Illicit Trafficking and Organized Crime - Term Paper Example

 Illicit Trafficking and Organized Crime Shedding a new light to an old dilemma Introduction As globalization opened up new frontiers to big business around the world, this was also the case for organized crime. This paper will contend that globalization changed the existing structures and realities of organized crime. There is a need to rethink our present conceptions of organized crime. The literatures used in this paper all agreed, to some extent, on the need to analyze organized crime in new light, for instance in illicit arms trade and illegal drug trade. Thus, the arguments in this paper are divided into two: first, the paper will show that organized crime need to be re-conceptualized beyond the constraints of present theoretical models, specifically the rational choice model; second, the present law enforcement mechanisms, considering the difficulties it face in dealing with transnational crimes, echo the fact that organized crimes are rapidly changing. The globalization of organized crime The nature of crime has changed rapidly. Twenty years ago, crime was organized in a hierarchy of operations – it was “industrial” in a way that it utilized division of labor and specialization of operations (Aguilar, et al., 2008: 42). Organized crime extended internationally mirroring the business world (Aguilar, et al., 2008: 42). However, in the same way that business operations changed, organized crime “dissolved” into a vast number of loosely connected networks (Aguilar, et al., 2008: 42). Each node in this network of criminal activities that extends globally has its own way of carrying out its operations (Aguilar, et al., 2008: 42). In other words, “crime became globalized” (Aguilar, et al., 2008: 42). Globalization, which includes the globalization of crime, is said to have started along with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of Soviet Union and socialism and the unrelenting attempts of Western capitalism to remake the world in its image (Aguilar, et al., 2008: 42). Western capitalism is guided by the idea of free market capitalism – allocating resources through the free market mechanism and facilitating the free flow of goods and services across the globe, among others. The unprecedented success of globalization can be attributed to various technological progresses, specifically the development of low-cost mass transit facilities and the information revolution through the Internet (Aguilar, et al., 2008: 42). These developments allowed for the continuous and unrestricted flow of goods and services as well as information. And while globalization proved to be beneficial to business across the globe, this was also the case for organized crime. But while there is a widespread agreement about the existence of transnational crimes, there is less agreement on how to define these crimes (Small and Taylor, 2005: 5). Transnational crime is not a new phenomenon but the magnitude of these activities increased in the last few decades. There are three related factors that largely influenced transnational crimes: the globalization of the economy, rise in the numbers and the heterogeneity of immigrants, and improvements in information and communication technology (NIJ, 1999 in Small and Taylor, 2005: 5). Along with these developments and the budding new democracies in Eastern Europe and around the world that seeks to establish stable governments increase the likelihood that local and organized crime problems will expand internationally seeking to exploit new victims (Albanese, 2002 in Small and Taylor, 2005: 5). In their paper, Kevonne Small and Bruce Taylor (2005: 6) used the working definition of transnational crimes used by the United Nations (1995): transnational crime is defined as “offenses whose inception, prevention and/or direct effect or indirect effects involved more than one country.” Organized crime can be defined as an activity that “involves the illicit flow of goods and services in once direction and the flow of the proceeds of crime on the other” (Aguilar, et al., 2008: 42). Power, individual action and illicit arms trade Organized crime has become a crucial strategic and political issue for the European Union and the Balkans and vast literature on issues related to this concern is present (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 375). But illicit arms trading received little attention (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 375). In order to understand the dynamics of organized crime in the Balkans, Jana Arsovska and Panos Kostakos (2008: 375) used the rational choice theory. Using this theory as an approach, organized crime is seen as a rational action committed by a number of actors to generate profit. The initial findings of their paper showed that rational choice theory is limited as an approach to the theorizing of particular social phenomena (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 375). Thus, although the researchers “ acknowledge the importance of micro-level market rationality in explaining illicit arms trafficking, analysis of our data supports several hypotheses that transcend purposive action and utility maximization” (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 375). Among their findings include: first, the actors who participate in illicit arms trade develop varying interpretations of risks, efforts and rewards associated with this trade (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 375). These interpretations are dependent on the micro- and macro-level background and on the person’s history and not only on a particular situation where the actor is involved (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 375). This study specifically and rather implicitly adopted a constructivist stand in its concluding notes and this merits further explorations. Consequently, organized crime can be viewed as a discourse where power relations are diffused and the actors’ actions are just products of discursive practices within this network of power relations. Hence, the individual’s decisions and goals in relation to his/her participation to organized crime are constructed by particular signifying practices in the realm of culture and societal pressures. Second, the actors’ behavior is characterized by a limited rationality rather than a normative one; there is a need to pay closer attention to the concept of power and the importance of an individual’s social networks and cultural background when understanding how they formulate decisions and goals (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 375). Although the article can be seen as more of a critique along the lines of interpretivist approach, the researchers argued that their findings are significant for “they offer indications with regards to control policies that could disrupt, limit or prevent illicit arms trafficking” (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 376). These findings are indeed interesting especially in understanding the behaviors and actions of actors engaged in organized crimes such as illicit arms trafficking. The researchers offered an insightful finding that is the need to rethink, if not, closely analyze the concept of power and the importance of an individual’s social and cultural background in the process. Rational choice theory has been consistently critiqued primarily by those coming from the hermeneutic-interpretivist tradition. On the other hand, rational choice theory assumes a rational individual who calculates the risk and benefits in participating in organized crime, thereafter maximizing gains at the end of the day. The problem with this approach