The Demise of Custer at Little Bighorn - Case Study Example

The demise of Custer at Little Bighorn In the Battle of Little Bighorn in the summer of June 25th 1876, 7th Calvary Commander Lieutenant Colonel (LTG) Custer led his men into battle against Native Americans of the Lakota, Cheyenne, and Arapaho nations. The combination of Custers arrogance, impatience, and improper assessment of the situation proved disastrous for his soldiers. He led his soldiers into a confrontation where he was outnumbered. LTG Cluster further compounded his predicament by dividing the 7th Calvary into three attacking forces before he knew the disposition of his enemy. LTC Custers three attacking forces were all repulsed and the attacking force under his control was killed to the last soldier. After two days the reinforcements for 7th Calvary arrived and discovered LTG Custers attacking force all dead with bodies spread all over the battlefield. This has been historically referred to as the demise of Custer at Little Bighorn. It is evident that Custers miscalculations caused his demise. However, Custer had some justifications for the attack and should not be solely blamed for the loss off the battle. Introduction June 25, 1876 midday, Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer is reported to have split his Seventh Calvary Regiment into three separate elements. Consequently, he attacked a massive village of the hostile Indians that was located along the historical Little Bighorn River in the contemporary Montana. Custer together with his immediate command that was composed of five troops totaling to 225 men never survived the fight. Immediately Custer and his troop died, the officers that included Bentee, Reno, Terry, Brisbin, and Gibbon recreated the history of the events that took place prior to the disaster with an aim of clearing themselves from any blame and responsibility. The facts that they provided and the remembrance of what took place before that fateful incident fully blamed Custer for the calamity, and this has increasingly influenced future historical appraisal of the battle. Numerous explanations have been advanced in trying to provide insight into what took place following the disaster over the years. It is reported that driven by unsuccessful personal motives, Custer is alleged to have disobeyed the orders of General Terry. This he did by not taking the particular route advised to the Indian village and subsequently rushing the exhausted troops into the battle. Custer did not even wait for support or reinforcement from Gibbon. Further, Custer never conducted proper reconnaissance and went ahead to ignore the warnings that were given by his scouts. Moreover, he went ahead to violate the maxim of war through the splitting of the forces in the glaring face of the enemy, and the midday attack destroyed any pending hope of a surprise. Indeed, the actions by Custer displayed an overall incompetence at fighting Indians. Indeed, Custers miscalculations caused his demise. The demise of Custer at Little Bighorn Battle of the Little Bighorn commonly referred to as the Custers Last Stand was an historical armed engagement that occurred between the combined forces. This included forces of the Northern Cheyenne, Lakota, and the Arapaho tribes, against the 7th Cavalry Regiment of the great Army of the United States. The battle took place from June 25-26 of the year 1876 near the historical Little Bighorn River within the Eastern Montana Territory. This was most significant and prominent action of the Great Sioux War of the 1876. The battle was an overwhelming and major victory for the Northern Cheyenne, Lakota, and Arapaho who were led by several war leaders. The leaders included Chief Gall and Crazy Horse, and inspired by visions of Sitting Bull who was also known as Thathanka Iyotake (Elliot, 2007, p. 14). The United States 7th Cavalry included Custer Battalion that consisted of a force of 700 men who were led by George Armstrong Custer. The Battalion suffered a major and humiliating defeat. Five members out of twelve of the 7th Cavalry were annihilated. Custer was killed with two of his brothers, a brother-in-law, and a nephew. The estimated total United States casualties included the 55 injured and 268 dead scouts (Hammer, 2000, p. 26). The public response and debate to the demise of Custer at Little Bighorn varied. The battle and in particular the actions of Custer have increasingly been studied by the historians. Custers Miscalculations Caused His Demise The defeat and demise of Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer Seventh Calvary at the historical Little Bighorn has indeed generated more historical written material than any other fight involving the American soldiers with exception of Battle of Gettysburg. The attraction is not derived from the fact that a great number of the casualties were witnessed since this was not the worst outing that was ever experienced by the American military. The other worse battles were embarrassing falling to the General Arthur St. Clair and the 832 men slain by Shawnees and the Miamis in the 1971 (Wert, 1996, p. 19). The Little Bighorn has become popular among scholars and particularly scholars due to the controversies that surround what took place. Since there were no Indian accounts or eyewitnesses, the facts that are been provided by the soldiers, historians, and the media have remained contradictory. Consequently, in an attempt to ensure that the mysteries of the Little Bighorn that led to the demise of Custer and his troops, there has been a need to find who was to blame for what transpired. This is where it emerged that Custer is to blame for the miscalculations that caused the demise. The subordinate commanders of Custer, General Alfred H. Terry, Captain Frederick W. Benteen, and Major Marcus A. Reno expecting accusations for the role they played in the attack that failed placed all the blames on Custer. Moreover, the press also played a