China's Involvement in the Vietnam War - Research Paper Example

China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War Introduction The Vietnam War was a proxy of a Cold War era that occurred in Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. The war lasted between November 1, 1955 and April 30, 1775. The 20-year period was characterised by mass destruction of property and lose of lives of more than three million people and fifty-eight thousand American soldiers. The Vietnam War arose due to conflict between the government of South Vietnam and North Vietnam. North Vietnam received support from the Soviet Union, China and all communist allies. The government of South Vietnam was supported by anti-communist allies and largely the United States. The divisive war ended with the withdrawal of US forces in 1973 and the unification of Vietnam under Communist control in 1975. The Chinese revolution had tremendous impact upon the Vietnamese revolution due to geographic, cultural, historic and economic connections between Vietnam and China. Young recognises the long history revolving around Chinese influence in the Vietnamese war (66); the Chinese, opposing the advancement of capitalism in Vietnam supported North Vietnam to defeat anti-communism supporters trying to eliminate communism from the north. Background to Chinese Involvement in the Vietnam War The Vietnam War was an international conflict characterised by large-scale engagements of Americans far away from their country. The war also deeply involved the two major communist powers, China and the Soviet Union. Gardner asserts that the Chinese scholars have for a long period made assumption that Beijing played a critical role in providing support to Hanoi efforts to fight the US (87). According to Porter, lack of access to Chinese sources of information has hampered the process of illustrating and defining the motives, the process of making decisions, magnitude and the involvement of China in the war of Vietnam (66). The Vietnam War was basically caused by the conflict between institution and abolition of communism. South Vietnam had abolished communism from their country through the influence of the United States. The anti-communism allies thought that the period between 1955 and 1975 was the best time to transform North Vietnam from communism to capitalism. The Soviet Union, China and other communist allies realised that South Vietnam’s transformation would be perilous to the communist society and decided to aid North Vietnam in overcoming the insurgence (Jian 358). The Viet Cong, a South Vietnamese communist common front, was helped by the North to fight guerrilla war against anti-communist forces in the region. Jian asserts that the Geneva agreement on Indo-China of 1954 concluded the first war in Indochina; however, the agreement did not address the military conflicts in South East Asia (356). Later in 1956, it became clear that Washington and the government in Saigon indefinitely blocked the peaceful reunification scheduled in the same year. Washington was not comfortable with the peaceful reunification planned to take place through the plebiscite since they thought that they could lose a lot due to possible intensification of communism. In reaction to this, the communist leadership of Vietnam made a decision to resume an armed resistance in South Vietnam between 1959 and 1960 (Kraus 497). Washington policy-makers perceived the armed resistance in the South as furthering the expansion of communism; therefore, they continuously increased America’s military involvement in the South. This led to intensification of the Second Indo-China War. The 1954 Geneva agreement was directly benefiting Beijing, who was also the main patron of the agreement. The policy of China towards the settlement of First Indochina War reflected country’s strategic considerations. These considerations included focusing on their domestic problems after the end of the Korean War and possible pre-cautions for preventing the American military from intervening in the Indo-china region. The sole objective of these considerations was to prevent another possible direct Sino-American confrontation. China also aimed at establishing a new international image corresponding with Indo-China’s new claims of peaceful co-existence. Beijing did not hinder or encourage the efforts of Hanoi to liberate the South by Military means (Dongsheng 265). However, after the Geneva agreement was signed in 1962, Beijing’s willingness of intervening in the liberation exceeded even that of Hanoi. The top Beijing and Hanoi leaders held several exchanges of opinions between 1955 and 1956 (Jian 357). The fundamental advice of the Chinese was that the urgent task facing the Vietnamese Communists constituted the consolidation of the revolutionary achievements in North Vietnam. According