What Defines and What Motivates the New Terrorism - Essay Example

The New Terrorism The New Terrorism There are perceptions that the "new terrorism" is extensively networked, ad hoc, lethal, as wellas dangerous compared to the old. These claims bring out the opinion that that terrorism presently varies little from its preceding manifestations, excluding the somewhat enhanced possibility that terrorists might utilize a nuclear, chemical, radiological or biological weapon. This does not certainly denote that terrorism is more dangerous compared to how it was before; rather, the critical factor in weighing up the threat set by terrorism is whether its use is strategic. The main distinction between new terrorism from the old happens to be a modern structure, a modern personnel, together with a modern attitude toward violence. This modern structure is in the forms of a network, eased by information technology, the modern personnel are amateurs, who in most case, collaborate in ad hoc or transitory groups, as well as the modern attitude an intensified willingness of causing mass casualties, maybe by using weapons of chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological (CBNR). Both network organizations, along with amateur participation have the perception that the "new terrorists" are no longer in need of state sponsorship compared to their predecessors thereby being extremely dangerous or at least extremely difficult in countering than its predecessor (Andrew & Kumar 2002, p.10). Terrorists have the capability and willingness of developing network king of organization for similar reasons as those of businesses. This is the necessitated by the information revolution, which lowers the cost of communication, thereby permitting organizations in pushing for functions out of a controlling hierarchical structure. Therefore, organizations are capable of flattening out their pyramids of authority, while, at the same time, controlling and approaching a network form, a grouping of more or less independent, dispersed entities, connected by developed communications and maybe nothing more than a common reason. Motivating or forcing the shift from hierarchy to network happens to be the advantages acquired by an organization while transforming itself (Gutteridge 1986, p.35). It turns out to be more supple, adaptive, as well as resilient since each of its units is capable of sensing and reacting on its own in unfastened integration with the others. This increases the opportunities for the organization for learning, while making it extremely flexible, as well as adaptive. The organization turns out to be extremely resilient since if one or even a number of its constituent entities get destroyed, the others are persistent; therefore, a network, not like a hierarchy, is incapable of getting destroyed through decapitation. In terrorists’ case, there is a possibility that the loosely connected autonomous entities making up a network could be individuals, for instance Ramzi Yousef accredited for organizing the World Trade Center bombing. There is also a possibility that the entities framing terrorist networks could be large, formal, or hierarchical organizations thereby working altogether devoid of any common hierarchy or main commanding authority amongst them. No matter what the constituents of the network are, the absence of this innermost authority or control is what makes it a network. It is this characteristic giving networks their suppleness, adaptiveness, as well as resilience, permitting them gains over organizations such as the U.S. government, which seem to be hierarchical industrial-age relics (Hallstorm 2011, p.51). An ideal example of manifestation of this networking happens to be the propagation of the amateur terrorist, along with the ad hoc terrorist grouping. Amateurs collaborate with the like-minded in conducting a terrorist attack and eventually getting disbanded. They do not undergo training or other logistical backing from state-sponsors; rather depend on networks of supporters, studying what is necessary from publications or the Internet or dismissed soldiers. Considering that their organizational structure is informal with no permanent existence, it is extremely hard spotting such groupings and taking steps of counteracting them. As transitory groupings functioning as and supporting through networks, they lack infrastructure, along with no benefit from a state sponsor’s infrastructure; therefore, there are no assets that conservative military power can put at risk. The main reason why amateurs, along with ad hoc groupings are capable of operating the way they do is an often unmentioned upon facet of the communication revolution. Apart from facilitating networks, this communication revolution aids fundraising or the mobilization of resources through political and individual backing, knowledge, together with money, which all terrorist organizations have to undertake. The reducing cost, together with increasing easiness of communicating over vast distances denotes that terrorist groupings have immensely heightened the potential pool of possessions they can exploit (Harris 1983, p.79). Therefore, they are now capable of appealing to the ethnic or religious Diaspora or even to the political sympathizers all over the world, thereby getting their message to the audience around the world with ease or to those people they deem most significant in their struggle. The world-wide web gives them accessibility to significant sources of information. A well established government tends to be disadvantageous when tackling amateur networked terrorists; however, they are more sobering due to the apparent increased enthusiasm of "new terrorists" of inflicting mass casualties. According to analysts, there are several factors, like the diffusion of lethal technologies; taboos erosion against using weapons of mass destruction; the lack of limitation on amateur terrorists who do not have an organization or sponsor protecting them this they see no cause of limiting extreme violence, which is capable of generating a backlash; as well as the continuing necessity of terrorists in finding modern ways of drawing attention. Apart from that, analysts emphasize the significance of religion; there is a perception that religiously motivated terrorists are capable of conducting mass casualty attacks considering that unlike politically motivated terrorists, they do not get restrained by the fright that unwarranted violence will affront some constituency bearing in mind that they only care about a little circle of the elect. Religious terrorists perceive the world as being under two divisions i.e. "us" and "them", meaning that others get saved, and others as damned; therefore, there is a need to destroy the damned. This is particularly so when the religious impulse undertakes a millennial character, while, at the same time, desiring for a modern order makes reasonable the obliteration of the old. This has resulted in some speculations that religiously motivated terrorists have the willingness of using weapons of mass destruction during their attacks, similarly to others whose intention is not intimidation or persuasion but just destruction. Such urges, together with the extensive availability of potent weapons, recommends that terrorists displayed within a network or as a network of networks having turned into opponents who has the