The Relationship between Micro Credit and Intra-household Violence - Coursework Example

The relationship between Micro credit and Intra-household violence One of the fundamental goals of policymakers in both developed and developing countries is to change the economic status quo through sustainable development. To alleviate dilapidated living conditions and improve opportunities for livelihood, economic models have been adopted to allocate resources efficiently to be distributed to the health, care, education and work of people in poverty stricken regions. These models are often based on the ideologies of common interests and current social structures which fall short of expectations due to the limited understanding of the relationship between economics and the intra-household dynamics which make up the social structure. Over time economists and policymakers are realising the significance of intra-household dynamics and its impact on policy implementation. In the following literature review, the researcher shall explore the relationship between microcredit and intra-household violence by studying household dynamics, theories, and perspectives on gender equality, and attempt to understand how power relations in family units can influence the efficacy of policies pertaining to microfinance. Many policymakers make policies with the assumption that a household is headed by the head of the family who is fair in distribution of assets and resources. This is far from the truth. Research indicates that household dynamics greatly influence the equal distribution of assets among family members, their access to assets and resources, bargaining power and decision making and sustenance of their welfare (Hart 1996; Kabeer 1991; Sen 1990; Whitehead 1984). One of the major reasons for unfair distribution is because of the male breadwinner bias which has a significant link to and impact on household policy efficacy (Elson 2002). It implies gender inequality and unequal decision-making power within the household. Pooled resources are often transferred to the male head of household, and the receiver of the benefits is not actually the targeted beneficiary. In this context, it is therefore critical to study intra-household dynamics to better apply social and economic policies such as micro-financing to alleviate poverty and improve sustainable development. The Significance of Intra-household Dynamics from the Neoclassical Perspectives According to the neoclassical theorists, a household is unit where both men and women are united together through marriage (Kabeer, 1994). Men pay bride price before they marry; this makes them treat women as property and objects of wealth (Bryceson 1995). Men often marry more wives to accumulate more wealth. A household can be described as a place where people live and share day to day activities (Harris 1981). People share meals, ideas, labour and resources. As earlier on mentioned, African household are not only nuclear but also extended in nature (Whitehead 1981). This is due to the polygamous lifestyles where men marry more than one wife (Bryceson 1995). This explains the existence of large households which comprise of children, parents and relatives from both maternal and paternal sides. The relatives may include uncles, grandparents and aunts. Sometimes, elders such as unmarried adults and housemaids may be treated as relatives even though they are not genealogically related (Harris 1981 p.52). Another important thing to note is that household derive from one common ancestor. Households rotate under a head that controls the entire house. He performs tasks such as bargaining and commercial transactions and allocates work to members. Women carry out farming and therefore contribute a lot to African agriculture than men (Bryceson 1995). This s based on the fact that women are food providers who grow food crops to feed their children. At the same time, domestic work rests on the shoulders of women. Domestic chores include fetching water, caring for children, collecting firewood, milking cattle and herding (Maher 1981). Women also are involved in educating girls’ household chores. Basing on the above fact, women are identified with the domestic sphere. It was also noted that women from poor households work as housemaids, sort wheat and serve in community functions to earn a wage (Maher 1981). During harvesting seasons, women start up their day as early as 6am in the morning and retire at 10pm in the night. They don’t have time for leisure activities. However, women from wealthier households hire maids to do domestic chores (Whitehead 1981). Economics of Household From economics perspectives, the neoclassical theorists assume that intra-household dynamics are made up of productive resources such as land, capital and farm inputs. Men therefore marry more wives to accumulate wealth. The more wives the man has, the wealthier he becomes. This claim on productive resources as property rights has been arranged into contracts to ensure economic security. The wifes responsibilities in this relationship however are not specified and neither the husbands but the principal agent has been assumed to be husband as he is the dominant worker in the family. Women in such intra-households assume submissive roles of caring and nurturing to meet subsistence needs of the household while leaving the surplus to be controlled by their husbands. Folbre (1994) explains that this patriarchical system is governed by constraints which depreciate the efficiency of the capitals and assets accumulated by the household because labour inequality persists within the family. This is because wives and children provide free labour to acquire mens income. This explains why African households are polygamous in nature and support patriarchical family dynamics. The neoclassical perspective of the household is also based on the agricultural lifestyle in which the theory of profit-maximisation and utility-maximisation of consumption are conjoined to develop the agricultural household with certain assumptions. The objective of