Hart's Contribution to Analytical Jurisprudence - Book Report/Review Example

In 1952, given his chancery background, he was persuaded by J.L. Austin to be a candidate for the Oxford chair of Jurisprudence when Professor Arthur Goodhart resigned. He was elected and held the chair until 1969. http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/jurisprudence/hart.shtml From 1952 on he delivered the undergraduate lectures that turned into The Concept of Law (1961, posthumous second edition 1994). He also lectured on rights and duties, but these lectures were never published. He held seminars with Tony Honor on causation, leading to their joint work Causation in the Law (1959, second edition 1985).

His visit to Harvard in 1956-7 led to his Holmes lecture on 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals' (1958) and a famous controversy with Lon Fuller. Returning to the UK he engaged in an equally famous debate with Patrick (later Lord) Devlin on the limits within which the criminal law should try to enforce morality. Hart published two books on the subject, Law, Liberty, and Morality (1963) and The Morality of the Criminal Law (1965). A wider interest in criminal law, stimulated by Rupert (later Professor Sir Rupert) Cross was signaled by his 'Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment' (1959).

Nine of his essays on the criminal law were collected in Punishment and Responsibility (1968). In 1968 he was asked by Oxford University to chair a commission on relations with junior members, then at low ebb, and produced a notably perceptive and constructive report. http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/jurisprudence/hart.shtml Feeling that his powers were waning Hart resigned his chair in 1969, to be succeeded by Ronald Dworkin, a severe critic of his legal philosophy. He now devoted himself mainly to the study of Bentham, whom, along with Kelsen, he regarded as the most important legal philosopher of modern times.

Ten of his essays were collected in Essays on Bentham (1982). From 1973 to 1978 he was Principal of Brasenose College. In his last years, he was much concerned to find a convincing reply to Dworkin's criticisms of his version of legal positivism. A sketch of Hart's reply is to be found in the postscript to the second edition of The Concept of Law. Hart's main aim as a lecturer and writer was, to tell the truth, and be clear. He was the most widely read British legal philosopher of the twentieth century and his work will continue to be a focus of discussion.

http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/jurisprudence/hart.shtml At the time that H. L. A. Hart (1907-1992) began forming his legal theory, an influential view within the legal theory literature was that law was best understood as the command of a sovereign to its subjects. Hart's approach to legal theory can be seen as a reaction to the command theory, and he presented his theory in that way on a number of occasions. The "command theory" offered a picture of law as a matter of commands (orders backed by threats) by a sovereign (one who is habitually obeyed by others, but who does not habitually obey anyone else) to citizens.

Hart found weaknesses at almost every point.