The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte - Book Report/Review Example

The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte The reign of Napoleon Bonaparte was one whose presence was felt throughout Europe by both the mighty and the low. Emerging as a military strategist like China’s Sun Tzu, Napoleon’s reign was by terror, yet commanded one of the earlier 19th century massive troops. His campaigns were of mixed reactions, sometimes testing his cannons in Europe while most of the time the vast Russian territory was a thorn in the flesh for him. Ironically, Napoleon as a military strategist elicited fear and hatred in equal measures. Those who loved him did so very dearly while those who disliked him also did so very openly. Napoleon himself also never like the English, something he declare so openly (Asprey 75). While outstanding as a champion for the masses whose majority were in the lower class and effecting changes towards equality in the society, the upper class viewed him as an a mess in the affairs of the state. There was no way Napoleon would have been liked across Europe yet Europe in the early 19th century was still full absolute Monarchy in significant quarters. Therefore, as Napoleon led expeditions for new territories, he left void behind for conspiracy against him. Most notable was his confrontation with Austria, later Austria-Hungary. This could be what probably made Prussia, now German, have a personal vendetta with France (Asprey 35). The effects of Napoleonic war could be traced up to the early 20th century with Hitler being seen to be so keen on France that perhaps most of the war was fought on French soil was just a payday strategy. Nevertheless, Napoleon left the society with some positive elements that escaped being spoilt by his madness. One of the reasons we can attribute Napoleons popularity among the masses is that he gave them hope. The problem with him was that his revolutionary ideas posed a threat to other monarchies like Britain. Perhaps the only monarchial system Napoleon’s expansionist ideas had effect on was Italian monarchy more than Napoleon though he had isolated Britain economically and socially (Chandler David 34). Risk Analysis on Chapter 22: The March to Moscow Napoleon Bonaparte had solidified his army by 1805, a period that witnessed battle after battle and conquering of most parts of continental Europe under his reign. Whether it was true that Napoleon wanted to forge and lead a peaceful and united Europe, his quest for supremacy still leave people to cast reasonable doubt. His eventual fall comes unexpectedly for him, having been captured the first time but manage to escape back to France. It tends to appear that Napoleon, other than taking considerable precaution when planning a battle, never put so much attention on the possibility of being defeated. Thus, his two captures were never realities to him, may be bad dreams that he intended to keep to himself (Erick 57). Point often overlooked is that while Napoleon is sometimes credited together with Sun Tzu as a military strategist, people fail to see the thin line between the reality and the intended meaning. Napoleon was born to lead but not to rule. Though he was brave, he lacked the spice that makes up a good ruler. It is no wonder that the Russian expedition was later to fail so miserable, indicating loopholes that the emperor could be defeated after all (Pokrovsky 25). Interestingly, Napoleon’s strategies have always been considered as so bright. The next question one would ask himself is what in the abyss of misconceptions ran in the emperor’s mind to order an attack at such a time when even Russians themselves coil back from their own winter. The march to Moscow seemed inevitable. It is not a surprise that of all campaigns, the Russian campaign was the most reckless. Napoleon was little aware that this was the beginning of his fall and that from his army of 750,000 able bodied-men, only 115,000 were to later return with no victory to bring back (Asprey 263). The first risk Napoleon took was to lead a march against the Russians on June 24, 1812, and sustain the campaign up to December 14, 1812. Asprey argues that Napoleon had anticipated quick victory going by his records on past military campaigns. He did not put into consideration the possibility of any eventuality and thus march with no clear counter measures. Many soldiers were frozen to death by the Russian winter as others fell victims at the hands of Cossack guerrillas. The whole war proved to be costly for both Russia and France, but the French bore most of it. An assessment of the course of the war would give a clear picture in assessing the risks involved throughout the ill-fated campaign. Of equal importance is to note the possible causes of the Russian invasion by Napoleon. Asprey alludes to the economic blockade of Britain as having effect on the Russian economy so that Czar Alexander I had to review their stand with Napoleon. Russia was allegedly not receiving in the same measure what she had been used to receiving from Britain since the emperor was against it and his word was the law. Consequently, justice sought to seek Russia deep in her territory when it emerged that Russia had intentionally ignored orders from above, (Asprey 253). All endeavors towards a negotiated solution had failed, as Russia could not accept anything short of trading with Britain. It is not exactly known how strategic Britain’s goods were to Russia but that was the point. Seeing a looming confrontation with Russia, Napoleon appealed to the feelings of the Polish nationalist by cleverly alluding to the Russian campaign as the second Polish war. This worked well enough to draw Polish soldiers into Napoleon’s own battle. Another probably reason that may have fuelled the March to Moscow was a clause in an old treaty that was signed in 1809. Asprey alludes to it rather shallowly and indirectly again but it played a fundamental role in determining a clash between Russia and France (Asprey 257). In this treaty, Western Galicia was removed from Austria and annexed to Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The proximity of this territory with Russia made her feel uneasy that in case of any eventuality, it may act as a military strategy zone for the French. These were the risks faced many and an opportunity to deviate from any binding was what many sought. Even among the countries in the continental Europe, that