A Distinction between a Private Individual and a Public Official - Literature review Example

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254, March 09, 1964 FACTS: Respondent Sullivan, an elected Commissioner of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a civil libel action against the four individual petitioners, composed of Negroes and Alabama clergymen, and against petitioner the New York Times Company (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). The newspaper company published an ‘editorial’ advertisement that communicated information, expressed opinion, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of the Negro movements (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). Paragraphs purported to illustrate the ‘wave of terror’ by describing certain alleged events (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). The text in the end, appealed for funds for purposes such as the “support of the student movement, the struggle for the right-to-vote, and the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. against a perjury indictment (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). Respondent contended that although the statements do not mention the respondent by name, the word ‘police’ referred to him as he supervised the Police Department, and hence being accused of those alleged in the advertisement (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). He further claimed that the rest of the paragraph referred to the police (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). It was found that some of the statements were not accurate descriptions of events, which happened in Montgomery (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). The jury were under instructions by the trial judge upon presentation of the case, that the statements made were “libelous per se and were not privileged,” and hence the petitioners may be held liable if found to have published the advertisement and if the “statements were made of and concerning respondent,” (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). Being libelous per se, the judge cited that “falsity and malice are presumed from the bare fact of their publication,” (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). He added that general damages are presumed, hence, “need not be alleged or proved,” and that the jury may award punitive damages even though there is no showing of the amount of actual damages (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). The decision also failed to charge to the jury that there must be malice or “actual intent to harm or gross negligence and recklessness” and did not distinguish between compensatory and punitive damages (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). These rulings and instructions were sustained by the Supreme Court of Alabama in all respects and added the injury being implied, there is no need for ‘proof of pecuniary injury’ for it to be actionable (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). It also rejected the constitutional contentions of the petitioners stating that, “The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not protect libelous publications and that the Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State action and not private action,” (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court, Montgomery County, Alabama, in awarding $500,000 to the plaintiff (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). Certiorari, however was granted to the defendants because of the constitutional issues involved pertaining to freedom of speech and press which, as claimed by the defendants, “limit a state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct,” (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). ISSUE: Whether the ruling on the liability applied to an action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct, abridged the freedoms of speech and of the press that are guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). DECISION: The Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Brennan, held that the application by Alabama courts of the rule of law was “constitutionally deficient” as it failed for failure to give safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press required under the First and Fourteenth Amendments in cases of libel action brought against critics by a public official as to his official conduct (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). Furthermore, it stated that the evidence presented was constitutionally insufficient to sustain the judgment in favor of the plaintiff (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). It stated that this case, although involving a civil lawsuit between private parties, is still subject to constitutional scrutiny since there are claims of invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). The publication which “communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern,” was not a commercial advertisement as used in the case of Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. 1262, and hence, still subject of constitutional scrutiny (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). The Court held that the advertisement being “an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time,” it would then qualify for constitutional protection, although there is some existence of falsity in the statements made. Citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445, 83 S.Ct. 328, 344, 9 L.Ed.2d 405, the Court stated that “constitutional protection does not turn upon ‘the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered,” N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445, 83 S.Ct. 328, 344, 9 L.Ed.2d 405. It stated that injury to official reputation is a repression of speech, which can be justified only if there is a showing of a clear and present danger and obstruction of justice (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). The proof presented in order to show actual malice, was insufficient and unclear which the constitutional standard demands and hence judgment for respondent cannot be sustained (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). Finally, the Court stated that evidence was “constitutionally defective” as no reference was made to respondent, either by name or official position, in the said advertisement as the testimony failed to establish the connection between the respondent and the advertisement (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). This being the basis or rationale for the Court’s decision, reversed and remanded the case. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, June 25, 1974 FACTS: Petitioner in this case was retained as an attorney of a Chicago policeman named Nuccio who was convicted of murder, in order to represent him in the civil litigation (Gertz v. Welch, 1974). Respondent herein published an article alleging that the murder trial of Nuccio was “part of a Communist conspiracy to discredit the local police, falsely stated that petitioner arranged Nuccio’s frame-up” and even labeled Petitioner as a Communist-fronter (Gertz v. Welch, 1974). Libel action was then brought by the Petitioner against the respondent before the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Gertz v. Welch, 1974). The district court held, citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, there is no liability for defamation of a public official if there is no proof as to the “knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.” Court stated that petitioner failed to prove knowledge of such falsity and hence held a decision in favor of the respondent (Gertz v. Welch, 1974). On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision, hence, the Petitioner brought this case on certiorari (Gertz v. Welch, 1974). ISSUE: Whether or not a publisher herein may claim constitutional privilege against liability, for injury inflicted on an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure on the basis of a claim that discussion was of a public issue (Gertz v. Welch, 1974). DECISION: The Supreme Court, through Justice Powell, held that “a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim the New York Times protection against liability for defamation on the ground that the defamatory statements concern an issue of public or general interest,” (Gertz v. Welch, 1974). The Court reasoned that private individuals “have less opportunities for rebuttal than public officials and public figures” in that, they would be more vulnerable to injury from defamation (Gertz v. Welch, 1974). The court stated that they deserve more recovery, not having voluntarily exposed themselves to such defamatory falsehoods (Gertz v. Welch, 1974). The court further stated that if the New York Times v. Sullivan case were extended as to include, private person whenever an issue of public interest arises, would beyond the legitimate state interest (Gertz v. Welch, 1974). The private individual defamed, if he or she has established liability “based on knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth” may recover compensation only for actual recovery (Gertz v. Welch, 1974). Finally, the Court held that Petitioner’s past service on certain city committees nor his appearance as an attorney in the case, did not make him a public official nor a public figure (Gertz v. Welch, 1974). There was no clear evidence shown that petitioner was involved in ordering the affairs of the society to make him a public figure (Gertz v. Welch, 1974). Conclusion I agree with the decisions. Certainly. There must be a distinction between a private individual and a public official or public figure when subject to scrutiny and defamation. A public official is always exposed to the public and has a duty to conduct himself rightly at all times while a private individual has more freedom to do things without examination of the public. Either way however, it must still comply with the guarantees of the Constitution on the freedom of speech and of the press. Read More