;71:257–266 Patricia Thompson, New Orleans Citizen and Evacuee, Select Committee Hearing, 2005 Waeckerle JF: Disaster planning and response. N Engl J Med, 1991;324:815–821 Wenger D, Quatrantelli EL, and Dynes RR: Is the Incident Command System a plan for all seasons and emergency situations? Hazards Monthly 1990; 8–12 http://www.WNBC.com. Assessed September 6th, 2005 http://www.CNN.com. Assessed September 6th, 2005 Reference list Alexander, D. (2002). Principles of Emergency planning and Management. Harpended: Terra publishing. Brennan, V. (2009). Natural Disasters and Public Health: Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.   Center for Public Integrity. (2007). City Adrift: New Orleans Before and After Katrina. Baton Rouge: LSU Press.  Durodié, W, (2004). 'Sociological Aspects of Risk and Resilience in Response to Acts of Terrorism'. World Defence Systems, 7(3), 214-6. Duffy, B. (2005). “Special Report: Anatomy of a Disaster,” U.S. News & World Report, 26 September, 23-43. Dyson, M. (2006). Come Hell or High Water: Hurricane Katrina and the Color of Disaster. New York: Perseus Books Group. Edwards, T., Young, R., Lowe, A. (2007). Caring for a surge of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees in primary care clinics. Annals of Family Medicine: 5(2):170– 173. Eggers, D. (2009). Zeitoun. San Francisco: McSweeney's Books. Fischetti, M. (2001), "Drowning New Orleans". Scientific American: (285 4): 68– 77. Gillan, B. (2005). “Exposed: Katrina urban legends.” Knight Ridder News Service, 28 September Hartman, C., Squires, G. (2006). There Is No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster: Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina. New York: Routledge. Hillson, D, & Murray-Webster, R. (2005). Understanding & Managing Risk Attitude, Aldershot: Gower. Marek, A. (2006). “A Post-Katrina Public Flaying.” U.S. News & World Report, 27 February, 62-64. Max, S. (2006). “Gulf Coast Revival.” Money, April, 60.Mulrine, Anna. 2005. “When the Cops Turn into the Bad Guys.” U.S. News & World Report, 10 October, 29. Mulrine, A. (2006). “New Orleans: Starting Over” U.S. News & World Report, 27 February, 46-58. Rozeman, A., Mayeaux, E., (2006). Hurricane Katrina and Rita: Evacuee healthcare efforts remote from hurricane affected areas. Southern Medical Journal: 99(12):1329–1333. Saint-Saens, A. (2010). Ordeal at the Superdome. Escaping Katrina's Wrath. New Orleans: University Press of the South. Shute, N. (2006). “On Life Support.” New York: U.S. News & World Report, 24 April, 54-59. Spielman, D. (2007). Katrinaville Chronicles: Images and Observations from a New Orleans Photographer. Baton Rouge: LSU Press. Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., & Davis. I. (2004). At Risk - Natural hazards, people's vulnerability and disasters. Wiltshire: Routledge. Read More