to the Chinese government, the North had achieved a lot in terms of revolutinalising the country. China believed this because they were in dire support of communism, which was widespread in the North. China’s primary aim of emphasising the necessity of consolidating North’s revolutionary achievement was to ensure Indo-China goes the way of communism as opposed to capitalism that was rapidly being instituted by America. The French withdrew from a provisionally divided Vietnam in late 1954 (Porter 56). The US found its way into the region with the objective of supporting non-communist leaders in the South using the Domino Theory. According to this theory, adopting the principles of communism by a neighbouring nation would make the surrounding nations fall like dominoes and become communists too. The US used the Domino Theory as a way of threatening the South not to ascent to the principles of communism and also to strive to discourage neighbouring countries from becoming communists. Soviet Union and North Vietnam became allies based on the fact that if the US is unsuccessful in taking over the South, the strategic position of the Far East would be bolstered. China thought that the advancing Soviet-Vietnamese relationship was interfering with development. The US and Soviet Union failed to agree on a plan to unify the partitioned Vietnam through a proposed 1956 election (Jian 357). The South decided to hold a separate election, which was considered fraudulent. The negative relationship between the North and the South intensified in the 1950s. December 1955 saw the Defence and Foreign ministries of Beijing deciding that the Chinese Military Advisory Group that has been in Vietnam since July 1950 go back to china (Bakich 688). All members of the group returned to China by March 1956. Liu Shaoqi visited Vietnam in May 1956 and held meetings with Ho Chi Minh and other leaders of Vietnam. In their discussions, Liu promised that in the event of war expansion caused by their efforts to liberate the South, Vietnam would definitely count on China as strategic rear. Liu was one of the most popular and fast growing leaders of China. When Kaysone Phomvihane, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, visited Beijing in October 1956, he requested China to support Laos’ Communist forces in their military struggles and building up of the base area, the request that Zhou Enlai agreed to this request (Gardner 87). A Chinese team under the leadership of General Duan Suquan went to Laos in early 1957 to do situational analysis and prepare the ground for large-scale Chinese assistance. America forces realised that the war would intensify with several communist nations offering assistance to North Vietnam. Towards the end of 1963, Johnson’s administration planned to expand American military involvement in Vietnam. Military planners in Beijing, realising this intention, suggested the necessity of strengthening their defence system in Tonkin delta (Olsen 34). The Tonkin delta was considered the area exposed to the worst risk by attack by external aggression. Protection of the delta was somehow complex, thus, further external assistance was necessary. Another task that was fundamental to the defence of the Tonkin was the construction of additional defence works; Hanoi requested the Chinese to aid in completing the construction of new defence works at Tonkin. The Chinese General Staff agreed to this request since they were in support of the North. China’s Approach in the Vietnam War The close relationship between China and Vietnam began in the late 1940s. During this period, the Vietnamese Communists were fighting the French. In the year 1949, the Chinese came into power. Ho Chi Minh, motivated by the power of China, identified the necessity of approaching China to ask for assistance in their struggle to overcome the French. Mao accepted to offer help because he was motivated to spread his method of making revolutions to neighbouring countries in Asia (Kissinger 28). Mao, therefore, demonstrated that his formula for a “People’s War” was applicable within the pan-Asian Communist movement. The Soviet Union and China accented to the principles of division of labour, though the effect of Soviet Union decelerated in the late 1940s and early 1950s when Stalin concentrated on supporting Eastern Europe’s communist parties. People’s Republic of China began participating in the Vietnam War during summer 1962. The period between 1965 and 1969 witnessed the Chinese direct intervention n the Vietnam War in four forms (Jien 371). These forms of assistance included the dispatch of Chinese engineering troops, use of Chinese anti-aircraft artillery troops, supply of large amounts of military equipment, and economic training. Dispatch of Chinese Engineering Troops China saw the necessity of sending engineering battalions