Best v the Chief Land Registrar & Anor - Coursework Example

Research and Development Research and Development Best v The Chief Land Registrar & Anor EWHC 1370 According to the judge, the potential commission of an offence under LASPOA 2012 could not stop an applicant establishing a title by adverse possession. As a result, Best was able to proceed under Sch.6 LRA 2002, but there may be an objection before he acquires the title. The Registrar had based a case of R (Smith) v Land Registry that indicated that obstruction could not support a claim to adverse possession of highway. However, the judge noted that the decision denying Smith was upheld by a Court of Appeal because a highway was incapable of adverse possession. In addition, there was persuasive authority that indicated, in some circumstances, obstruction could not prevent from establishing a property right. For this reason, the judge recognized he could not depart from Smith unless there were further compelling reasons. There was no indication in LASPOA 2012, or any reason that could result in the enactment of s.144, so that it turned to be question of principle1. Even though, the fundamental principle of public policy declares that a person should not take advantage of his criminal act in order to create rights in which a court should give effect. However, it was not a principle to any circumstance. In the context of adverse possession, trespassers had the capacity to support a claim to title of adverse possession with an act contrary to criminal law. It was not clear whether LAPSOA 2012 was intended to modify the concept of adverse possession so that acts that constituted the new offence now fell outside the doctrine, when tortious and other criminal acts fell within it. The judge could not be convinced that LAPSOA 2012 had this effect. The public interests enable a trespasser to acquire title by adverse possession and apply for registration as the owner. Undoubtedly, criminal unlawfulness does not necessarily prevent a proprietary claim. Thus, when the relevant act is unlawful because there is a lack of the relevant act that is supposed to be established, it can result in public policy considerations. In other words, criminalizing trespass has no adverse effect on the establishment of adverse possession for both registered and unregistered lands. LAPSOA 2012 was to provide a solution for house owners faced with stubborn squatters rather than undermine the doctrine of property law. Best case recognizes the policy value in accepting some claims to title based on adverse possession. LAPSOA 2012 could be amended to ensure that a conviction prevents a claim to adverse possession. Also, if there are attempts to include commercial premises within its range, it will not be discounted. But as things stand, Best resolves an ambiguity left by LAPSOA 2012. This application, however succeeds, and Mr Bests application now has to proceed through the next stage in Schedule 6 of the 2002 Act. Has Best resolved any ambiguity left by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012? The High Court had held that adverse possession was based upon criminal trespass. In addition, it did not bar successful claim to adverse possession under the Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002)2. Most importantly, it does not criminalize all residential squatting and says nothing about trespass onto commercial or agricultural premises. Thus, the offence is not committed by a person who was a tenant when they entered the premises, and who subsequently holds over, it applies only to trespass in a residential building3. In Best v The Chief Land Registrar the High Court considered the effect on a claim for adverse possession of section 144 of the (LASPO 2012), which considers squatting in residential areas an offence4. The Land Registry referred to another High Court case, R (Smith) v Land Registry. However, Mr. Best differed with the Land Registry and took a claim for judicial review of the decision. The High Court found that the Chief Registrar was not justified in refusing the squatter application for adverse possession5. According to the Registrar, his occupation of the property since September had been constituted a criminal offence under section 144 LASPO 2012. Best was told that his application would be unsuccessful because effect of section 144 LASPO 2012 would prevent the claim. Section 144 came into force on 1 September 2012 and provides that an any person who is living in residential building, or intends to live there for any period without the owner knowledge is as a trespasser. LASPO 2012 was not clear about the impact of an offence of the trespasser that prevents him from establishing adverse possession. However, in general, circumstances a person cannot acquire a right to do something that is outlawed by public statute. After judicial review, the High Court declared that the squatter should proceed with the application. This judgment recognizes that declaring residential squatting a criminal offence had no intention of making an impact on the law of adverse possession6. It is a law that benefits the economy because unclaimed land and property gets recovered back into use. The High Court found that it was uncertain that Parliament would have passed section 144 unless it were presumed that adverse possession will not be affected on the basis the trespasser act of possession was unlawful or not7. The purposes this section was to help home