Crime Prevention Policies in Organizations - Report Example

Topic: In terms of prevention, what do we mean by multi - agency partnership? Introduction The concept of multi-agency partnership is worldwide recognised as an essential element of government policy in preventing crime. Basic to the concept of partnership is networking of agency utility, working together with community stakeholder organisations in taking crucial decisions that help in the prevention of crime. Opinions vary on the theoretical and ideological interagency aims and the extent of gaining equal power with the police force, the primary stake holding organisation in the collaborative efforts in preventing crime. Although a lot of concern has been expressed on the practicality of multi agency initiatives by Blagg et al. (1988)) and Sampson et al. (1988)), there are other research works indicating the suitability of multi-agency approaches for preventing situational crime (Walter 2006). Major issues to multi-agency partnership are related to the structure, leadership, consultation, ownership, training, resources, and publicity, as found by Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994b)), which can become a cause of success and failure of the initiative, i.e. multi-agency partnership in preventing crime. Success depends on sound planning and management to attain the aims. Policy makers and practitioners use the concept of community empowerment more randomly and show readiness in the implementation of multi-agency crime prevention programmes but lack in providing dedicated support to issues at stake, leaving the responsibility on the shoulders of primary stakeholders. Active government support can help the multi-agency partnership in allaying the fears and theoretical misconceptions over the credibility of the effective implementation of crime prevention programmes; culturally specific processes of planning and development are needed to mitigate the barriers to multi-agency cooperation (Walter 2006). Any multi-agency partnership needs a strategy to work upon. In the Australian context, such an effort was made in 1991 by the crime prevention unit (CPU). It organised a number of seminars to structure a strategy on the policy consisting of four major parts: (1) Coalition against Crime; (2) Local Crime Prevention Committee Programme; (3) Aboriginal Programme; and (4) Exemplary Projects. The Local Crime Prevention Committee Program included local agency workers and local inhabitants working collectively in the formulation of strategies for solving local crime prevention issues. Through the aboriginal programme, the needs of specific aboriginal communities were paid attention. Exemplary projects included a number of distinct programmes tackling problems of top priority or social concern like family violence, drinking in and around licensed premises, youth, crime and the elderly and likewise. Excluding the first programme related to coming together to fight crime, the rest of the three programmes listed above support and promote interaction among various agencies although basic purpose of any such initiative needs collaboration for making a joint front against crime. Membership for crime prevention coalition is made from such stakeholders as police, local government, justice, Aboriginal Affairs, youth, education, social welfare, health, private sector, and a number of voluntary agencies. Activities of the crime prevention coalition are given below (ibid). The stakeholders to the coalition, politicians, state’s senior functionaries and business community, other than the main stakeholders, the police department, all have found that “correction” is the most crucial problem in crime prevention. Other problems to be followed afterwards are community education involving community pride and youth, morality, multi-cultural issues, and parenting. Strategy against crime prevention should include the viewpoints of all stakeholders to the coalition to provide a direction to the policy to prevent criminal behaviour. One can not see crime prevention as an organic activity; it needs to be based on sound theory, relevant and to the point (ibid). The government should take the lead by contacting different agencies for policy formulation, which are focussed on encouraging diversity and community participation. As it seems, the organic approach has inherent risks of isolating agencies and community leaders among them aboriginal communities as well. Community leaders can misuse the chair for realising their personal and organisational aims to be fulfilled from the allocated government funds. Such an attitude can be suicidal to the cherished cause of coalition against crime prevention by provoking tension and unhealthy competition among partners to exploit the situation for their personal and organisational benefits. Such an experience has happened in South Australia when after investing about two years in formulating the strategy that was meant to add fresh life and speed to the aim of crime prevention through the crime prevention unit, given the responsibility of managing the strategy, abandoned the coalition calling it as “schizophrenic” and lacking “cohesion” (ibid). Mostly, it has been observed that a good number of attempts for multi-agency crime prevention are made through such policies that lack a coherent theory. As a result, attempts have been made to define the concept on a larger scale with many interpretations. Such attempts at defining the concept with wider implications have government support. This sharing of specialisation and resources for fulfilling community needs has been possible due to political support and economic practicality. Even then this delegation of authority for making the state responsible for increasing crime rate in adjoining communities within the partnership mechanism has not yielded practical benefits (ibid). Coming to the earlier theoretical additions to crime prevention, particularly situational crime prevention, Clarke (1980)); Clarke and Mayhew (1980)) and Clarke and Cornish (1985)) have presented the rational alternative view in the context of the development of opportunity theory. This work of literature shows direct link between theory and the development of situational prevention techniques. Latest research by Clarke and Homel promotes Clarkes previous rational alternative scheme (Clarke 1992)), offering a mechanism that puts greater importance to the psychological and social relation to offending. Clarke and Homel have linked the notions of shame (Braithwaite, 1989)), moral ethics (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990)), neutralisation of guilt (Sykes and Matza 1957)) and peer pressure (Sutherland and Cressey, 1966)) in their classification. Actually, there is lack of criminological theorising on the combining of social and situational prevention activities, and the relentless efforts by the governments to mix the two. Therefore, the work of Clarke and Homel is a welcome sign (ibid). Multi-agency practices should be taken in the wider political