Battle of Shiloh as the Major Battle of the Civil War - Research Paper Example

30 September Battle of Shiloh In two days, from April 6 to April 7, 1862, the Battle of Shiloh became the first bloodiestbattle of the American Civil War, claiming around 23,746 lives, wherein 13,047 were Union soldiers. When the battle occurred, the Union forces were taken by surprise, even when earlier reports of Confederate sightings reached both Brigadier General William Tecumseh Sherman and Major General Ulysses S. Grant (Groom 46). Both generals were criticized for not heeding these warnings well, thereby resulting to greater casualties on their side (Groom 46). This paper describes the important figures, critical events, and effects of the Battle of Shiloh on the Civil War. The significant figures of the battle are the generals from the Union and the Confederacy, while the critical events were Sherman’s earlier dismissals of reports of Confederate sightings, the initial fighting, Johnston’s death, and the successful counterattacks that Grant ordered and Buell reinforced. The effects of the Battle of Shiloh on the Civil War are the recognition of the true intensity, duration, and consequences of the Civil War and the importance of experienced soldiers and officers in winning the war. The Major Players of the Battle of Shiloh The decisive figures of the Battle of Shiloh were Major General Ulysses S. Grant and Major General Don Carlos Buell for the Union, and General Albert Sidney Johnston and General P.G.T. Beauregard for the Confederate, although General Sherman affected the unpreparedness of the Union too. Chuck Veit underlines that the first battle of Shiloh occurred five weeks before the April attack, one which already foreshadowed poor planning and intelligence assessment on the part of higher military officers of the Union. Winston Groom specifically blames General Sherman for his “folly” because he disregarded mounting reports regarding advancing Confederate lines (46). Groom narrates that, two days before the attack, Major Elbridge G. Ricker already reported to General Sherman that they encountered a Confederate group with artillery only two miles from the latter’s headquarters (46). Instead of verifying the veracity of this report, General Sherman easily dismissed Ricker and said: “Oh, tut-tut. You militia officers get scared too easy” (Groom 46). He also reproached Ricker for inciting a battle when the Union troops were not yet fully prepared (Groom 46). Groom lamented that instead of physically reinforcing the vulnerable Pittsburgh landing, where the Union soldiers were, Sherman focused on drilling exercises (46). General Grant, moreover, greatly relied on General Sherman’s assessment of intelligence information and determination of enemy threat. Grant sent a telegram to Major General Henry Wager Halleck, a higher-ups officer in St. Louis, that the enemy stayed in Corinth and would not likely attack them, though they were prepared in case they did (Groom 47). Unknown to the Union generals, Confederate General Johnston wanted to take initiative after the defeat at Forts Henry and Donelson. Blair Howard describes Johnston’s awareness of the vulnerability of their Corinth position and that he knew that Grant was still waiting for Don Carlos Buell’s army as reinforcement (45). Johnston planned what seemed to be inconceivable to General Grant and General Sherman, doing an offensive on the Union’s own front yard (Howard 45). Johnston wanted to attack Grant’s forces on April 4, but bad weather delayed him (Howard 45). By the eve of the April 6 attack, Johnston’s army of 44,000 already moved around two miles south of Shiloh Church, the outermost border of the Union army, with the element of surprise on their side (Howard 45). The Turning Points in the Battle of Shiloh The opening attack happened at Fraley Field, as the sixth of April of 1862 began. Union officers in the high command constantly rebuffed reports of advancing Confederate soldiers, but Captain Gilbert D. Johnson, a company commander in the 12th Michigan, was already suspicious of reported activities in the woods. Johnson and Major James E. Powell went to Brigadier General Benjamin M. Prentiss’s 1st Brigade commander, Colonel Everett Peabody. Like other upper officers, Peabody did not want to upset his superiors, but hearing reports from Johnson and Powell themselves, he ordered Powell to check the reports with five companies (around 400 men) (Groom 46). Major Powell proceeded with his troops to the Fraley Field without knowing he would bump into the Confederate’s S.A.M. Wood’s brigade, led by William J. Hardee, who had written the West Point textbook Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics (Daniel 144). At around 5 AM, Hardee’s Mississippians fired at the unsuspecting approaching Yankees (the Union soldiers). Powell ordered his men to create a skirmish line and to press forward. He had not yet discovered that he was walking right into a 10,000-man line of the Confederate general (Groom 46). During the lull, Powell saw a cavalry on his left flank, and he ordered his bugler to sound their retreat (Daniel 144). Colonel Peabody already heard the faint shots from the headquarters, and when Powell’s dispatch arrived, the messenger that they estimated that the enemy forces were around 3,000 (Daniel 145). General Prentiss rode into the camp, and when he found out that Peabody ordered a reconnaissance, he became angry and accused the latter of launching a battle without his superiors’ approval (Groom 49). Peabody asserted that he was right to call