Major External Threats to the Ottoman Empire - Essay Example

Major External Threats to the Ottoman Empire Number Department Introduction The term, Ottoman Empire historically refers to Turkey or the Turkish Empire. It is also referred to as the Ottoman Turkish, to denote a state that the Turkish tribes founded in 1299, in the north-western Anatolia, under the leadership of Osman Bey. The Ottoman Turkish became an empire proper, after Mehmed II’s conquest of Constantinople in 1453. Nevertheless, even after centuries of great strength, towards the end of the 19th century (1878-1900), the Ottoman Empire began to experience an array of external challenges. These are the very challenges for which it was referred to as the sick man of Europe. This discussion therefore seeks to dissect these external challenges and how the empire responded to them. The Consequence of the Russo-Ottoman War Reid explains that in the period between 1878 and 1900, the Ottoman Empire was still grappling with the negative aftereffects of its previous involvement with war against her external enemies, Poland, Persia, Russia and Austria in the period between 1768 and 1774. Moreover, the terms of the treaty that ended this war did not auger well with the Ottoman Empire’s interests. Particularly, the Kuchuk-Kaynarja Treaty which was intended to end the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774: granted independence to the Trans-Danubian provinces; forced the Ottoman Empire to abandon the Tartar Khanate which was in the Crimea; compelled the empire to pay large war remunerations; and gave Russian ships permission to access the Ottoman water bodies. The 1870s therefore found the empire grappling with these setbacks and carried them onwards1. Problems Arising From the Consequences of the Greek War of Independence Additionally, the empire was still reeling from the effects of the Greek War of Independence which had taken place between 1821 and 1832. At the Battle of Navarino, the Anglo-French destroyed the Egyptian and Ottoman fleets, as the Russian troops captured swathes of the empire’s territories upto to Erdine. It is against the backdrop of the development that the Ottoman power attracted greater extents of vulnerability. This vulnerability was in turn underscored by the glaring attractiveness of the empire’s vast holdings to other players in international relations and thereby complicating the status and fate of the Eastern Question. As these problems persisted, Tsar Nicholas I of Prussia referred to the empire as the Sick man of Europe. From this point, the Concert of Europe was mainly concerned about how the Ottoman Empire could be disposed off in a manner that would not gain any power, at the expense of other powers, so as not to disturb the balance of political power in European politics and diplomacy. The Loss of External Territorial Blocks Such as Herzegovina and Bosnia Because of the aforementioned glaring attractiveness of the empire’s vast holdings and the empire’s vulnerability, the decisions that were made in the Concert of Europe became hegemonic towards the Ottoman Empire, than fair. For instance, when the Congress of Berlin was called in 1878 because of the Ottoman Empire’s refusal to accept Russia’s dominant position in the Balkans, Romania and Serbia became recognised as fully autonomous states as two of the Ottoman provinces, Herzegovina and Bosnia became placed under the administration of Austria. Additionally, Cyprus was also made part of the British protectorate, though its status as a portion of the Ottoman Empire was technically maintained. As the Scramble and Partition for Africa loomed large, Britain began to occupy Egypt as France seized Tunisia and Algeria in 1882. Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria were part of the larger Ottoman Empire. The Inability to Maintain Trade Routes In another wavelength, Pamuk2 waxes polemical that the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century had a dual economy which comprised a small commercial sector that was linked to the European market and was under the management of foreign interests on one hand, and a large subsistence sector on the other hand. It is for this same reason that foreign investors are the parties that built the empire’s first railway networks to help transport cash crops from the coastal valleys of Anatolia such as grapes and tobacco to Smyrna for export and processing. However, the Ottoman Empire lacked proper reforms and logistics for maintaining a modern army. This heightened expenditure to the point of exceeding tax revenues. The empire’s effort to strengthen the treasury by borrowing from foreign banks and to make payments on older loans by tasking newer loans also compounded the empire’s financial distress. The culmination of this state of affair was the Porte surrendering its administration of Ottoman debt to a commission which was representing foreign investors in 1881. This commission collected the empire’s public revenue and transferred directly, the receipts obtained therefrom to creditors in Europe3. The Empire’s Failure to Unify Locals with Ottomans in Diaspora Lewis4 contends that there are a group of young intellectuals who sought to dissolve this barrage of external challenges that accosted the Ottoman Empire by forming the Young Ottoman Movement. This movement was popular among the western-oriented and aligned intellectuals who were interested in seeing the Ottoman Empire accepted by European powers as an equal player in international relations and politics. The rationale behind this approach is that the acceptance of the Ottoman Empire as an equal partner would not only inspire mutual respect from the Concert of Europe, but that the same would compel Europe to sincerely succour the Ottoman Empire without pandering to its hegemonic tendencies. Nevertheless, this move