Analysis of Operation Overlord - Article Example

OPERATION OVERLORD Operation Overland was one of the great military undertakings of all time. In the of a single day the Allied troops stormedthe beaches at Normandy, establishing a foothold in France, and spelling out the beginning of the end for Nazi Germany. But was the method and strategy employed by the Allies—in particular the British and Americans—completely perfect? And how did the strategy evolve over time? These and other important questions are asked and answered by Adrian R. Lewis in his article “The Failure of Planning and Doctrine for Operation Overlord: The Case of Minefield and Obstacle Clearance.” Lewis’s essential thesis in the course of this article is as follows: the doctrine underlying the British and American attack on Omaha Beach on D-Day was one of the worst possible doctrines under the circumstances. It required an amphibious assault and the clearing of mines and obstacles while underfire. Either of the two more traditional doctrines—involving either a night-time attack behind enemy lines (using paratroopers), or a massive assault with American power—would have been better. The reason for this bad doctrine—underlying the amphibious assault and the large casualties sustained—occurred because the British and Americans were somewhat new to working with each other and felt the Normandy landings were a unique situation that required a unique solution to solve it. Lewis’ thesis is clear throughout the article and he sticks to the point of the article closely. Lewis marshals a wide array of significant facts to make this case. He has done a lot of historical research using both primary and secondary research materials. I could also be said that the paper is organized in an analytical manner. Lewis is intent on learning why certain key decision makers made the decisions that they did. What motivated the American and British armies to take their respective positions? How did they not see the problems on the horizon that appeared to be so obvious? These are key questions that Lewis wants to answer. He attempts to do this by analyzing individual decision and following them up the chain to see how they appear in aggregate form. In so doing, he paints a picture of how exactly the Western Front was opened and managed by the Allies. While the article is well-written, it is a little specific and detail-oriented. Many of the figures written about would be unfamiliar to a contemporary or general audience. Many acronyms are left unexplained. When Lewis gets into the details of the engineering tactics, the reader requires a serious amount of sustained attention to follow exactly what is being said. The article is definitely intended for an audience that knows a lot about the Allies operations during the Second World War. It would not be appropriate for students, only for serious historians. It’s subject matter is especially narrow and of little interest to someone who is even interested in Operation Overlord as a whole. Indeed, while the article makes a contribution to the topic under consideration, one of the immediate questions that comes to mind is: is this article necessary or relevant. In what way can Operation Overlord be considered or called a “failure”? While there may have been dispute over doctrine, etc, and while many more lives and materiel may have been lost than hoped, the mission did succeed against powerful odds, and contribute in a significant way to the defeat of Nazi Germany. So that is in part a concern with the article’s argument. The approach is definitely military and political. Lewis clearly understands the dictates and strategies of military life and how they are sometimes interfered, emphasized, or exploited by political figures. He quotes extensively from military figures and strategist and has a good sense of how they fit into the picture. He paints a picture, to some extent, of the actions on D-Day and how the Allied powers planned it both politically and militarily. He also has a very good sense of what was at stake on that day. A thread runs through the article which suggests how vital this moment was in the history of the Second World War. It is evident that Lewis believes D-Day and Operation Overlord were a kind of hinge upon which the rest of the war swung—which is why he is interested so much in the minutiae of it all. Does he appear to be biased at all? If he is biased at all it would be towards perfectionism. One thing Lewis does not seem to understand very well is that both political and military institutions are complicated and bureaucratic organizations. They are run by human beings who routinely make mistakes. When he asks why one doctrine was chosen over another he seems surprised to encounter serious imperfections in the Allied armies. Indeed, there were, just as there were in any army. There is also a tendency in this article to use hindsight to judge actions taken 65 years ago. As an historian, Lewis has a lot more material and research available to him than the individual doing the planning for Operation Overlord at the time. That has biased him to some extent. One thing, however, which cannot be denied is that Lewis’ sources appear to be excellent. A large portion of them are primary sources and actual military reports. One thing that he might have done to make it interesting would be to interview contemporary army engineers and ask their opinions of how the doctrine appears looking back; while this might be a bit off topic, it might also provide insight into why the decisions that were made back then were made. Operation Overlord and the landing on D-Day are vital subjects of historical interest. They mark the opening of the Western Front against Nazi Germany and the beginning of the end of that odious regime. The decisions taken on that day influence our lives up to the present moment. By examining why those decisions were made, Lewis has made an interesting contribution to the historical record and lifted the curtain on a number of useful and important Allied military doctrines. Read More