Human Rights and International Criminal Court - Coursework Example

Human Rights and International Criminal Court INTRODUCTION One hundred and sixty countries vali d the Rome Statute thatset in motion the formation of the ICC (International Criminal Court) on July 17, 1998. The ICC was and still is a unique court that is treaty-oriented, independent, and designed to be permanent. The founding countries intended to create a court that tackled complicated and gruesome international offences, especially genocide, serious violations of basic human rights, war crimes, and crimes of violence. Since its enactment in 2002, number of supportive members has decreased to 122, with the United States being most controversial and significant state that withdrew. The first ten years of the ICC has been dealing with the inevitable reality of its adversity and unrestrained incidents that overwhelm its successes in relation to protecting human rights. The following paper researches and discusses the circumstances surrounding the formation of the ICC, its objectives, successes, failures, and adequate examples of cases and developments that either catalyze or deter any of these factors. THE ICC’S RELATION TO HUMAN RIGHTS Headquartered in The Hague, the ICC is a “last resort” for the trial of cases concerning genocide, war crimes, and serious violations of human rights (Decaux 600). By mid-2013, the ICC had begun hearings in eight states and published two rulings, which were trials against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. It is the role of the ICC to make international justice commonplace and cause increased expectations in places where the globe’s worst crimes took place. The court’s key successes surround this role. At the same time, the ICC is currently preliminary address for international criminal responsibility, which is its overwhelming mandate and global reach. This mandate means that governments that the ICC relies on to conduct its hearings have to be consistent in their support (Shattuck, Epps, and Hannon 151). The current ICC Chief Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, is expected to hear proceedings against suspects in Libya, Sudan, Uganda, Cote d’Ivoire and Congo. The ICC has four main objectives. i. To make sure the worst criminals are held liable for their offences ii. To function as a court of “last resort” that can probe, prosecute, and sentence the criminals of genocide, serious violations of human rights, and war crimes iii. To help national judicial systems in their investigation and action against suspects with the intent to enable governments to be the first to investigate and prosecute iv. To help spread peace and security by putting off potential perpetrators (Scheipers 29). SUCCESSES ICC has accomplished its objectives in several cases. First, the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the creator of the military arm of the Union of the Congolese Patriots, was a success for the ICC (Nmehielle 9). Dyilo recruited children to partake in the Ituri Conflict, which was a civil clash between the Hemaand and Lendu tribes of Congo. The ICC found Dyilo guilty of charges of war crimes, theories violations of human rights, and genocide. ICC convicted Dyilo along with his lackeys Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Germain Katanga, Bosco Ntaganda, Callixte Mbarushimana, and Sylvestre Mudacumura (Philpot 2014). The ICC convicted Dyilo of three counts of recruiting children in his army and using them to partake in crimes against humanity. Dyilo is now in prison for 16 years and is the first criminal that the ICC has sentenced in history. This case is the best example of ICC’s profound amount of influence and authority (Nmehielle 9). Another less profound success by the ICC was the establishment of tribunals against Germany and Japan following the Second World War. The victorious allies stressed the conviction of individual perpetrators of war crimes carried out during World War II by German and Japanese authorities (Scheipers 29). The ICC prosecuted these perpetrators through work-related tribunals set up for less high-ranking suspects. The ICC revealed to the world the gruesome crimes carried out by the Axis Powers’ high-ranking and low-level representatives. This revelation was evidence of the defense for the establishment of a perpetual international criminal court (Dukalskis and Johansen 812). A third success of the ICC was the inclusion of genocide, serious violations of human rights, and war crimes in Uganda’s SC resolution 3314. After a conference in Kampala with the UN Security Council in 2010, Ghana decided to add that these crimes as an induction of the description of violent crimes. This addition came under the ICC, which made the court’s influence over the country more flexible (Young 203). This amendment to the Rome Statute demonstrated the adaptability of the ICC and its member states to gear to a steadily changing world. Including violence in the list of war offences guaranteed that in spite of the solid foundation of the Rome Statute, the ICC would prolong its dominion and guarantee international peace (Huneeus 21). The ICC also laid the groundwork for including terrorism to its list of violent offences during the 2009 Review Conference. Member countries and ICC tribunals gathered and declared the intent to add terrorism under ICC’s dominion (Huneeus 39). This amendment outlined a reasonable definition of terrorism, which was a key step in the procedure of adding it in international criminal law. The amendment continued to propose the addition of terrorism in the Roman Statute as an ordinary offence against humanity. The full enforcement of this amendment is not yet complete (Dukalskis and Johansen 