Leadership And The Blackhawk Accident - Coursework Example

LEADERSHIP AND THE BLACKHAWK ACCIDENT Name: Institution: Date: Leadership and the Blackhawk Accident Introduction On 12th June at Dusk in the year 1996, during the process of a routine exercise in Queensland near Townsville, two Black Hawk helicopters belonging to the army had a collision and crashed to the ground in an enormous fireball. 18 soldiers died in that crash on that fateful day and 12 were injured (Australian Army 1996). Many exercises of a similar nature had been undertaken before so the question that begs is; “why did this particular one go wrong?” (McLucas 2000). That fateful day of June 12 1996 was the 2nd day of a succession of training sessions which were intended at developing and retaining lofty keenness when it comes to Special Air Service Regiment as well as the 5th Aviation Regiment. This was an exercise to build skills that are required for Counter Terrorism (CT) as well as Special Recovery Operations (SRO) for both individual trainee soldiers and teams in general.The soldiers who were under training were engaging in a preparation activity geared at recovering Australian citizens if they ever found themselves held hostage in cases of the occurrence of Terrorist activities. After the occurrence of the accident, a wide spread enquiry was carried out which lasted about three months. The report from this inquiry by the board of inquiry is contained in about 17 volumes. This paper is a quest as to the role that leadership played before and after the accident. Discussion The Plaintiffs to the case were all of Australian origin and were people mainly injured as well as the estates of those that were killed in the crash. The action was brought to connecticut with several counts that were based on the accountability of products, neglect and breach of articulate and indirect pledges by the plaintiffs. According to them, the accident was as a result of shortcomings related to the assembling and blueprinting of the planes involved and other equipments such as night vision equipment. According to the defendants who were mainly the manufacturers of the equipments and the helicopters, the complaints were basically “non-conveniens” but the the motion advancing the claims of the defendants was denied by the court. The relevant facts relating to the problems that caused the Blackhawk accident are mainly those that came from the complaints of the plaintiffs, the findings of the board of inquiry as well as the official declarations that were filed to stop the claims that the defendants were advancing. After the accident had occurred, the Austrralian Army chief of general staff assembled a board of Inquiry that investigated the accident in order to find out the cause of the accident and come up with suggestions on how similar accidents could be avoided. This investigation of the Board attracted 144 witnesses that also included personnel in the millitary at that time. According to Vennix in a researh concerning accidents such as the Blackhawk accident of 1996, there was a realization that very little was known about the nature of the occurrence of accidents such as this in what he refers to as “Messy Problems” (Vennix 1996). There are certain pre-existing conditions in relation to what leads to accidents such a the Blackhawk accident of 1996 and these are not only related to the occurences immediately before the accident. They are in most cases the occurences that took place many weeks, months and in some cases years in advance according to McLucas. The commonest of these include; accumulations of systems failures which subsisted at various levels of organizational leadership, communication breakdowns, the existence of a “culture of denial” when it comes to admitting that there is a problem, a breakdown when it comes to understanding issues and learning from them understand and learn and lastly but not least a breakdown in risk management (McLucas, 2000). McLucas goes on to say that the most disturbing of them all, the breakdown in understanding issues and learning from them is one of the biggest failures when it comes to leadership roles in managing accidents such as the one in question. According to Tidwell, the Blackhawk accident was a representation of serious etical problems in the Military (Tidwell, 1999).There is a recognition when it comes to most literature on the nature of accidents including the board of enquiry formed to look into the accident that the pre-existing conditions beforehand were particularly similar to most of what we face in our day-to-day lives and that looking into these pre existing conditions is bound to bring out the real picture of what he refers to as “the normal” and recognizing that the scene was being set weeks, months and even years before the actual occurence of the accident for catastrophe to take place (McLucas, 2000 ; Centre for Defence Leadership Studies, 1997. Pg 4). Research has come out strongly to suggest that “normal situations” existing before the actual accident occurs usually entail element intricacy, criticism, postponement mechanism and lethargy. According to Sterman, that is really worrying considering that human beings are extremely limited when it comes to predicting character beneath such circumstances (Sterman, 1989). The black hawk accident took place under such circumstances and the explanation that seems to have reared its head is that there was a lack of appreciation of the nature of the complex problems that existed during that time. The Board of inquiry particularly pointed at this and suggested that the millitary forces should be forearmed with tools to habitually evaluate details and dynamic complexities (Centre for Defence Leadership Studies, 1997. Pg 2). The Board of Enquiry after scrutinizing the main constituents of the evidence presented and after weighing the connection between those constituents within the means of lawful premeditations concluded that the accident was a result of a series of happenings which included in this order; the failure of the leadership in the army to put in place “fail-safe and termination formulas” which would ensure that unsafe dynamics were corrected in time when it comes to precise assignments, the failure to distinguish the intricacy of assignment and being familiar with the significance of accounting for aircraft incidents in training, failure to update the arbitration of those accountable for designing pooled arms, guidance and related protection as well as sustainability, the growing convolution of when it comes to training that is beyond the completion of some of its constituent parts especially those involved in CT and SRO, increasing demands as a result of the expansion in the diverse range of equipment expertise, low level of ability in some members of the 5 Aviation regiment in terms of preparation and conducting of faster strategic configuration when flying at night at CT and SRO. Other issues included deficiency in unambiguous lines of accountability and lack of proper leadership for CT /SRO related activities, demoralization and insufficient