Second Avenue Subway Project - Case Study Example

SECOND AVENUE SUBWAY PROJECT Table of Contents Introduction 3 2.Successes and failures in the initial planning 4 3.Successes and failures in monitoring and controlling 5 3.1.Successes 5 3.2.Failures 8 4.Assessment of the impact of the SAS project on the society 10 5.Conclusion 11 6.References 12 1. Introduction Second Avenue Subway project (SAS) is owned by the City of New York and is envisioned to bring in effectiveness and efficiency in transportation once completed. While phase 1 of the project is currently ongoing and phase 2 is under planning, the need for the project was pinpointed more than 50 years ago, but was launched just recently. Phase 1 of SAS which connects 96th street and BMT 63rd Street Line is currently under construction, with 76% complete and the project manager expects that it will be opened by December 2016. Apparently, upon its completion, Phase 1 of SAS will serve circa two hundred thousand riders every day while the whole project which is anticipated to be opened by 2029 is expected to serve about six hundred thousand riders in a single day reducing congestion by 37% (Shannon, 2015). The SAS, which had been planned since 1929, has experienced many fabricated starts and delays due to numerous multifaceted reasons that still threaten its successful completion. Funds were a major limiting factor. The construction plan currently in use was launched on March 20th 2007 after metropolitan transport authority awarded the tunneling contract to consortium of S3 (Skanska/Shea/Schiavone) (Nobbe et al., 2013). This was immediately preceded by preliminary engineering which saw the completion of a tunnel design connecting Arup and AECOM. However, despite the numerous challenges, the construction manager, Parsons Brinckerhoff, is hopeful that the project will eventually be completed and projected deliverables delivered to the public who have invested heavily in the project. Phase 1 of SAS which consists of 3 stations and 2 miles of tunnel is expected to be finalized within a modest budget of $4.45 billion whereas the entire line covering 8.5 miles will cost over $17 billion. On April 12 2007, a grand ground-breaking step in SAS was witnessed when the contractor constructed a construction location at 96th street. 2. Successes and failures in the initial planning The need for SAS was pinpointed in 1919 after WW1 when the NYPSC (New York Public Service Commission) launched investigations to determine the improvements required in the public transport system within the city. In 1929, the expansion was approved by the city’s Board of Transportation. Apparently, a major cause of the unabated project failure mushroomed in its planning phase when the board projected that the project will cost $98,900,000 and be deliverable within 9 years (Nobbe et al., 2013). Similarly, the cost only included construction cost while ignoring the cost of land acquisition; land was an important material requirement and failure to budget for it indicates the board’s obliviousness. Moreover, the approved plan (1929) encompassed 4 trails from Harlem River to 125th street, six more trails to connect 125th street to the IND Sixth Avenue Line at the common and populous 61st street, and 6 more trails to connect 61st street to Pine Street. Due to inadequate planning, emergence of the world war coupled with the Great Depression, the costs of the extension became insurmountable. Disparagingly, the state could not provide funding, construction of phase 1 was now behind schedule, a clear indication that cost and time, important aspects of the triple constraint triangle were not considered in the planning (Shannon, 2015). As a way of reducing costs, the board prepared a condensed proposal in which a junction was introduced at 34th Street and postponement of major connection tracks. However, while postponing was carried under due care and supported with sufficient reasons, the proposal failed to take into consideration the fact that there were turmoil boiling from every corner and another world war which would further delay the project and increase its costs was approaching was it was now very obvious that another world war will break out. Apparently, the New York city Board of Transportation failed by not including support teams in the development of the proposal. The project plan was regularly reviewed since the team could not easily agree on the necessary connections that required urgent attention. For instance, in 1947, a new plan was drawn in which it pictured the Second Avenue Line passing through Williamsburg and Manhattan Bridges to connect with Brooklyn via BMT trackage. Lack of understanding and miscommunication can be considered to be the main causes of the continual planning and disagreement within board members (Nobbe et al., 2013). The contractors, who would have been beneficial in the planning process, were left out deliberately and city engineers became oblivious of this act that portended the project’s doom. Similarly, the funding allocated for phase 2 is too meager considering the scheduled completion time and the terrain that will be involved. While it is clear that phase 1 is already facing resources constraint, particularly cash, the planners currently planning for phase 2 have failed to consider this and phase 2 might remain a paper plan just like the American dream if the MTA does not source for additional funds. To cover the massive amount of work required in phase 2, an additional $15 billion is required and MTA has not indicated where these funds will come from whereas the legislators have openly indicated that they are not certain whether these funds will be attainable and whether the project will be attainable. This is a strong symptom of poor scheduling and fear of the unknown (Rosenau & Githens, 2015). 