Information Systems Management & Quality - Coursework Example

Information Systems Management & Quality NHS Computer System Worth £12 billion for Bexley Hospital turned out to be “unfit“ for the purpose and had to be replaced. The basis for saying it was unfit was partly the fact that only “160 health organizations out of 9,000 utilized the patients’ records, according to Michael Savage (2010). From 2008 onwards to 2011, there were listings of wasted resource allocations for IT projects. This prompts for questions and answers as to why such losses occur. Was there not a careful and logical decision making process aside from planning based on IT governance models? What were the criteria for evaluating those projects which were said to be wasted by discontinuations? Was there any response to media claims about wasteful resource allocations so that the people might be enlightened by the right way to assess performance of a related IT project implementation? What have been the standard operating procedures prior to approving a budget for any IT project? A good example would be the purchase of a computer system for Bexley Hospital worth £12 billion. Did they not prepare a Needs Analysis based on survey and statistics so that the knowledge of “usefulness” or “functionality” of the computer system could be a solid basis for disapproving the budget for such a computer system? Government must have haphazardly allocated and implemented a £ 12 billion budget only to realize that out of 9,000 organizations, only 160 would use the system. According to Michael Savage (2010), that functionality was discovered only after the implementation process. What might be the reason why it seems that government does not have quality control over IT governance? This case study concerning Bexley Hospital was chosen because it clearly represents a situation wherein no pre-planning or poor planning was done using a comprehensive model that can screen a decision whether or not to approve and fund a project. According to David Cameron (2008), the IT system ideas were sold to NHS Professionals and swallowed as a whole and “As Is” after IT Consultants gave recommendations to government. That Computer Weekly article, News Clipping # 2, revealed no checking and control functions. Cameron cited inefficiency as a result of a preference for centralized and large computer systems that tend to be more costly and more risky. This can be read in the Kable’s Government Computing article. See News Clipping # 3. In another article, clarifications about the problem showed that centralized data that should have been accessible in local areas turned out to be 3 to 4 years delayed. See News Clipping # 4. And the more detailed explanations for such a scenario are found in News Clipping # 5. It says, “…the centralized system has often been seen as a failure owing to continued installation setbacks, rising costs and data management problems.” In determining the needs of government for IT resources, for example, the ISMQ should have utilized a model that can filter the basis of decisions based on real needs instead of artificial or imaginary needs. A sample self-made model would be as follows: + + + It should be recalled that Information System projects are not the only projects in need of allocation of resources. Whatever will be the evaluation of alternative IS projects would have to compete for funding prioritization in the government’s portfolio of many projects in various aspects of governance. Such a model would have identified the limited beneficiaries who would not represent the common good of 9,000 organizations. There should have been a survey if most of them need the computer system under certain conditions, e.g. on the condition that the system provides updated information. It turned out that only 160 out of 9,000 found a need for the expensive computer system which had to be replaced. Potential delays and more accurate timetables can be communicated to administrators of the system in order to set the right expectations insofar as performance and efficiency are concerned. The timely availability of information has become very important in the world of business, partly due to many unpredictable changes and the need for quick decisions from the management in order that opportunities can be tapped or threats (e.g. dangers of losing in the market) can be avoided while possible. Also, the quality of data in terms of accuracy and adequacy will make a big difference for a company’s performance. These criteria define the “relevance of data quality” for a business and will have an impact on the “effectiveness of all kinds of information systems used by organizations” according to Michael Rothlin (2008, p.1) He further emphasized (p.2) that “…successful operations of a new IT system are only possible when data is correct and useful to all concerned parties in an organization”, and “… attributes of data quality are accuracy, completeness, consistency, or timeliness” He cited (p.3) Nestlé’s experience with its Information System wherein the management discovered 56% of data gathered by the IT Department turned out to be “garbage causing anomalies in operations”. In the quality management of information systems, it is normal to encounter and anticipate downtimes. Thus, in the planning stage, there should be contingency measures to minimize customer or end user dissatisfaction. Possible sources of delays can be predicted and provided with corresponding contingency measures or ways to avoid delays. In order to arrive at quality data, the model for research was recommended and shown as follows: (Note: ERP = Enterprise Resource Planning; DQ = Data Quality ) (Source: Management of Data Quality in Enterprise Resource Planning Systems by Michael Rothlin, p.8) According to a news report (Savage, Michael 2010) involving