Strange Defeat by Marc Bloch - Book Report/Review Example

Strange Defeat, by Marc Bloch Order No.327755 October ‘09 Strange Defeat by Marc Bloch Much has been written about the reasons for the defeat ofFrance in 1940, but no one has presented so vividly and accurately the truth as Marc Bloch has done in his book, Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence. Marc Bloch was a renowned historian and a Resistance fighter who was later executed by the Nazis. He wrote the book after he returned home from service following the fall of France. Bloch was able to take a close look at the military failures he had seen and examine why France was not able to answer the attack quickly and effectively. His military service enabled him to give a personal account of the battle. He concluded quite harshly that the immediate cause of the defeat was the total incompetence displayed by the High Command. In the book he also explores all the other factors, both social and military, that had had diluted the national solidarity of France. All historians generally agree that in the history of modern Europe, the French military defeat of 1940 was one of the greatest military disasters. It took just six weeks for the French army to collapse. German tanks, supported by the infantry and mechanized forces and a formidable air force, swept through France cutting off Allied forces and supply lines in a move that came to be known as The Cut of the Sickle. The French military was routed and all organized resistance collapsed. What led to this collapse, the correctness of the decisions taken at that time is all a matter of debate. Many French politicians and military leaders during investigations claimed that they had tried their best to defend France but could not succeed because France had already decayed to an extent that it became impossible for them. One of the most important and one of the earliest works about the defeat was written in 1940 by Marc Bloch. His Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence is not an historical analysis. He did not have access to any record or documentation to make a historical analysis. His is an insightful book giving us details and arguments about the flaws that led to the collapse of the army. His arguments cover the Intelligence, the system of the Army that was beleaguered by confusion, poor strategy and lack of communication and the nature of the French people themselves. Bloch had served during World War I and World War II and hence is able to give number of reasons and arguments as to why the French army, even though it was better equipped than the Germans, collapsed so suddenly. His arguments are different from what one has learnt in school. Blochs main argument is that the Third Republic was weakened by the tremendous polarization in the 1930s. This proved fatal as it sowed seeds of disunity when what was required when there was threat from Germany was exactly the opposite. The examples he provides of polarization are fighting between Communists and Leftists on one hand, and the various French fascist groups like the Croix de Feu and other extreme rightists. Here he quotes a common quip that was circulating among the French gentry and upper-class, "Better Hitler than Blum." Blum was the Socialist leader. He argues here that pacifism which first spread under Leon Blum and after that under the High Command did not allow France to attack a relatively weak German force in Rhineland even though it had a superior military force. The polarization and the structural instability of the Third Republic created a sort of a breakdown of democracy that proved fatal at the time of aggression. While blaming the army for the defeat Bloch argues that the French army never learnt that the speed of modern weapons had shortened the distance between two armies. According to him the French military leadership just could not understand the implication of the new technologies the German military used. In fact the technologies the Germans used gave a new meaning to time in warfare. The French continued to calculate time taken for an army to advance based on assumptions from the previous war. The French army understood what was happening to them when it was too late. He recalls here that the German offensive overtook each French retreat and that his unit constantly found the Germans behind them. The French army was constantly retreating and did not have the time to employ a counter offensive. French leaders never expected the Germans to execute such a surprise assault from the front. Bloch also believed that the unwieldy bureaucracy of the French military comprising of arrogant, old, over cautious and unimaginative leaders was responsible for the failure. In contrast the German Army according to him appeared to be “more democratic" than the French. There was camaraderie between officers and there was a powerful metaphysical bond between the Nazis especially among the young. Bloch however did not believe that there was cowardice in the French army as many others did. However he admitted that there were embarrassing moments when the army fled when the Germans advanced. In this connection Marc Bloch (1940) says “Let us admit, (as I fear we must do) that such stories are not wholly groundless, that, as I have often heard my friends on the staff say, discipline at the front did break down. If that is so, then I think that the High Command was very largely to blame... I am inclined to believe that these cases of cowardice in high places were not as rare as we would like to think – after, that is, it became obvious that we had been beaten." Marc Bloch also felt that cultural factors played a role in the French defeat. According to him the French education system ignored history and visual arts while deciding the curriculum. He wanted a greater emphasis on these subjects. Bloch argues further that it was the professors and teachers who, maybe unintentionally, cultivated a “race of cowards” in the years between the wars. However Bloch had no doubt that once the war began the teachers who were called up to fight had fought valiantly. Nevertheless, Bloch believed that this courageous display on the war front did not free them from the responsibility of the earlier mistakes they had committed in the classroom. He had these words to say about history teachers, “Those who teach history should be continually concerned with the task of seeking the solid and the concrete behind the empty and the abstract”. (Marc Bloch, 1940) He further asks, “Do you not think that, having learned from an experience so dearly purchased, you will find much to alter in the things you were teaching only a few years back?” Bloch’s another key argument was that the outcome of a war does not rest only on the shoulders of military officials and soldiers. It also depends on the people of the country and their manner. The national psyche played an important role. The ineptitude of the government may be partly responsible. To a great extent the evolvement of the people of the country also mattered. Marc Bloch argued that both Generals and civilians were complacent, selfish and careless when the war began. They were confident that the Germans would never attack them. They were not prepared mentally, there were no proper armaments and there was no civilian unity. The French did not fight the war as a single unit but as individuals. Self-interest was foremost in their minds as they fought the war. This attitude he has examined in the last chapter of his book, "A Frenchman Examines his Conscience". Here he argues that it was human interaction, which was the on the whole the basis of the French defeat. Many according to him considered the war an opportunity for exploitation. To the trade unions, it meant making profits. According to Bloch (1940), “Their vision was limited to immediate issues of petty profit, and I am afraid that this blindness marked the conduct of most of the big unions”. Businessmen were hiking up the prices of war supply prices as the "carpet-baggers" did in the American civil war. Bloch also felt that the French people did not have a proper understanding of the war. In conclusion it can be said that since Marc Bloch took part in the French Resistance and was experienced and knowledgeable in the ways of war having also fought in World War I the arguments he puts forward as to why France suffered such a humiliating defeat are convincing. In short he argued that the French defeat was not only because of the military prowess of the Germans but also because of France’s outlook and the fundamental problems in French society. The German victory was more of an intellectual victory. In the end Bloch comes to a rather sad but optimistic conclusion that in the future the men who will build France will be by men belonging to a new breed and not by men belonging to his generation. References 1. Bloch Marc (1940), Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968). Read More