597). However, the onset for the consummation of this adjustment began after this conference. The strong flexibility and adaptability of the ICC and its Rome Statute is a success that certainly is pivotal to its long-term achievements and survival as an international institution. FAILURES The ICC has had more failures than successes during its relatively short run. First, ICC has been attempting to take legal action against the criminal of the Libyan clash. The previous Libyan revolutionary Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was the first criminal that ICC sought to prosecute during this Libyan conflict (Nmehielle 10). However, the ICC could not convict Gaddafi after his death by revolutionaries in October 2011. This death was a message by revolutionaries about the way they wanted to implement justice internally without external influence or counsel. Before Gaddafi’s death, the ICC placed a warrant for the apprehension of his main spy Abdullah al-Senussi (Scheffer 245). Abdullah was apprehended after Gaddafi’s death and received a very controversial ruling. The ruling was contentious because Libyan citizens overlooked the demands of the ICC and sought to convict Abdullah al-Senussi under Libyan laws to make sure he receives capital punishment (Dukalskis and Johansen 812). The ICC conducted holistic investigations and court measures after indicting the current President of Sudan Omar al-Bashir and issuing a permit for his apprehension. This indictment and warrant for apprehension was a response to al-Bashir’s crimes and serious violations of human rights in the capital of Sudan, Darfur (Scheffer 250). The ICC issued a second indictment of President al-Bashir in mid-2010 for genocide, which complicated the first one. This prosecution turned President al-Bashir into the first president in history to be indicted by an international court. President al-Bashir was also the first individual to remain in office while there being an active warrant for his apprehension. Since then, President al-Bashir has traveled to only four other countries. It is worth stating that Sudan is not a ratifying member of the ICC although the court constantly requests the Sudanese government to help in President al-Bashir’s arrest (Scheipers 119). The failure to apprehend and prosecute President al-Bashir was aggravated by the decision by the African Union to approve a controversial resolution. This resolution banned the precise type of collaboration exhibited by the four African countries that harbored President al-Bashir (Nmehielle 8). This resolution put member states in an uneasy position of opposing the original continental treaties and addressing concerns about the ICC’s far-reaching ideas about justice and human liberties. In addition, this resolution demonstrated a bigger matter concerning support for the ICC from other intergovernmental institutions, which was severely lacking. The African Union has constantly been in conflict with the requests of the ICC. The United Nations Security Council has not given any significant support on this matter either (Young 190). This lack of support is ironic to a significant degree since the UN Security Council brought the President al-Bashir case to the ICC. The ICC was unsuccessful at convincing both the African Union and the UN Security Council to join hands, and prosecute and convict President al-Bashir for his crimes (Nmehielle 11). The ICC has been lax towards dealing with the ongoing terror crisis and war crimes ongoing in Syria and its neighboring countries. Syria has been subject to huge invasions by different Islamic terrorist groups that serve as western delegation institutions ran by mercenaries. These institutions are supported and funded by the United States, three EU members, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. More than 200,000 Syrians have lost their lives to bombing, terrorizing, and murder through decapitation and 2.5 million more live in surrounding countries as refugees (Philpot 2014). These crimes constitute to serious violations of human rights, war crimes, and genocide. As a result, ICC should intervene, prosecute, and sentence all associated perpetrators of these crimes. However, the current chief prosecutor has been negligent towards responding to the ongoing sufferings in Syria. The prompt response could have simply saved nearly half of the Syrians killed by the acts of these terror groups (Scheffer 234). While the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar enjoy complete legal immunity, the ICC’s Rome Statute ties Britain and France. The ICC can charge the leaders of these countries for supporting and encouraging crimes carried out in Syria by the Free Syrian Army and the numerous Jihadists forming crimes against humanity (Philpot 2014). Bensouda does not need an official complaint to start filing these claims. Bensouda can use the case of the conviction of Charles Taylor, the previous leader of Liberia, is a platform for charging the associated leaders of Britain and France for abetting crimes carried out in Syria. Charles Taylor currently serves an imprisonment of 75 years for assisting crimes carried out by rebels in Sierra Leone, which was enforced by the special court for Sierra Leone (Donovan 2012). Bensouda has the authority to petition the ICC for permission to charge François Hollande, David Cameron, and other military heads (Scheffer 231). This approach does not seem far-fetched when the previous Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo employed it after the internal dispute that ensued the Kenyan General Elections of late 2007 (Nmehielle 13). Bensouda’s portrayal and extension of double standards are a failure of the ICC since she is the face of the