IT projects that cost taxpayers “£26 billion for computer systems” got aborted. Within the same year, the report identified 10 IT failures. So what can be done to prevent the development of a bad image of IT governance by the UK government? Let’s take one example of a more recent similar investment which is about to be launched. With reference to a very recent news article about the UK’s increase in “Datacentre Investment”, dated September 9, 2011, there can be another situation in the near future when such a project which will result in incurring $ 3.5 billion expenditure, might end up being junked in the middle of the implementation, for the simple reason that insufficient planning and the absence of a comprehensive decision tree can result in overlooking a factor capable of justifying a stop of the project in mid-stream. What if another recession occurs? Will that not be a lower priority compared to the more urgent project of reduction in government expenses at a time when the BOP would inevitably suffer? Or is there a more urgent set of reasons why the Datacentre Investment is imperative, e.g. obsolescence of the current equipment is near. Was this part of a bigger picture of IT Governance Strategy that will not be stopped regardless of the outcome of each phase of the implementation? This case study was chosen for the purpose of having a basis for analyzing why some IT programs flop and lose substantial amounts (millions or billions of £ Sterling Pounds) similar to those that had been discovered to have already wasted government funds, e.g. the report of Bobbie Johnson and David Hencke (2008) concerning “£2 billion Cost of Government’s IT Blunders”. This would exemplify the issue of Information System Management and Quality Control. It also clarifies why other IT programs successfully achieve their purposes. Some other important factors that need to be known are as follows: (1) What is the expected value in terms of potential gains and/or losses over the long terms and short-term? (2) How is the datacentre investment a low risk or high risk investment option? (3)What is the probability of implementation failure for this project? Part II. Outline of Presentation 2.1 The Impending Value of Open Data Centre and NHS IT Program A month ago, August 4, 2011, UK government was preparing to “create opportunities for developers, businesses and members of the public” by encouraging them to tap the Data Centre with free access for some data and others for sale. The economy has not been growing fast enough to lower the unemployment rate to levels before the most recent recession. Most SMEs have yet to be funded shortly after the risk of funding their business needs is reduced by better, more effective strategies based on facts. It is a popular understanding in the business community that most businesses are SMEs that can hire more people and thereby reduce the unemployment rate. Very similar to this Open Data Centre, the earlier Case Study involving the modernization of computer systems for the NHS, there should be a UK government IT Governance strategy as well as a set of systematic, logical frameworks or models to ensure accuracy of decisions and successful attainment of desired results. In the first place, the criteria for successful launching, maintaining, and growing ought to be known ahead of time. To present the case study on the viability of UK’s NHS, research about the foundations for approval, funding, and implementations was done. This is followed by a critical analysis of whether or not a module or logical framework was utilized in preparation for review, and assessment prior to decision making. According to Michael Cross (2007), the National Health Service plan to become computerized nationwide was ready for implementation, saying that “the foundations of an NHS IT System are in place”. Let us verify what foundations were being referred to and if he was correct in saying that foundations were ready. A closer look shows the article was more concerned about political preparations rather than proper IT governance. Michael Cross was satisfied with simply giving the computerization system a try. And that, along with an undefined “blueprint Delivering 21st Century IT Support for the NHS, was the cited basis for saying the foundations were ready. As a matter of fact, the feedback to the undisclosed blueprint was said to have been negative from the viewpoint of “doctors, politicians, academics, and privacy groups”. At best, Michael Cross noticed that the NHS IT Agency had “put in place the basic components of a computerized NHS”. What components? Towards what purposes? The news was silent. Therefore further research was done to find out how the project got approved without a clear logical framework utilized. 2.2 Why the Topic was Chosen This topic was chosen following the hypothesis that the government does not have an IT Governance Model to use as guide in order to make accurate decisions to arrive at successful programs meant for the common good. Thus, sample models were included to show what an IT Governance Model or Framework looks like and how the use of one or more models can avoid substantial losses as a result of failure during implementation. 2.3 Management & Quality Issues, Relation to Modules, and Relevant Literatures A good model should show the important factors for management to consider prior to allocating scarce resources. It ensures quality processing of information and leads to quality outcome of funding projects. Figures 1-6 can serve as examples worth considering for the purpose of arriving at a good basis or solid foundation for deciding whether or not it is time to budget large amounts. Shortly after verifying the actual situation of NHS computer systems, how it was processed for approval, application of important parts of IT governance frameworks and modules will be done to show how their use would have avoided great problems for the government, including avoidance of bad publicity about inefficiencies. 