powerful role in providing information on what happened leading to the failed attack. "Custer," an editorial that was published in Chicago Tribune stated that, "preferred to make a reckless dash and take the consequences, in hope of making a personal victory and adding to the glory of another charge, rather than wait for a sufficiently powerful force to make the fight successful and share the glory with others" (Barnard, 1998, p. 17). Moreover, the superiors of Custer also joined in bashing him with President Ulysses S. Grant during an interview stating that, "I regard Custers Massacre as a sacrifice of troops, brought on by Custer himself that was wholly unnecessary- wholly unnecessary" (Barnard, 1998, p. 21). Despite that not everyone joined in the bashing, but in the light of his personality, reputation, perceived aspirations, political activity, as well as the dominant opinion, several people condemned Custer for the failed attack. The indictments that have been made against Custer in the context of the failed attack are numerous. It is argued that Custer was driven by the approval he wanted to get from President Grant. This made him disobey the orders that he was given by Terry and subsequently rushed up Rosebud River and later arrived at the Indian village surprisingly a day and a half before the expected schedule (Gallear, 2001, p. 34). Custer did not take time to conduct thorough and complete reconnaissance of the Indian village. Consequently, he ignored all the warnings that he was given by the scouts that there were several Indians that could not be handled by the regiment. With the horses and troops fatigued from the forced marches, Custer made a deliberate attempt to attack a superior enemy that was numerically advantage. Furthermore, Custer violated the basic principle of war through scoring surprise and consequently splintered his forces thereby loosing the desperately needed numbers for a vital victory. An egomaniac who had limited experience regarding fighting Indians, Custer is reported to have deluded himself with the invincibility and subsequently made irrational decisions at the battlefield (Gallear, 2001, p. 41). The decisions he made indeed led to the destruction of his immediate command eventual demise. Custer did yearn for victory for himself and the regiment and foolishly threw in the lives of the troops away in this quest without adequate considerations. However, some scholars and in particular historians have argued that he did not obey the orders that they were given by Terry and that those were just suggestions. The intention of Terry was for Custer to find the Indians and consequently attack them. The orders therefore, left Custer the absolute discretion of making decision on whether to attack or not. Furthermore, it is argued that Custer did not attack earlier has had been planned since Terry had not given specific time frame the combined attack with the supporting soldiers of Colonel Gibbon was to take place (Welch & Stekler, 1994, p. 31). The link update that has been widely debated of June 26 was only supposed to be approximation of the time Gibbon and Terrys column was likely to have reached the mouth of Little Bighorn and was not mention in the written orders by Terry (Welch & Stekler, 1994, p. 19). However, this school of thought cannot justify the actions that were taken by Custer, if he was not sure of the order given by Terry he could have asked for clarification. Further, after realizing that the troops of Gibbon had not arrived for support he could have backed off since it was evident his men could not handle the Indians. Scouts under the command of Custer reported a large concentration of the Indians who were located on the lower part of Little Bighorn and Custer must be blamed for not conducting critical reconnaissance before making any move. However, some sympathizers of Custer argue that the initial plan of attacking on 26th changed, but when he received a report in the morning of 25th that the hostiles had made a discovery of the regiment he had to change plans. Fearing that the Indians would scatter them, Custer made a decision to push his men forward in pursuit of the enemy. Custer was not aware of the true location or size of the Indian camp. He simply shared a belief with several Army officers who were fighting in the plains through their experience that the most difficult part of fighting the Indians was not ensuring they are defeated but rather catching them (Dustin, 1939, p. 16). Therefore, the approach he took towards the village was indeed a forced reconnaissance which is a difficult mission that requires situational development, coordination, and decisions to be made while on the move. Nevertheless, this school of thought can never be justified since he had the option of backing off and seeking for reinforcement if he was not aware of what was ahead. The risk he took led to his demise and several troops under his command, and this could have been avoided. Justification of Attack by Custer Custer is reported to have made a plan of attacking using a three pronged attack. Since the bulk of his combat strength were directly under his command, this was going to allow him ensure that the village was hit from different directions and consequently preventing mass escape of the Indians. This particular scheme of maneuver is reported to have worked eight years before the battle on the Washita River against the village of Kiowas, Southern Cheyennes, Arapahos, Apaches, as well as Comanches that are known to have been large just the same way as Little Bighorn (Sarf, 1993, p. 17). This school of thought makes sense, but Custer could not have had full confidence on a strategy that had not worked for him or in the village. This was only trial and error approach which led to his demise and that of his troops. Indeed, it is an error that should not be allowed in a military combat since lives of so many individuals are involved. Driving component of the attack