Armed Conflict Type Trends 1946-2006 - Term Paper Example

Name: Course: Institution: Date: Armed Conflict Type Trends 1946-2006 Introduction Modern war has been characterized by an evolution in terms of the tactics and the techniques that different countries have used in conquering their enemies through armed conflict. The signing of the Westphalia Peace treaty in 1648 marked the beginning of generations of warfare characterized by the dominance of nation states (Bert 22). The Westphalia Treaty marked the end of 30 years’ war which had characterized the nature of conflicts in Europe. In addition, through the peace treaty the nation state was established and they began the process of monopolizing wars (Lansford et al 100). This also led to the development of the military in different states as it was only possible for a state to engage with war against another state that had developed a section of its members to take part in armed conflicts (Echevarria 78). Since 1648 there has been four generations of warfare which were characterized by formal and orderly battles and battle fields. The main objective of this paper is to assess the trends in the nature of armed conflict from 1948-2006. This will be through developing an understating of the Fourth Generation of Warfare in terms of its definition, tactics, the techniques of winning and its shortcomings. The Fourth Generation Warfare Definition Four Generation warfare is a term that is commonly used as an approach to armed conflict by experts in military affairs. This approach refers to the period following the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations. In addition, Fourth Generation warfare is also often characterized by the declaration of the Universal Human Rights that introduced an aspect of freedoms and rights to all the individuals engaged in active war and the civilian population (Bert 22). Fourth Generation warfare (4GW) unlike the other instances of war is often characterized by a desire to achieve moral victory. This is often considerd a realizable objective when one of the sides of the warring factions undermines the strength of its enemies (Echevarria 56). This is unlike in the first second and third generation warfare which were often characterized by direct attacks and partial destruction of the enemy (Lansford et al 80). In 4GW, the warring factions tend to identify the weaknesses of their enemies and use these aspects to triumph. In addition, through the incorporation of the tenets of different warring techniques the 4GW has also been characterized by the use of asymmetric weapons where the warring factions demonstrate their warfare might by engaging weapons with substantial differences form those of their enemies as in the case of terrorism (Echevarria 57). Drivers of Fourth Generation Warfare The rise and popularity of 4GW can be considerd as a product and a driver of different aspects on the international platform. The loss of nation state monopoly on violence for instance was considerd as major driver into the establishment of this generation of warfare. This meant that those engaged in this form of warfare are not constrained by the rule of law (Echevarria 88). However, they were also not considerd to be above this law especially when these laws could be used to the advantage of 4GW warriors. These powers when combined with ideological orientations concerning those who are considerd as opposers to their assertions become legitimate targets (Robb 70). Those who embrace the ideological beliefs of the warriors of 4GW become victims or martyrs in case of attacks against the by the enemy (Echevarria 88). This explains why this generation of warfare is characterized by acts of violence surpassing the capabilities of nation states. When such individual are arrested, they often use the existing laws to their advantage and this leads to the freedom of many members of non-state groups to be freed even after committing numerous crimes against humanity (Keane 51). Legal constraints of different countries therefore play a role in setting free non-state actors considered violent and oppressive to other state and non-state actors in enemy countries. When released, a high percentage of these actors return to war and this would not happen in cases where violent criminal gangs were arrested and tartest as prisoners of war (Echevarria 88). The evolution of cultural ethnic and religious conflicts has been considered as primary drivers of 4GW. The rise of violent non-state actors such as Taliban, Al-Qaeda has been based on their ability to spread ideologies on irrational and radical religious and cultural traditions. This explains why these groups have the ability to develop and administer propaganda that is rough and speedy in terms of implementation (Keane 67). In addition, while developing their ideologies these groups are often thought to be implementing relatively fair justice in areas under their jurisdiction. Their ideological approach to societal matters is often considerd effective in areas where there is a relatively corrupt judicial system or in areas where such systems are absent. The radical nature of their beliefs of these groups allows them to surpass government forces and use horrific approaches to warfare when it suits their intentions (Lansford et al 95). Most of the active participants in 