Altering the Course of the American Revolution - Essay Example

The Battles of Trenton and Princeton Altered the Course of the American Revolution The victories at Trenton and Princeton exercised a very significant impact on the course of the American Revolution, less in the sense of the scope of their conquests, than in their broader significance as an exceptional strategic move on the part of the beleaguered commander-in-chief and a subsequent moral turning point in the face of an initial more and more daunting British advantage. Though the furtive victories at Trenton and then at Princeton did not inflict heavy military harm on the British troops, the campaign served psychologically to reinvigorate the spirit of the debilitated and, thanks to the poor oversight of an inept Continental Congress, nearly-destitute army of disillusioned soldiers in the wake of an initial series of major setbacks and stinging retreats. Conversely the battles of Trenton and Princeton might be said to mark a point in the war when the over-confidence and inscrutable miscalculations of conquering British troops and Hessian mercenaries left their better-equipped ranks susceptible to unexpected Patriot maneuvers and stunned alarm at the remarkable tenacity of the all-but-subjugated revolutionary upstarts. New York had recently fallen, and the Continental army had fled in full retreat across New Jersey, with the superior British forces at their heels (Ellis 96). Frightened citizens, fearful the colonial capital was doomed to fall to the British as well, were fleeing Philadelphia with their families and possessions (Rodney 13). Washington and his men had managed to traverse the Delaware river into Pennsylvania and to prevent the British from following by demolishing every sea-worthy vessel, save those required for the troops, for sixty miles along its banks (McCullough 263). Without the slightest hesitation or apology, two brigades, a full two thousand of Washington's men, had simply abandoned the fight, their enlistment up (McCullough 256). Inexplicably, rather than go after his clear advantage, the British General Howe opted for wintering down on the opposite side of the Delaware river, establishing outposts in a chain of forts stretching from New York through New Jersey, fully anticipating victory over the hapless insurrection by the following spring (Green and Pole 301). It was December of 1776, and a Hessian brigade led by Colonel Johan von Rall was stationed in Trenton, directly across the Delaware from the Patriot forces. The Hessians typically maintained outposts on round-the-clock watch, and had been alerted by a Loyalist to a possible attack (Ellis 98). The Hessians, who showed out-and-out contempt for the raw American militia, were German mercenaries hired by the British for combat in the colonies (Ingrao 975). In the course of the night of December 25 Washington and his men stealthily crossed the Delaware through hazardous chunks of river ice and pelting sleet and snow in high-walled barges from the Durham Iron Works that had improvised ice breakers in the curvature of their prows and spanned forty to sixty feet in length (McCullough 274). Not Washington alone, but all the men, as many as forty per vessel, stood upright, shoulder to shoulder for the passage. Ellis remarks that Emanuel Leutze' well-known painting of the Delaware crossing with the eminent general standing firm at the helm, though historically inaccurate, illustrates a fitting portrayal of the stature of Washington's resolve as leader at the forefront of the assault (Ellis 98). The detailed logistics of the judicious and dangerous crossing were expertly implemented by a regiment of seamen from Marblehead under Colonel John Glover, recruited astutely by Washington for their critical maritime skills (Magra 558). Early in the morning of December 26, disembarking from the ferries on the opposite bank of the Delaware, the ice-encrusted Patriot militia, dwindled by loss and departure to a paltry three thousand men, descended surreptitiously on Trenton (Greene and Pole 301). With their gun powder saturated in the crossing, the troops began the charge with only their wielded bayonets (Murray 39). General Henry Knox, lately appointed by Congress as Colonel in charge of the Continental Artillery, and well-read, if as yet unproven, in military science, had shortly transformed the Patriot artillery into one of the most proficient divisions of the Continental army (Green and Pole 742). Along with Washington's forces General Knox landed additional Durham vessels hauling eighteen field cannon and some fifty horses (McCullough 274). In his own words Washington conceived his detailed stratagem with the express intent: "to charge the enemy before they had time