interests through cost cutting and efficiency. Government policies under the impact of neo-liberalism in economic theory have created new values in all areas, public or private. A new management process has developed from this neo-liberal economic theory that includes purchase agreements, output statements, performance indicators, strategic plans and the like including everything symbolic of the new era of efficiency and productivity (Pollitt, 1993)). This new way of functioning, led by economic ideologies and rational strategies has contributed in the making of public sector and further assimilation of both public and private business for economic growth and capitalism has speedily turned into a positive discussion on government policy and practice (McLaughlin and Murji 1995)). Relevant to this new approach of economic neo-liberalism, public sectors in Australia and New Zealand are showing off how their departments under the contract agreements are playing their role constructively. Such an approach of serving the “core business” efficiently has made a mark in all fields of business and management, public or private of delivering goods or serving the very purpose of their existence. Such an initiative and attitude has offered challenge to organisations shouldered with the responsibility of coordinating a multi-agency crime prevention strategy (ibid). The crime prevention units need to market the multi-agency approach to organisations where crime is not one of their business aspects. Taking the example of healthcare agencies getting involved in certain aspects of crime like drug and alcohol don’t get any government aid in controlling crime. Crime prevention nowhere gets entry in their “purchase agreement”. No motivation exists for such agencies to be a part of the movement against crime prevention. Even if they get indirectly involved in such initiatives, their involvement is not much. Crime prevention units have to behave out of compulsion as if they are the marketing media trying to win the favour of such agencies that crime prevention is in the interest of their organisation. In New Zealand, for example, crime prevention has entered in the contracts of departments as a core or significant business field, for example, the social welfare, Education, aboriginal Affairs, Justice and other departments are supposed to show their allegiance in national crime prevention efforts. Amidst all this, still there is lack of clarity on the meaning of crime prevention through multi-agency partnership and there is huge gap in the perception of the government over the limit of involvement by its departments on the subject (ibid). Limitations Research has indicated that organisations fear risk in sharing their resources with other agencies and see it as a threat to their business interests. In business terms such a situation is referred as “client poaching”…If youve got your little patch of clients you dont give them up for anybody, because theyre worth stats to you. And also, regardless of whether youre [sic] offering is of great value to the client—they wont let you have them... [Presdee and Walters, 1994:165)). The term of multi-agency collaboration has become a fad, a sort of artificial term lacking in true meaning that could show commitment in reality of any such joint cooperative movement for prevention of crime. What stakeholders get by involving through such collaboration is that they try to get political leverage by propagating their networking but show disinclination on sharing their inputs and knowledge base and their clientage with others whom they consider their competitors (ibid). Governments on their part promote merging and restructuring as a practical and effective way of collaboration at multi-agency level but the concept has not reached the lofty heights because of increased tensions and competition for resources. The new outlook on the concept, therefore, should justify the surrounding issues related to partnership and collaboration breeding inter-agency tensions (ibid). Conclusion Multi-agency crime prevention is a complicated notion. At policy level it should be followed carefully. Although widely elaborated, the concept randomly changes rhythm of crime prevention. At the centre of crime prevention, there are agency hardships, ideological differences, clash of interests and cultural differences, all leading to varied hopes, processes and results. Further, things start moving wrong because of political climate affecting the process of crime prevention. The concept has got favourable response from the governments in Australia and New Zealand, made famous through close partnering of government with communities. But limitations exist regarding economic and management perspectives on attaining cost efficiency and putting of responsibility that is not given space in such joint operations. Agencies promote individualism and create differences through contractual settings with other agencies providing their contributions in the government initiatives. There is need to outline the objectives, expectations and results of inter-agency approaches so that products and services are delivered where there is need to expand the horizon of such partnerships through formal and informal networks providing desired outcomes. Research on the Australian collaboration has confirmed the previous research that multi-agency crime prevention should be intensive enough to permit the involvement of specialists for gathering information and resources. Eclectic crime prevention programming carries practical risks of the susceptibility of strategies. Defining the functions and results of multi-agency partnerships for crime prevention is very crucial to overpower the conflicts over leadership that may create differences between the stakeholders. If proposals are based on theory, there are more chances of positive outcomes. Situational crime prevention ways are also susceptible to political and power games but if objectives are properly defined and tools are provided, multi-agency expertise can be used for the benefit of the cause. Those supporting crime prevention policies must structure the multi-agency approaches by specifying the objectives and processes of intervention so that deficiencies could be managed. Multi-agency crime prevention models should be placed rightly before managing them. Projects fail because of lack of planning, management and culturally-inclusive governance. Those shouldering the responsibilities should check that mechanisms essential for the desired outcomes on policy initiatives are in working order. For effective implementation of crime prevention policies, theoretical structures, aims and outcomes should be followed and upheld so that inter-agency crime prevention becomes a reality, not a dream. Reference Walter, Reece., 2006. The "dream" of multi-agency crime prevention: pitfalls in policy and practice. Victoria University of Wellington. Available from: http://www.popcenter.org/library/crimeprevention/volume_05/04_Walters.pdf [Accessed 7 August 2010]. Read More