heeded Napoleon’s decree not to trade with Britain in actual sense traded but kept the whole affair a secret. Therefore, when Napoleon led his army into Russia in 1812, these were some of the underlying issues. Most importantly, Napoleon wanted to punish the Russian Czar for leaving the continental system, which was aimed at starving Britain into submission. His idea of the looming battle was a pitched battle that was easy to win, but since Czar Alexander I knew that Napoleon’s army was good at such battle, he never gave him the opportunity to engage him under such circumstances. This happened much to the frustration of Napoleon who now had to go deeper into Russian territory in pursuit of the Russians (Frank 33). In fact, trouble started here since Napoleon’s army had little supplies against their huge number of soldiers drawn from different nations. The first risk that faced them was staying in Russian longer than anticipated no food at all. It seems the emperor never anticipated finding an empty territory. Deprive of food and shelter, Napoleon realized that Russians employing the dreaded scorched earth policy against Napoleon and his soldiers. By adopting this tactic, the Russian authorities deprived Napoleon’s army food and labor and logistics consultation. Czar’s tactics weakened Napoleon’s army and delayed their match considerably. The only open battle Napoleon ever had against the Russians on his great campaign was the battle of Borodino. It was not surprising that Czar Alexander ordered the burning of Moscow as well when it emerged that Napoleon was closing in on it. This risk faced Napoleon’s army once it entered Moscow. They found it in ruins. There was no victory to be celebrated for capturing a city on fire. However, just before then, there were other areas of small battle between the some elements of Russian citizenry and the advancing Napoleon’s army (Elizabeth 54). On 16th August 1812, the 1st Corps arrived in Smolensk and got ready for an encounter with the Russians. The attack was coordinated by 7000 to 8000 infantry in the suburbs of Micislav region. The Russian only defended any territory only if they were still evacuating the civilian population or moving supplies (Asprey 260). Napoleon’s armies fought on bayonet after ammunitions were exhausted, pushing back the retreating Russians into the ditches of Smolensk. The battle had raged the whole night but by morning, again the French were to inherit a city that was in ruins from fore and bombardment (Ralph 77). Asprey also covers other happenings before the battle of Moscow and its subsequent burning. Napoleon also had his army at Valoutina on 19th August. He marched them partly along Moscow road and shortly on the road to St. Petersburg. The division that was matched to Moscow realized that majority of the Russians had been matched to Valoutina heights for safety. The topography had favored defiance more than offence, giving the Russians an upper hand in this battle against the invading army. The engagement at Valoutina was not an easy one and the commanding officer of Napoleon’s army for this sector needed reinforcement, which was not easily available, save for the slow communication strategy that had not been put in place. The battle of Valoutina was also one of poor military strategy in which ammunitions brought by the reinforcing battalion got over and soldiers had to fight using Bayonets (Gate David 59). This was also another bigger risk that Napoleon exposed his men into, having rushed into war with no back up plan. His exuding with over-confidence cost many soldiers loyal to him their lives. In an attempt to motivate his soldiers, Napoleon had given medals of distinguished service in the battle field. After the battle of Valoutina, he had given the soldiers two days rest before embarking on the retreating Russia. The battle of Valoutina had caused him distinguished officers and general. The final battle that decisively ended Napoleon’s Russian campaign was never to be. When Governor Rostopchin ordered the burning of Moscow as the Russians made further retreat, Napoleons army that was now reduced to 100,000 had to march back to Poland. The irony of the whole situation was that while most of Napoleon’s soldiers who survived the war against the Russians were yet still at the mercy of a natural condition they had never imagined: Russian Winter. Only 115,000 soldiers made it back out of the 750,000 soldiers. Napoleon opened a new chapter in history, the famous last chapter where empires wane. Russian Winter destroyed Napoleon's invincible Grand Army. After recovering, Russian Army now flooded into central Europe, making deals with up Prussia and Austria as allies. Actually, it was not long before the German nationalists rose up in battle as well. Several events had marked the absence of the emperor. To begin with, in January 1813 the Duke of Wellington crossed the Pyrenees between Spain and France, threatening to invade France (Alfred 83). Later in October 1812, a general in Paris almost pulled off a coup d'etat after spreading rumors that Napoleon had died in Russia. Finally in December 1812, on realizing the seriousness of the situation, Napoleon left his army in Russia, as he had previously left his army in Egypt, and returned to Paris. Traveling nonstop by sled and carriage, he made it back to Paris in only 13 days. The entire Russian quest was a big risk of the soldiers lives. Every move had its repercussions given its poor organization. Summary of Chapter 22 Risk Analysis: The March to Moscow Works Cited Asprey, Robert. The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte. New York: Basic Books, 2002. Chandler, David. The Campaigns of Napoleon. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1967. Christiensen, Eric. The Origins of Military Power in Spain.1800-1854.London: Oxford University Press. 1967. Cobham, Alfred. History of Modern France. London: Penguin, 1957. Gate, David. The Spanish Ulcer. : A History of the peninsular War. New York: Norton 1980. Gaxotte Pierre. The French Revolution. New York: 1932. Korngold, Ralph. The Last Years of Napoleon- His captivity on St. Helena. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959. Longford Elizabeth. Wellington-The Years of the Sword. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969. McLynn, Frank. Napoleon.London: Jonathan Cape, 1997. Pokrovsky, M. N. Brief History of Russia. London: Martin Lawrence, 1983. Read More