Public Sector Safety Professionals - Case Study Example

Centralia No 5 Centralia Coal Mine No 5 exploded 25 March 1945, killing 111 miners. Before its explosion, both state and federal agencies had conducted several inspections on the mine, and had submitted written reports to both the Illinois department of Mines and the Federal bureau of Mines. Neither the federal Bureau, the state Department of Mine nor Centralia Coal Corporation, owners of Centralia Mine No 5 took any action even though the reports had clearly specified the probable danger posed by hazards discovered by the mine inspectors. According to investigations by both Federal and state agencies, “coal dust raised in the air and ignited by explosives fired in a manner considered dangerous and impermissible.” Heavy deposits of coal dust rested on roadways and on the roof, ribs and timbers in working places and entries (Bureau of Mines, 1947). In 1941, Driscoll Scanlan was appointed the inspector of the district, that included Centralia Mine No 5 by Illinois Governor, Dwight Green, and he (Scanlan) was the one who had personally inspected the mine several times before the blast occurred on behalf of the state Department of Mine. In the written report he made, each of which he sent to the Illinois Department of Mine and Minerals, he noted that the mine was highly explosive because of coal buildup. However, Robert Weir, assistant Director at the State Department of Mine and Minerals treated each report as a matter of routine, signing each of the letter having made recommendations and had them sent to the company requesting immediate response. Logistical Alternatives It is worth noting that Scanlan was a public officers with certain obligation to the public, and as a former miner, he could well evaluate the probable consequences of the hazards he noted each of his report. Since the company and state department of Mine and Minerals were not going to act in ways that substantially reduced risk posed by the hazard, it was perhaps, pertinent on his part to address certain logistical alternatives that could either solve the problem and remove risk posed, or reduce the level of probable fatality, should an explosion occur. It was, in this view, logical to assume that the Mine could not afford to shut down or reasonably reduce operation for maintenance as the country was at war and coal considerably factored in the war effort. Driscoll Scanlan could well have concentrated his endeavors towards addressing; 1.) The proper maintenance of ventilation fans 2.) Safety training 3.) Measures that force the company to withdraw men from areas of mine with dry and dusty conditions to areas appropriately rock dusted 4.) He could have ordered the mine shut down if the mine was not regularly stone-dusted with specified period. Ventilation Maintenance Although coal was needed in the war effort, safety regulation could well have been enforced had Scanlan made the vital decision to work with the federal agent since the federal government had authorize the enforcement of federal safety rules in mines in 1946, just one year before the blast. According to report, 45 of the death recorded resulted from afterdamp, a gaseous mix of carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide. Just before the disaster, the ventilation fan had malfunction and efforts to reinstall it had suffered severe setback. Had Scanlan concentrated on recommending measures that forced the coal company to do regular and proper maintenance of ventilation system, perhaps the 45 added deaths would probably not have occurred. Safety Training Harry Nierman, the mine superintendent claimed after the blast that the training that could have saved miners in the Centralia mine should have been provided by the union, however, a retired mine and mineral board member claimed that safety training was not the responsibility of the union in 1947. This responsibility fell on the company, including the mine superintendent and underground bosses. Scanlan as a public administration manager should perhaps, have tried to understand the rules of operation. A public administration manager who had to manage a network such as the Centralia presented should be able to measure in relative terms the resources each network actor brings to the network, the rules of operation, and the process of exchange between organizations (Rhodes, 1981, pp. 98-99; 1999, pp. 78-79). It was perhaps, his responsibility to determine who was responsible for safety training and make recommendations accordingly. This probably could have saved lives. Explosive Measure According to report, the dust probably was ignited by an explosive charge which had been tamped with coal dust, and had been fired by an open flame fuse worked with coal dust and that the resulting explosion was catalyzed by coal dust throughout four working sections of the mine. However, the explosion subsided when it reached rock-dusted areas. It means Scanlan could have recommended that men be withdrawn from dusty areas to areas properly rock-dusted areas before explosive were fired. Mine Shutdown The federal mine act of 1942, did not give mine inspectors to enforce mine safety regulation. Scanlan tried to abide by the law and did the only thing he was permitted to do under a bureaucracy, but bureaucracy as characterized by Koliba, Meek and Zia (2010) is a hierarchy of interrelated “command and Control” structure with several interlocking levels of power and responsibilities. In hierarchy, duties are graded according to the degree of authority and the responsibility attached to position occupied in the administrative setting, (Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2010; Gladden, 1953). Scanlan operated within the laws and power allowable in his level of bureaucracy. Nevertheless, he it was perfectly within his power to shut down operation in the mine if he considered conditions in the mine dangerous for the miners. From the time he was appointed as the regional mine inspector for the Centralia area in 1941, his reports on the Centralia No 5 Mine were negative and gave explicit descriptions of infractions and means to improve deficiencies. He knew the probable consequences of allowing coal dust in passageway. He knew it could cause a blast. He knew that the dust was bad enough to ignite and kill every miner underground, but why did he not act? He could have shut it down. It was his responsibility but he did not do. It was a duty, an obligation he conveniently shirked. By virtue of his positions in the hierarchy, he had powers, ferreted out as administrative authority (Koliba, Meek, and Zia, 2010). The power his position as state mine supervisor accorded him was used instead consolidating his position. Proposed Actions As mentioned in the paragraph above, Scanlan would have shut down the mine. It is an action I would naturally take were I in his position and knew what he knew about the state of the mine. Of course, Robert Medill would probably have overruled and reversed his action, but it would not have been without some level of rock-dusting exercise. Robert Medill would not have re-opened the mine without some level of maintenance work if he judged that the responsibility for any resulting explosion would rest on his shoulders (Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2010). That way, the explosion could have been avoided, but it might be worth noting that Scanlan would perhaps, have suffered some political penalty from the governor who appointed him in the first place. In taking this course of action, Scanlan would have exercised control as a way of winning concession from the mine management and his boss at the department of Mine and mineral as the information he had regarding the situation in the mine had vested him with more power than his boss in this regard (Durant,2001). Scanlan did not act in this direction even though he knew that the dust was bad enough to ignite and kill every miner underground. By his inaction in this regard, he conveniently placed the responsibility of the resultant explosion on himself. Scanlan by his position as state supervisor of mine was more or less a network manager as the other actors involved in the network were from the private sector, represented by the mine management and a nonprofit represented by UMWA. Were I in his position and knew what he knew about the state of the mine, I would have engage in such politicization that pitched me with the mine Union as a way of exerting pressure on the mine management to clean up the mine. The political skills of the public administrator in a network can be harnessed essentially for the fostering of allegiance between the diverse sectors involved in the network and its set goals (Mandel, 1990). To do this effectively, trust would need to be built, not only with the Union, but also with the company in ways that assure them that the goal is meant to enhance both the safety of the miners and the production ability of the company (Thompson, 2003). Bibliography Fred Fanning. “Public Sector Safety Professionals: Focus on activity or result?”. 2007. ASSE. Robert Stillman. “Public Administration: Concept and Cases. 2009. Wadworth Publishing Co. Bartlow Martin. “Centralia Mine No 5”. 2007. Rev By Michelle Little Koliba, C., Meek, J. W. & Zia, A. 2010. Governance Networks in Public Administration and Public Policy. New York: CRC Press. Mandel, M.P. (E.d.). 2001. Getting results through collaboration: network and network structures for public and policy management. Westport, CT: Quorum Books. Read More