Failure of the UN in Preventing Rwandas Genocide - Dissertation Example

 Failure of the UN in Preventing Rwanda’s Genocide Introduction On April 6th, 1994, the lives of many Rwandese citizens changed as they witnessed a bizarre event that they will live to remember. President Habyarimana's plane was shot down en route from Arusha for peace talks and what could then ensue was a massacre. The majority extremist Hutus rose against the minority Tutsis killing what is approximated to be around 800000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. According to the United Nations Convention on the prevention and punishment of genocide; acts such as those witnessed in Rwanda, committed to destroying in whole or in part of an ethnic group, race, or religious group is what is termed as genocide. The world sat and watched as the Hutu militia and state troops continued killing with little intervention to save the state. Genocidal killing was not the only crime against humanity committed. There was also the crime of neglect by the international community, which though not punishable, was the second biggest crime during these bizarre incidents. THESIS: The international community and the United Nations failed to prevent the atrocity when they could have intervened. A genocide is not an accident that can happen all over sudden or without warning. It requires organization and constitutes a deliberate strategy, especially one that has been carried out by the government or state-controlled apparatus. Information on the way genocide occurs and ability to recognize signs that could result in genocide is necessary to avoid such horror incidents. For the case of Rwanda, the signs of an impending genocide were evident, yet those who could have prevented it neglected all warnings. The international community’s reluctance to act can be attributed to numerous interconnected multifaceted issues, such as the misguided views of Africans, peacekeeping fatigue and the bureaucratic nature of the United Nations. The United States was not ready to intervene because the events of Somalia were still raw, and they didn't want to lose soldiers like it happened in Somalia (Uvin 2001). The United Nations was also not willing to engage in another peacekeeping mission in Africa, after the protracted one in Somalia. The second reason for inaction was due to national interests, and United States did not intervene because they did not have any national interest at stake in Rwanda. For France, they should have prevented the genocide but rather, they facilitated it further by providing ammunition and weapons. The media also failed to report on the genocide hence there was no pressure that could have influenced policy makers to take action. Both contributing factors point to the lack of commitment to efforts to stop the genocide as being the primary reasons for failure of the international community and the United Nations to act. Belgium, France, United States and the United Nations are the parties who knew the genocide was eminent in Rwanda and they had the obligation to prevent and stop it, but both parties lacked political will to be involved. The members of the Security Council paid attention to unending civil wars in other parts rather than discussing the genocide which would have forced them to take action under the 1948 Genocide Act. The international community's failure to act had detrimental effects on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) that had neither a clear mandate nor adequate resources to help in restoring peace. Historical Background of the Genocide Rwanda was colony of Germans and later Belgium just like most African states. The Germans ruled by virtually allowing Rwandans to rule themselves through the already established institution of the king. The subjects of the king were divided into social groups that are the Hutus, who were predominantly the poor majority, the Tutsis, who were the elite class who owned land and cattle and the minority, pigmy Twa. The differences between the groups were not based on ethnic lines since they spoke the same language, but on economic lines (Dorn and Matloff 2000). After the fall of the German rule, the Belgians exploited the disparities between the groups by preferring the Tutsis over the Hutus. They introduced the identity card system that could later be an important tool for the perpetrators of the acts (Kuperman 2001). Movement between Tutsis and Hutus was prohibited as the Belgians sought to use the Tutsis to govern. Towards independence, the sentiment between the two groups was heightened and by the time Rwanda was independent, there were two political parties each aligned toward the groups. In 1962, elections were conducted and a Hutu president came to power. There was vengeful killing of Tutsis by the Hutus and the violence forced Tutsis to flee to neighboring countries as refugees, where they began to form armed bands to attack the new Hutu government. In its first decade, there were repeated attempts by Tutsi revolts to overthrow the government and overt military action. In response, the Hutu government inflicted violence upon Tutsis and by mid-1960s, close to 20000 Tutsis had been killed and more than 150000 had turned to neighboring countries as refugees (Dorn and Matloff 2000). In 1973, General Habyarimana overthrew the government of President Hayibanda and established an authoritarian and nepotistic regime dominated by his Hutu political party. His government worked to weaken and isolate Tutsi citizens. By 1990, Tutsi rebels in neighboring countries, especially those in Uganda staged its major attack on the Rwandese government with an aim of reestablishing Tutsi rule in Rwanda. The attacks plunged the country into civil unrest culminating in the events that followed in 1994. International Community and United Nations' Failures The events that led to the genocide were cultivated