3. Successes and failures in monitoring and controlling 3.1. Successes In the SAS, more than 10 contracts were issued to different contractors. Four of the contracts are currently complete and six are expected to be completed before 2016. Apparently, the issuing of contracts to different contractors enabled the project team to share risks, bring in specialization, and attain the and at a high efficiency. For instance, the joint venture of S3 was awarded the contract for the TBM (tunnel boring machine) in March 2007 by the MTA (Metropolitan Transportation Authority), an action that saw immediate commencement of designing of tunnels and access shafts at 92nd, 69th, and 95th streets. In the execution of the project, the machines used are highly complicated and multifaceted to meet current engineering and construction requirements (Nobbe et al., 2013). There has been satisfactory communication between MTA and contractors, a factor that has enabled the planning and construction schedules to be kept at par. Manhattan Community Board 11 together with the Manhattan Community Board 8 which are an imperative task force in the SAS meet the MTA and together with its contractors. As such, MTA has been able to report to the boards the progress of the SAS project and subsequently seek help from the community. MTA’s success in monitoring the project and its interest to communicate project development to the public is also evident from its maintenance of a web page that summarizes the planned construction activities one month before their scheduled start date. This has ensured that project participants are well aware of forthcoming activities and prepare adequately to handle the tasks that have been or will be allocated to them. This kind of controls and communications helps in reducing uncertainty and makes all people to buy into the project. The controlling and adjustment of schedules is another important factor that the SAS can be appraised of. Changes are inevitable in projects and the best thing that project managers can do is to anticipate changes and be ready to deal with any risks presented by the changes. In the SAS project, the ability of the project manager to manager changes can be demonstrated and explained from the delayed arrival of the TBM. After construction of initial tunnel on 23rd April 2007, S3 expected that the TBM will arrive at the construction 7 months after commencement of the construction. However, excavation and relocation of the utility required the creation of a launch box, which was previously unanticipated and the placement of the TBM delayed until early May 2010. S3 became creative and deployed its resources to other tasks that could be managed without the TBM (Nobbe et al., 2013). Special contractors deployed by MTA finally managed to complete the installation of TBM and turned it on in the early hours of May 14. By the time the TBM was ready, S3 had completed installation in of basic infrastructural facilities in expected stations and could then simply speed up tunnel boring process in an effort to complete it within the previously scheduled duration. Moreover, the project team has created transparency in project parameters by regularly monitoring successes, failures, and corrective actions while still striving to communicate this to the concerned parties including the public and the government (Rosenau & Githens, 2015). The project team regularly meets officials from MTA and communicates what has been done. Apparently, all contractors have put in place performance measurement baseline and the performance of costs, scope, and effort and tradeoff between them are regularly appraised and improved when necessary. What’s more, there has been inclusion of all necessary legislations that are primarily aimed at safeguarding the wellbeing and safety of the public. Stations within the SAS lines have been designed without columns to offer a unique experience. Unlike previous stations, stations within the SAS lines will be fitted with a unique ventilation system and comply with fire codes which will ensure the safety of the constructors as well as safety of passengers when they are officially launched. The project managers communicated this and it apparently helped in building momentum and unrestricted support from members of the public (Nasri, 2013). The 8.5 miles tunnel was well planned and controlled considering the advance determination of the construction methods to be used in different stages of the construction. Taking into account the high rise properties in the vicinities, population, and special conditions of the ground, the MTA decided that several methods including the cut and cover, TBM, and mining with cut and cover are planned to be used in various segments are indicated below; Streets Construction method Lex–2 Aves TBM 101–95 CC 43–41 Mined with CC 125–123 Mined with CC 95–87 TMB 41–34 TBM 123–120 TBM 87–84 Mined with CC 34–32 CC 120–117 Existing 84–73 TBM 32–24 TBM 117–114 CC 73–71 Mined with CC 24–22 Mined with CC 114–109 Existing 71–58 TBM 22–15 TBM 109–106 CC 58–56 CC 15–13 CC Evidently, having such a plan was an important control strategy as it ensured that the infrastructure required for the execution of the project was available. The required machines and tools for mining were acquired well in advance, a clear indication of successful planning of the execution of the SAS project. 