failed to produce its intended results. The movers and shakers of this Young Ottoman movement clamoured for the adoption of Western political institutions which included an efficient centralised government, a written constitution and an elected parliament. This kind of Ottomanism also was interested in an integrated dynastic state which was to make Islam ancillary to secular interests and to allow non-Muslim subjects the chance to participate in the politics of decision making in the representative parliamentary institutions. Negative Effects of External Battles with Bulgaria and Greece Conversely, the unrests that were taking place in Eastern Rumelia did not help matters at all. Particularly, Rumelia led the powers in Europe to insist on the union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria in 1885. At the time, the Bulgarian and Greek partisans were proceeding with their running battles against the Ottoman army which was in Macedonia. Additionally, the repression of the revolutionary elements and activities in Armenia between 1894 and 1896 cost the Ottoman Empire over 300,000 lives. This state of affairs compelled European powers to court anti-Ottoman opinions and policies. At the same time, external support for a rebellion against Crete also compelled Porte to make a declaration of war on Greece in 1897. The Ottoman Empire tried to handle the situation by facing the war head-on. However, this approach was not wholly helpful. This is because, even though the Ottoman infantry vanquished the Greeks significantly in Thrace, yet powers in Europe forced about a compromise peace. This compromise peace kept Crete under Ottoman suzerainty while inaugurating the son of the king of Greece as the governor. The Inability to Win the Support of Major Powers in Europe Likewise, the Ottoman Empire attempted to solve its external problems by trying as hard as possible to maintain its cordial relations with Germany. The rationale behind this approach is that the Ottoman Empire had been getting increasingly isolated in Europe and that Germany could bargain for the empire’s cause, since Germany was both powerful and a long time ally. This is especially true, in light of the fact that Germany, through its friendship, had offered Abdul Hamid II a congenial recourse to French and British intervention. Resultantly, in 1902, Germany was given a 99 year concession to construct and manage the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway connection. In as much as Germany did not disappoint by continuing to invest in the economy of the Ottoman Empire and managed command and training stations in the Ottoman army, yet the support of Germany alone did not suffice, in the politics of Europe which was still inclusive of other powers such as France and Britain5. The Discord among Turks as Citizens of the Ottoman Empire Another problem which accosted the Ottoman Empire is the ubiquitous manner in which the Turks and the Turkish speaking people were distributed in and outside the empire. This ubiquitous distribution of these people became instrumental in fostering discord among the Turks. Specifically, opposition to the sultan’s rule persisted and manifested itself among liberal members of the elite and westernised intellectuals. Because of this, whereas others advocated for Ottomanism, others clamoured in favour of pan-Turanism. Pan-Turanism referred to the union of Turkic speakers inside and outside he Ottoman Empire. Ziya Gokalp, the Turkish nationalist ideologist and writer defined Turkish nationalism as a value that existed within the context of the Ottoman Empire. The crux of the matter herein is that the empire suffered yet another setback as those who were in Diaspora began to feel less integral to the empire. At least for the first time, debates on who was more Ottoman than others had began. This development above put him in a position parallel to his contemporaries, since he had called for the adoption of the vernacular, in lieu of the Ottoman Turkic. It is against this backdrop that some scholars such as Hanioglu see in Gokalp’s work, advocacy for a national Turkish state whereby western values and folk culture would dispense an equally important role that was to foreshadow events that would take place at least 25 years into the next century6. Conclusion In a nutshell, the case of the Ottoman Empire makes it imperative to acknowledge the fact that any state can neither exist nor thrive in isolation or under inimical external environments. Although the empire fell because of an amalgamation of internal and external factors, yet it is also true that the shambolic manner in which the Ottoman Empire left its foreign affairs dissuaded it from earning favour from key players in European relations and politics. Similarly, it is the same mistake of not ameliorating its external affairs that prevented the Ottoman Empire from securing its trade routes also cost the empire its economic and strategic interests. When World War I materialised, the many wars and rebellion the Ottoman Empire faced had left it too weak to remain. References Geyikdagi, Necla. Foreign Investment in the Ottoman Empire: International Trade and Relations. (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2000), 165 Hanioglu, Sukru. A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire. (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 129. Lewis, Bernard. 1988. The Political Language of Islam. (London/ Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 122. Pamuk, Sevket. 1987. The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913. (Cambridge: CUP, 1987), 232. Pamuk, Sevket. A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire. (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 215. Reid, James. 2000. Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878. Stuttgart: Steiner, 59. Read More