Anti Corruption Strategy - Research Paper Example

Governance - Anti-corruption strategy School Affiliation: The political economy of countries normally gives rise to a number of forms of corruption. The effects of corruption can be quite far reaching to the society as a whole. It is on this premise that efforts should be made to check the incidence of the vice. In this paper an attempt is made to unmask the approaches that have been put forth by the Kenyan and South African governments. Whereas, the South Africa scores highly on its efforts to rein on corruption, Kenya’s performance remains abysmal. On this evidence, suggestions are raised in the paper. The suggestions are made in reference to the available lessons that Kenya should learn from the South African experience. It is however concluded on the basis of this paper that adopting measures to contain corruption without the political support may not achieve the desired goals. Introduction Corruption is an evil act that predates upon society. It is a form of activity that manifests itself in a number of ways. The major underlying truth is that corruption is always seen as an illegality in almost all countries in the world. It usually involves a person who abuses their authority in a manner that positions her/him to unfair gain. In this regard, government officials that use public funds to carry out their personal activities are captured in the corruption quagmire. In most countries, public officials, corporate executives improperly award contracts. A striking feature of corruption is that service is rendered to an individual after a bribe has been given out (Todaro, 2010). In the year 2008, Kenya was ranked number 147 out of a possible 180 nations. This is by the transparency international rankings. The implication of these findings is that Kenya is worse off than 146 countries in the fight against corruption. Only 33 countries were found to be more corrupt than Kenya. This presents the stark reality on the gravity of the problem that faces the country. This is only a ranking and as a result may fail to capture the effects and perceptions held by the Kenyan people. Naturally, corruption is difficult to measure (Todaro, 2010). In Kenya, the incidents of corruption have not been limited to government circles. The incidence of corruption has risen to unprecedented levels. This is supported by the fact that even private businesses have been sucked into the vice. Further evidence is drawn from the fact that lower level officials of government have served to worsen an already bad state. Tribalism has been a major cause of corruption in the Kenyan state. As remarked, one factor that heightens the problems of graft in Kenya is based on tribal loyalty. In the Kenyan context, people are in the first place loyal to their immediate families. Then, next they exhibit their loyalties to their clans, and finally to their tribes. It is on this basis that members of the civil service always want to play the tribal card and help each other in the acquisition of wealth or favours. The idea of this kind of patronage waning has often been observed over the years. However, the family and tribal ties continue to hold sway on the operation of public service (Todaro, 2010). A major twist in corruption in relation to the two countries is based on political leadership. Whereas the South Africa political elite were not so much into corruption, the Kenyan counterparts have either been directly involved or abetted the vice. The founding president of independent South Africa was one individual whose integrity remains there for everybody to see. During his tenure, no notable corruption allegation was labelled against his government. Later on, Thabo Mbeki was made to undergo some form of damage as in his regime; some ministers were implicated in corruption scandals. However, the magnitude of leadership involvement in graft is wanton in the Kenyan case. Corruption and Kenyas Presidents It emerges that the three individuals that have served as presidents must have either abetted the vice or involved in it through various ways. Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya from Independence Day in 1963 should primarily soldier responsibility in the corruption debate. During the colonialism time, the European colonisers had made the move to steal the fertile lands. This was stolen from among others, the Kalenjin people. After independence in 1963, Kenyatta chose not to return those lands to the rightful former owners. He instead chose to hand it over to trusted members from his own clan and tribe, the Kikuyu. It is thus no surprise that Kenyatta became among the largest private owners of land in the country (Ruhiu, 2005). Daniel Arap Moi was to follow as the next president of Kenya. During Daniel Arap Mois tenure as president corruption was to become more widespread. Moi himself became involved in many occasions. To cite a specific example, in the 1990s Moi was part of the Goldenberg scandal. In this case of fraud, smuggled gold was to be exported out of the country in exchange of high government subsidies. This remains to be one of the biggest financial scams to ever rock the country. No notable individual was arraigned in court to face charges of fraud while in office (Ruhiu, 2005). The third president was elected on the change platform. However, Mwai Kibaki did very little to uproot the public rot and in a few months time, his regime had become embroiled in a number of scams (Ruhiu, 2005). The Kenya Anti-corruption Commission Through legislation, the Kenyan government seems to have taken measures to check on corruption as early as at 1956. The Act, Prevention of Corruption remained in operation until 2003. Under the current anti-graft law, KACC holds the mandate to prevent corruption in all government and industry levels (Kivutha, 2008). The development of the commercialised courts to deal with economic crimes presents one area of departure from the Kenyan case. Whereas in South Africa there is in place special courts, in Kenya such a provision is lacking. Economic crimes where corruption is captured are dealt in accordance with the constitutional provisions. The difference is that such cases are handled in the same courts that deal with all other cases (Kivutha, 2008). The point that arises is related to overlap of activities. In the Kenyan case, the courts are left with a plethora of issues to handle. This is accompanied by the limited nature of facilities. The limited nature of facilities has the blunt implication that cases normally outstretch the service needs. In simple terms, the courts have got too much to handle. It is little surprise then that major economic