The Decision to Make Nuclear Weapons in USSR - Case Study Example

Soviet Union’s Decision to Acquire Nuclear Weapons and how it Overcame the Obstacles to Acquire Nuclear Weapons The second country to develop nuclearweapons after the US was the Soviet Union. Although they were allies during the Second World War, that was only temporary alliance. The use of nuclear weapons by the US at the end of the second world war and the fact that they kept it as a secret from the Soviet Union has created a fear for Soviet leadership that they might use it for dominating them (Krieger, 2005). The decision to make nuclear weapons was a political decision of Stalin. He made the decision in the same year the Second World War ended (Reed, 2010). It took only four years for Soviet Union to become nuclear. The first nuclear weapon that they fired was a copy of the bomb dropped in Nagasaki by the US. It added to their prestige and deterrent potential. The Soviet effort to develop nuclear weapon was led by Igor Kurchatov at a secret site known as Arzamas-16 (Cold War: A Brief History, 2011). They were helped by spies inside the Manhattan project, most notably by Klaus Fuchs. Fuchs had German origin, but took British citizenship and was send to US to work on the atom bomb. He passed detailed information on the project to the Soviet Union through a courier in 1945 (Klaus Fuchs , 2011). Using the detailed description made by Klaus Fuchs, Soviets constructed a similar copy of the Fat Man bomb (Cold War: A Brief History). It was tested at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan on August 29, 1949 and its estimated yield was about 22 kilotons (Cold War: A Brief History). He also passed information regarding hydrogen bomb in 1946 an 1947, but that were not very useful. Reports of the unusual explosive force of the atomic bomb appeared in Soviet press for the first time in Pravda on 13th October 1941. Medvedev (n.d.) points out that the release of a spontaneous chain reaction by the fission of uranium-235, which had been done in 1938 in Germany by Otto Hahn, and by Frederic Joliet-Curie in France, was independently discovered by the young Soviet physicists Georgy Flerov in Leningrad and Yulii Khariton in Moscow in 1939. In the United States, the possibility of developing atomic bomb was discussed in the press in 1940. Flerov believed that research was taking place in Germany and the US in the field of uranium fission. He sent a letter to Stalin saying that nothing is being published about the nuclear program and there is something suspicious (Soviet Atomic Bomb Project, 2011). In that letter, he wrote, “we must build uranium bomb without delay (Thomas B. Cochran, 1995)”. Intelligence officials of Moscow had definite information about this. In the Soviet system during that period, only Stalin got all secret intelligence information. Medvedev argues that the intelligence communications about the atom bomb were also seen and considered firstly by Stalin. In 1942, the Soviet secret service received information from Cairncross, Fuchs and Pontecorvo. They were diehard communists. Klaus Fuchs was a physicist and atomic scientist who left Germany in 1933. John Cairncross was the secretary of Lord Hankey, one of the war ministers of the War Cabinet. Bruno Pontecorvo, was an Italian emigre and close collaborator of the famous Enrico Fermi, who, in 1942, was the first person in the world to construct a nuclear reactor (Medvedev). They send information as goodwill and on their own initiative. Much of the information passed by them was scientific in nature and only a physicist could understand them. In May-June 1942, Kaftanov reported on a letter addressed to Stalin from the physicist Flerov, who explained in a much clearer way what the atomic bomb represented, and why Germany or the USA could possess this bomb in the not too distant future (Medvedev). On hearing Kaftanov’s report, Stalin walked about a little in his Kremlin office, thought, and said ‘it is necessary to act’ (Medvedev). By this time, the intelligence departments have gathered 2000 pages of technical information regarding atomic bomb. A leader was required to conduct the nuclear program. The leader has to be familiar with intelligence departments also, because they had the information. In the autumn of 1942, several scientists were called to Moscow for consultation. But none of them were members of communist party. Amongst the academicians, the most senior were Abram Joffe, Vitali Khlopin and Pyotr Kapitsa (Medvedev). They were not very much interested in the bomb program. Young atomic scientists, Georgy Nikolayevich Flerov, Igor Vasilevich Kurchatov, Izaak Konstantinovich Kikoin, Abram Izaakovich Alikhanov and Yulii Borisovich Khariton were also called separately for consultations in Moscow that autumn. In February 1943, Stalin finally signed