Stag Hunt Game Models - Coursework Example

Stag Hunt game models Insert (s) Stag Hunt game models Stag hunt is a game that defines the conflict as well as the dilemma between social cooperation and safety. In this kind of game, two players may choose to hunt a hare and a stag individually. Each player is however usually required to make their choices without letting it known to the other party. The two individuals must however seek the cooperation of each other in order to succeed in their game (Bacharach, 2006, p.67). For example an individual can successfully hunt down and get a hare by hunting alone but a hare is considered to be worth significantly less than a stage. Consequently derived from stag hunt game is often used as one of the important analogies for social cooperation. With regard to the game theories, the main difference between game theory and standard game theory is that game theory is largely based on the assumption that the players in a particular game are always rational and using their best strategies. On the other hand, evolutionary game theory is often based on the assumption that players are always biased toward their choice of strategies. There are also a number of other games that can also be effectively used to depict social cooperation. Some of these games include the prisoner’s dilemma and analysts believe it better than stage hunt with regard to its explanation of Social Corporation. The primary difference between stag hunt game and the Prisoners dilemma is that the game usually involves two Nash equilibria in the event that both the two players cooperate or defect at the same time. On the other hand, Prisoners dilemma as a game generally involves a Pareto efficient cooperation between two players but as opposed to stag hunt, Nash equilibrium is only present in the event that both the two players decide to defect. This paper discuses stag hunt game models, the predictions using evolutionary and standard game theories as well as the contribution of such outcomes to the social sciences. In the context of social cooperation, game theory can be defined as the study as well as the predictions of the outcomes of strategic interactions between economic agents with respect to their individual utilities and preferences particularly in the situations where the outcomes are expected by none of the agents (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.77). In a stag hunt game, there is usually one side considered to be risk dominant while the other side is regarded as payoff dominant. Although many analysts regard the prisoner’s dilemma as the best game that effectively represents the concept of social cooperation, many people also strongly believe that stag hunt as a game is equally significant in the understanding of some of the challenges of social cooperation. According to Skyrms (2004, p. 45), there are a number of similarities between the two games of stag hunt and prisoner’s dilemma. For example most of the outcomes that can be predicted by prisoner’s dilemma can also be effectively predicted by stage hunt. On the other hand, classical game theory demands that all players in a particular game should make rational decisions regarding their strategic moves. For example each of the players can monitor the moves made by their opponents before they make strategic and appropriate decisions to counter such moves (Myerson, 1991, p. 89). For example assuming that two players were involved in a game where a car a given junction was faced with the choice of either moving fast or waiting for the other car to move, the pay-off matrix can be designed as below.     Car 2       First Second Car 1 First 0, 0 2,2   Second 2, 2 0,0 In the above diagram, it is observable that there are only two Nasj equilibria given as (2,2) and this only means that equilibrium is absent. It is worth noting that the lack of nash equilibrium as well as the occurrence of multiple equilibrium is one of the major weaknesses of standard game theory. This problem can however be effectively solved as long as the initial condition is well known (Chinchuluun, 2008, p.107). Evolutionary equilibrium generally has more emphasis on history. In this regard, the decision of whether car 1 should wait for the Car 2 or not can only depends on the history. The unique equilibrium is therefore presented in at the top right quadrant. On the other hand, standard game theory is concerned with the study of alternative results that may result from the varying choices of the two players. Consequently the main emphasis is usually to ensure that the choices of the players affect the outcomes for each one of them. A good example of this concept of standard game theory can be a hypothetical advertisement game between Coca Cola Company and Pepsi Soft Drinks Company. Cola Company wants to advertise some of its new products to enhance its profitability which is valued at $250 million. In this case an important question will be the response of Pepsi soft drinks. Most probably the Pepsi soft drinks company will respond to the challenge through an alternative advertisement strategy. For example the profit of Coca Cola will be $ 300 million if the company uses $ 10million in its advertisements. This is however only if Pepsi soft drinks do not advertise. In this regard, it can be predicted that a failure by Pepsi to advertise will make them gain $100 million in profit while if they choose to advertise, they will acquire $300 million profits just like their rivals, the Coca Cola. From these predictions, it will be in the best interest of Coca Cola to advertise since they will make additional profit of $50 while Pepsi will most likely not advertise as it will reduce their profits by $60. This example clearly demonstrates the significance of corporations particularly in business entities. The outcomes indicate that it was in the best interest of the two companies to cooperate with each other by agreeing to avoid advertisements to help both of them retain their market share s as well as profits. Standardized stag hunt game theory therefore opposes competition among organizations since it often results in wastage of resources without necessarily yielding positive results. The cooperative equilibrium that is seen in this game generally resembles the ones common in stag hunt model games. For example it can be safely argued that if just like in the stag hunt model, the variables in this case are the customers who are being hunted by the two companies through advertisements. Although collaborations may sometimes prove risky, it is largely recommended to corporate organizations since it can significantly help in the mitigation of some risks while at the same time maintaining positive results (Hofbauer and Sigmund,1998, 45). The outcomes of both evolutionary and standardized game theories have significant potential use in both the social sciences as well as in the solving of economic issues. This is particularly because the stag hunt game models often present more accurate predictions of outcomes as compared to the other contemporary game models (Osborne, 2004, p.136). The wide range applications of these game models also make them more popular among social scientists particularly during the analysis of strategic interactions in economic and social contexts. For example in the case of the hunter Vs stag model, there is an assured possibility of success when the two parties hunt down the stag together as opposed to when they individually hut the hare. Finally the outcomes of these game models have been used by a number of social scientists in the development of ethical theories and in the understanding of the contexts in which they are applicable. In conclusion both the evolutionary game theory and the standard game theory are effectively used to understand the concept of fairness that often results from social cooperation and collaboration as opposed to each party going it alone. These outcomes can be applied to enhance better understanding of the social and economic behavior of institutions or organizations with regard to their competition, consumer behaviors and their target markets. References Bacharach, M. 2006. Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chinchuluun, A. 2008. Pareto optimality, game theory and equilibria. New York: Springer. Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. 1991. Game theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K.L. 1998. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Myerson, R. B. 1991. Game theory: analysis of conflict. Cambridge : Harvard University Press. Osborne, M. J. 2004. An introduction to game theory. New York: Oxford University Press. Skyrms, B.S.2004. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Read More