Shaping Views on the Czechoslovakia Crisis - Essay Example

DISCUSSION OF THE POTENTIAL OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF PRIMARY SOURCES FOR SHAPING OUR VIEWS ON THE CZECHOSLOVAKIA CRISIS INTRODUCTION Signing the treatyof Versailles officially marked the end of World War I. No one present at that time was aware that it also signaled the opening act of a conflict that would erupt twenty years later with even more terrible consequences. The Paris peace conference began on January 18, 1919 with 21 nation's attendance (1). The representatives of Germany and other defeated central powers were not allowed to sit at the conference table. The "Big Four"- President Wilson of the United States, Prime Minister Lloyd George of Great Britain, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau of France and Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando of Italy - dominated the conference and made the important decisions. Wilson pushed for inclusion of his fourteen Points especially the League of Nations. Many of his proposals however, clashed with the secret treaties and territorial rearrangements already made by the other three European powers. They found it difficult to hide their contempt for what they saw as Wilson's naivet and superior attitude. The political wrangling became intense. Finally, agreement was reached and a treaty presented to the German representatives on May 7, 1919. The terms were harsh. Germany was stripped to approximately 13% of its pre-war territory and all of its over-seas possession. The Ruhr-Germany's industrial heartland - was to be occupied by allied troops. The size of Germany's military forces was drastically reduced. The treaty further stipulated that Germany would pay for the devastation for the devastation of the war through annual reparation payments to its European neighbors. The victors ignored the bitter complaints of the German delegation. On June 28, two rather German representatives signed the treaty. Ever since the treaty was signed it brought bitterness to Germans but they had no other choice other than facing it. The latter years were spent to pay the debts. Ever since Hitler came to power in 1933 he had made successive assaults on the restrictions that had been placed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. He had begun secretly the process of rearmament and felt confident enough to announce the program in 1935, the same year in which he introduced conscription to the new German army. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS THAT LEAD TO THE CRISIS Since the public announcement of German rearmament in 1935, in defiance of the treaty of Versailles, there had been apprehension among the European states, large and small, as to Germany's intentions. That they would not be pacific was made clear in the following year with the remilitarization of the Rhineland zone that had been permanently demilitarized by the same treaty (2). Thus, it was felt that it would only be a question of time as to when Hitler would proceed to realize the pan-German dream of German-Austrian unity (i.e., Anschluss): after all, Hitler himself had been born in Austria. Inasmuch as the earlier aggressive moves had produced no serious retaliation from either Britain or France, it was not to be expected that the absorption of Austria under threat of invasion on March 12 (soon to be endorsed by referendum of the Austrian people) would be met by other than words of protest from the Western powers. The gravest implications of Hitler's action, however, now pointed to Czechoslovakia (3), France's vulnerable ally now that hope of French assistance had been dealt a death blow by the earlier remilitarization of the Rhineland zone along the Franco-German border. RHINELAND CRISIS On March 7, 1936, in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles, troops of the German army entered the demilitarized buffer zone along the River Rhine. Earlier, in 1925, the then German government, in order to facilitate its entry to the League of Nations and regain its status of a great power, had signed an Agreement (the Locarno Pact) with France that provided, under an Italo-British guarantee, for mutual acceptance of their existing border, including the continued demilitarization of the German Rhineland territory, the buffer zone along the French border. With the assumption to dictatorial power of Adolf Hitler in 1933, these earlier arrangements began to dissolve. Germany's unilateral rearmament along with the introduction of the draft in 1933 signaled a new and disruptive direction for German policy with which its former enemies--the democracies of France and Britain--were ill-fitted to cope. On March 7, 1936 a small contingent of German troops, increased considerably in number in the following days, marched into the Rhineland demilitarized zone bordering France. Hitler's excuse was the ratification one month earlier of a mutual assistance pact between France and Russia that he chose to regard as directed against Germany(5). Though the demilitarized zone was German territory, the Treaty of Versailles (Arts. 42, 43) had decreed that no troops or fortifications were ever to be placed there--as a permanent guarantee of French security. Though a blatant defiance of the treaty, it should be noted that the force of the Treaty had been considerably weakened since Hitler's advent to power in 1933. In 1935 the Treaty had been successfully defied by the German announcement of rearmament and the introduction of a military draft: the Treaty's guarantors--Britain and France--merely condemned the unilateral German actions. Worse still, Britain separately concluded a naval pact with Hitler that same year allowing Germany to build a battle-fleet that included submarines--a British validation of Treaty violations! The militarization of the Rhineland was a direct blow to French security inasmuch as it rendered worthless the promises of military aid by France to her eastern European allies Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania if any of them were attacked by Germany. Despite the brave talk, France was not disposed