To What Extent Was the Conclusion of the Suez Crisis Based on the Work of Eisenhower - Research Paper Example

To What Extent Was the Conclusion of the Suez Crisis Based on the Work of Eisenhower? 1. Introduction The development of the Suez Crisis in 1956 can be characterized as the result of the long term political conflicts between the West and the Middle East especially regarding the administration and the control over key geographic regions – in terms of their value for commercial but also for military activities. In accordance with the report of Hahn (2008) ‘the origins of the crisis can be traced to the Arab-Israeli conflict that swept the region during the late 1940s and to the wave of decolonization that swept the globe in the middle 20th century, which caused conflict between imperial powers and emergent nations’ (Hahn, 2008, online article). In other words, the appearance of the crisis can be described as rather expected – taking into consideration the volatile climate throughout the discussions on foreign policies adopted by states worldwide during the specific decade – two world wars had already finished but the initiatives of states worldwide during the recovery phase had to be closely controlled and evaluated ensuring the promotion of specific political and financial interests. The Suez Crisis has been also related with the Cold War. In fact, it is stated that ‘the Cold War bargain of 1949-50, and thus the Western bloc architecture, was challenged in 1956 and 1962-63; the Suez Crisis and the SKYBOLT Affair are classic examples of intra-bloc conflict; the crisis year 1956 witnessed a European challenge to the bipolar order of the Cold War’ (Dietl, 2008, 259). In accordance with the above view, the Suez crisis (see Figure 1 below) appeared and developed because of the need of Europe to intervene in the conflict between USA and Russia gaining specific benefits – the improvement of its position in the international community – referring to the decision taking process regarding issues that have a strategic importance globally - could be one of these benefits. The Suez Crisis cannot be characterized as having the extension or the characteristics of modern military – political conflicts (e.g. Iraq); however, the specific crisis can be used as an example of the effectiveness of the decisions/ strategies of politicians under specific conditions. In the specific crisis, the role of politicians from three states – Egypt, Britain and USA – has been highlighted; Eisenhower (President USA), Nasser (President of Egypt) and Sir Anthony Eden (Prime Minister of Britain). The reasons for the appearance of the crisis and its development are analytically presented further on. Figure 1 – Photo presenting a conflict within the context of the Suez Crisis – ‘Aerial view of two of the vessels scuttled by the Egyptians in Port Said at the entrance to the Suez Canal in order to prevent any shipping movements. On the right, a British vessel specially equipped for refloating operations’ (source: http://www.ena.lu/suez_crisis_1956-020703596.html) – photo n. 3596 It seems that the Suez Crisis was not resulted only because of the initiatives of Nasser (President of Egypt at that period); it was rather the result of the co-existence of strong financial interests of many states on a particular region – the Suez Canal. The control of the specific region/ canal was considered to be of strategic importance for the increase of financial and political power of the states involved in the crisis. 2. Appearance - Development of the Crisis In order to understand the reasons for the development of the Suez Crisis it is necessary to refer primarily to the political conditions of that specific period – referring to the specific region. The Suez Canal was under the control of Britain up to 1956 (June 13) when Britain decided to terminate its occupation over the specific region. Shortly after this decision, on June 23 of 1956, Nasser is elected as the President of Egypt and decides to nationalize the Suez Canal – just one month after his nomination as a President of the country, i.e. on July 26 of 1956 (see the timeline presented in the African History website). Different views have been presented regarding the appearance and the development of the specific crisis. In accordance with the speech of R. Owen – Middle East history department, Harvard University – ‘the crisis, was a very grubby and short-lived affair; there was no real occupation, no invasion—nothing that can compare with Iraq at the moment but it is difficult to think of any part of the world not involved in what essentially began as a feud between Sir Anthony Eden and Nasser’ (Symposium on the Hungary-Suez Crisis, 2006, online article). In accordance with the above view, the Suez Crisis has been the result of the conflict – at a personal level – between the British Prime Minister and the President of Egypt at that period. A primary approach of the events related with the crisis could lead to such an assumption – at least at a primary stage. The decision of Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal has been a fact of critical importance for the development of the crisis. For this reason it should be necessary to identify the reasons that led the President of Egypt to the specific decision – in terms of the approaches used but also of the targets set. After