4GW are Islamic non-state actors. Their activities are often defined by terrorism against the enemies and promises of paradise for their believers. This makes these actors more ferocious in war. The decentralization of their levels of authority also allows local commanders to take advantage of the available opportunities and seize control of various regions as in the case of Syria, Iraq and Yemen (Kiss 67). Globalization has also been perceived as one of the greatest drivers of 4GW. This is largely because through technological integration, globalization can be viewed to be affecting the political, economic, and cultural and the sociological aspects of any society. Increase in trade between countries is considerd as a way through which different countries obtain foreign currency while at the same time ensuring some form of prosperity to their population (Keane 55). Despite the opening of markets it is only a few countries and markets which benefits from imports and exports considering that a large fraction of wealth is often concentrated (Kiss 68). Imports for instance have been active in fueling cultural, political and religious hostilities among different countries. Cultural and political intentions of globalization have also been perceived as major forces of 4GW (Lansford et al 80). An attempt to create a global and religious orientation has led to the emergence of groups and sects appealing for the survival of their religious and cultural alignments. The idea of merging political fronts through an introduction of regional and global bodies has been considered as an intention to harmonious the global political landscape. An increase in the rate of interactions and the development of different forms of technology often necessitate the possibility the development of a conducive and low intensity environment or fourth generation warfare (Kiss 70). Tactics of Fourth Generation Warfare One of the outstanding features of the 4GW is the tactical approach to armed attacks the perpetrators of these wars have shifted targets from military battlefields to rear area operations. The warriors of 4WD do not confront military factions of nation states but rather the society that is often characterized by innocent civilians (Lansford et al 100). The warriors of this generation of warfare often evade the military considering their levels of training in handling sporadic attacks. This makes it easier to target untrained civilians and their attacks on such populations are meant to reveal the intensity of their actions due to the possibility of mass causalities (Keane 67). The success of these non-state actors is to accomplish their attacks against the civilian population is based on the difficulty in recognition. This is because their targets are often few but important. In addition, the followers of these groups are often indoctrinated hence their willingness to fight and even die for their courses of action (Lansford et al 77). On numerous occasions they do not wear uniforms and this makes it difficult to differentiate them from the general population. In situations where there are difficulties in the realization of their goals or objectives, these actors often resort to extreme measures such as suicide bombing (Keane 63). The use of terrorist attacks against innocent civilians is considered to have a lasting impact on the military might and the tactics of the enemy state. This is an indication that 4GW is not a war of battlefields but a psychological war. For instance the activities of Al-Qaeda against the American government during the 9/11 attacks on Americas soil were meant to intimidate the American government and its citizens (Keane 67). This attacks not only affect the level of trust on the abilities of the government by the American population, it was also a sign that even the most protected and the greatest military could undergo attacks by non-state actors. The psychological nature of these wards also emanate from the fact that most of these wars are expected to create fears among the targeted population (Kiss 89). An outstanding feature in the tactical approaches to wars by the warriors of 4GW is often aimed at total destruction and eradication of the enemy. This is through paralyzing the systems of an enemy government, these of their supporters and their sympathizers (Robb 76). Most offense attackers often base their ideologies on religious doctrines hence the need to align governance and religion (Robb 76). The intention is also often to eliminate western crusaders from traditional land assumed to be of members of their faith as in the case of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Taliban in Afghanistan and Al-Shabaab in Somalia (Kiss 88). Their tactical attacks often fail due to lack of essential structure on governance. Even after elimination of the ruling governments, the non-state actors are often incapable of developing effective governance to provide essential services to their populations. This explains why Al-Shabaab militia in Somalia failed in their attempt to govern Somalia after ousting the legal government. In addition, it also provides sufficient explanation on the success of the African Union in ousting their government form the failed state of Somalia (Marie 29). One of the tactical means that often characterize 4GW is the ad hoc innovations