among the Rwandese population by the German and Belgium colonial rule. They divided the population along ethnic lines through the introduction of the identification cards in 1933 as they specified whether one was of Tutsi or Hutu (Uvin 2001). As part of the international community, they contributed to the growing ethnic tensions by being partial in their governance. The killings could have been avoided if the colonialists had treated all the people equally. Thus, the international community should be held responsible for the genesis of these events which they failed to act towards to provide a solution. In 1993 when UNAMIR was formed, Belgium, which had deeper connection with Rwanda contributed the largest western contingent. Belgium had prior knowledge of the impending danger, and they requested for a stronger UNAMIR mandate, but most states were not interested in supporting the mission. After some Belgian peacekeepers had been killed, Belgium petitioned for the withdrawal of UNAMIR as it was apparent that no country was interested in the mission. The petition was supported by the Security Council. The only time Belgium and others showed interest was when they were airlifting their citizens from Rwanda. The quick and efficient airlifting missions indicate that had the international community intervened, they would have saved the nation from the deadly killings (Melvern 2000). Belgium knew the nature of the events and they were in a position to prevent or even stop them, but the phobia of what had happened in Somalia deterred them as there was growing pressure from their voters back home advocating the return of their boys home. Bureaucratic indifference and organization structure in the United Nations and poor communication with the Security Council is also another area where there was a notable failure. As the responsible body that could have prevented and stopped the genocide, the United Nations Security Council failed in delivering its obligations. The secretariat and the secretary general failed to pass information prior to and during the period of the genocide. Although there was concrete evident that there was genocide going on in Rwanda, staff in the council talked about it only as a civil war that needed ceasefire. Nobody was ready to use the "G" word. When the US secretary of state delivered a speech on Rwanda, he only mentioned a possibility of genocide and when asked to comment further on the issue, little was offered. Dallaire the then commander of UNAMIR laments on how his reports kept vanishing in the abyss of New York's non-action (United Nations General Assembly, 2004). According to Dallaire, as a result, the non-members of the Security Council could not consider the killings as genocide since the Security Council did not see them so (2004). Events in Rwanda were deemed to be of low status compared to the large and complex missions in the Balkan state of Bosnia and Somalia. Moreover, President Clinton blamed the United Nations for the death of the American soldiers in Somalia hence creating pressure on the Secretariat. United Nations staff wanted to avoid another peacekeeping failure which would have signaled the end of UN peacekeeping. The failures of Somalia were greatly exaggerated, and there was a dark cloud hovering over the UN headquarters so the staff wanted to avoid such scenario (Scheffer 2004). Even though the UN staff was hard working, their bureaucratic minds and egos made them believe that withholding information could save the future of peacekeeping (Barnet 2002). In the end, they failed in preventing and stopping the genocide. Greater blame falls on the United States for their part in taking no action against the genocide mainly due to the fact that since the end of the cold war, no international action had taken place without their leading role. As early as 1993, CIA warned of possible deaths of up to 500000 potential victims in Rwanda (Power 2003). Before the genocide, major powers knew about the plans of impending genocidal killings in Rwanda. However, since the killing of US Rangers in Somalia, the US did not want to place UN's interests before the interests of Americans. President Clinton, whose poll ratings were dwindling after bringing home body bags from Somalia decided that many factors were to be met for the United States to approve any UN peacekeeping missions. The presidential decision directive influenced the US decision-making, and unfortunately, Rwanda did not qualify for a US sponsored peacekeeping operation under the directive. In addition to the shadows of Somalia, the United States had no interests in Rwanda as defined under the presidential directive. The case of Somalia was due to public pressure; however, that was no pressure in 1994 largely due to the absence of international media in Rwanda. Various reports about the genocide demonstrate how the west misunderstands African conflicts. To them, Africans kill each other from time to time and the killings were not any different hence there was no need to get involved (Power 2003). In the US, the then government officials could not describe the events as genocide yet they were unwilling to Act. According to the genocide convention, the international community is obliged to act whenever there is genocide. At the time of the genocide, Rwanda had not developed sufficiently in terms of technology compared to the developed countries, as means of communication such as telephones were scarce. The primary means through which information could have traveled was through radio and majority owned the radio, especially Hutus who had received them for free from the government. The radio was the means of spreading propaganda, and it was only the United States that had the equipment that could have jammed the frequencies to stop spreading hate speech and propaganda. However, the US refused to use the technology or even lend it to the