Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons by Joseph Cirincione - Book Report/Review Example

Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons Joseph Cirincione, presents a balanced study of the drivers that cause s to seek to obtainnuclear weapons also as the barriers that prompt some to turn aside from the quest, or abandon it altogether. And in the light of reasoned thought he concludes, "The good news is that the nonproliferation regime has worked. The nuclear threat is less cruel today than it was in 1970 when the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force". He bases this evaluation on the fact that "the number of nuclear weapons in the world has declined from a peak of 65,000 in 1986, to roughly 27,000 today". But does this automatically make the world a safer place' Cirincione takes fulfillment that "the threat of a global thermonuclear war is now near zero". He goes on to state, "The dangers we face today are very serious, but they are orders of magnitude less severe than those we confronted just two decades ago from the overkill potential of U.S. and Russian arsenals. We no longer worry about the fate of the earth, but we still worry about the fate of our cities".(Cirincione) It is in the resulting debate of nuclear violence that the upbeat tenor of the author's faith in the potential of discussions and agreements to handle the imminent threat more and more seems detached from reality. While it is factual that the risk of global thermonuclear war has diminished, the possibility all out nuclear war was for all time very low as a result of the Strangelovian logic of mutually certain destruction. Then again, the probability of the explosion of a nuclear weapon smuggled into an American city by terrorists in the next decade is evidently important. Though such an event would not be the end of life on this planet, its societal, economic and political consequences would about definitely be the end of life as we have come to know it. And, millions of people would die. This being the case, how can the author argue that the world is safer now than it was twenty years ago' Cirincione also contends that the decrease in ballistic missiles is a pointer of the decline of danger in the present day. What he neglects to consider is that weapons dispatched through alternate means - say in shipping containers with GPS activation - do not leave a return address, and as a result would not invite immediate retaliation. It would seem that a country aggressive to the United States could launch such an attack with an impunity that would be unimaginable were the process of delivery a ballistic missile. In this context it's hard to buy into the author's upbeat evaluation of the future. As he would have it, securing existing weapons and stocks of fissile materials, new rounds of negotiations employing various carrots and sticks, and the good instance of further disarmament by the US and Russia hold the promise of an enhanced and a safer world. The trouble is that while these actions are indeed essential they are definitely not adequate to create the intended result. This is mainly the case given that some future nuclear adversaries may hold to apocalyptic world views. Since the fall of the Soviet Union near the end of the last century (1991), the United States has funded the Russian government in the "cleanup" of warheads, bombs and other nuclear components scattered throughout the a range of nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Republic in an attempt to put off terrorists and other non-nuclear nations from obtaining the same. Cirincione believes that "with additional funding, this threat decrease program could be accelerated to protect or eliminate the enormous mass of nuclear weapons and materials by 2010." "Nuclear weapons are the most terrifying weapons ever created by humankind. They are unique in their destructive power and in their lack of direct military utility. Most national leaders repeatedly express their hope that these weapons will never be used."(Cirincione) "Why, then, do states devote enormous human and financial resources to develop these weapons' What are the principal desires and fears that drives these expensive, demanding, programs' And why don't more states have these weapons' What are the main barriers that prevent proliferation, and have'these motivations, strategies and obstacles changed over time'"(Cirincione) There are five main reasons states acquire nuclear weapons: Security, prestige, domestic politics, technology, and economics. Each nation necessitates national security for its countrymen, and most nations see the nuclear weapons as the respond. For the prestige factor, it shows the nation's great status.' For domestic political aspect, is'for competing'for internal factions for military influence that may lead a state to nuclear weapons. For technology reason, its an assurance that a state is technologically competent of developing nuclear weapons that delivers a scientific accomplishments that makes more leaders to resist.' For the economic aspect, even if not adequate to stand on their own as a casual model, interact with the other four of the nuclear proliferation , sometimes persuade nuclear proliferation and sometimes restraint.' Different sides of the same reasons are also why many nations choose not to acquire such weapons. Cirincione sees Russia as the #1 possible source of nuclear weapons/material for terrorists. It has thousands of nuclear weapons at 150-210 sites and hundreds of nuclear materials at about 49 sites. Experts believe that it would be hard for terrorists to obtain a completed bomb - they are well secured and utilize complex security locks. On the other hand, experts also believe that terrorists could construct a bomb from enriched