cases have been adjourned time and time again. In this regard, economic justice is always delayed. It should be realised at this stage that justice delayed is justice denied. This takes this case to the next level. In South Africa, the conviction success rate has been phenomenal. At 94 percent, the record is clear and available for everyone to see. On the converse, the Kenyan courts have a less than 5 percent success rate. This is a pure contrast that reflects a big shortcoming on the side of the Kenyan case. South Africa Just as in Kenya, South Africa took a necessary step that would help in the fight against graft. She refused to set up a special body to help check the vice. Instead, South Africa chose to fight corruption through the strengthening of her already in place anti-graft institutions. In this light, special units were to be created within the existing law enforcement organs. This is the main reason as to why coordination never arose as an issue in the initial stages. However, coordination was to come up as a major problem. In South Africa the anti-graft war has been divided into various parts. These sections were to be taken by various agencies within government. The institutions assigned the graft responsibility included the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), the South African Police Service, the Auditor General, the South African Revenue Services, the Public Protector (Ombudsman), the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) and the Public Service Commission. All these agencies are responsible and address core functions whose aim is to strengthen financial management, employee integrity and the quality of administration in the public service. The public service anti-corruption unit is charged with the coordination responsibility within the department of the Public Service and Administration. It aids in the implementation of anti-graft policies and legal affairs. It is also responsible for convening the anti-graft coordinating committee. The unit does not in any way get directly involved in the carrying out of investigations. Its composition is wide as it encompasses all agencies that hold an anti-corruption role. This covers both national and provincial level departments. In spite of the much hyped success in the war on graft, coordination as pointed earlier has remained a thorny issue. This is occasioned by the overlapping nature of functions within the graft fight agencies. The creation of a special unit, the Directorate of Special Operations in 2001, served to ease the investigations and prosecutions problem. The unit managed to achieve some level of success until its disbandment in 2009. This unit was among the best suited for the job and it managed to achieve a notable degree of success. To cite an example, of 380 cases the unit was investigating in 2004, 349 of them led to convictions. This is a truly convincing success rate. The republic of South Africa does not follow a decentralised type of corruption assault (Beinart, 2001). On the contrary, Kenya runs a centralised Anti-corruption Commission. This points out to the capacity levels of the two approaches to fighting corruption. Whereas, the South African model has a mechanism to have a spread effect across the country, the centralised models as the one in Kenya, runs the risk of failing to meet the national needs. It is also realised that the Kenyan model lacks the departmental agencies as the ones that are present in the South African one. The South African model also enjoys the services of a policy making organ at the level of cabinet (Sarre, Dilip and Hans-Jörg, 2005). The anti-corruption coordinating committee is charged with the responsibility of leading the coordination role on corruption. The committee is made up of 14 agencies and departments that fall under the government. This may be used to explain why in South Africa there has been a high success rate as compared to the Kenyan case. The ability of law enforcement agencies is another considered aspect. Whereas the South African government can count on the enforcement departments to have the law on corruption enforced, the reverse is the case in the Kenyan scenario (Camerer, 2006). The law enforcers in Kenya, the Kenya police for instance, are one of the most corrupt organs in the country. It is thus ironical to expect this organ to lead the fight against corruption. If indeed, the agency is corrupt as alleged, then there is no doubt that corruption is there to stay in the Kenyan republic. On the converse, the South African law enforcers, given the success rate being enjoyed in the country, appear to be playing a pivotal role. Kenya can only match the South African success only and only if they adopt serious reforms in the law enforcement aspect. Suggestions on what Kenya can learn from South Africa Kenya needs to learn from South Africa in a number of ways. In the first instance, the existing graft institution needs to be restructured to enable it to face the real challenges that it faces. Secondly, the coordination issue should be looked into with a view to giving it the attention due to it. Thirdly, politicians need to borrow a leaf from their South African counterparts and give a thought to graft by adopting serious approaches in the war against corruption. This is after the realisation has been made that the fight against graft cannot be won without the input of the political class. However, it should not be confused at this point that this paper solely presents the politicians as the holders of the solutions to the corruption agenda. The common populace should also emerge to stake a claim in the war against graft. Though the politicians hold power, this power is only transferred to them by the masses. In this sense, the masses ought to arise and seek their rightful role. The need for stronger institutions The need to establish a special court as indicated by South Africa is a good scheme to check on corruption. Kenya as a country ought to borrow from the South Africa experience. It is true that resources are hard to come by. But this is not an excuse as each nation has a number of competing priorities. It is upon the political establishment to decide what to do first. In this regard, the Kenyan government should consider establishing a special unit that can help to check corruption. A special court will thus help in ensuring that economic crimes are not delayed as it currently is the case in Kenya. The need for worthy coordination The coordinating agency to be set should enjoy a given form of authority. This authority is necessary if the unit is to hold any influence in the war against graft. A coordinating unit needs to be