2.4 How Issues are Related to Modules and Literatures News Clipping # 7 shows how, as a result of great dissatisfaction during the implementation, even the NHS head attacked the computer projects. He forewarned government about doctors and clinic personnel were losing confidence over the programme because of delays in the proper implementation of the project. The implementation tended to violate customer records privacy. Aside from doctors, clinic personnel, and the NHS outgoing chief, people noticed the issue of “direction” where the programme was going. News Clipping # 8 was about the question of direction of the programme. It showed how the forerunners were more concerned about immediate implementation regardless of results of further planning. Those obliged to be a part of the system were said to have “…a vague idea of the intended destination and had no (or very limited) input into its choice. They were probably given no option as to whether they wanted to go on a journey and may even had had other things that they would have preferred to do.” according to Keith Clough (2011). So many issues arise out of the failure to utilize a comprehensive model to define the direction, criteria for assessments, accountable officials and staff, duties and responsibilities, processes, standards of quality performance, components that should be considered, feedback from various sectors. Granted the NHS IT programme is aligned with goals and strategies of the government for the UK, there would be the issue of “ethics” in the public disclosure of patients’ private information considering that doctors were not in favor of the idea while owners of the info were not sufficiently consulted and their approval secured. Another issue would be the major disruptions in health services being rendered as a result of major changes from an old system to the computerized system, because the new system generated outdated patient information. It took time to upload database. There was no timetable for everybody’s guide so that the users would know when the new computer system would be functional or useful for actual, daily use. Doctors realized dissatisfaction over useless information made available during the transition, specially without any idea about what could be done to prevent delays in services. Patients also encountered services dissatisfaction due to delays in services rendered. To allow for new technological computer hardware, most users had to sacrifice quality of their services. And no one knew how long that would last. The other important negative effect was higher cost not only for the government but also for the patients. As a result of failure to utilize models and frameworks for IT governance and decision making, especially before disbursing billions of Sterling Pounds, the NHA centralized computer system finally had to be stopped. News Clipping # 9 was released by E-Health Insider Jon Hoeksma (2008) to conclude that the NHS £ 12 billion centralized computer system was a failure in terms of strategy, policy, and standards. It was in fact a gigantic failure with the very basics of the health care industry by standardizing processes without heeding the standards of the field involving patients and doctors. 2.5 What Could Have Been the Proper Way of Modernizing NHS ? In the following paragraphs, simulations using the modules shown in Figures 1 to 6 will strive to determine the outcome of the proposed NHS centralized computer system. Alignment of Strategy UK government wanted to upgrade the industry’s services capabilities in data storage and accessibility for doctors, clinical staff, and patients. The plan was to use a centralized computer hardware system that could process data for 9,000 organizations. Involve End Users (Customers of the New Technology). At this point, assuming the plan is still subject to approval and funding, doctors who would be the major users of the needed data, were not in agreement with the process. The project should have stopped until doctors were satisfied with the recommended procedures because they know the ethical standards that patients are entitled to enjoy. Privacy is imperative. Proponents of the new technology should have uploaded “medical cases” for the databank instead of patient data. Doctors would agree to the idea of having database of findings based on clinical cases without the names of patients and their personal details. This would have resulted in the need to survey how much data would have to be uploaded coming from all departments and all the doctors. The organization of information could have been based on consultations with doctors. Based on the volume of information to be uploaded, the provider of technology could have estimated the time it would take to upload all the recommended information that all doctors could have accessed. A timetable of different stages can be presented to set the right expectations for the end users. Priorities for the implementation stages should be communicated and explained in order to secure end user understanding of developments towards a centralized computer system. Although there was a contention about centralized computer system being inefficient, the IT Executives can justify why not and then point to the root causes of the problem, e.g. lack of coordination with the doctors, patients, and clinic personnel enough to understand what standards to follow. Privacy of information about patients was considered not negotiable to doctors and most patients. Yet the IT people who proceeded to implement the programme did not heed the standard needed by end users. Also, IT Group failed to orient the end users about the various