the reconnaissance. Prentiss instructed Colonel Moore to provide reinforcement to Powell. Moore had hardly gone forward into the field when the skirmish rapidly “doubled in intensity” (Groom 49). Men looked alarmingly at one another, and Peabody, realizing the possibility that the skirmish was more than it seemed to be, instructed his drummer to beat the long battle roll call (Groom 49). Up to his point, Prentiss continued to berate Peabody for bringing on the fight to the Union line (Groom 50). At the Fraley Field, with the day entirely lighting the enemies, Powell and his troops finally saw what lay directly ahead of them- a 10,000-strong Confederate army, with uniformed officers on horses, shining artillery, and sergeants ordering movements (Groom 50). During this time, Colonel Moore and his relief arrived already, and they went straight into Powell’s retreating people (Groom 50). Private Ruff of Powell’s troops said that Moore called them cowards, but they cautioned him that he should not be too bold, but Moore went ahead (Groom 50). Moore found the enemy lines and understood the battle ahead. He decided to buy time for the Union to prepare for Johnston’s army. Moore and the remaining troops from Powell’s unit tried to delay the Confederates, until Powell died and Moore lost his leg to the fight that killed almost all of the Union soldiers with him (Groom 51). Groom underlined that Moore’s and Powell’s sacrifice was not wasted because they were able to prevent the Confederates from attacking the unprepared division that Prentiss led (51). Moore’s messenger already reached and warned Sherman of the advancing Confederate troops. An hour before, Sherman dismissed a similar warning from Colonel Appler, however, this time, the former heeded the warning (Groom 51). After 7 AM, Sherman and his staff went to Colonel Appler’s regiment. Around this time, one of Powell’s bloodied messengers already warned Appler that the Rebels were coming and they had to form their battle line (Groom 51). Appler’s men were forming their line, when on Sherman’s right, Rebels killed Sherman’s orderly, very nearly missing Sherman himself (Groom 51). Only then that Sherman realized that they were being attacked. Sherman rode to Appler’s line and told them that he and his men would support them (Groom 51). By afternoon, several Federal troops created a battle line at the sunken road called the “Hornets Nest” (Woodworth 5). The Confederates continued to attack the Union with their artillery until they surrounded the latter. The Union responded with a creation of their defensive line at Pittsburg Landing, which Buell’s men fortified thereafter (Woodworth 18). The battle lasted until evening, but the Union stayed their ground. The Confederates drove the Union back, but they suffered a major setback when Johnston was mortally wounded earlier that day and the command went to the less-experienced Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard (Howard 66; Woodworth 24). Beauregard was not aware of the coming of Buell’s reinforcement, and his men was overwhelmed when the Union reached 40,000 men, while the former only had less than 30,000 people (Woodworth 18). On April 7, around 6 AM, William Nelson attacked the Confederates, and Beauregard instructed a counterattack. Beauregard was successful at first, but the Unions held their position and continued to push the Confederates back. Beauregard started a second counterattack that stopped the Union from reaching his offensive line, but it ended to a stalemate. He discovered that the Union forces outnumbered him, and because many of his troops were already wounded or dead, he ordered a retreat to Corinth. The outcome of the Battle of Shiloh was positive for the Union; however, it had repercussions for both parties, where around 23,746 men in total died, and 13,047 were Union soldiers. Tactically, the Union won, but many of their men died more than the Confederates. The effects of the battle were clear, especially to those who participated in it. General Sherman and President Abraham Lincoln learned that the Civil War would see many more bloody battles and that it would take longer than they expected (Woodworth 53). Because of tens and thousands killed in the Battle of Shiloh, both the Union and the Confederacy knew the high stakes of the protracted war and that most likely, Britain would no longer intervene. Furthermore, the South was demoralized by this loss. Many of the Confederate soldiers went home already because of what they witnessed during the first bloodiest battle of the Civil War (Woodworth 6). In addition, the range of deaths in the Battle of Shiloh severely damaged the reputation of Grant and Sherman, but they were able to revive their tarnished images because Lincoln wanted experienced officers and soldiers to continue the war and to win it (Woodworth 6). Thus, the Battle of Shiloh was a preview to the bloodiness of succeeding battles and the sacrifices the whole nation paid in order to be united. Works Cited Daniel, Larry J. Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. Print. Groom, Winston. “Sherman's Folly at Shiloh.” MHQ: Quarterly Journal of Military History 24.3 (2012): 44-53. Print. Howard, Blair. “Chapter 4: Shiloh.” Battlefields of the Civil War: A Guide for Travellers, Vol. 1, 2nd ed.: 41-68. MasterFILE Premier. Web. 21 Sept. 2013. Veit, Chuck. “The First Battle of Shiloh.” Naval History 18.5 (2004): 42-45. Print. Woodworth, Steven E. “The Shiloh Campaign.” Civil War Campaigns in the Heartland. Carbondale: Southern Illinois U P, 2009. eBook. Read More