independent. If it is to be independent, the unit should be free from political intrigues. In this sense, the unit should be allocated enough funding, be given worthy authority and be beyond political machinations. This will allow the unit the power to come up with proposals on the fight against corruption and be able to implement such suggestions. Funding is vital as it will enable the unit to source high technology to aid its operations in aid to tame corruption. In the case of South Africa, the coordination problem seems to have been given due attention. In respect to this, the establishment of a special unit to play the role of coordination was set up. Kenya needs to go the South African way if her war on graft is to bear any meaningful outcome. The need for political goodwill The political class holds so much sway in regards to how a country is governed. To that effect, the political readers in Kenya need to learn from their South African counterparts and embrace the need for change. With the political goodwill, good laws on corruption that already exist will be applied. In addition to that better laws can also be developed. However, the development of better laws does not guarantee success. The development of the laws should be accompanied with strengthening of institutions. In this sense, the latter is a step that precedes the former. For any success to be achieved in the fight against graft there must be strong coordination between the various agencies and departments that are engaged in the battle. To cite an example, the prosecutorial agency and the investigative units ought to work closely if success is to be attained. As it emerges in the South African case, there is a good level of communication and linking amongst the various agencies and departments. This is not the case in the Kenyan anti-corruption fight. In Kenya, the prosecutor is supposedly the Attorney General. This person is a political appointee and is expected to spearhead prosecutions assisted by the Chief Public Prosecutor. This is despite the fact that the Kenya Anti-corruption Commission is expected to lead the fight against corruption. In a nutshell, there is lack of cooperation between the office of the Attorney General and the Kenya Anti-corruption Commission. The commission lacks the powers to prosecute and it can only forward cases to the Attorney General to prosecute. It is no secret that the Attorney General has over time slept over the job as accusations are often traded between the two offices. The Attorney General and the KACC have not worked as a team. In Kenya, the judiciary is often a weak point in the fight against graft. It is no secret that the arm of government stands accused in relation to the fight. It is often responsible for unnecessary adjournments of cases in courts. The courts are also accused of subverting justice by the provision of partial treatment to cases. Senior government officials or private bigwigs are known to be immune to prosecution. In any caser, when these individuals are taken to court, it has been in most instances seen as a public relations act as this is only meant to deceive the public that corruption is being fought. It is true that the republic of South Africa has its share of shortcomings but it would be an injustice to rank it alongside Kenya. It is true that there exist case logs in courts but the action of the South Africa governance system to set up special courts for graft crimes speaks volumes about the court system in the country. One other inherent problem in the African nations fight against graft is based on system overlap. It is a fact that in most countries there is in existence a number of agencies and departments that play the same roles. To cite an example, the Kenyan experience of governance shows that there are the Kenya police, the Public Prosecutor and the Attorney General, all these offices are responsible for investigations and prosecutions. The bone of contention here is premised on overlapping powers. These units should ideally work as a team if success is to be made. In that respect, there is need for high level coordination. This is something that has always lacked in the Kenyan case. It is often heard one office complaining and accusing the other/s for sabotage or incomplete support. Conclusion It emerges that Kenya unlike South Africa has failed to make notable progress in the fight against corruption. As one goes through this paper the realisation is made that the fight against graft is a process. In this respect, the process may witness a number of obstacles. On the basis of the Kenyan case, the governance structures need to be tailored in the mirror of the South African experience. This should however not be done blindly. Every system is different and may demand different measures, but given the success story of South Africa, there are a number of aspects that have been raised above which should serve as an example to Kenya. To have an effective control on corruption, concerted effort must be input. To begin with, the political class must offer their support to anti-corruption measures (Johnston and Arnold, 2001). Secondly, the existing laws on graft should be strengthened. The third consideration should focus on strengthening existing institutions. Finally, if the institutions already in place cannot be trusted to offer the services, they should completely be overhauled. Since corruption in Kenya has permeated itself into low levels of the society, it is ideal that a bottom up approach be envisioned. However, this approach should be juggled both with the top down approach because it is the top leadership that is soiled in corruption than any other part of society. This view is taken in reference to the fact that it is the top leadership that holds the responsibility on governance. It is summed that without a change in the political will, Kenya will remain rooted in the corruption problem for some time to come. References Beinart, W 2001, Twentieth-century South Africa, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Camerer, L 2006, Corruption in South Africa: Results of an expert panel survey SA, Institute for Security Studies. Johnston, M & Arnold, J 2001, Political corruption: Concepts and contexts, Transaction Publishers. Kivutha, K 2008, Initiatives against corruption in Kenya: Legal and policy interventions, Michigan, University of Michigan. Sarre, R, Dilip, K & Hans-Jörg, A 2005, Policing corruption: International perspectives, Lexington Books. Todaro, J 2010, The Economist, University of Michigan, Economist Newspaper Ltd. Ruhiu, L, 2005, Corruption in Kenya: Only I have the answer. Kenya, Oakland Media Services. 1999 93 pages. Read More