capability of dancing circles all over governments gets surpassed only by the intensified lethality of their punch. Although terrorists are increasingly using information technology, along with modern communications in facilitating networks, apparently networks as a formation for terrorist or brutal non-state groups are not modern (Karawan 2008, p.50). As a matter of fact, in 1983, considering 30 years study about "extralegal violent organizations", along with five years experience inside the Polish underground throughout Word War II, there is an analyst who made a conclusion that these "extralegal violent organizations" had in possession a network structure during this period, a structure comparable to that perceived to be modern by analysts during the late 1990s. The networked, ad hoc feature of modern terrorism is not new since the terrorism experienced today, particularly the international terrorism, is almost certainly more lethal compared to when it first came up three decades ago thereby producing mass casualties. In a given period, the number of international terrorist attacks get strongly connected to wars, main regional crises, along with other divisive world events thereby reflecting on fluctuations within inter-state tensions. The lethality of modern international terrorism might seem in a distinctive, extremely benign light when accurately compared to, for instance the lethality of anti-colonial terrorism within the instantaneous post-Word War II years or amongst other manifestations of terrorism before the Word War II. There are several ways of measuring the lethality of terrorism or a propensity toward mass casualties; however, with the above limitations in mind, international terrorism has turned out to be extremely lethal and highly likely in producing mass casualties (Kushner 1998, p.73). Religion happens to be a key driver in new terrorism since there is an argument made concerning the old terrorism that is applicable to the new variant, even in instances whereby there is involvement of religion. According to this argument, terrorists who have religious motivations also tend to have political, as well as social agendas; for instance, the founding of an Islamic state since they will toil under the same forms of restraints that terrorists who have political motivations toil under while they struggle with the intention of achieving their political goals. Apart from that, they will also have to be anxious about the prevalent reaction to their violence. However, this does not denote that a political group or a religious group is incapable of committing mass casualty attacks. It only implies that such groupings have motive not to do so. Although religiously inspired terrorists lack political goals, apparently, politics tends to follow them in every way; whether or not their objectives were political or thought concerning them, Islamic fundamentalists within Egypt, as well as Algeria got undone partly by the political predicaments that came to pass from their extreme violence with their own supporters, as well as their sympathizers turning against them (Lanqueur 2000, p.90). Eventually, even militant Islamist groupings will get a lesson concerning the application of extreme violence i.e. there are excellent reasons of avoiding it or suffering a decline within life expectancy. This judgment of action, as well as the reaction, is applicable even to the international Islamists supporting jihad all over the world and who happen to be responsible for a number of mass casualty attacks. Their violent rhetoric, along with practice end up making them the main terrorist target of the United States, along with other countries thereby increasing the cooperation with resources brought to endure against them, in addition to those providing them, haven. These measures have turned out to be effectual; this does not denote that international Islamists will not use excessive violence, only that they end up paying a price for doing so, while, at the same time, having reasons of thinking on the utility of mass casualty attacks. This is an indication that the new terrorists comes face to face with similar constraints as the old. Mass casualty attacks happen to be similar to uncommon terrorism, suicide attacks, do not get limited to a religious phenomenon. As a matter of fact, presently, the majority of terrorist groups along with religious motivations undertake their operations with techniques and results that are not different from their secular predecessors. Apart from that, the Tamil Tigers, who happens to be a non-religious terrorist organization, have undertaken an attack, which resulted in immense mass casualties; furthermore, there are sects such as Aum, who unlike other religiously motivated groupings, may be adequately divorced from this world thereby having the intention of creating casualties more massive than ever experienced by using weapons of mass destruction. This is an ideal example whereby religious motivation, along with such terrible weapons goes hand in hand with no countervailing argument or any motivation. Luckily, in this case, exactly the psychology making use of weapons of mass destruction reasonable to such a grouping through alienation, delusion, paranoia, inflexible devotion when it comes to the decisions of a leader thereby making it less able of engineering, as well as planning required in using them (Lesser 1999, p66). According to the review of issues concerning mass casualty attacks, it is apparent that it is not religion per se; rather, the religion that tends to be most critical when assessing the relationship between religious motivation, as well as mass casualty attacks. Therefore, considering the variety, along with the intricacy of religious motivation, the expression "religiously motivated terrorism" does not have analytical meaning. More strongly framing the probable connection of a religious inclination to mass casualty attacks, while, at the same time, to violence along with weapons of mass destruction could not be comprehended as a denial that a CBNR terrorist attack is capable of taking place (Lucy 2008, p.99). The other motives cited by analysts in explaining why such an attack might occur continue to be valid. Additionally, considering that conventional war has turned out to be extensively lethal, there are suspicions that unconventional war will, as well. It might be that 1998, which is the most lethal year for terrorism to go on record, is the starting points of a long-term trend, which will see eccentric means of political violence, go behind the trail blazed by conservative means. Though this might not be the case, the truth of the matter is that, the likelihood of CBNR weapon use is in the increase. Terrorists have at all times been networked and, at first, amateurish; however, they might now be no more or be only a little bit more lethal or prone at committing mass casualty attacks compared to how they were in the last 20 years. Certainly, if bin Laden’s organization happens to be distinctive from the majority of other terrorist organizations, it is not due to its amateurish and networked; rather, it is due to its personnel being more professional or experienced owing to conflict within Afghanistan and elsewhere, while, at the same time, being better organized, and well financed compared to its predecessors. 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