the decision of the State Committee of Defence (GKO) on the beginning of a programme of work in the Soviet Union to build the atomic bomb. The general responsibility of the task was entrusted to GKO vice-chairman V.M. Molotov (Medvedev). He approached several academicians to take the leadership of the project. Kurchatov showed some willingness and Molotov introduced him to secret documents and secret agents and presented him to Stalin. On 10th March 1943, Stalin signed the decision of the State Committee of Defence of the USSR on the appointment of Igor Kurchatov to the newly established post of scientific leader of work on the use of atomic energy in the USSR (Medvedev). He was also appointed as the director of the newly established scientific institute of atomic energy. Intelligence agencies provided information regarding developments in USA and how close it was to developing atomic bomb. But Soviet Union could not progress much in this regard as there was no uranium in the country. Search for uranium expanded. Professor Nikolaus Riehl, the main German expert on the production of pure uranium metal, at this time, freely agreed to meet Soviet people. He led Soviet scientists to Oranienburg, a town to the north of Berlin, where the main factory in Germany for the production of pure uranium for reactors was situated. The factory, however, had been completely destroyed by American bombers over some days before the end of the war (Medvedev). The damaged remains of the factory’s equipment were dismantled and taken to the Soviet Union. In July, the German team of Nikolaus Riehl began transforming the ‘Electrostal’ factory in the Noginsky district of Moscow into a uranium factory (Medvedev). By 1945, pure uranium was developed and the uranium-graphite experimental reactor commenced in January 1946. It was prisoners who worked in this factory. In 1950, the production of pure uranium reached one tonne a day. (Medvedev). The United States tested the first atomic bomb in the State of New Mexico on 16th July 1945 and Stalin got the information on 20 or 21 July. On July 24, President Truman told Stalin and Molotov that USA had a new highly explosive weapon. Within two weeks atom bombs were used in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. During the Yalta conference of February 1945, Stalin had agreed to join war with Japan at the insistence of USA and Britain. Stalin’s intention however has been to establish Soviet domination in the Asian region. Fuchs and Pontekorvo meanwhile reported that the production of uranium 235 and plutonium in the USA permitted the preparation of eight atomic bombs per month (Medvedev). In these new circumstances the atomic project became, for Stalin, the absolute priority (Medvedev). On August 20, 1945, Stalin signed GKO Decision No.9887. It established a new structure for the atomic project. The State Defence Committee established a ‘Special Committee’ with exceptional powers and Beria was appointed as the chairman. By the end of 1945, fifty thousand people were working for the project. Most of them were prisoners. By 1950, 700,000 were working on the nuclear project. By the middle of 1948, the nuclear reactor became operational. The successful testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb took place at a specially constructed testing range in the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan on 29 August 1949 (Medvedev). Stalin honoured the persons who helped the nuclear project. The scientists Kurchatov, Flerov, Khariton, Shchelkin, and Dollezhal received the highest award – the title of Hero of Socialist Labour and the Gold Star medal (Medvedev). The German Professor Nikolaus Riehl also received the Gold Star and the title of Hero. Works Cited Cold War: A Brief History. (2011). Retrieved March 9, 2011, from Atomic Archive: http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/coldwar/page03.shtml Klaus Fuchs (1911 - 1988). (2011). Retrieved March 9, 2011, from Atomic Archive .com: http://www.atomicarchive.com/Bios/Fuchs.shtml Krieger, D. (2005, Novemebr). Why Nations Go Nuclear. Retrieved May 9, 2011, from Nuclear Age Peace Foundation: http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/11/00_krieger-why-nations-go-nuclear.htm Medvedev, Z. A. (n.d.). Stalin and the Atomic Bomb. Retrieved March 9, 2011, from http://www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/medvedev.pdf Reed, T. C. (2010, November 19). A Political History of Nuclear Weapons. Retrieved March 9, 2010 Soviet Atomic Bomb Project. (2011). Retrieved March 10, 2011, from WorldLingo: http://www.worldlingo.com/ma/enwiki/en/Soviet_atomic_bomb_project Thomas B. Cochran, R. S. (1995). Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin. Retrieved March 10, 2011, from Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_01019501a_138.pdf Read More