is that it rules other societal influences that could play significant roles in the decision-making process. Moreover, organized crime cannot be considered a mere game along the lines of this perspective where the individual plays out his/her cards well to his/her advantage. For instance, ethnic or religious affiliations would have considerable effects to a person’s participation in organized crime, more so in an illicit arms trafficking. Weapons gives one the power to take and save lives and that in cases of ethnic or racial conflicts, rational choice theory is hardly useful considering its largely economistic approach to the problem. “Organized” crime and drug trafficking Drug trafficking, perhaps, is one of the most notorious forms of organized crime activities. It is defined as “an activity that involves the importation, manufacturing, cultivation, distribution, and/or sale of illicit drugs” (Desroches, 2007: 827). In a paper examining upper level drug trafficking in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands, Frederick Desroches (2007) provided an analysis and critique of existing typologies of drug traffickers and theoretical models of organized crime as applied to upper level drug trafficking. The paper found out that higher level drug trafficking showed that drug markets represent “informal and loosely organized associations of relatively small syndicates of crews of independent drug entrepreneurs” (Desroches, 2007: 827). Moreover, they compete for shares in the market and deal exclusively with trusted associates who are usually on the bases of ethnic, kinship and friendship networks (Desroches, 2007: 827). Furthermore, the study identified a number of gaps in our present knowledge of the characteristics of upper-level drug trafficking and drug networks (Desrcohes, 2007: 840). For one, the research by Mangai Natarajan (2006) on the structure of a large heroin distribution network in New York City in 1990s provided an interesting finding. The research contends that the “organization” it described night had no real structural existence as supposed by the actions of law enforcement (Natarajan, 2006: 189). It may be the case that the distributors are operating independently exploiting every “business” opportunity that came up to make some money (Natarajan, 2006: 189). According to Desroches, there is relatively little published research on the following areas in drug trafficking activities: the background of dealers, recruitment and opportunity structures, stages in the careers of dealers, upward mobility in drug networks, the length of supply chains from importing to the street, relations between players, the role and characteristics of trusted associates, the significance of credit and the use of fronts in the illicit drug trade, the use of violence and intimidation, dealer profits and lifestyles, how crime profits are invested and protected, the involvement and/or the use of legitimate businesses and business services, the use of technology for security purposes, the role of informal information networks, and social and economic incentives to desistance and retirement from drug businesses. Based on the existing literatures reviewed in this paper, the current state of knowledge on this issue shows that law enforcement strategies are “likely modest” in preventing the drug trade (Desroches, 2007: 840). Free market forces, along with the fragmented nature of upper level drug trade, largely influences its prevalence – unremitting demand for illegal drugs coupled with huge profit potential will always compel more people to engage in higher level drug trafficking (Desroches, 2007: 480). Law enforcement and its limits Stephen Aguilar, et al. (2008: 44) noted that the transportation revolution led to the lower costs of freight transfers and increased the number of routes available. These routes which facilitated the efficient transfer of illicit goods and services led to the growth in the arms trade, especially those of personal weapons of relatively small calibers (Aguilar, et al., 2008: 44). This presented a dilemma to law enforcement, “the problem with policing such activities is jurisdiction, which has led to the increase in cross-border police cooperation” (Aguilar, et al., 2008: 44). Small and Taylor (2005) made a fairly exhaustive review of literature outlining State and local law enforcement response to transnational crime. The responsibility of responding to transnational crimes fall to federal agencies however, there are transnational crimes that surface at the “street level” (Small and Taylor, 2005: 7). This prompts local law enforcement agencies to face transnational crimes within their jurisdictions. And during these incidents, the local police do not know whether what they are seeing is an individual violation of the law or the result of planning, conspiracy and/or organization that operated across national borders (Small and Taylor, 2005: 7-8). In this case, the local police will likely respond to the individual incident without unearthing the larger picture behind such crimes. Moreover, responding to and investigating transnational crimes also faces a number of barriers. These include “transnational police cooperation, multilateral assistance treaties with other nations, corruption, and nationalism, to name a few” (Small and Taylor, 2005: 8). In this case, interagency collaboration can be used by law enforcers against organized crimes, like the Operation Trifecta in the United States and Mexico (Small and Taylor, 2005: 8). On the other hand, the underlying concern behind the globalization of organized crime is that new forms of illicit operations arise within a network of operations that transcends borders. The dilemma faced by State and local law enforcers is a manifestation of the changing nature of organized crime activities. The emergence of “street level” transnational crimes is alarming, these show how current State and local as well as transnational policies have limited capabilities to respond to these matters. Conclusion This paper showed the limitations of some literatures on organized crime and provided suggestions on how to analyze this issue in a different perspective. The aforementioned research on arms trade in the Balkans provided with some interesting conclusions, that is, the need to go beyond analyzing organizing along economic lines. On the other hand, the two studies on drug trafficking showed how economic factors can largely influence the individual to partake in the crime operations. Nevertheless, these researches do have a common contention: the existing conceptions of and theoretical approaches to organized crime, which is highly dependent on law enforcement actions, does not correspond to its present reality. Thus, the sooner that we understand organized crime from different vantage points can we only respond to this global crisis effectively. Bibliography Aguilar-Millan, S. et al. (Nov-Dec 2008). The Globalization of Crime. The Futurist: 42-44. Arsovska, J. & Kostakos, P. (2008). Illicit arms trafficking and the limits of rational choice theory. Trends Organ Crime, vol. 11: 352-378. Desroches, F. (2007). Research on Upper Level Drug Trafficking: A Review. The Journal of Drug Issues, vol. 22, no. 426: 827-844. Natarajan, M. (2006). Understanding the Structure of a Large Heroin Distribution Network: A Quantitative Analysis of Qualitative Data. J Quant Criminol, vol. 22: 171-192. Small, K. & Taylor, B. (April 2005). State and Local Law Enforcement Response to Transnational Crime. This document is a research submitted to the United States Department of Justice. Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 10, no. 2 (Winter 2006): 5-17. Read More