oversight when it comes to control of pooled arms action in this case CT/SRO preparation training. In total, the Board found about 32 issues. (Centre for Defence Leadership Studies, 1997) Prior to the accident specifically in 1994-1995, there had been a deficiency in functional aircraft and this had led to a demoralization situation and a degradation of flying principles. Those in charge of supervising demoralization then lacked a holistic vision of handling the situation and with an exception of matters related to air crew, matters suh as pilot training and aircraft availability for instance were particularly of great importance to such a vision. For instance, if they had they would perhaps have appreciated the fact that the prooblem was far more deeper than what they saw on the surface and that it was one that was highly affected by directorial politics, issues related to funding and the vailability of resources. Demoralization was an entity by itself which was indicative of other more extremely ingrained problems some of which could be traced years back. It was a significant pointer of other tribulations which were interrelated. The leaders ought to have noticed this and realized that the issue of demoralization could not be solved by wishful thinking or suddenly because for example it would take several years to enlist and train pilots and an even longer time to coach qualified flying instructors (McLucas, 2000). Lack of strategy is another factor that caused this non-realization as the matter is one that would have required counteractive a perceptive reactive tactic to solve it and therefore it was never dealt with efficiently. According to Senge and Coyle, embarking upon an intricate crisis is often a matter of bearing in mind where the control lies (Coyle, 1996 ; Senge, 1990). Undeniably it is recommended that any approach aimed at avoiding training episodes or catastrophes should be directed at exacting critical concepts such as the one mentioned above and specifically these three; the failure to distinguish the intricacy of assignment and being familiar with the significance of accounting for aircraft incidents in training, failure to update the arbitration of those accountable for designing pooled arms, guidance and related protection as well as sustainability, demoralization and insufficient oversight when it comes to control of pooled arms action in this case CT/SRO preparation training; According to the observation of the Board of inquiry, “failure to inform the judgement of those responsible for designing combined arms training and associated safety” (Centre for Defence Leadership Studies, 1997). This according to McLucas was “the worst failure, the failure to learn” (McLucas, 2000). A collapse in Risk Management Prior to the Blackhawk accident a breakdown occurred when it comes to appreciating the intricacy that was involved, the breakdown in understanding the complexities and learning from them and especially, a Collapse in risk management took place. The third factor was particularly brought about partially by Misunderstandings when it comes to risk, their probability and their outcomes; A deficiency in positive reception of systems and complete structures. Impediment as well as response, factors that contribute to dynamic convolution and lead to dynamically changing risk and; According to Flood, “Systems related to knowledge as a source of power as well as “systems related to implication” (Flood, 1999). A reasonable person in a position of leadership when confronted with the circumstances such as those that existed prior to the Blackhawk accident and in accordance with the evidence that was presented before the board of inquiry would have acted in a manner sggesting that he is reasonable. According to the concept of reasonable man in law, a reasonable person confronted with the circumstances outlined should supposedly or expectedly act in a manner that suggests under law as “reasonable” (Miller & Perry, 2012). After analysing all the veidence, the Board of Inquiry came up with what could be referred to as the resultant conclusion or in other words the constituting factors as to what may be logically be considered as existing or what could be logically be considered to have been in the knowledge at that point in time as well as general structures that were identifiable and analyzable in the case. Conclusion There is a very strong evidence from the case of the Blackhawk accident that managers as well as strategic decision-makers have under developed approval when it comes to the kinds of complexities that they have to deal with. Leaders often tend to be unaware of evolving examples of procedures and behaviours that are indicative of fundamental complete formations. Political systems related to information power, the secularization of information, unawareness and ineptitude resistance to the existence of embeded and prospectively flawed assumption brought to the surface, distrust of diagnostic techniques, circumscribed prudence and distrustful practices have all been a part of the assessment making atmosphere of most organizations. These factors have been working against the appreciation of the embryonic models as well as the underlying structures in organizational structures as seen in the case of the Blackhawk accident. There is therefore a need to creative a primary objective aimed at using techniques aimed at strengthening understanding and learning not just in the millitary but in other organizations as well. The highest priority according to McLucas is “to correct the worst failure, repeated failure to learn because that is where the greatest gains are to be made (McLucas, 2000). List of References Australian Army, 1996, Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Mid-Air Collision of Army Black Hawk Helicopters A25-209 (Black 1) and A25-113 (Black 2) at Fire Support Base Barbara High Range Training Area , North Queensland on 12 June 1996, Sydney: Australian Army. Centre for Defence Leadership Studies, 199, The Australian Army: Blackhawk board of Inquiry, Canberra: Australian Defence College. Coyle, G, 1996, System Dynamics modelling: A practical Approach, London: Chapman and Hall. Flood, L, 1999, Rethinking the fifth discipline: Learning within the unknowable, London: routledge. McLucas, A, 2000, The worst failure: repeated failure to learn - 1st International Conference on Systems Thinking Management, Canberra: Australian Defence Force Academy. Miller, A, & Perry, R, 2012, The Reasonable Person, New York University Law Review Vol. 87 (2) , 323-392. Pinker, S, 1997, How the Mind WAorks. London: Penguin. Senge, P, 1990, The fifth Discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization, New York: Doubleday. Sterman, D, 1989, Misconceptions of feedback in dynamic decision making Experiment, Management Science Vol. 35 (3) , 321-339. Tidwell, A, 1999, When Trust Fails: The Blackhawk Accident, Sydney: Macquarie University, Vennix, M, 1996, Group model building: Facilitating team learning using system dynamics, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons. Read More