having examined the specific conflict, Mattern (2001) was led to the conclusion that the use of negotiations was of high importance for the end of the crisis in the specific region. However, it has been also proved that during the particular crisis ‘both states relied on nonphysical but forceful expressions of power to `fasten' their identity against the disintegrating effects of their dispute; one effect was to stabilize the security community and preserve nonviolent order’ (Mattern, 2001, 349). The above researcher refers exclusively to the strategic approaches used by politicians in Britain and USA for the resolution of the problem. It is suggested that the methods used by these states for ending the crisis can be characterized as effective – an assumption also justified by the fact that at the end the crisis was ended with no extensive damages – referring to losses of human lives but also to the financial consequences on the Egypt’s economy. The appearance and the development of the Suez Crisis should be related with the existence of key interests in the administration of the region because of its importance for military and commercial purposes – as already explained above. Both British and USA wanted to ensure that the Suez canal would remain under the control of the international community – i.e. there was no direct administration of the Suez canal from a specific state. However, Britain followed a more aggressive strategy towards the decision of Nasser to nationalize the specific region. In this context, Britain with the support of France and Israel developed a military attack – indirectly - against Egypt. It could be doubted whether Britain would proceed to the specific action in case that her allies would not agree. In accordance with the study of Mc Namara (2000, 619) ‘Britain's interests in the Middle East, which were primarily the protection of oil, the maintenance of a balance of power and the containment of Nasser, became dependent on an Israeli military victory’ intervention would have had much too high a political and economic cost; likewise, the USA came to much the same conclusion, which was why both nations secretly welcomed the Israeli victory’. In other words, the actions against Egypt were administered and control by the Anglo-American politicians even if the military attacks themselves were developed by Israel. The efforts of British and French to take the control of Suez Canal has been considered to have similarities with other – modern military interventions in the international community – specifically that of Iraq. However, significant differences have been identified between the methods used during the above projects. In this context it is noticed that ‘there is also one crucial difference: Far from leading the attack (or orchestrating the deception), the White House was enraged, with President Eisenhower asking Eden, ``Anthony, have you gone out of your mind?"’ (The Boston Globe, 2006, online article). The above report proves that at that period, the use of military forces as a tool for the achievement of specific strategic targets was avoided; negotiations were preferred instead. In the case of the specific conflict, negotiations have been engaged in the efforts for resolving the crisis but there was no result. In other words, in the crisis of Suez, military attacks were used only after the failure of negotiations among the parties involved. Through the above issues, it is made clear that the Suez crisis was a fact that proved the existence of strong strategic interests in the area. Up to the decision of Nasser to nationalize the region, there was no particular interest (at least this was the impression) of the global community (especially of USA, Israel and France) in the administration and the control of the Canal. Even Britain that had the total control over the Canal left the region without stating any interest for the maintenance of its power of control on the region – at any level – in the future. However, through the decision of Nasser to nationalize the region, the intentions of the above four countries regarding the control of Suez Canal were revealed. There were countries, like the USA, that had a limited intervention in the management of the crisis – at least this assumption could be made by the fact that other states like Britain and Israel were directly involved in the specific conflict. However, the conclusion of the crisis in Suez led to the assumption that the role of other states, especially of the USA, in the resolution of the problem was more important and critical that was initially estimated. The decisions of Eisenhower – the President of USA – during the specific period helped towards the conclusion of the crisis in Suez under the terms explained in the next section. 