Security Council and the crisis of the invasion of Kuwait - Term Paper Example

 Security Council and the crisis of the invasion of Kuwait Introduction A glance at the previous war records show us that in 2002, the then US President George Bush had asked the UN Security Council to review the situation in Iraq, in context of the repeated violations of the resolutions of the UNSC by this Middle East country. This request by the President was made, keeping in view the 1990 UN Security Council resolution that under international pressure had allowed the ‘use of force’ in order to secure Iraq’s withdrawal from the occupied Kuwaiti regions. UN Security Council, which has the chief responsibility of overseeing the conditions of peace and security, had allowed international forces against the Iraqi troops, keeping in acquiescence with the 11 resolutions that it had passed earlier. After the 1991 war ended, the UN Security Council passed another set of 12 resolutions that imposed certain tasks on the part of the United Nations, and another set of corresponding obligations for Iraq to follow. This paper will review the Security Council and the crisis of the invasion of Kuwait, and analyse the functions of this Council in relation its task of safeguarding peace and security worldwide, and will analyse the role of SC and the measures taken by it in various armed conflicts. My article would also examine various ground situations to understand if SC has managed to achieve its goals, or is it a complete failure as a body. Discussion United Nations Security Council: The UN Security Council forms to be one of the 6 primary divisions functioning under the United Nations. The Council has 15 members, of which 5 are permanent members: United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China (Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 5). These 5 permanent members have been given the veto rights on adoption of various resolutions, pertaining to substantially important matters; “Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, these five Permanent Members have been given the power to veto actions favored by even a majority of the Security Council (that is, a single "No" vote from any one of these five kills any action otherwise accepted by a majority of the full Council)” (The Green Papers Worldwide- The UN Security Council, 2010). The other 10 members have a non-permanent seat and are elected by the members of the UN General Assembly; and each one of them is given a two year seat that starts from 1st January. It has been so arranged that 5 of the non-permanent members are replaced each year. From 1st January 2010 till 31st December 2011, the five members that have taken their seats are Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Gabon; Lebanon; and Nigeria. The other 5 members whose terms are ending on the 31st December 2010 are Austria, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, and Uganda. The countries that will be replacing them on 1st January 2011 are Germany, South Africa, India, Columbia, and Portugal and they will have their seats till 31st December 2012 (ibid). Under Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has been vested with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and order, and Article 25 declares all the member states to be under obligation to follow the decisions as meted out by the Council, “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter” (Charter of the United Nations, Article 25). Under Chapter VII we find that there are outlines given for the upkeep of international peace and order, which include enforcement actions not accommodating the use of force, and there are also mentions of action that include the use of force. In this chapter under Article 39, we find that the drafters of this UN charter of 1945, mention that when faced with conditions that implicate “existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” the Council will have to find suitable measures to deal with the crisis, and if necessary also use “armed forces” (Article 43, 1). “Of the 18 resolutions authorizing the use of force directly or implicitly and passed by the Council between 1945 and May 1999, we found that the word “force” was used five times” (Browne, CRS-2). Besides use of ‘armed force’, the UNSC is also authorised to investigate any international situation that it thinks may have pose to be a threat for worldwide peace and security. The Security Council can suggest various procedures as resolutions, for peacefully solving a dispute. The UNSC also has the authority to ask its member states to completely cut off all kinds of diplomatic and economic relations, and stop all other forms of communications through air, water, postal service, and even via the radio, with a country that it finds has breached the peace resolution. On 28th April 2006, the UNSC passed another resolution that aimed at protecting the civilians that come under the war zone. Under this resolution the UNSC takes the responsibility of providing all kinds of protection from “all acts of violence or abuses committed against civilians in situations of armed conflict in violation of applicable international obligations