Leadership and the Blackhawk Accident - Literature review Example

LEADERSHIP AND THE BLACKHAWK ACCIDENT Your name Subject Date Introduction Leadership refers to a sociological phenomenon or a process involving the intentional exercise of influence exercised by one person over one or more other individuals in an effort to guide activities toward the attainment of some mutual or specific goals. These goals usually requires interdependent actions among members of that particular group (Pierce and Newstrom, 2003) According to (Rost, 1993), leadership also refers to an influence on relationship among followers and leaders who intend for real changes that reflect their mutual purposes. The reason as to why leadership has numerous definitions is due to the fact that it can be used in a variety of contexts. However, leadership is often defined as the characteristic of a person. This mostly applies when it is viewed as virtue within someone such as the ability to inspire confidence and respect or the ability to identify and comprehend organizations goals. In this report, we are going to concentrate on the definition of leadership that describes a category of behavior that involves influencing or directing people, enabling and motivating others. This definition targets leader’s competency though ignores the role of followers in most cases. Power, Authority and Influence Though power has been extended in management texts to mean the ability to change the behavior, beliefs of others and attitudes, it is normally defined as the capability of doing or affecting something. There are five common bases of power which include coercive power, reward power, referent power, legitimate power and expert three powers. According to research, there referent and expert power (also referred to as inspirational appeal and rational persuasion) are mostly effective in influencing task commitment. On the other hand, the legitimate and coercive power, also known as enforced compliance and punishment for inappropriate behavior, are least effective because they diminish the ability of others to improve themselves over time (Harris S, 1981). On the other hand, authority can be defined as conferred power to perform a service (Heifert , 1994) . For instance legitimate authority as that given to an appointed commander will tend to include some responsibility and obligations that are governed by established rules and regulations. In this scenario the commander has the sole authority to enforce compliance with set rules and procedures through consequences such as punishments. However the use of legitimate authority is not usually considered as an example of leadership but rather an example of command mainly used in military set up. Influence in this context of leadership refers to the emotional part is closely related to referent power. In most cases follower usually commit to do what leaders want them to do not necessarily because of the authority governing them but due to the trust and belief towards their leaders. For instance the two people can have the same formal authority and power and yet one can emerge more successful than the other in terms of control over resources. This means that leadership is more about influence than authority and other forms of power In this essay, we are going to observe the leadership issues that were associated with the black hawk plane crash that left seventeen soldiers dead and scores injured on a training operation drill that was expected to be rather peaceful and harmless Looking at the findings by the board of enquiry on Black Hawk crash it is quite apparent that the problem didn’t emanate from the crash site but it hard its roots back to the leadership governing the black hawk operation. Thanks to the report it emerges that there existed problems that were building up before the initial accident that claimed the lives of 17 soldiers and seriously wounding others One of the major problem according to the report was the use of Black Hawks in the operation yet their servicing record read they were unfit for the operation due to their high un-serviceability caused by lack of spare parts in market in the previous years prior to the tactical training operation. This was further characterized by a high rate of pilot separation over the same period. The separation rate partly contributed to the accident as this had a negative effect on the pilot’s ability to conduct a highly demanding counter terrorism operation Those individuals in charge at the commanding level knew about this but apparently did nothing to rectify the matter. As a matter of fact they gave a green light for the ill-fated Black Hawks to be used in the counter terrorism training operation When trust erodes, in an organization it can have serious consequences that goes beyond interpersonal relationship (Tidwell, 1999). According to Tidwell when observing the ethical issues that were involve in the Black Hawk crash, he notes that luck of trust amongst different level of commands played quite a big role in the culmination of the June 12, 1996 Black Hawk helicopter accident. He argues that the crush demonstrated ethical failing on the part of military leadership. Observing the conduct of the military commanders at various level of commands he come s to the conclusion that the sum total of the accident brings to light failure of accountability which in turn had been caused by violation of trust within the military Tidwell’s argument holds a lot of credibility especially when related to the first two findings of the inquiry. Trust is considered a core value in organizational life .The soldiers in the Black Hawk trusted their leaders when they were issued them with the Black Hawks in the training operation but their leaders violated this trust at all levels of command. At the heart beat of accountability in the military is the manner in which orders are given or received. Those giving orders are supposed to be accountable of the consequences of the orders they are issuing to their junior commanders. It is through this series of orders that responsibility and accountability can be understood in a military set up In military the obligation to follow an order issued by a superior doesn’t lay on some the intrinsic nature of the superior but on what the superior represents. This means that the obligation in place doesn’t exist between the soldier and his superior but rather between the soldier and the nation he/she swore to defend. Moreover those issuing the obligation should work to ensure that those orders do not place those undertaking them into undue constrains (Gabriel R, 1982) Relating to the Black Hawk accident, some orders that were issued by superiors on that fateful night were questionable. For instance, the training operation drill was to equip the soldiers with the three-breast formation skill known to be a very dangerous one, .This formation is usually considered very dangerous and calls for thorough practice and requires formal authorization before being attempted. Prior to the crash the three choppers were flying three abreast. Surprisingly, no