the household is to maximise profits (through the male member) and utility (through the female members and children). Moreover, the members are assumed to have identical preferences and are comfortable with the cost of production, capital, division of labour, and the wages given to them. Koopman (1991) objects to these assumptions and argues that shared preferences and pooled incomes and resources have been fundamentally misrepresented as far as women are concerned. She presents the case of women in the south Cameroon households as overworked and having little leisure time whereas their male counterparts enjoy greater freedom and leisure. Instead, she explains that women engage in unpaid labour because of the nature of the agricultural market and the wage they fetch from it force them to engage in low paid labour. Moreover, by natural socialisation patterns, women engage in nurture and care of family members (in particular children); they assume their roles as both workers and carer of the family. This tendency therefore depreciates their value in terms of labour inputs. Beckers New Home Economics However, the above concept of the household does not explain why some households remain single entities while others based on multiple or extended families. The unitary model of the household can be understood by Beckers (1991) New Home Economics. According to Becker, a household is an altruistic unit with sexual division of labour to ensure efficiency which otherwise as a gendered group would not have been possible. The design of the unitary household is such that it enhances the collective well-being of the family members. Members are motivated by self-interests and therefore are comfortable with the assumed roles each has. Since households are single entities, there is equal allocation of resources and individuals work together towards a common goal. Both men and women are involved in the planning and decision making. Household members pull together resources to produce goods and services. In addition, the income generated caters for the welfare of the family. This indicates a good working relationship between members. However, this definition is insufficient since it ignores the unequal roles of males and females in the family (Galbraith 1974 p.35 cited in Kabeer 1994). As Akram-Lodhi (1997) observes, “widespread evidence exists of intra-household inequity in the distribution of resources, a failure which would appear to cast doubt on whether the household actually seeks to achieve joint welfare maximisation” (Akram-Lodhi, 1997: p. 39). Resource maximisation does not concern with consumption benefits only. One needs to understand the time spent on unpaid work, inequality of labour inputs, and long-term benefits too. The neoclassical family unit model therefore does not explain why the patriarchal system in Africa and elsewhere continue to be multiple entities governed by single decision-makers. For example, in Africa, households are patriarchal in nature; men are the household heads and women are subordinates. Male heads dominate decision making, control the resources, income and handle discipline of the members. Furthermore, men’s control of resources is also evident in India. Male children are considered more productive than girls (Kabeer 1994, p.101). Therefore, fathers invest in male children by allocating a share of the family’s resources such as land, animals and income. As if that was not enough, boys attend school while girls stay at home helping in domestic work. This gender bias rules out the point that there is equal distribution of resources in the household. Girls are discriminated against on the grounds that they will be married off therefore they don’t contribute economically to their families. Basing on Evensons work, distribution inequalities in households are dictated by men who seem to have unlimited power over family members (Evenson, 1976). In the above context, as far as intra-household relations are concerned, neoclassical theorists remain elusive in their understanding of the vulnerable household members. For this reason they fail to rationalise intervention failure and their implications. The welfare of the targeted members remains elusive even though there is apparent rise in the household income resources. This is because the head of the family household maximise the welfare whereas allocation disequilibrium continue to persist. In this sense, the neoclassical family concepts of household is limited in explaining why there exist conflict and violence in families in poor and developing countries. These aspects motivate the researcher to explore the issue of intra-household violence further. Bargaining Theory of Intra-households As echoed by anthropologists, men are bread winners in the household. Men’s roles range from provision of health, protection, school fees, rent and food. It is men’s responsibility to ensure that the household is well taken care of. Despite men’s role as bread winners, women are always food providers. They are allocated plots of land for farming (Kabeer 1994, p.115). Both men and women have different plots for cultivation. Though in some circumstances, plots may be jointly owned and cultivated. Women cultivate food crops such as rice, potatoes, and ground nuts for home consumption. Where as men grow cash crops such as sorghum, coffee and rice which are sold to generate income (Whitehead 1981 cited in Kabeer). The income accrued from agricultural sales is spent separately. Women also acquire money through other channels such as small business. These businesses are secretly run by their neighbours and trusted relatives. Furthermore, women lend and borrow money from friends which assist in providing needs in times of economic stress. Others also support their extended families (Kabeer 1990 and White 1992 cited in Kabeer 1994). Secret businesses may fuel conflicts in cases where the husband was not informed earlier. Household relationships differ from one place to another. In Nigeria, women undertake domestic work in return for food supply. More so, their