and giving support to anti-aircraft units to North Vietnam after the launch of Operation Rolling Thunder. The Chinese and Vietnamese delegations singed a formal agreement on May 30, which stipulated that China would send her engineering troops to build and rebuild twelve roads in North Vietnam; these roads would be linked to China’s road system (Gardner 34). China assumed the responsibility of defending its engineering troops against the attack by Americans from the air. The aim of sending engineers was to aid the North to repair the damages caused by bombs launched by Americans. The engineers were also supposed to build roads, rail roads, and do all other engineering works meant to enable North Vietnam regain some stability. Through this initiative, the North Vietnamese army units were freed to go to the South. More than 330,000 Chinese soldiers provided critical services to the North. The year 1967 was the peak year when 170,000 Chinese soldiers served the North (Jien 372). Throughout the serving period, 1,100 soldiers were killed while 4,200 were injured. Use of Chinese Anti-aircraft Artillery Troops China was active in helping the Vietnamese against their enemies striving to institute capitalism into the region. Previously, in the 1950s, the Chinese had captured American artillery pieces from Korea with the aim of helping Vietnam (Kraus 500). It seems as if the Chinese had started planning for the war against anti-communists early before it began. The collection of artillery pieces were believed by the Chinese to contribute towards the fighting that would take place during the actual fight. Mao Zedong had in fact argued that the Chinese artillery gunners were extremely instrumental in the battle of Dienbienphu. The meeting between Ho Chi Minh and the visit of Le Duan to China in May 16, 1965 and in April 1965 respectively concluded that China should send anti-aircraft artillery troops to Vietnam. It was further requested that China send two anti-aircraft artilleries to defend Hanoi and its northern areas from a strike by American air force. By August 1965, everything was in place and the artilleries were in operation. (Dongsheng 301) reports that the Chinese used 37mm and 87mm anti-aircraft guns to shot down one F-4; this was the first US plane to be destroyed by the Chinese forces. Another anti-aircraft unit entered the Kep area. In August 23, the 63rd division engaged the Americans (Jien 379); this was their first direct battle with Americans and they managed to down one American plane and damaged another. The period between August 1965 and March 1969 featured the deployment of a total of 63 regiments of Chinese anti-aircraft artillery units in North Vietnam. The Chinese military used the Korean War experience to adopt a rotation strategy where one unit worked for three to six months and got replaced by another (Young 69). This kind of rotation is critical in strenuous exercises because it relieves others tasks and affords them the opportunity to recover. Supply of Large Amounts of Military Equipment Upon the Chinese military entry into Vietnam, Mao Zedong prioritised supporting Vietnam and dramatically increased military and other forms of support. Mao Zedong volunteered to supply Hanoi with ninety-thousand rifles and several guns without any charge. China supplied Vietnam with weapons and other military equipment to the level of personal hygiene. Among the military equipment supplied included 5,500 sets of uniforms and 5,500 pairs of shoes (Jien 378). China also supplied food stuffs including 550 tons of rice (approximately 0.8 kilograms per person per day), 6.5 tons of sauce, 55 tons of pork meat, 20 tons of seam and peanuts, 20 tons of salt, 20 tons of soy sauce, 20 tons of fish, and 20 tons of sugar (Jien 378). In maintaining soldier hygiene, China supplied 8,000 toothbrushes, 24,000 pieces of regular soap, 11,000 bottles of toothpaste, and 10,600 pieces of scented soap. The year 1965 saw the increase of guns supply from 80,500 to 220,767, guns bullets increased to 114 million, pieces of artillery increased to 4,439, and artillery shells increased to 1.8 million (Bakich 688). Economic Training The Chinese identified the gap in economic training among the military commanders. Creating a solid economic base, according to the Chinese, was only possible if commanders were highly trained in matters of finance, tax, and fiscal policies. The Chinese, therefore, helped North Vietnam to train their military commanders particularly in ways of reorganise their defence and financial systems in addition to tax and fiscal policies. These were all geared towards creating a solid economic base. According to Gardner, economic base is critical to any war period (91). A country that lacks the required finances is usually defeated due to lack of finances for buying war equipment and