authorization had been given for the three breast formation. It emerged that Captain Hales, the flight lead and Major Jameson, the Air Element Commander had failed to seek formal authorization thus violating the obligation created by the American flight orders (AFO). This is another failure the part of leadership, as the leaders of the training operation opted to operate outside AFO at the expense of risking the lives of fellow soldiers. In summary the orders governing flight authorization were not followed and consistently ignored an illustrative indication that the failure in leadership played a bigger role in the 1996 chopper accident. Moreover, the systematic flouting of the AFO rules by flight leader and Air Element Commander with regard to authorization of missions brings the entire Military leadership hierarchy under scrutiny. It raises eyebrows about the extent to which commanders violate stipulated army policies and go away with it since senior commanders of the 5th Aviation Regiment are too lazy to act on this misconducts or they are not even aware . Failure to take corrective actions on such misconduct sends quite a negative message that there exist problems in the leadership structure Apart from this two other significant findings by the board largely concentrated on the working culture at the 5th Aviation Regiment .. The inquiry found that the planning of the air mission at the night of the accident was not adequate. There was also inadequate delegation and supervision of planning tasks by superior commanders, poor diagrammatic representation of the landing site during the operation used by the commanders for briefing both the air crew and SASR. Among this the serious mistake was that of changing the flight profile and direction meant for the night mission from which had been organize and practices during the day. The superior commanders also happened to appoint a flight leading commander who was incompetent to lead the formation in the air. In addition the inquiry board found that the safety culture was quite week and needed radical change. Using then above findings it is quite obvious that there existed some organizational systemic deficiencies which permeated down the leadership hierarchy from the top to bottom. For instance, it is apparent that the Black Hawk accident is characterized with multiple examples of failures in safety. It appears that commanders were more into getting results rather than creating a safety working environment free from foreseeable dangers and safety threats. A good scenario of another leadership failure in the 5th army Regiment is when Captain Burke a competent flied lead pass over the command of the flight group to a rather less experience commander Captain Hales. “Hales took over the role of flight lea from Captain Burke who was more experienced…in order to reduce Capt. Burkes Work load” (Black Hawk Board of inquiry, 1996). The reason for Burks work overload was partly due to the high separation rate from the army and a possible managerial post taken by hi commander. As a result the Australian Defense Forces (ADF) could not exhaustively train pilots thus putting undue pressure on those who remained. The leadership yet again failed by allowing experienced pilots to leave the service and didn’t see the importance of training others in an effort to replace those who had already left. Moreover the ADF leaders failed to care for their soldiers Unfortunately this safety concerns did not come up until after the Black Hawk accident. Major Martlew, a former regimental standards officer had wrote to his commanding officer in December 1994 outlining some safety concerns he had. This letter was drafted two years earlier before the Black Hawk incident. The letter gave a critical analysis on safety concerns that required immediate attention. Amongst is concerns were his fears of the over emphasis on getting the job done rather than safety of the soldiers. He also noted the poor stature of the air safety reporting system which may result in decline of accountability in respect to violations of air safety protocols. These are just but a few of his many concerns that were never acted upon until the aftermath of the June 12, 1996 incident What casts a dark cloud on the leadership structure at the 5th Aviation regiment was the sinister question why Martlew had to wait until the end of his tenure with 5th Aviation Regiment to make public his safety concerns. Was Martlew afraid his concerns would have landed him in trouble with his superior?. It is documented that as early as 1989 there had reports of “near misses” or choppers that nearly ran into other flying choppers but this reports remained a secret and were never reported to senior commanders. This brings another negative view of the military leadership in the 5th Aviation Regimen. It appears that the juniors felt intimidated by their superiors or the commanders did not create a conducive environment for communication with their juniors and yet inviting such views as those of Major Martlew would have averted the two Black Hawk Helicopters from colliding and causing loss of life and destruction of property. A critical look at the issue of work place safety shows that an abrogation of safety rules and regulations did exist in the 5th Aviation regiment but it seems that this regulations were not given a priority or they were ignored all together. Moreover the soldiers themselves pay little or no initiative on the fact of an unsafe workplace culture. Additionally further up the leadership hierarchy those who had the ability for funding and equipping the ADF failed to disseminate the resources that were required to ensure a safe working environment. Conclusion It is quite obvious from the discussion above the extent to which leadership factors contributed to the crash of two Black Helicopters in June 1996. As a matter of fact it appears as if the individuals who were involved in the plane crash were just unlucky that they happened to be the ones to be involved, the unfortunates who acted as an trigger to a disaster that was waiting to happen due to failure in leadership on all levels of command at the 5th Aviation Regiment List of references Aviation Regiment. 1985 Pacific Defence Reporter, October 1989, p, 51 Gabriel, R. 1982. To Serve with Honor. Greenwood pres, Westport, CT. Heifer R. Launcher, 1994. Regime shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics. Pdf Version Horn B. and S. Harris, S edt.1981. ‘Distinguishing the Concepts of Command, Leadership and Management’ Generalship and the Art of the Admiral, Newyork Pierce J, and Newstrom J. 2003. Leaders and the Leadership Process. Saint paul, Minnesota US Rost C, Joseph, 1993. Leadership for the Twentieth Century. Greenwood publishing group Tuchman, B.1981. Generalship in practicing History. Balantine Books, New York. Work safe. 1994. ‘Work safe Australia Submission: Industry Commission Inquiry Into OHS Arrangements in Australia, Work safe, Sydney Wright, T. 1997. ‘Black Hawk Crash Inquiry: Call for Review, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 September. Read More