work on farms is rewarded. Women in Nigeria spend their income in gift giving among fellow women to build strong social networks. Also, women invest income in their families as source of security against future risks such as divorce (Kabeer 1994). On the other hand, among the masa women in Cameron, women cultivate rice for their husbands in return for wages. However the wages earned are low compared to the amount of time spent. Men control large amounts of income earned through rice sale to settle their debts such as bride price. Women who are displeased with low wages resent by neglecting their domestic chores. This result to violence where by those that refuse to cook are beaten (Kabeer 1994 p.131). Therefore, women who are dissatisfied with low wages ventured in their own businesses. Those who are successful in their businesses normally separate from their husbands. This shows different patterns of income expenditure and control and how relationships in households vary from one place to another. The importance of bargain in conflict, cooperation and division of labour is particularly emphasised in households in regions where the members have significant roles to play in the commercial production. According to Hart (1995) changing livelihoods and agricultural production in Kenya for instance has greatly influenced the roles of members of households involved in production of high-value crops such as tea, coffee, and tobacco. Hart (1996) explains that whether in unified or non-unified households decision-making power becomes unified through cooperation and conflict alleviation which in turn determines the gains through fair allocation of resources among respective members. Allocation of incomes, assets and resources is the greatest function for maximising welfare as individual members enjoy cooperation, unity, and economy in consumption. Preferences to this form of bargaining in particular in large and extended households explain why patriarchical and collectivism continue to exist in Africa and elsewhere. However, Sen (1990) is of the view that household members access to resources is sustained as long as both parties, the allocator and the beneficiary, have more to gain than if they had been in their breakdown position. In reality, in third world countries, women are discriminated against distribution of resources and often fail to gain through their bargaining power. Power relation is determined by the interests, valuation and well- being of the individual as well as their gender and position in the family. This is the reason why in developing countries society such as South Asia, women have devalued position and hence their entitlements are considerably lesser in comparison to males even though they legitimately have rights to the households production and consumption share. Furthermore, differences in social value through cross-cultural differences may vary bargaining power among women but the household dynamics and economics remain almost the same. In Kenya and other sub-Saharan countries in particular, deteriorating economic conditions render most men the inability to grow crops and provide income to support their households. This has resulted in growing number of women working in the fields who do not intend to marry. These women have more bargaining power as compared to those who depend on their male counterparts for commercial income. In such conditions, individual strategy and behaviour in households towards access to finance, resources and assets differ greatly from say the women in households in Nigeria (Francis 1998). Thus, Seiz (1991) argues that the inferior market positioning and assumed household responsibilities are relative assumptions by neoclassical economists. Modern economists believe that women can bargain for their superior position in the household and displace the traditional roles through bargaining. The bargaining approach hypothesize that women can establish their bargaining power through interaction with the household and the "employer" (husbands, heads) by objecting to the tasks allocated to them, overall labour time and leisure, and the distribution of consumption of goods and services. Furthermore, they can also bargain for nonwage income or wealth, employment opportunities, and access to support from the household (Seiz 1991). There is no reason why this bargaining approach cannot work as African and Asian women are already engaged in informal bargaining activities. Microfinance The assumption of a household as being a joint unit where resources are pooled together is therefore much criticised (Kabeer 1998, p.92). This can be observed in the control of income in households. In many instances, men control income and decide how it should be spent. Women have to ask for money in case they want to purchase something for themselves. In the case of Nigeria, both men and women have separate savings and expenditures. Women spent income on gifts to build social networks and invest against risks such as divorce. While men spend income on food household items such as food, school fees and health care. Therefore, this indicates that individuals in households have different interests and priorities. In some cases, this may result to conflicts where by men being the heads want to determine how the expenditures will be incurred. Drawing attention to power relations, it seems to be unequal (Harris 1981 p.58). Since men are the household heads, power to make decisions is vested in their hands. Women are meant to be subordinate to men who mean they cannot make decisions without consulting their husbands. For example women’s participation in productive work has been denied. This constrains women’s ability to make decisions contradicts the idea that woman are involved in decision making in the household. It is from this inequality in the control and decision of resources allocation and consumption in the household that emerge the concept of micro-financing. According to Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman (1997) inequality in intra-household control and its implications