owners who were faced with stubborn squatters rather than disrupt the adverse possession establishment8. In Best case, the high court drew a distinction between primary aims of Section 144(1), to provide the homeowners with a solution for dealing with squatters. Also, the objectives of the guidelines on adverse possession under LRA 2002: namely, to balance the privileges of the property owners and those of squatters who have occupied properties for a long duration9. The court held that, even though squatting in a residential building had become a criminal offence ,regardless of its illegality, a squatter can use it to establish a claim for adverse possession under LRA 2002. Best case was helpful to the property owners to understand that the fact that squatter’s occupation constitutes a criminal offence will not prevent the squatter from acquiring the title through adverse possession10. Thus, if criminal acts are not responsible for forming the basis of a claim to adverse possession, the registrar will be required to decide what the crimes are as a requirement to accept an application. As a result, it would be possible to determine the extent in which a wrongdoer can benefit from his wrongdoing11. Best case was a High Court decision that was persuasive rather than binding. However, this decision provided some helpful clarification, as well as draws an explicit distinction between the criminal offence of squatting in residential buildings and the possibility of long-standing squatters to be entitled to an adverse possession12. According to the residential property Section 144(1), it is easier for the homeowners to take out the squatters13. On the other hand, it is difficult for the squatters to remain in occupation of a residential building for the duration enough to claim an adverse possession. However, residential property owners should know that Section 144(1) does not necessarily mean that they should no longer be cautious14. On the contrary, homeowners should be careful of squatters, or have their occupation legalized, early enough before there is any risk of them attaining rights by adverse possession. Nevertheless, if we agree that squatting is often an indication of vulnerability and housing need; then the use of criminal sanctions to control trespass in buildings may have a scary effect on protest15. Additionally, the enforcement of offences designed to tackle squatting may in practice be harmful to the non-squatters. Using sources The journal of Housing article, criminal squatting and adverse possession: the best solution, was relevant to the paper. I know the distinction between the criminal offence of squatting in residential buildings and the possibility of long-standing squatters to be entitled to an adverse possession. Also, I understand the reasons why the High court differed with the registrar decision. Additionally, Best v The Chief Land Registrar v The Secretary of State for Justice showed s144 LASPOA has no effect on the provisions of the 2002 Act, and that the Defendant got it wrong in law in so treating it. The case of Best v Land Registry is a lesson of what happens when a new legislation is passed in a hurry, it can result to mess. Parliament should have taken consideration that adverse possession was based on criminal trespass but should not exclude claim of adverse possession. Also, before a claim of adverse possession, more than ten years should have passed with an effective action by the owner. If all these statutory processes were completed adequately, thus adverse possession is not sufficient to bar transfer of a title. Those circumstances are where the property, in which adverse possession was claimed, was a right which can not be prevented. However, these cover several situations in which trespass is criminal offence, but does not involve in focusing on crime facts. Bibliographies Best v The Chief Land Registrar & Anor [2014] EWHC. 1370 Home Office, Options for Dealing with Squatting: Consultation (London: Home Office, 2011). Crisis, Life on the Margins: the Experiences of Homeless People Living in Squats (London: Crisis, 2004). E. M. Peñalver and S. K. Katyal, Property outlaws (University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095, 2007). Home Office, Options for Dealing with Squatting: Response to Consultation (London: Home Office, 2011), p.36. J. Spencer, Trespassers will be prosecuted: wooden lie comes true (Cambridge L.J. 10,13 1973). LC Working Paper No.54, Criminal Law: Offences of Entering and Remaining on Property (London: HMSO, 1974). LC M. Brake and C. Hale, Public Order and Private Lives: the Politics of Law and Order: A Critique of ConservativeCriminology (London: Routledge, 1993), p.43. M. Weaver and S. Morris, Staff occupy Isle of Wight wind turbine plant in protest against closure (The Guardian, July 21, 2009). M. Whitaker, People power (Roof Magazine, January 2, 2007). N. Cobb and L. Fox, Living outside the system? The (im)morality of urban squatting (Legal Studies 236, 247and 248, 2007). P. Thornton et al, The Law of Public Order and Political Protest (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), p.189. P. Vincent-Jones, Private property and public order: the Hippy Convoy and criminal trespass (Journal of Law and Society 343, 351, 1986). Report No.76, Criminal Law: Report on Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform (London: HMSO, 1974). S. Hall, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978). Read More