to take action without the assistance of Britain, at least. Besides, the military chiefs advised against military action and public opinion showed no enthusiasm for war. Nonetheless the timorous British attitude--favoring negotiation at all cost--was a sore disappointment to the French whose military strength at this stage greatly exceeded German strength: at the height of the 'crisis', only some 20,000 German troops had occupied the zone. Thus, the "last chance" to stop Hitler's gallop passed off with no more than denunciations and recriminations, despite the judgment of the League of Nations that Hitler had again violated the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler's gambling on the defensive posture of France paid off. THE PATH OF AGGRESSION In the early stages of power as Fuhrer of Germany, Hitler made several changes in administration and brought sleepless nights to leaders of the "Big Four" nations. THE INVASION AND ANNEXATION OF AUSTRIA Within three years of the rise to power of the Nazi Party in Germany and his appointment as Chancellor, Adolf Hitler had begun to rearm Germany and had marched his troops back into the demilitarized Rhineland. These actions were in breach of the Treaty of Versailles, but produced no retaliation from Great Britain and France, and the Nazi leader felt that he could safely embark on military aggression against tiny Austria. After first destabilizing its government, Hitler invaded Austria in 1938. Many Austrians welcomed the Nazis and were content to see their country incorporated into Germany. The British Government, led by the servile Neville Chamberlain, merely registered a diplomatic protest which was contemptuously rejected by Germany. THE BETRAYAL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AT MUNICH When Britain and France failed to take a firm stand on his aggression against Austria, the Nazi leader turned his attention to Czechoslovakia and demanded that the Czech government hand over to Germany the Sudeten districts which bordered Germany and had a population of about three million ethnic Germans. The Czechs refused, and called on France to honor her pledge to defend Czechoslovakia from aggression. The Czech request was reasonable because Great Britain, France and Czechoslovakia could easily have combined to defeat Germany at this time. France had an army of one hundred divisions, and Czechoslovakia had thirty-five well-equipped divisions which were deployed behind strong mountain fortifications. However, the political leaders of France and Britain, Edouard Daladier and Neville Chamberlain, were both weak leaders who were desperate to avoid a military confrontation with Germany, even if it meant failing to honor their treaty obligations and sacrificing the people of Czechoslovakia to the Nazi dictator. POLICY STATEMENTS BY NATIONS It was a foregone conclusion in the minds of the governments of France and Britain that once the German union with Austria had been effected, Hitler would have as his next goal the resolution of the problem of the German ethnic minority in Czechoslovakia, whose northern border was now with an enlarged Germany. The ethnic Germans --some 3 million--resided along that border in a region known as the Sudetenland. Just as Hitler had used the Franco-Soviet pact as his excuse to remilitarize the Rhineland, so also he alleged anti-German designs in the accession of Czechoslovakia to that pact. He could get his way by demanding autonomy for the Sudetenland within the Czech state but, given Hitler's Pan-German dream, it was more likely he would resort to aggressive action, via the annexation of the Sudetenland, should diplomacy fail. Therefore, the question of how to prepare for this eventuality in a manner that would avoid war troubled both Britain and France, most particularly the latter country which had a treaty with Czechoslovakia promising military assistance in the event of outside aggression. APPEASEMENT AND PUBLIC OPINIONS The word in its normal meaning connotes the Pacific settlement of disputes; in the meaning usually applied to the period of Chamberlain's premiership, it has come to indicate something sinister, the granting from fear or cowardice of unwarranted concessions in order to buy temporary peace at someone else's expense. Appeasement in the popular mind is often linked with Chamberlain and World War Two (6). This is a multifaceted debate over whether the pursuing of the appeasement policy did bring about the outbreak of war in 1939. Appeasement had popular public support in Great Britain during the 1930s, and reached its height with the Munich Crisis of 1938. In British public opinion, war had to be avoided, but orthodox historians have tended to overlook this, stressing that both appeasement and the Treaty of Versailles failed to keep the peace. Instead, the generation of the 1920s and 30s were blasted as being 'disillusioned'. Chamberlain was vilified as being unrealistic to follow the policy of appeasement when it had little chance of success in any case. In the latter years the chamberlain appeasement policy was called a deliberate surrender of small nations in the face of Hitler's blatant bullying. At a meeting with Hitler at Munich on 30 September 1938, and despite the strong protest of the Czech government which was not permitted to be heard, the British and French leaders dishonored their countries again. They agreed to allow the Nazi leader to seize the Sudeten districts of Czechoslovakia in return for an assurance from him that he had no further territorial claims in Europe. For their part, the British and French leaders undertook to protect the territorial integrity of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. With no sense of shame for his betrayal of the Czechs, the spineless British leader Neville Chamberlain returned to London and proclaimed that he had achieved "peace with honor". The Munich Agreement deprived Czechoslovakia of its strong mountain fortifications in the Sudeten districts which were incorporated into Germany. The loss of its mountain fortifications left the unfortunate country unable to defend itself