supporting the troops. The primary goal of the Chinese was to ensure that North Vietnam has access to adequate finances for funding their war budgets. The money raised through taxes and other economic activities was used to buy military equipment, which sustained North Vietnam throughout the war period. Additional support by the Chinese was felt through helping Vietnamese in mobilising peasants to support war through land reform campaigns. The land reform campaigns were critical because they enabled people to understand the vital necessity of their land, its proper economic and the reason for defending it. Kissinger argues that overall, making revolution to the Vietnamese involved massive transfer of the Chinese experience (28). Without transfer of this experience, Vietnam would have long lost in the war and transformed into a capitalist state. War Aftermath The United States have not found a solid basis for characterising the long-lasting, costly, and ultimately unsuccessful American military involvement in Indochina (Olsen 35). Most people believe that the Vietnam War was a crime; critics contend that the war was the attempt by the US to suppress the prosperous Vietnam’s national liberation movement that drove French colonialism from the country. The United States actually exaggerated the influence of communism and underestimated the power of nationalism. This explains why they wanted to shun communism from the North and make it similar to the South. The People Republic of China launched talks with the US during the early 1970s. The talks were characterised by high level meetings involving Henry Kissinger and the later Richard Nixon (Dongsheng 275). The main impact of the meetings constitutes the re-orientation of Chinese foreign policy toward the US. Meanwhile, Khmer Rouge in Cambodia continues to receive support from People’s Republic of China. Both China and Vietnam lost several troops; China lost 3,446 million yuan in overhead. This loss delayed the completion of China’s economic plan of 1979-1980 (Kraus 502). Vietnam realised that it was necessary to take various repressive measures to deal with the issue of real and potential collaboration. One of the precautions was expelling approximately 8,000 Hoa people from Hanoi (Porter 71). Vietnam also resettled the Hmong and all ethnic minorities from the provinces of the North. The defection of Hoang Van Hoan caused launch of cleansing the Communist Party of Vietnam. The party was cleansed of the pro-Chinese and other persons who had surrendered to the advancing Chinese troops during the course of the war. Conclusion The years of Vietnam War caused a lot of destruction for Vietnam and let to demise of several Vietnamese civilians, Vietnamese soldiers, Chinese troops and the military of several other communist countries engaging is that fierce war. America, the main motivator of the war, lost 58,000 members of the military. China supported North Vietnam with the aim of defending the North from shunning their communism state. The war involved anti-communist fighting against the communist state. China participated in the Vietnam War in various forms; these forms were dispatch of Chinese engineering troops, use of Chinese anti-aircraft artillery troops, supply of large amounts of military equipment, and economic training. The Vietnam War ended in 1975 with the United States as a looser in the war and the North merging with the South under Communism. Works Cited Bakich, Spencer D. "Institutionalizing Supreme Command: Explaining Political–Military Integration In The Vietnam War, 1964–1968." Small Wars & Insurgencies 22.4 (2011): 688. Publisher Provided Full Text Searching File. Web. 15 Apr. 2015. Dongsheng, Zang. "Chinas "Attitude" Toward Human Rights: Reading Hungdah Chiu In The Era Of The Iraq War." Maryland Journal Of International Law 27.(2012): 263-303. Academic Search Complete. Web. 12 Apr. 2015. Gardner, Lloyd C. Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam. Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1995. Print. Jian, Chen. "Chinas Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69." The China Quarterly 1995: 356. JSTOR Journals. Web. 14 Apr. 2015. Kissinger, Henry. On China. New York: Penguin Press, 2011. Print. Kraus, Charles. "A Border Region ‘Exuded With Militant Friendship’: Provincial Narratives Of Chinas Participation In The First Indochina War, 1949–1954." Cold War History 12.3 (2012): 495-514. Web. 15 Apr 2015. Olsen, Mari. Soviet-vietnam Relations and the Role of China, 1949-64: Changing Alliances. London: Routledge, 2006. Print. Porter, Gareth. "Perils Of Dominance: Imbalance Of Power And The Road To War In Vietnam." (2005): Books at JSTOR. Web. 17 Apr. 2015. Young, Marilyn B, and Robert Buzzanco. A Companion to the Vietnam War. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2006. Print. Read More