3.2. Failures While phase 1 of SAS is almost complete, the project team has not learnt any aspects that will circumvent the same difficulties that almost made it impossible for the completion of phase 1 from crawling into phase 2. In 2008, following an up surge in the prices of diesel fuel and construction materials, the MTA failed to scale-down its tasks or simplify certain features to ensure that the changes in the economic environment do not impact negatively on the project. The project team also failed in implementing required changes. For instance, during the construction, the project team was forced to demolish some buildings to pave way for the construction (Nobbe et al., 2013). MTA advised that such demolitions be done at night to avoid disruption of the community but S3 found it difficult to adjust to the required suggestions and undertook the demolitions during daytime as previously scheduled hence disrupting the social and business activities. Moreover, while the constructors were faced with several challenges that necessitated the use of bottom-up construction method, the use of the method was scanty and the project team anchored its hesitancy to embrace the method on the risks associated with earth excavation. During the construction of phase 1, geological anomalies were experienced. For instance, fractured rocks, faults, unexpected clays, and soft grounds were found along the way and S3 portrayed little ability to handle the anomalies (Nasri, 2013). Risk preparedness was also scanty a factor evident by the continual halt of project work anytime an uncertain social, political or economic activity occurs. Intriguingly, MTA failed to communicate effectively with the contractors regarding changes in schedules. This made it difficult for the contractors to in turn communicate with the constructors undertaking the project tasks, a further that often bridged misunderstanding, wastage of resources, and extreme deficiencies. According to Nasri (2013), considering that the SAS project involved 10 different contractors, MTA should have put in place a comprehensive communication plan that would adequately cover the communication needs of the project. 4. Assessment of the impact of the SAS project on the society According to Shannon (2015), phase 1 of SAS has been nothing but a disgrace to the surrounding community. It has left the surrounding environment worse off and deterioration of business activities is a bitter reality that the state government must accept. “The process has left local businesses suffering the adverse effects. Almost half of the businesses between 68th Street and 95th Street that saw the beginning of the 2nd Avenue construction have moved or closed within the last 5 years due to declining revenues” (Shannon, 2015). Business owners along the 2nd avenue strongly believe that the SAS construction is a major reason for the failure of their ventures as it has made it difficult for people to access the 2nd avenue. Business along the areas surrounding the SAS are experiencing a 50% overall loss due to the dramatic decrease in number of customers visiting the stalls. Apparently, many customers end up believing that the business are not closed since they are fully covered up by the construction and one will strain to be sure that a business is operational even at daytime. Additionally, business representatives are grouchy due to the lack of financial support and communication from state officials regarding how they will be compensated for the inconceivable losses they are incurring. The community is already convinced that the MTA is not willing to undertake any measures to help traders in the construction zone. This devastating scenario implies that the project managers failed to effectively assess the impact that the project will have on the community and formulate and implement measures to curb the adversities. Noteworthy, the community might soon withdraw its support from the project and its failure will be inevitable (Shannon, 2015). Seemingly, one of the things that was erroneous in the phase 1 of SAS was community sensitization and impact assessment. This failure, on the part of MTA, might eventually contribute to failure of the entire project. 5. Conclusion From the above elucidation, it is ostensible that the SAS project has been ‘on and off’ due to various challenges including funds inadequacy and poor project planning. While phase 1 of the project is currently ongoing and phase 2 is under planning, the deliverables of the project might never be attained if the project manager does not take a deeper analysis of the tradeoff between scope, costs, quality and schedule. While there has been success in monitoring and controlling, there are more factors, issues, and challenges that the project manager and the MTA must take into consideration to ensure success of the project. The metropolitan community has invested so much in the project and its failure will be disheartening and might lead to loss of confidence in MTA and the state government. 6. References Nasri, V. (2013). Design and construction of the Second Avenue subway project in New York / Entwurf und Bau der Second Avenue Subway in New York. ISSN 1865-7362, 10/2013, Volume 6, Issue 5, pp. 528 – 541. Nobbe, P., Berechman, J., University Transportation Research Center,, & City University of New York. (2013). The politics of large infrastructure investment decision making: The case of the Second Avenue subway. Rosenau, M. D., & Githens, G. D. (2015). Successful Project Management: A Step-by-Step Approach with Practical Examples. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons. Shannon, H. (2015). Throughout 2nd Avenue Subway Build, Local Businesses See Fewer Customers, No Aid. Retrieved from http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/government/5585-throughout-2nd-avenue-subway-build-local-businesses-see-fewer-customers-no-aid-mta Read More