3. The role of Eisenhower in the conclusion of the crisis in Suez In the beginning of the conflict regarding the control of the region, the role of USA could not be clearly understood – the President Eisenhower asked the Israeli Prime Minister (Global Security, 2008) to make his best in order to keep the peace in the area – Eisenhower’s willing for the promotion of peace and the avoidance of any military intervention unless if absolutely necessary has been proved in many cases that similar conflicts were developed in the international community. However, the development of the military intervention of Israel in the region could not be avoided. For this reason, the US naval troops in the greater Mediterranean region were put in alert after the decision of Israel to proceed with the attack. In fact, Israel had already completed its military intervention in the area by the 5th of October – the message of Eisenhower that followed – about the 28th of October did not have any particular effect on the crisis. For this reason, British and French politicians decided to proceed to a joint effort in order to take back the control of the Canal. It was at this point that USA entered the crisis drastically. In the 29th of October 1956 ‘the British government issued an Anglo-French ultimatum calling on the Israelis and Egyptians to withdraw their forces to a distance of 10 miles from the Suez Canal and demanding that Egypt allow British and French forces to temporarily occupy key positions guarding the canal’ (Global Security, 2008, online article). USA had to support its allies. Indeed the naval forces of USA that were kept close to the region – as explained before – were asked to protect the British naval forces that had already started their military attacks against Egypt in order to force Nasser to leave the administration of the Canal in the international community. Up to that point, the intervention of Eisenhower in the conclusion of the crisis seems to be limited. However, the role of the specific politician in the success of the strategic decisions of British and French – as allies – has been quite important. The efforts of Eisenhower to achieve the conclusion of the crisis without the intervention of military attacks were however proved inadequate. In the end, Eisenhower had to follow the common policy of USA regarding the appearance and the development of conflicts in the global community; this policy focuses on the use of military forces for the conclusion of crises worldwide. Indeed, the study of Howard (1972) led to the assumption that ‘while the Eisenhower administration did not alter any of the basic foundations of American policy in the Middle East during 1953-61, for a brief period it did maintain an evenhanded and balanced position in the Arab-Israel conflict which has not been achieved since’ (Howard, 1972, 85). In other words, even if based on the use of military forces the intervention of USA in Suez was not common with the country’s participation in similar disputes. Military forces were again a critical tool for the conclusion of the crisis; however, the use of military attacks throughout the crisis was limited and appropriately evaluated; for this reason, the conclusion of the crisis was achieved within a short period – if compared with other conflicts in the international community that remain unsolved for many years even if military forces are used for their conclusion. There are many issues to be considered in order to explain the strategy followed by USA throughout the administration of crisis in Suez. In fact, different approaches have been used by theorists and political analysts worldwide when trying to identify the reasons that led Eisenhower to avoid an extensive involvement in the specific crisis. In accordance with a report published in the Boston Gloge ‘the reaction in Washington was conditioned by domestic political considerations: The Anglo-French landings took place on the day before the presidential election, with Eisenhower running for a second term; to complicate matters further, the Hungarian rising erupted, and was savagely suppressed by the Soviets; Eisenhower didn't need one international crisis on his hands come Election Day, let alone two’ (The Boston Globe, 2006, online article). In other words, at that specific period – November of 1956 – Eisenhower had to deal with two different international conflicts. The issue of Hungary was considered to offer to Russians a strategic advantage – if the latter were to participate in the conclusion of that crisis while the issue of Suez involved in a conflict in which major allies of NATO – i.e. Britain and French – actively participated. In fact, both Britain and French had already decided to proceed to military attacks in order to get the control of the region. Under these terms, Eisenhower, had to think the potential consequences of any strategic decision and act with no delay. On the other hand, the choice of a military intervention in Egypt – supporting the allies – could be proved to be of critical importance for the presidency of Eisenhower – who at that period had to face the elections for keeping his position. It is for this reason that the direct involvement of USA in the crisis was chosen as the most appropriate solution. In accordance with the study of Filipink (2007, 173) ‘the Americans clearly sought to avoid a military confrontation over the Egyptian seizure of the canal; when the British and French colluded with Israel to precipitate a military confrontation, the Americans cracked down economically on their allies to force a UN-sponsored resolution which left the United States as the dominant power in the region’. In other words, Eisenhower even used the financial power of USA in order to force British to avoid the invasion of the area using military forces. Regarding this issue, it should be made clear that the result of the conflict could not be identified in advance; despite the fact