United Nations even after they were alerted to the events happening in Rwanda (Berman 1998). The actions of the US prevented the international community from jamming the frequencies of which if they had been able, they could have stopped the spread of hate messages and hence the genocide. Jamming of frequencies would have incapacitated the government thus avoiding hunting down of people, whose names could be read on the Hutu power radio station. That way, the genocide would have been stopped without the need of any military action. France played a significant role in the genocide in that although it knew of the ongoing killings in Rwanda, it continued provide military and political support to the Rwandan government (Melvern 2000). After the attack on Rwanda by Rwandan Patriotic Front rebels from Uganda, France provided military support and weapons to the government to fight back. France was more concerned with prestige and international stature, and they considered the attack by RPF to be Anglo-Saxon, which they saw as a threat to their position. It led to their quick intervention in Rwanda. Days after the genocide begun in Rwanda the French left leaving only around seventy soldiers (Melvern 2000). The soldiers continued to provide weapons, train militia, and even controlled checkpoints arresting Tutsis and handing them to the Hutu militia. Pressure from NGOs and the media led France to contemplate their intervention, but after, the Security Council sanctioned multinational operation citing humanitarian grounds. France was quick to respond, but only to ensure Rwanda remained a francophone by stopping the advances of RPF and sending a signal to French speaking nations in Africa of their commitment. France had national interests in Rwanda, but did little to prevent the atrocities that occurred in the country. As the only western nation that was willing to offer assistance, they could have supported UNAMIR, but they remained silent. On the ground, UNAMIR was not properly equipped to be in a position to adequately prevent and stop the massacre. There was constant pressure by the Security Council on UNAMIR to cut on the costs. UNAMIR's responsibility was to monitoring, assisting and investigating. They were not supposed to take any military action. The only instance they were allowed to use force apart for reasons self-defense was when they were tasked to airlift western nationals. After the withdrawal of Belgian peacekeepers, UNAMIR remained short of manpower and other resources such as secure transport and ammunition among others. This rendered UNAMIR helpless and for this reason, they had to watch as people got slaughtered (Dallaire 2003). Conclusion The reaction of the international community to the genocide in Rwanda was wanting and irrefutably a failure. The external influence on Rwanda that spawned the genocide highlights the tragic insincerity of the international community to help those facing disaster. Rwanda is an obvious example of a situation in which systematic humanitarian intervention could have saved many lives from the bizarre actions that happened. Lack of the legal structure of militarized intervention and a pragmatic focus on self-interest rather than the need to preserve the values of common humanity, are among the primary factors that prevented any international intervention. The international community and United Nations had viable options to consider in countering the genocidal killings, but they failed to respond to the obligations entitled to them as the world clout and the leading peace promoting body. The improvements to international humanitarian norms and laws, predominantly the responsibility to protect, recommend that the Rwanda genocide has taught the United Nations and the international community some lessons about the need for humanitarian intercession to prevent such incidences. In order to prevent future genocidal killings not only in Rwanda but also in other places, there should be constant monitoring of agents of communication, such as radios and cell phones, to ensure hate messages are not spread. However, the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda bore the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P). The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was created in 2001 to discuss ways that the international community should respond to potential human rights violations such as the case of Rwanda. The Commission arrived at a conclusion that in the event civilians are facing a threat of major harm like the case of Rwanda, and their government is unable to protect them, then humanitarian intervention is legitimate. References Barnett, M., 2002. Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. London: Cornell University. Berman, Eric G., 1998. The International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda): Lessons and Observations from the Field. [pdf] Available at: [Accessed 28 March 2015]. Dallaire, R., 2004. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. London: Arrow Books. Dorn, A. W. and Matloff, J., 2000. Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN Have Predicted and Prevented the Rwandan Genocide? The Journal of Conflict Studies. Vol. 20, No.1, Kuperman, Alan J., 2001. The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Melvern, L., 2000. A People Betrayed: The Role Of The West In Rwanda's Genocide. London: Zed Books. Power, S., 2001. Bystanders to Genocide. [online] Available at: [Accessed 28 March 2015]. Scheffer, D., 2004. Lessons from the Rwandan Genocide. A Look Back. [pdf] Available at: [Accessed 28 March 2015]. United Nations General Assembly, 2004. Fifty-ninth Session: Follow up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit. [online] Available at: [Accessed 28 March 2015]. Uvin, P., 2001. Reading the Rwandan Genocide. International Studies Review. 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