with respect, in particular, to (i) torture and other prohibited treatment, (ii) gender-based and sexual violence, (iii) violence against children, (iv) the recruitment and use of child soldiers, (v) trafficking in humans, (vi) forced displacement, and (vii) the intentional denial of humanitarian assistance”(UN Security Council SC/8710, 2006). Till 1999, we find that the UN Security Council have found only four situations that it deemed as suitable for authorizing the use of armed forces. In 1950 during a war between the North and South Korea the UNSC found the situation to be an act that threatened peace in that region. It passed Resolution 83 (1950) on 27th June 1950, which authorised the ‘use of force’ and called upon its member states to move in and help South Korea. Again in 1982, Resolution 502 was passed when the UNSC decided that a peace breach had been affected in the region of the Falkland Islands, after the Argentine aggression. The third instance was in 1987, during the Iraq-Iran war when resolution 598 was adopted; and fourthly in the adoption of resolution 660 in 1990, where it was deemed that there was a “breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait” (Shaw, 1124). The UN Security Council gave sanction to four peacekeeping operations, under the capacity of UN, to use ‘force or its equivalent’ as and when deemed necessary. These were the UNPROFOR (U.N. Protection Force) in Bosnia and Herzegovina; U.N. Operation in the Congo), UNPROFOR in Croatia; and UNOSOM II (U.N. Operation in Somalia). The UNSC also authorized six coalition operations (not under the capacity of UN), to use ‘force or its equivalent’ as and when necessary. These were the: Operation Turquoise in Rwanda under French command; Persian Gulf coalition of nations assisting Kuwait, the Unified Task Force in Somalia, and the Multinational Force in Haiti, all under U.S. command; and the operation during the Bosnian war under NATO where the operation was undertaken to invoke Dayton accords — SFOR (Stabilization Force) and IFOR (Implementation Force). There have been various disputes as to whether these resolutions passed by the UNSC have any legal standing in the International Court of Justice. It is generally agreed that resolutions adopted under the UN Charter chapter VII under the heading Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression are obligatory on its member states and hence legally binding. However the main contention is about chapter VI, known as Pacific Settlement of Disputes, which most experts UN feel that have no legal binding in a true sense. Here Sands, Klein and Bowett tell us “One final point must be noted in connection with Chapter VI, and that is that the powers of the Security Council are to make "recommendations" (Sands, Klein and Bowett, 46). Thus ‘recommendations’ mean only ‘advises’ that are not legally binding to the members states, and article 25 under chapter VI mentions only of ‘decisions’. As Prof. Schott opines “Though certainly possessing judicial language, without the legally binding force of Chapter VII, such declarations were at worst political and at best advisory" (Schott, 56). However there are opposing views too, like Prof. Zunes feels that such interpretations always “[do] not mean that resolutions under Chapter VI are merely advisory, however. These are still directives by the Security Council and differ only in that they do not have the same stringent enforcement options, such as the use of military force” (Zunes, 291). While adopting a resolution, if the UNSC fails to reach a consensus, then they can also issue a ‘Presidential Statement’, that is legally non-binding in nature and is a means of applying political pressure, to drive home the point that UNSC is keeping a watch, and further stringent actions may follow if steps are not taken by the offending country to bring back peace in that particular region. UNSC have faced severe criticisms, where it has been said that the five permanent members of the Security Council have formed a sort of ‘closed club’, that take care only of their country’s personal needs, while remaining blind towards the plight of those countries that do appear to serve them in any respect. The UNSC faced strong opposition when it decided to rush into protecting Kuwait that was an oil rich country; while turning a blind eye towards Rwanda, a poor country without any natural resources to serve these ‘5 permanent members’. In this context we will examine the UNSC’s role in the Kuwaiti /Gulf war of 1991. UNSC’s role in the 1991 gulf war: Kuwait, an oil rich country, had been invaded by Iraq under Saddam Hussein on 1-2 August 1990, with the aim of annexing Kuwait to Iraq, so that the latter could earn rich dividends from the flourishing oil trade (Iraq’s economy had taken a complete nosedive after Iraq-Iran war of 1987). However this action sparked international outrage, and under pressure from its member states, the UNSC sprang into action. Between 2nd of August, and 31st of December 1990, the Security Council adopted 12 resolutions all under Chapter VII. “After condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanding Iraq’s withdrawal in Resolution 660 (1990), the