stages of implementation to a point wherein people did not know what direction all the problems were headed towards. Objections were not properly handled. Who Should Have Been Involved During The Setup? In the right way to plan, direct, and control, those people who should be involved have to be identified even before approval of the resource allocation. It can be discerned from news articles that the committee supposed to be identified and held accountable was not even known during the implementation stage. This could have been avoided if an IT governance model for decision making and processing was utilized to guide all the people who should have been involved. Such a big investment worth £ 12 billion did not hold accountable officials for the orderly conduct of planning and implementation? Feedback from patients and doctors should have been analyzed to arrive at acceptable changes. But under a situation wherein there seemed to be lack of accountable officials, news articles reported analysis from a variety of sources other than those who should have been made responsible for the ongoing changes, feedback, improvements, and reports. According to Jon Hoeksma (2008), ASSIST gave multiple recommendations as the “NHS Informatics professional body”. So where are the key figures supposed to have been designated to direct the setup and implementation processes? Why was accountability limited to just the NHS Informatics body? Who processed the proposals prior to funding? Was there a committee and sub-committee assigned to study the value of such a major proposal, and to secure substantial funding after careful study? Where were they when people started to complain about the problems encountered in the implementation? News Clipping # 10 shows the observation of media that there was also lack of transparency. According to Alexi Mostrous (2009), billions of Sterling Pounds were being spent “with no central regulation by one ministry…protected by confidentiality agreements and periodic progress reviews…, despite calls by MPs and anti-privacy campaigners for their disclosure.” Following the predicament of not even knowing who should be held accountable for the failed NHS computer system, “a right-wing think tank (has) called for more open standards and open source development in IT.” That article in News Clipping # 11 called for the scrapping of UK government’s IT out of disgust for their performance, as though saying the problem was the IT group. In the principles of IT governance, IT Department is only one of the key accountable group of top officials. Sarah Bruce (2009) said: “ The paper calculates that the government’s IT provision of £ 16.5 billion this year is the equivalent to £700 for every household across the country. Yet it calculates that of all the IT projects that the government invests in, only 30% succeed.” Another part of the IT governance models is about making the business case. In this situation, substantial loses can represent the business case. Heavy losses due to bad decisions must be avoided as it affects the nation’s performance as a whole. In order to avoid substantial losses, preliminary research is recommended for purposes of knowing whether or not to push through with an IT project that would cost substantial amounts to implement. Attempts should be made to value the benefits that can be derived out of full scale implementation, and then weighed against the costs and expenses as well as potential losses. This leads to planning and formulating a decision tree which Ahti Sato, Jeffrey Keisler, and Alec Morton (2011) called “Portfolio Decision Analysis”. Due to uncertainties about what might happen, certain methods can be applied, namely, “decision trees, influence diagrams, and Monte Carlo Simulations…probabilities and preferences, performing sensitivity analyses” as mentioned by Salo, Ahti et.al. (2011, Foreword). However, the editors themselves anticipate that producing an extensive simulation for a very accurate decision tree would not be feasible due to the many possible branches of the decision tree out of a specific case. The best that can be done is to have one containing the major decision making options. Output Expected In the model for IT governance within Figure 1, if applied to NHS computer system setup, there should have been some anticipated results of all the effort to centralize database. Only those agreed upon between end users and IT Specialists should appear in the list of desired results. This way of planning could have avoided the negative feedback during implementation. End users would have understood what was happening to improve the system if what was agreed upon as desired results turned out in the actual. The expected output should be defined even before approval of the programme. Simulations do not have to the actual installation and use of modern technology for the management of database. It could have been a mere theoretical simulation for planning purposes, discussion, handling of objections, determination of benefits, and so on. Towards the latter parts of the assessment of that new technology, the bottom line would be “value for money”. Billions of people’s money should delivery much more in value for the National Health Services and Department of Health in favor of the people as a whole. Disclosure of Responsibilities for the Knowledge of Officials Held Accountable Under the actual scenario of such a transaction kept in secret or not afforded adequate transparency, practically all the officials who took part in the decision making process leading to the approval of the NHS computer systems can be blamed for the failure. However, in the absence of a disclosure of responsibilities, no specific official can be accused of being solely responsible for specific reasons for the failure. By having knowledge of