to form." (Rhodehamel 254) General Knox's well-aimed barrage of artillery overwhelmed the stunned Hessians in a swift and deadly fight as they charged into the white blur of driving snow in the gusting winter storm, which, by Knox's own account, blasted fiercely from the Patriots' back and "consequently in the faces of the enemy." (qtd. in McCullough 280). As the Hessians rolled out their own artillery, a half-dozen Patriots managed to seize the cannon and turn it back on the Hessian force. Mortally wounded, Colonel Johan von Rall, the Hessian commander, fell from his horse and contracted an official surrender with Washington shortly before succumbing to his fatal injuries (Murray 39). The Patriot forces took nine hundred ten Hessian soldiers, twenty-three officers, and eight hundred eighty-six men into captivity (Rhodehamel 255). A full half of Washington's strategic plan for Trenton went unrealized – in the sub-zero weather two other Patriot forces downstream, led by Patriot Generals Ewing and Cadwalader, were unable to navigate the frozen waters to their designated positions – so that the remainder of the Hessian regiments, five hundred or so, made their escape uncontested over Assunpink Creek toward Bordentown (Rhodehamel 255). General Cadwalader would succeed in crossing the Delaware with his men two days later, on December 27 (Rodney 24). Those of Cadwalader's brigades that stood their ground would prove to be of incalculable support to General Washington in the upcoming battle of Princeton (Rodney 36). By retiring from the punishing American winter to the relative amenities of the recently-seized city of New York, British General Howe had inadvertently left his widely-dispersed New Jersey garrisons vulnerable to unexpected attack in the brutal and unpredictable December weather (McCullough 267). In the heady atmosphere of victory General Howe absurdly squandered the historic chance to dispatch with the struggling remnant of the Continental army as it retreated in defeat across New Jersey. Washington, on the other hand, confronted with the appalling realization that the whole drive for American Independence was on the edge of obliteration and might even shortly expire on its own in the face of the rapidly diminishing morale and resolve of his exhausted men, had conceived "what is generally regarded as Washington's most tactically brilliant operation of the war," and determinedly executed "the moment when the Continental army went on the offensive for the first time" (Ellis 97). The unfortunate campaign of 1776 underscores the indecisiveness and incongruities that weighed down the British military endeavor all the way through the American Revolution. British generals of the era were not well-versed in tactical judgment (Greene and Pole 302). In a brief amount of time local American papers were rife with tales of the Delaware crossing, the piercing winter night march, the delirious victory, the huge number of prisoners, and the booty – six cannon, multiple swords, numerous horses, untold arms and a fair provision of Hessian rum. Word of mouth spread electrically. No one could have predicted the dramatic effect the reports would have in reviving the fledgling nation's waning morale (McCullough 283). On January 2, 1777, chaffing with the embarrassing defeat at Trenton, General Howe sent General Charles Cornwallis with an ominous militia of eight thousand British regulars to attack Washington's six thousand man army camped at Trenton (McCullough 98). The Patriot force found itself trapped, with its back against the Delaware river. Cornwallis, assured that he had them for certain, made the fatal miscalculation of waiting for daylight (Mitchell 82). Washington cautiously stole away in the darkness, leaving a token of troops behind to stoke the campfires, and then advanced undetected past Cornwallis toward Princeton, to confront his rear guard without warning (Murray 42). Initially a British regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mawhood unexpectedly clashed with Brigadier General Mercer and his Patriot force who was sent to the area earlier by Washington to seize the Stony Brook Bridge. In the confusion that ensued General Mercer was fatally wounded and another American brigade under General Cadwalader was routed as well (Mitchell 84). The men under both officers were scattered in disarray. However, upon his arrival at the scene of battle, Washington, mounted on a white charger, rode fearlessly into the thick of the fray and succeeded in rallying the disoriented soldiers, so that, once the rest of the entire company arrived, the British forces were thoroughly routed (McCullough 99). In his analysis of the stratagems of the campaign, Frederick the Great has been said to rank