where these violent non-state actors use the available technological innovations in the enemy country to conduct their warfare. For instance during the 9/11 attacks, the terrorist group used American aircraft to attack the Twin Towers (Marie 32). This was characterized by an interception if the country’s intelligence systems to fulfill an objective. It is also important to note that in other occasions these groups use individuals born and groomed in the enemy countries to conduct their attacks. This makes it relatively complicated for the intelligence agencies to develop effective strategies on how to defeat terrorist attacks within a country such as the USA that is populated by citizens from different countries (Kiss 90). The aim of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 was to bring down the economy of the US. This is an indication tha 4GW would characterized by attempts to collapse the enemy from within. The destruction of the economies in the view of these non-state actors was to ensure that the security system was a wreck and different nation states could treat non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah as equals in the negotiation table. Non-state actors who dominate 4GW often have the desire to end the monopoly of nation states as participants in organized conflicts with defined battle fronts (Marie 30). Differences in the methodologies of warfare Most of the approaches that characterize warfare in 4WD have been used in different times in the history of war. However, the differences between in the use of these tactics are in the application. In 4GW the non-state actors operate on a global platform. The activities of different terrorist groups such as Taliban, Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda among other actors have been exacerbated by modern technology which allows for communication between different factions in different regions on the international scene (Keane 60). The availability of social media platforms for example allow for easy communication among the groups and in some instances these sites are used to communicate planned and already executed attacks. Through such communication the violent non-state actors have been able to demonstrate their authority by staging sporadic and violent attacks against their targeted enemies (Lansford et al 90). The 4GW can also be said to be pervasive in nature. This is attributable to the collapse in the monopoly of nation state in matters of war. in addition, the availability of universal codes of associations such has the Universal Human Rights also provide some form of protection of these non-actors considering that the rights and freedoms are accorded to every individual irrespective of the crimes that they might have committed or those that they are accused of committing (Lansford et al 99). The rise of violent non-state actors as important players in 4GW is characterized by the existence of extremely small groups whose warfare is based on numerous reasons. For instance, the belief in religious superiority is considerd as a major reason for their existence (Deakin 129). This is often exacerbated by the existence of some form of conflict of interest between the existing laws to regulate human behavior and the need to replace secular laws with religious laws (Marie 49). The presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan was to oust the reigning government and introduce a system of government strictly governed by the sharia law (Keane 63). This, with the existence of the democratic space characterized by human rights, creates tension between countries that support the ideologies of the non-state actors and these that oppose their intentions (Edwards 26). Other than religious ideologies, the need to ensure cultural presence and cultural dominance also exacerbates the rate at which smaller but extremely violent groups emerge. Dissatisfaction with the status quo in terms of allocation and distribution of resources can also be said to be a possible cause of the emergence of these groups. Through their violent attacks the actors often hope to safeguard property from a community of explorers and exploiters (Lansford et al 121). Winning of Fourth generation warfare All forms of triumph in 4GW if often of the moral sphere. The main objective of the non-state actors who engage in these wars is often to ensure a compete destruction of the moral bonds that allow for peaceful co-existence among different members of an enemy state or community (Deakin 129). This is often realized through the enforcement of menace attacks which on numerous occasions undermine or to some extent can be considerd as threats to basic human survival instincts. In other instances, moral bonds of cohesion are often broken through an increase of activities that enhance the development of mistrust among citizens or members of a community (Keane 59). For example the radical nature of the religious ideologies propounded by the violent non-state actors may lead those of other religions to consider those of the enemy’s religion to be radical (Marie 40). Through their unpredictable and inhumane attacks, these groups often create some degree of uncertainty hence undermining economic initiatives through a decrease in confidence concerning the possibility of peaceful co-existence in the future (Lansford