against Nazi military aggression. Hitler then secretly threatened the government of the semi-autonomous state of Slovakia with a brutal military invasion if it did not declare its independence from Czechoslovakia immediately and seek the protection of Germany. The intimidated Slovaks agreed. Hitler then made a similar threat to the government of what remained of Czechoslovakia. Faced with this threat, the Czech government submitted. In documents drafted by the Nazis, the Czech and Slovak governments both announced their desire to become part of Germany. On 15 March 1939, the German army occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia which was then incorporated into Germany. Even after the Germans had occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia, Neville Chamberlain's initial response was to blame the Czechs for their misfortune. In the House of Commons, on 15 March 1939, he cynically excused Britain's neglect to honor its undertaking at Munich to protect what remained of Czechoslovakia on the ground that the declaration of independence by Slovakia nullified the Munich Agreement. To Chamberlain's surprise, the British public and media reacted with outrage to his repudiation of Britain's obligation to Czechoslovakia. Even more ominously, members of his own cabinet and party were turning against him on his policy of appeasing Hitler. Chamberlain realized that his position as Prime Minister was in jeopardy, and on 17 March 1939, he denounced publicly the complete occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany. He warned Hitler that Britain would not necessarily stand idly by if Germany undertook further aggression. It was only after this speech, that formal protests were lodged by the British and French governments with Germany. The Germans dismissed the protests contemptuously. Despite a warning from the German ambassador in London that the British warning should be taken seriously, Hitler now viewed the British and French with contempt, and felt free to pursue further aggression in Europe. CHAMBERLAIN "THE GENERAL POLICY OF APPEASEMENT" The first crisis of Chamberlain's tenure was over the annexation of Austria. The Nazi Government of Hitler had already been behind the assassination of one Chancellor of Austria, Engelbert Dollfuss, and was pressuring another to surrender. Informed of Germany's objectives, Chamberlain's government decided it was unable to stop events, and acquiesced to what later became known as the Anschluss. The second crisis came over the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia, which was home to a large German minority. The Munich Agreement, engineered by the French and British governments, effectively allowed Adolf Hitler to annex the country's defensive frontier, leaving its industrial and economic core within a day's reach of the Wehrmacht. In reference to the Sudetenland and trenches being dug in a London central park, Chamberlain infamously declared in a radio broadcast on 27 September 1938: "How horrible, fantastic it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing. I am myself a man of peace from the depths of my soul". Chamberlain flew to Munich to negotiate the agreement, and received an ecstatic reception upon his return to Britain on 30 September 1938. At Heston Aerodrome, west of London, he made the now famous "Peace for our time" speech and waved the agreement to a delighted crowd. When Hitler invaded and seized the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Chamberlain felt betrayed by the breaking of the Munich Agreement and decided to take a much harder line against the Nazis, declaring war against Germany upon their invasion of Poland which unlocked world war two. SUMMARY OF PUBLIC OPINIONS OVER NAZI THREAT In April 1938, Hitler finalised plans to smash Czechoslovakia but Chamberlain determined to avoid war at all costs and for the people immediate post-Munich reaction was one of relief that war had been avoided. Consequently Henlein, Sudeten Nazi leader increases demands for autonomy for Sudeten Germans and British felt this was more important than defending a democratic country and Chamberlain hailed as returning hero. Chamberlain intervened personally by meeting Hitler at Berchtesgaden, Bad Godesberg and finally Munich on 29/30 Sept. Government reaction was 'Either accept Munich or face Hitler alone'. Moreover Hitler had signed agreement never to go to war with Britain again. At last Britain, France, Germany and Italy agreed to Czechoslovakia giving up the Sudetenland to Germany. German troops entered Sudetenland on 1 Oct. Munich brought 'peace for our time', according to Chamberlain. Czechoslovakia had been abandoned and Hitler had got what he wanted. At last Chamberlain admitted as 'We have suffered a total and unmitigated defeat'. CONCLUSION From the different perspective views got on Chamberlain policy at that time, the conflicts between appeasement and armament were certainly obvious. Chamberlain's appeasement policy, though, brought humiliations to the world in the latter part. The real thing we should make out is that he was cornered to do so. Public opinion towards the Nazi threat was so high. No one in the world was unable to diagnose the plans of Hitler. The war at that time was inevitable and none can justify the outcome of the war. Every nation bears its own responsibilities for outcome of the war. The Czechoslovakian crisis thus resulted in major outbreak of war environment in the world at that time. Works Cited 1) Documents on German Foreign Policy, (London, 1950), Series D, vol. II, nos. 675-6, pp. 1014-17 2) R.E. Murphy., National Socialism (U.S.Gov. Ptg. Office, 1943), pp. 232- 43. 3) E.L. Woodward., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (H.M.S.O.), 2nd series, XII 4) W.N. Medlicott., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919- 1939, XVI (H.M.S.O.), pp.84-9, 110. 5) E.L. Woodward, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-39, 3rd ser. I (H.M.S.O.) pp. 83-6 6) POLICY OF APPEASEMENT, Chamberlain , Spartacus.com 7) Consequence of Munich Agreement, Lloyd J.K,1952 , Manchester University Press Read More