Causes of Information Systems Failure - Essay Example

Causes of information systems failure There are many factors that can influence the failure of a given information system. The failure of such systems is often overlooked, as their occurrence is quite rare. Failure is though detrimental since in the event it occurs it is devastating to the whole infrastructure of an organization. Systems normally fail for a variety of reasons and the main reason is the possible factors, which culminates around the degree of change, the quality of project planning as well as the use of project management tools (Westrup 1998). Other factors include the use of extremely formal quality assurance processes, the use of computer aided software and engineering tools, or even the object oriented systems development. The causes of information systems failure may therefore include: - lack of research, risk management criteria as well as long term commitment. In terms of costs and their required functions, the implementation of information systems becomes more complex day by day. Mere assumptions that an individual is in the position of managing and IS project without conducting thorough prior research, formal training, and the engagement of required expertise would be a lie (Korac-Boisvert and Kouzmin 1995). In line with the same, all the stakeholders of an information systems management right from the management, Information technology staff and the leadership ought t be engaged. Risk determination with regards to the project needs to be undertaken as well as factors such as budget overruns and delays needs to be researched and distributed normally before the project is initiated (Westrup 1998). The facilitation of this elaborate plan is majorly only possible when the management engage all parties in setting a more realistic period under which any given form of information system is delivered. The second cause of failure is the, “acceptability” of failures. This is fueled by the lack of accountability despite the huge resources in terms of money involved. This has resulted into a scenario where a system fails and the stakeholders which involve the management and the vendors melting away to simply regroup for a new project. The question of ‘Who’, ‘How’ and ‘why’ are seldom asked after a failure of the information systems in the healthcare industry has taken place (Korac-Boisvert and Kouzmin 1995). Despite being involved in repeated high profile failures you will find that a health institution still succeeds in winning over 60% of government contracts with the only looser being the taxpayer. The training given the high demand for their services at present does not seem to be of any significance as failure seems and order of the day and hence acceptable or to an extent is even expected. The third cause is the lack of user buy-in and ownership. It should be noted that despite an introduction of change, there is need to convince the users of the efficiency that is likely to arise out of a given new system. These would include the onset of better work practices and better patient in the unique environment of the National Healthcare System (Slater 1996). Due to the pragmatism portrayed by most clinicians, the above factors may be of much value to them as well as the convenience brought about by the use of information technology system. Overlooking the end users of a system may be quite detrimental; consulting them should therefore be of priority since this would enable the establishment of systems, which are of great relevance to the users of such information (ParA and Elam 1998). An example in the healthcare system would be the implementation of the Computerized Physician Order Entry Systems. Such a system is of much benefit to the management since they provide them with detailed information to enable their scrutiny of the physicians. On the other hand, there is no addition to the daily practice of the physician since with the slowdowns of the systems what results is more frustration (Westrup 1998). The system becomes even more redundant with a claim that it helps in the reduction of adverse drugs reactions while at the same time we have existing ward pharmacists, pharmacy based pharmacists as well as discharge nurses whose roles and responsibilities are to check every prescription along the patient care pathway (Slater 1996). The system has inherent flexibility that enables the hospital staff to prescribe for special circumstances and take care of multiple layers of inspection. The only setback is the lack of engaging the hospital staff during its implementation. Lastly, we have inappropriate use of technology as a cause of failure. Technology on its own is just a tool period. An assumption that it can exist and solve problems is invalid. Technology hence requires that its implementation is coupled by well-trained staff and right work processes to realize a growth in productivity and profitability (Korac-Boisvert and Kouzmin 1995). It is even worse to hijack a tool for use to achieve unintended goals; it would terribly fail, as the original goals will not be achieved. A case in point is the “Choose and Book,” in this occurrence, the original project was created to help in the facilitation of patients’ referral and booking into the local outpatients