et al 100). Shortcomings of the fourth generation warfare Despite the success of the violent non-state actors in exerting fears and high levels of mistrust among citizens in different countries, 4Gw can be considerd as a setback to the peace treaty at Westphalia. One of the greatest forms of weakness is within the communicating structures considering that powerful nation states often intercept communication between these non-state actors (Edwards 26). This has therefore rendered telecommunication and communication through the internet relatively impossible. This means that these actors will lose their strategic agility considering that it takes then months to plan and execute their attacks. In addition, his also provides an explanation why these violent non-state actors must rely on psychological attrition to ensure successful attacks gains an enemy state such as the US (Keane 66). The other strategy that non-state actors in 4GW have used includes the targeting essential events of sectors that attract large groups of people. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 killed about 3000 people (Deakin 123). This was considerd a success to the Al-Qaeda. Despite their triumph, through the development of the Patriotic Act, America and other states around the world have been compelled to alter different aspect of their lives such as the way they live, travel and even the way they handle different communication platforms. This has in itself improved on the level of surveillance and intelligence (Keane 67). This is considered as a setback to 4GW considering the development in resistance to psychological attacks (Edwards 30). Lack of strategic means of communication is an indication that 4Gw are lacking in their ability to establish an operational level of war. This means that it is relatively complicated for these groups to develop any tactical coherent mechanisms in ways that will help in the realization of their strategic objectives (Marie 45). Ineffective communication channels are therefore an indication of the inability of these groups to ensure control of their attacks. Their extreme measures against enemies and even members of their groups to alienate themselves hence a loss in the support of the population. The collapses of Taliban in Afghanistan were enough evidence of lack of structures among non-state actors (Edwards 33). One of the greatest shortcomings of the warriors of 4GW is in their inability to recognize success. Initially the objective of such non-actors was to replace a government. However, in 4GW organizations such as Taliban and Hezbollah the desire is often to ensure a complete destruction of any opposing government (Keane 70). Their inability to maintain and improve existing structures and continues as a governing body explains why these groups are never successful in their initiatives to take over leadership roles within any jurisdiction that they desire (Edwards 37). Conclusion The signing of the Westphalia Peace treaty in 1648 marked the beginning of generations of warfare characterized by the dominance of nation states (Bert 22). The Westphalia Treaty marked the end of 30 years’ war which had characterized the nature of conflicts in Europe. Since 1648 there has been four generations of warfare which were characterized by formal and orderly battles and battle fields. Fourth Generation warfare (4GW) unlike the other instances of war is often characterized by a desire to achieve moral victory. This is often considered a realizable objective when one of the sides of the warring factions undermines the strength of its enemies. One of the greatest shortcomings of the warriors of 4GW is in their inability to recognize success. In other instances, moral bonds of cohesion are often broken through an increase of activities that enhance the development of mistrust among citizens or members of a community. Works cited Bert, Wayne. American Military Intervention in Unconventional War: From the Philippines to Iraq. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Internet resource. Deakin, Richard S. Battlespace Technologies: Network-enabled Information Dominance. Boston: Artech House, 2010. Internet resource. Duncan, Stephen M. A War of a Different Kind: Military Force and America's Search for Homeland Security. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Print. Echevarria, II A. J. Fourth-generation War and Other Myths. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005. Print. Edwards, Frances, and F Steinhäusler. Nato and Terrorism: On Scene : New Challenges for First Responders and Civil Protection. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2007. Print. Keane, Michael. Dictionary of Modern Strategy and Tactics. Annapolis (MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005. Print. Kiss, Peter A. Winning Wars Amongst the People: Case Studies in Asymmetric Conflict. , 2014. Print. Lansford, Tom, Robert P. Watson, and Jack Covarrubias. America's War on Terror. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009. Internet resource. Marie J. J, and Shahdad Naghshpour. Revolutionary Iran and the United States: Low- intensity Conflict in the Persian Gulf. Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2011. Internet resource. Robb, John. Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons, 2007. Print. Read More