carried out by Custer is the belief that he had eventually lost the particular element of surprise that violated basic principles of war. Nonetheless, the sympathizers argue that Custer never believed that he was launching an attack on the whole village that was on a defensive posture, but rather one that is on the run. It is ironical that he did not achieve the surprise intended since the Indian account states that they were never aware of the attack and that the appearance of battalion under Reno caught several Indians unawares and in the middle of their activities. Further, the accounts also dispel the theories that they Indians planned any attack on Custer and his troops (Hatch, 1997, p. 53). Irrespective of how these facts are viewed, it remains a fact that Custer failed and should be blamed for the demise. Since if the Indians had never planned any attack, then it simply shows that Custer was not competent enough to fight Indians who were caught by surprise. Custer Should Not Be Solely Blamed for Despite the flaws in the action that was taken by Custer leading to his demise, it is significant to note that he should not be blamed, and he deserves some credit. The assessment that have been made hold truth, but should be in context of what Custer had knowledge of at the time of the attack. Indeed, given the prior experiences of Custer and the information he had at hand, it can be argued that he configured his forces correctly and consequently acted appropriately by going ahead to launch attack on the hostile Indian village. The field strategy of Custer was formulated in such a way that it aimed at engaging the noncombatants at the encampments at the historical battle of Little Bighorn in order to capture children, disabled, women, and the elderly to be human shield and hostages. The battalions of Custer were supposed to be riding into the Indians camp and consequently securing the noncombatant hostages and eventually forcing the Indian warriors to surrender (Goodrich, 1999, p. 19). It is observed that if Custer could have managed to occupy the whole village before the resistance developed, then the Indian warriors could have been forced to surrender eventually. This is because if they started a fight, they were only going to shoot the hostages who were members of their families. Furthermore, the forces he had were not enough to ensure that they overcame the combination of the peculiar circumstance, some of which was his creation, which were opposing them. Indeed, provided that Custer had some information at the time as well as his experiences during past engagements, his tactics and actions are sound and should not be solely blamed for the Little Bighorn disaster. Under normal circumstances, an attack he launched could have worked, but it happened that the situation at Little Bighorn was not as he expected. On that fateful day in 1986, Cheyenne and Sioux were increasingly strong in numbers, extremely confident following the repelling of General George Crooks attack on June 17 along Rosebud and heavily armed. Furthermore, the governments action of taking Black Hills motivated them and was also led by the extraordinary chiefs (Fox, 1993, p. 28). The Indians were never going to run as they were expected to do and there lay the misjudgment of Custer that led to his demise. Custers tactics that had proven to be successful before was a representation of a blatant underestimation of the resolve of the Indians as well as their fighting ability. This is a phenomenon that Custer is not only the one to blame for, but the entire Army officers who were on the plain. Nevertheless, for Custer, the lessons learned and the prior experience did not provide him with a basis for the Seventh Calvary victory but rather set the stage for the disaster and his demise. Conclusion Custers miscalculations caused his demise. As discussed in this paper, Custer did not obey the orders that he was given by Terry and he decided to rush and engage the Indians in a battle that he eventually lost. Moreover, Custer never conducted proper reconnaissance and went ahead to ignore the warnings that were given by his scouts. This is serious negligence that led to his demise. Custer acted selfishly, and it is indicated in the paper that he was eager to get praises solely for winning the war that he never achieved. Finally, he violated the basic principles of war through the splitting of the forces in the glaring face of the enemy and at midday. Indeed, the errors that were made by Custer led to his demise and that of the other troops. References Barnard, S. (1998). Digging into Custers Last Stand. Huntington Beach, California: Ventana Graphics. Dustin, F. (1939). The Custer Tragedy: Events Leading Up to and Following the Little Big Horn Campaign on 1876. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers. Elliot, M. A. (2007). Custerology: The Enduring Legacy of the Indian Wars and George Armstrong Custer. University of Chicago Press. Goodrich, T. (1999). Scalp Dance: Indian Warfare on the High Plains, 1865–1879. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. Gallear, M. (2001). Guns at the Little Bighorn. Custer Association of Great Britain. Mark Gallear, CAGB Fox, R. A. (1993). Archaeology, History, and Custers Last Battle. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. Hammer, K. (2000). Men with Custer: Biographies of the 7th Cavalry: June 25, 1876. (Ronald H. Nichols, editor). Hardin, Montana: Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association. Hatch, T. (1997). Custer and the Little Bighorn: An Encyclopedia. McFarland & Company, Inc. London. Sarf, W. M. (1993). The Little Bighorn Campaign: March–September 1876, Conshohocken, Pennsylvania: Combined Books. Welch, J. & Stekler, P. (1994). Killing Custer: The Battle of the Little Bighorn and the Fate of the Plains Indians. New York: Norton. Wert, J. D. (1996). Custer: The Controversial Life of George Armstrong Custer. New York: Simon & Schuster. Read More