on household economics is not limited to gender distinction. In fact, it influences the productive capacity of inputs, management, specialisation of skills, and welfare distribution. Failure to commit to these aspects results in conflicts whereby the women and children become discriminated against. Women become victims of violence whereas children, as public goods, are forced into labour at a young age to contribute to the households pooled resources. Based on this rationale the World Bank Report (2001) has established that "gender equality is a core development issue" and should be the objective of policy formulation to reduce poverty, gender inequality, and improve standard of living. According to the report, reform institutions need to establish equal rights and opportunities for women and men legally in particular "family law, protection against violence, land rights, employment and political rights" and foster economic development through education, health and nutrition, and provide command and voice to resource access (World Bank 2001). This is the only sure way to eliminate male dominance and violence in households in these regions. Anderson and Balands (2002) furthermore emphasise that the roscas or credit associations in African and Asian countries have been successful sources of financing for women which offer women the opportunity to save and spend as they like. In Kenya for example women engage in roscas to gain income independence as well as bargain their position in the household by eliminating conflicting interactions. Participation in roscas therefore is a form of savings strategy and prevent the husband from accessing to the wage earned. This form of microfinance has become significantly popular which can be diversified into micro-financing through policy interventions. Microfinance refers to the informal financing sector which may or may not be directed towards small businesses or self-employment. This form of financing can channel to small households and may be targeted towards women to alleviate their position in the household. According to Aghion, Armendariz and Morduch (2007) in the recent years microfinance for the informal, non-agricultural sector have grown significantly to support women in countries where women make up the largest share of the population in particular Africa. Women have been targeted in these countries because they are more credit constrained than men and are likely to benefit from microfinance through financial independence, social development (such as education and health care of their children) and extricate themselves from male oppression. However, intervention of this type requires infrastructure intervention and industry incentives. Despite this understanding, the World Bank policies and other welfare institutions continue to use threats of withholding financing, implement structural adjustment programs and economic policies which actually impede womens development or eradication of violence, family abuse, polygamy and child marriages. Poverty prevails everywhere while the social constructs and household dynamics remain intact because these institutions do not want to interfere with the existing social structure (World Bank 2001). These aspects imply that policies for sustainable development, gender equality, and household welfare need to be congruent with the concepts of intra-household power relations and its impact on welfare generation. References (Kabeer, 1994) (Bryceson 1995). (Gal braith 1974 p.35 cited in Kabeer 1994). Evenson, 1976) Kabeer 1990 and White 1992 cited in Kabeer 1994 (Kabeer 1998, p.92 Harris 1981 Works Cited Aghion, B.A., Armendariz, B. and Morduch, J., 2007 The Economics of Microfinance. MIT Press. Akram-Lodhi A. H., 1997 The unitary model of the peasant household: an obituary? Economic Issues 2 (1), pp. 27-42. Anderson, S and Baland, J., M., 2002 The economies of rosca and intra-household resource allocation. Quartely Journal of Economics, (3), pp. 963-995. Becker, G. 1991 A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press. Elson, D. 2002 International Financial Architecture: A view from the kitchen. Politica Femina, Spring. Folbre, N. 1991, Cleaning house: new perspectives on households on households and economic development. Journal of Development Economics 22 (1) pp. 5-40. Folbre, N. 1994 Who Pays for the Kids? Gender and the Structures of Constraint. New York: Routledge. Francis, E. 1998 Gender and rural livelihoods in Kenya. Journal of Development Studies, 35: 2, pp. 72 — 95 Haddad, I., Hoddinott, J. and Alderman, 1994 In Intra-household allocation an overview by World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper 1225. Hart, G. 1996 “Gender and household Dynamics: recent theories and their implications”, in M.G. Quibira (ed.) Critical Issues in Asian Development. Oxford University Press. Kabeer, N. 1991 Gender Production and well-being, Rethinking the Household Economy. Institute of Development Studies Discussion Paper 288. Kabeer, N., 1998 "Jumping to conclusions? Struggles over meaning and method in the study of household economics" in Jackson, C. and Pearson, R. (eds) Feminist Visions of Development: Gender Analysis and Policy. Routledge: London. pp. 91-107. Koopman, J. 1991 Neoclassical household models and models of household production: problems in the analsysis of african agricultural households. Review of Radical Political Economics 23 (3&4) pp. 5-40. Seiz, J., 1991 The bargaining approach and feminists methodology. Review of Radical Political Economics 23 (1&2) pp. 22-29 Sen, A. 1990 “Gender and Cooperative Conflicts”, in I. Tinker (ed) Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development. Oxford University Press pp. 123-149 Whitehead, A. 1984. “I’m Hungry mum: the Politics of Domestic Budgeting" In K. Young et al. (ed) Marriage and the Market: Women’s Subordination Internationally and its Lessons. World Bank 2001. "Power, incentives and resources in the household" in Engendering Development; Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice, Oxford pp147-180. Read More