material with only 3-4 technically people. Pakistan is seen as a close #2 potential source. USA Today reported in November of 2001 that at least 10 Taliban had contacted Pakistani scientists in the prior two years. Pakistan has enough highly enriched uranium to make 50-100 bombs. There are also about 40 nations with civilian stockpiles for power reactors. While not sufficiently enriched for nuclear weapons, it would be a simple matter to extend the enrichment process to create such. Potential nuclear powder-kegs involve U.S. and Russian weapons being on 15-minute alert, and situations involving Taiwan, or India-Pakistan. Unfavorable current events contain the U.S. invasion of Iraq (increased terrorist and nervous state motivation to acquire nuclear weapons), our support for improved Indian growth of nuclear weapons, U.S. spread of new logic for nuclear weapon use ("bunker-busters," use against non-nuclear states), and a slowdown/stop in reduction programs concerning Russia. The good news is that numeral of nuclear weapons in the world has been cut in half over the past 15 years, those seriously considering their acquisition or having them have declined from 23 to 10, there has been a two-thirds reduction in ICBMs, and both the U.S. and Russia have shattered their chemical weapons. The matter, of course, is that the "have-nots" want what the "haves" have: NUCLEAR ENERGY. Here the author proposes that a new system restricted by the International Atomic Energy Agency would offer a supply of nuclear material to countries that need it for civilian use in exchange for an agreement that those same countries not seek to build facilities to create their own "nuclear resources". Cirincione understands that it is not possible to persuade the "have-nots" to give up their nuclear weapons ambitions and to adhere to nonproliferation norms while the "haves" assert the significance of these weapons for their own security and safety (read that Pakistan and Iran). As one state goes nuclear, another circumstance is required to do the same thing ad infinitum: "in short, proliferation begets proliferation." Cirincione whimsically wonders if the obverse is probable. 88 countries are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that became effective in 1970. The only countries that have not signed are: Israel, Pakistan, and India. North Korea has withdrawn. These are the countries the treaty has ineffectively prohibited from obtaining nuclear resources. The original signatories, the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China all agreed to ultimately dismantle their arsenals under a future agreement: to date that "future accord" has not happened. In fact, advances in this area have continued. Without compliance with this treaty, Cirincione posits the world faces a nuclear disaster. Conlusion: The history of the growth of the atomic bomb and the initial hard work to contain the technology was captivating. The most important conclusions about control or abolition of the atomic bomb were raised soon after it was first used. As stated by Truman in 1946, "The hope of civilization lies in international arrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb." Unfortunately, the United States was unable to renounce its ownership of the weapons which led to the arms race when the Soviets called their bluff by requiring this step before allowing inspections. Joseph Cirincione moves us forward in time to the development of the idea that control of the technology should be at the level of the fissile material. This control was put in place even before the unbelievable support which resulted in the Non-Proliferation Treaty with its 188 signatories (only Israel, Pakistan and India never signed). This treaty and others have resulted in relatively few countries still holding atomic weapons and no testing performed since 1997. I have to differ with Mr. Cirincione however with his attitude offered in the chapter entitled, "The Good News about Proliferation". He invites the reader to be optimistic as he reviews the successes of the non-proliferation regime and increased security on nuclear materials worldwide. He reports the need for prudent policy choices which include preventing nuclear terrorism, blocking new nuclear states, reducing current arsenals and fortifying the nonproliferation regime. He feels this is done by reducing the perceived security threat to a given nation while lowering the appeal of nuclear technology. "At a time of challenges and uncertainties regarding the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, Joseph Cirincione's Bomb Scare offers a complete review of the history and theory of nuclear weapons, also the policy options before us today in our common endeavour to address the existing arsenals, the emergence of new nuclear-armed states, and nuclear terrorism. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime is identified by Cirincione as the guiding belief of any such policy. His perceptive study goes beyond the focus on 'proliferation barriers' and echoes the increasingly vocal call in the international society to address the root causes of proliferation, conflicts and perceptions of anxiety. Like Cirincione, I conclude that reducing nuclear risks in the twenty-first century cannot just be a military or nuclear energy tactic; rather, we must look at resolving underlying political conflicts that are the drivers of nuclear proliferation and competition. By highlighting the direction to be followed in order to lessen the global nuclear risk, Bomb Scare is a welcome contribution in our efforts to change the way we approach refuge and ensure that the atom is used merely for the benefit of humankind. ' work cited Cirincione, J. "Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons". 2007, 1-99. ' Read More