responsibilities, those involved could have done their share more diligently and problems could have been avoided starting with the planning stage until actual implementations. For example, those standards identified by doctors to be critical could have been investigated by whoever was assigned and held responsible for the establishment of agreed upon standards. The impression given by government is that the IT Group in charge of setting up the new system was given a free hand to do what they want even if the doctors complained. This is obviously a bad strategy. The consequences of not knowing the responsibilities during major changes should have been clarified long before the implementation of the plan to upgrade the NHS technology for database management. That would have prompted accountable people to prevent negative consequences attributable to their share of the duties and responsibilities. Functional Integration There must have been insufficient orientation of doctors and clinic staff about the benefits that would be gained under a different system. Given that objections are handled properly, these end users could have cooperated wholeheartedly after the IT Group is able to adjust to the right standards as the new system was being setup. Doctors can understand theories or theoretical frameworks similar to that of Functional Integration in Figure 5 – Strategic Alliance Model. But was there any attempt to present to them the benefits of change and to persuade them to be willing to change. Again, this is if, on the other hand, the IT Group listens to what end users consider as right. Figure 6 would have been another way of References Blazey, Mark L. (2008). Insights to Performance Excellence 2008: An Inside Look at the 2008 Baldridge Award Criteria. ASQ (American Society for Quality) Quality Press. : Bruce, Sarah 92009). Scrap Big Government IT: Think Tank. eHealth Insider, June 30, 2009. Retrieved September 15, 2011 from http://www.ehi.co.uk/news/ehi/4981 . Clough, Keith (2011). Are we nearly there yet? BCS: The Chartered Institute for IT. Retrieved September 15, 2011 from http://www.bcs.org/content/ConWebDoc/12737 Cross, Michael (2007). The Foundations of an NHS IT System are in Place: Now Start Building. The Guardian, June 14, 2007. Retrieved September 15, 2011 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/jun/14/comment.society . Grembergen, Wim Van. (2003 ). Strategies for Information Technology Governance: Diagnosing IT governance Effectiveness. Idea Group Publishing, September 2003. ISBN-10: 1591402840 , p. 8) Hall, Kathleen (2011). Government Seeks Public Opinion on Open Data Policy. ComputerWeekly.com, August 4, 2011. Hoeksma, Jon (2008). ASSIST Says Idea NHS Like a Bank Fundamentally Flawed. EHI E-Health Insider. October 8, 2008. Retrieved September 15, 2011 from http://www.ehi.co.uk/news/ehi/4219 . Johnson, Bobbie and Hencke, David (2008). £2 billion Cost of Government’s IT Blunders. The Guardian, January 5, 2008. Kamath, John-Paul (2008). Cameron Slams NHS IT Programme. Computer Weekly, January 7, 2008. Retrieved September 15, 2011. Mostrous, Alexi (2009). Secret Computer Deals That Are Costing the Taxpayer Billions. Times Online. February 2, 2009. Retrieved September 15, 2011 from http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/technology/article5636240.ece Ross, Jeanne W., and Peter Weill (2002). Six IT Decisions Your IT People Shouldn't Make. Harvard Business Review, November 2002, p. 3 Rothlin, Michael (2010). Management of Data Quality in Enterprise Resource Planning Systems. BoD Publishing. Salo, Ahti; Keisler, Jeffrey; Morton, Alec Eds. (2011). Portfolio Decision Analysis: Improved Methods for Resource Allocation. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, Vol. 162. Springer Science and Business Media Savage, Michael (2010). Labour’s Computer Blunders Cost £ 26 bn. The Independent, January 19, 2010. Retrieved September 12, 2011 from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labours-computer-blunders-cost-16326bn-1871967.html Shah, Sooraj (2011). UK Datacentre Investment Jumps by 25%. Computing.co.uk September 9, 2011. Retrieved September 12, 2011 from http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2107945/uk-datacentre-investment-jumps-cent . . ( Source Online: http://jazieko.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/business-value-of-it-investments.pdf , p.54) ( Source Online: http://jazieko.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/business-value-of-it-investments.pdf , p.55) ( Source Online: http://jazieko.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/business-value-of-it-investments.pdf , p.57) Figure 4 ( Source: Ross, Jeanne W., and Peter Weill (2002). "Six IT Decisions Your IT People Shouldn't Make." Harvard Business Review, November 2002, p. 3) Figure 5 – SAM ( Strategic Alliance Model ) ( Source: Grembergen, Wim Van. 2003 . “Strategies for Information Technology Governance: Diagnosing IT governance Effectiveness”. Idea Group Publishing, September 2003. ISBN-10: 1591402840 , p. 8) Figure 6 – SAD (Strategic Alignment Domains) ( Source: Grembergen, Wim Van. (2003 ). “Strategies for Information Technology Governance: Diagnosing IT governance Effectiveness”. Idea Group Publishing, September 2003. ISBN-10: 1591402840 , p. 8) News Clipping # 1. From “The Independent” News Clipping # 2 – Reasons for IT Process Failure According to David Cameron News Clipping # 3 – Additional Reasons Why NHS Computer Systems Failed News Clipping # 4 – Delays in Data Accessibility Could Reach 4 Years News Clipping # 5 – Details Why There Were Delays In Data Accessibility from the Centralized Database Framework News Clipping # 6 – Foundation for NHS Computer System Established ? News Clipping # 7 News Clipping # 8 News Clipping # 9 News Clipping # 10 News Clipping # 11 Read More