Washington's redeeming maneuvers in the face of devastating losses early on in the American Revolution as the most inspired in all of military history (Mitchell 86). The victories at Princeton and Trenton emboldened New Jersey locals. Small groups of citizen militia began scheming surprise attacks on the British garrisons and foraging parties. The persistent guerilla warfare of the populace eventually drove the British to withdraw to the less susceptible environs of British-occupied New York (Mitchell 87). The year 1776 was momentous for more than the Declaration of Independence. As the year wore out, its darkest hours were gloomier than any that the document's intrepid draftsmen could have anticipated. In the critical weeks before the battles of Trenton and Princeton, hope had all but vanished. Strategic thinking, fortuitous weather conditions, serendipitous circumstances, military miscalculations, and personal heroism all came together in the critical ten-day period over which the twin battles of Trenton and Princeton altered the destiny of the American nation. Annotated Bibliography Ellis, Joseph J. His Excellency: George Washington. New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 2004. The biography sketches a sound picture of Washington's resilient leadership in the context of the bitter struggle for independence. The work is limited in its references to the battles of Trenton and Princeton and debunks some of the information in other accounts. Fleming, Thomas. "Myth and Truth at Valley Forge." American History 40.5 (2005): 42-73. Academic Search Premier. 28 March 2006. http://search.epnet.com. The very recent article professes to use historical analysis to separate myth from truth in the history of the American Revolution and discredits many accounts in the works of 19th Century historians as romantic simplifications or misrepresentations. Greene, Jack P. and Pole, J. R. The Blackwell Encyclopedia of the American Revolution. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1991. The work is an encyclopedia of authoritative accounts of the events and people and the cultural context within which events took place with contributions of experts from both sides of the struggle. Ingrao, Charles. "Barbarous Strangers: Hessian State and Society during the American Revolution." American Historical Review 87.4 (1982): 954. Academic Search Premier. 27 March 2006. http://search.epnet.com. The article gives historical background into the Hessian mercenaries and credible motives with regard to their inclination to defect to the Continental army. Magra, Christopher P. ""Soldiers Bred to the Sea": Maritime Marblehead, Massachusetts, and the Origins and Progress of the American Revolution." New England Quarterly 77.4 (2004): 531-562. Academic Search Premier. 27 March 2006. http://search.epnet.com. The article gives important insight into how Washington engaged the nautical abilities of the Marblehead regiment to navigate the treacherous winter waters of the Delaware for the battle of Trenton. McCullough, David. 1776. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. Based on extensive research in American and British archives the narrative paints an energetic picture of the events in that pivotal year of 1776 from the perspective of a array of different contenders, especially from the standpoint of the commander-in-chief. Mitchell, Lt. Col. Joseph B. Decisive Battles of the American Revolution. New York: G P Putnam's Sons, 1962. The work offers an overview of each of the battles in their own context in the greater picture of the war with an analysis of the military tactics on both sides. Murray, Aaron R. Ed. American Revolution: Battles and Leaders. New York: DK Publishing, Inc., 2004. The work provides succinct overviews of important elements of the battles, key players in the immediate confrontations, and each battle's effect on the whole campaign. Rhodehamel, John. Ed. The American Revolution: Writings from the War of Independence. New York : Library of America, 2001. This is a wonderful resource of firsthand accounts from a multiplicity of perspectives taken from letters, diaries, newspaper articles, pubic documents of major events of the conflict and the prominent antagonists engaged in combat. Rodney, Caesar A. "Diary of Captain Thomas Rodney 1776-1777". Papers of the Historical Society of Delaware. VIII. New York: Da Capo Press, 1974. Acting from patriotism Captain Thomas Rodney from New Castle County, Delaware, gathered a militia of several officers and thirty-five men to join General Washington's brigade in response to the appeal of Congress. His journal is a living day by day account of his personal experience as an officer in the battles of Trenton and Princeton. Read More