Council decided in Resolution 661 (1990) to impose economic sanctions against Iraq and occupied Kuwait as a means of securing compliance by Iraq with Resolution 660 (1990). In Resolution 665 (1990), the Council authorized states with maritime forces in the area... [And] Finally, in Resolution 678 (1990), the Council authorized states “to use all necessary means” to implement previous Council resolutions” (Browne, CRS-3). After the war was over, the Ceasefire Resolution 687 was made, which turned out be the most extensive resolution ever made by the Council since its inception. Resolution 688 which was made under humanitarian grounds was nothing more than a direct infringement on Iraq’s internal matters. “Iraq was obliged to accept onto its territory teams of inspectors in search of weapons of mass destruction that were to be destroyed and/or removed. Iraq was obliged to accept international assistance for the housing, protection, and feeding of the segments of its population that had been subjected to and fled from gross human rights violations inflicted by the Iraqi government” (ibid). Thus, massive steps were taken to humiliate Iraq; yet UNSC kept mum when during the Darfur crisis the Sudanese government hired terrorists and killed thousands from a particular group of ethnic community. Again, during the Srebrenica mass murders, when Serbians were killing the Bosnians by thousands, in a region declared safe by UNSC, the SC turned a blind eye and a deaf ear. Most critics are of the view that the five permanent members, that also have the ‘veto vote’ are more interested in representing their government’s interest without taking into account the interests of their own common people; and it is of little wonder that these five members are also known to be the biggest dealers in arms and ammunitions, worldwide. Thus, one can say that UNSC is a undemocratic body, governed by five permanent members that are only interested in filling their own coffers. Many critics have suggested that either the permanent group must also include non-nuclear member states (Shourie, India makes strong case for UNSC expansion), or this group must be done away with permanently (Global Policy Forum, Statement by Ambassador Allan Rock,). Even the practice of the private meetings of the permanent members and the presentation of their resolution to the Council members as one single team, has also drawn severe criticisms from almost all quarters. Thus, we find that UNSC as a body has failed to take effective measures against the real perpetrators of crimes that relate to genocide, mass murders; and has become a body, (thorough its faulty voting system where the five permanent members are given the powers of vetoing), which serves to function only in the interest (mainly economic) of the permanent five members. Conclusion The UNSC which had been created with the novel aim of overseeing and safeguarding worldwide peace and security has completely failed to function effectively, since its governing and decision making powers have gone into the hands of the ‘Permanent Five’. Until UNSC expands to break this ‘cosy club of five countries’ to include more members; or does away completely with the concept of having ‘five permanent members’, and gives all its members equal say; there are very little chances of the UNSC functioning in a correct and ethical manner towards the upkeep of world peace and security. Works Cited Browne, M. The United Nations Security Council – Its Role in the Iraq Crisis: A Brief Overview. CRS Report for Congress. 18th March 2003. Web. 22 November 2010. http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21323.pdf. Charter of the United Nations. Chapter 5: The Security Council. 2010. Web. 22nd November 2010. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml Global Policy Forum. Statement by Ambassador Allan Rock. 12th July 2005. Web 22nd November 2010. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/200/41375.html Sands, P., Klein, P., and Bowett, D. Bowett's law of international institutions. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001. Print. Schott, J. Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council Action and the Regulative Ideal of Emergency. Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights. Volume 6, Issue 1, Fall 2007, 24-80. Print. Shaw, M. International Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print. Shourie, D. India makes strong case for UNSC expansion. 13th November 2005. Web. 22nd November 2020. http://web.archive.org/web/20060709065814/http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/6640_1544815,001600320005.htm The Green Papers Worldwide The United Nations Security Council. 2010. Web. 22nd November 2010. http://www.thegreenpapers.com/ww/UNSecurityCouncil.phtml UN Security Council SC/8710. Importance of Preventing Conflict Through Development, Democracy Stressed, As Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 1674. 28th April 2006. Web. 22nd November 2010. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8710.doc.htm Zunes, S. International law, the UN and Middle Eastern conflicts. Peace Review, Volume 16, Issue 3 September 2004, 285 – 292. Print. Read More