organization. More specifically, Bensouda took into account the immunity of Britain for the crimes carried out in Iraq and the immunity of the United States, France, and Canada for crimes carried out in Afghanistan. Considering Canada is a signatory of the Rome Statute, a double standard fails to apply logically (Young 199). Clearly, Bensouda has a different mindset when delegations of the United States and powerful EU members commit crimes against humanity. In addition, these crimes occurred in neocolonialist violence against Syrians in contrast to the civil unrests and gruesome violence in Kenya during the post-election violence of 2007/08 (Scheipers 73). As a result, African leaders often think of the risk ICC charges by means of inhibiting their grafted commissions of war crimes. Alternatively, the ICC has repetitively failed to take measures and instead offered implicit assurances of full immunity for developed countries such as the United States, Britain, and France. Chief Prosecutor Bensouda said the ICC could not file any charges against Israeli leaders after the end of the Israeli war on the Gaza between July and August 2014. To file charges, Palestinian authorities had to validate and approve the Rome Statute first (Philpot 2014). Despite adequate support from the international community to charge Israeli leaders at the ICC for war crimes, Bensouda took on an impractical approach (Scheffer 237). Even though this approach is essentially not a failure of the court, the delay that ensues will certainly lead to a failure. Before a primary investigation against these leaders can begin, they will have possibly destroyed evidence required to establish a case. In addition, Israel did not sign the Rome Statute. Due to Bensouda’s lack of political determination, Palestinian victims of the Israeli conflict on Gaza will not receive the ICC’s decision well (Dukalskis and Johansen 813). The ICC has been unsuccessful at ensuring the full participation of the three permanent founding members of the UN Security Council: the United States, Russia, and China. China is yet to sign the Rome Statute of the ICC, and the United States and Russia have never approved it. President George Bush’s administration unsigned from this Rome Statute, thereby officially and fully revoking the United States’ membership of the ICC (Shattuck, Epps, and Hannon 156). This lack of support indeed prevents the capacity to implement legislations founded by the ICC. Full support from a superpower country such as the United States, as well as other permanent UN Security Council participants, would allow the ICC to survive and perform effectively as an international court (Scheffer 249). The United States can exercise veto power because of its permanent membership to the UN Security Council. This means that the United States can veto the indictment of a warranted perpetrator and enable his or her crimes to go unpunished if it thinks this indictment is in conflict with its agenda or constitution (Scheipers 68). CONCLUSION The ICC’s key successes have mostly been on paper and not in the actual prosecution or conviction of criminals. The legal basis, overall international reception, and the flexibility of the court formulate a precedence and path to total success. The creation of a system for realizing this success is in play and steadily adjusting to the constantly changing global environment to guarantee the victory of the court in the end. However, at an adolescent stage, the ICC has recorded more failures than successes that serve as highly risky incidents. The ICC needs to file more cases against perpetrators of crimes against humanity and genocide to shape its niche in the international community. To accomplish this feat, the ICC and its chief prosecutor have to be adaptable but pertinent at the same time. Works Cited Decaux, Emmanuel. “The Place of Human Rights Courts and International Criminal Courts in the International System.” Journal of International Criminal Justice 9.3 (2011): 597-608. Donovan, Daniel. International Criminal Court: Successes and Failures. 2012. International Policy Digest. Web. 6 May. 2015. Dukalskis, Alexander, and Robert C. Johansen. "Measuring Acceptance of International Enforcement of Human Rights: The United States, Asia, and the International Criminal Court." Human Rights Quarterly 35.3 (2013): 569,597,812-813. ProQuest. 6 May 2015. Huneeus, Alexandra. "International Criminal Law By Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal Jurisdiction Of The Human Rights Courts." The American Journal of International Law 107.1 (2013): 1-44. ProQuest. 6 May 2015. Nmehielle, Vincent O. Saddling the new African Regional Human Rights Court with international criminal jurisdiction: innovative, obstructive, expedient? African Journal of Legal Studies 7.1 (2014): 7-14. Philpot, John. Failures of International Law and Human Rights Institutions: Palestine, Syria and Iraq in 2014. 2014. Global Research. Web. 6 May. 2015. Scheffer, David. "Proposal for an International Criminal Court Arrest Procedures Protocol." Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 12.3 (2014): 229-52. ProQuest. 6 May 2015. Scheipers, Sibylle. Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights: International Society and the International Criminal Court. London: Manchester University Press, 2010. Shattuck, John, Valerie Epps, and Hurst Hannon. "Human Rights & The International Criminal Court." New England Journal Of Public Policy 19.1 (2003): 147-158. Business Source Complete. Web. 6 May 2015. Young, Rebecca. "Internationally Recognized Human Rights Before the International Criminal Court." The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 60.1 (2011): 189-208. ProQuest. 6 May 2015. Read More