that the military forces of Britain and France were stronger than those of Egypt, there was still the risk of the development of a greater crisis in case that other countries of the region would decide to participate in the conflict supporting Egypt. The above issues had to be taken into consideration by Eisenhower before deciding any military intervention in the greater region having in mind that USA should respond appropriately in a potential military attack of Russia against Hungary – the Hungarian Revolution was also in progress at that particular period. All these issues have been examined by Boyle (2005) who made clear that ‘the Hungarian Revolution and the military phase of the Suez Crisis occurred virtually contemporaneously in the last week of October and the first week of November 1956; the interconnections were of particular importance in explaining the depth of bitterness in the rift between Britain and the United States over the Suez Crisis’ (Boyle, 2005, 550). Overall, it seems that the co-existence of the specific conflicts and the development of elections in USA were the main factors influencing the behaviour of Eisenhower throughout the particular events. 4. Conclusion The decision of Eisenhower to avoid a direct involvement in the Suez crisis has been considered to be a weakness in administering critical events but also an indication of his intentions regarding the administration of internal and external issues during his presidency. In accordance with Howard (1972, 85) ‘wisely or otherwise, the Eisenhower administration continued a policy of regional security which centered not on the projects for a Middle East Command (MEC) or Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), but on the Northern Tier states of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, and even Pakistan’ (Howard, 1972, 85). In accordance with the above study, the behaviour of Eisenhower during the development of the Suez crisis was not indicative of his intention to avoid a risk of failure during the presidential elections in USA; it was rather an effort to keep the existing policy of USA regarding the zone of military interventions – as the area described by Howard (above) could be characterized. USA strategy focuses on the development of military interventions in specific areas around the world; in other areas, the participation of the country in military conflicts is avoided. At least this is an assumption made in accordance with the behaviour of Eisenhower at that specific period – as the issue is presented by Howard. In the case of Suez crisis, Eisenhower preferred to avoid the participation of his country in the military attacks developed in the region as these attacks represented – basically – the interests of Britain and French in the area. For this reason, there was no particular benefit for USA to be involved in the specific crisis. The above assumption is also supported by Worrall (2007) who noticed that British politicians even pressed Libya to let British troops to pass from its territory in order to administer more effectively their military attacks against Egypt. Libya denied such an arrangement – a fact that could have possibly led to an extended crisis in the area. In case that USA had also participated actively in the specific crisis there was the risk of the development of many different ‘fronts’ with all the following consequences in terms of human and financial losses for all states involved. In fact, the development of the Suez crisis could be characterized as the consequence of the ‘decolonization’ of the region. British politicians could not accept that the control over the region was to be totally lost. Indeed in the study of Gordon (2000) it is noticed that ‘the `retreat from empire' was not so much a simple, reflexive response to demands from below but a conscious effort by those from above to find new ways of exploiting the opportunities that the world beyond Europe offered them’ (Gordon, 2000, 403). In other words, the Suez crisis was an issue involved more with Britain – the decisions of Eisenhower throughout the crisis can be considered as justified as there was no direct relationship between the specific region and USA’s strategic interests. The fact that Britain decided to proceed with the conflict even with the negative consequences on its economy – due to the specific crisis – proves the above assumption. In fact, in accordance with the study of Klug et al. (1999, 181) ‘‘support of sterling at its Bretton Woods lower bound lost credibility as early as July of 1956; reserve losses also are consistent with an exchange rate crisis; the Bank of England's interventions reacted strongly both to official sterling and to the transferable sterling market in New York’. In other words, even under the severe pressure by USA to stop the military attacks in Egypt, Britain kept on progressing with its strategic plans in the region as major interests – of Britain - were under risk. Through the above issues, it is made clear that Eisenhower’s decisions regarding the specific crisis were absolutely justified – under the political conditions of that specific period but also the risk involved in the particular conflict – case of an expansion of the crisis in the region surrounding the Suez Canal under the terms explained above. 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