clinics. However, as the pilot project made positive indicators, the focus was changed to meet political agenda of “Patient’s Choice” and “Payment by Result.” The patients surveyed were all against this as it was irrelevant and at the same time time-consuming for no better reason (Slater 1996). Tools and techniques to prevent information system failure The failure of any given form of information system most so the Healthcare IS depends on the degree of mismatch between the conceptions in that system’s design and the realities upon which it was introduced. Such mismatch can be assessed along seven main dimensions as described by the ITPOSMO Model. Given that stakeholders are normally more concerned about a failure more than success and given the fact that in healthcare systems failure is more prone than success, the reality gaps that create failure is as follows. First, different behavioral reality resulting from hard rational models in health care systems, when there exists a transfer healthcare IS of private sector to public sector. Finally, when there transfer of HCIS of one country to another country (ParA and Elam 1998). Tools for prevention of failure commences with an analysis of the conception-reality gap. This is conducted through the a) the analysis of the current reality and b) the design of a new Health Care Information System. In these two procedures, the ITPOSMO is incorporated where design is used in the exposition of the inherent conceptions (Vian, Verjee, and Siegrist 1993). This comparison will help in giving an idea of the extent to which the gaps have changed. The other tools and techniques are bound to either a) prevent large gaps arising in the first place, b) reduce the gaps in the event they are identified. The tools and techniques used here include - legitimizing and mapping organizational reality; this is an integral part of ensuring a success in the relevant information systems. This is because it aids in the understanding of the current realities in a prudent way. It is though at times difficult most so in the event that there is the dominance of the rational paradigm. The project leaders therefore have the responsibility of legitimizing reality through the support of the participants to create a mix between rational and prescriptive models of whatever it is they should be doing and whatever it is that they are actually doing (ParA and Elam 1998). In this scenario, the mapping and exposing techniques play a great role where self and third party observations will help in exposing realities. The mapping of realities will be aided by the use of soft system tools such as ‘rich pictures.’ Prototyping on the other hand will help in both the instances and specifically in helping the users to understand their real information needs (Korac-Boisvert and Kouzmin 1995). Reality supporting not rationality-imposing applications; a continuum of healthcare applications can be distinguished where on one hand there are the ‘rationality imposing applications’ such as the decision support systems (DSS) while on the other far end there are the ‘reality supporting applications’ like the word processors (Vian, Verjee, and Siegrist 1993). The former will strive to bring together an integration of assumption concerning the presence of rational information, processes, objectives, and values together with management structures. Such rationalities have two options in their incorporation, which is either that they were present in the organization as a precondition or they are imposed for the success of the implementation. The latter will though require a few conceptions so that either they are met as pre-condition or they are imposed. Because of the above reasons, the application of the former in organizations will not succeed in most organizations because of the large gap between the applications required rationalities and the organizational realities at current. On the other hand, the latter will be able to work successfully in many organizational settings (ParA and Elam 1998). Therefore, while it is quite hard introducing DSS applications in many healthcare organizations, there is a wider domination of word applications and email applications in many healthcare organizations. Other techniques include - customization to match reality, use of change agents, end user development and participation, hybridization and incrementalism. In addition, there is the aspect of closing specific conception-reality gaps and freezing dimensions of change (Vian, Verjee, and Siegrist 1993). Works Cited Westrup, C. Implementation and Evaluation of Information Systems in Developing Countries. Bangkok: Asian Institute of Technology, 1998. Print. Korac-Boisvert, N, and Kouzmin A. "Transcending soft-core IT disasters in public sector organizations™." Information Infrastructure and Policy 2.4 (1995): 131--61. Print. ParA, G, and Elam J.J. "Introducing information technology in the clinical setting." International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care 2.14 (1998): 331-343. Print. Slater, E. "Slowly but surely." Health Service Journal 1.1 (1996): 8-9. Print. Vian, T, S Verjee, and R.B Siegrist. "Decision support systems in health care." International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care 3.9 (1993): 369-379. Print. Read More